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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the Palestinian refugees‟ experience in Lebanon since 1948, 
to critically engage with Agamben‟s theory of exception. Agamben conceives of the 
„camp‟ as the space where the normal juridical order and the inhabitants‟ rights are 
suspended, the hidden matrix of the modern where the sovereign confronts nothing but 
bare life. Refugees are framed as the ultimate embodiment of bare life, a life stripped of 
rights and protection and at the mercy of state authorities. This research critiques this 
understanding in three ways. 
Firstly, by disenfranchising the concept of sovereign power from statehood, I adopt 
a multiscalar approach to uncover the complex network of sovereigns and decisions 
impacting upon the Palestinian life. From the international level (UN and humanitarian 
organisations) to the regional level (Arab states and Lebanon), I discuss the roles and 
responsibility of multiple actors in the production of Palestinian bare life showing the 
global scope of sovereign power. Secondly, by disengaging the concept of power from 
political institutions, I include the Palestinian refugees‟ agency in the chessboard of power 
relations. Focusing on lived experiences and critically engaging with state-centric and law-
centric perspectives, the thesis uncovers the micropolitics on the ground constituted by 
multiple forms of resistance that refugees adopt in their ongoing struggles for survival and 
recognition. The recognition of this agency and political significance of refugees‟ lives is 
paramount if a just solution to the Palestinian refugee question is to be found. Finally, this 
study interrogates and problematises the uncritical assimilation of refugee camps to spaces 
of exception. By looking at the evolution of Shatila refugee camp and its relation to the 
city of Beirut, I discuss the formation of a new spatial model that I call „campscape‟. As 
social and spatial boundaries increasingly blur, the „campscape‟, which includes the 
refugee camp and informal settlements around, is the space in which the refugee meets the 
other outcasts of the Lebanese political and economic system. 
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Introduction 
As a result of the spiral of violence and war that took place in Palestine between 
November 1947 – following the issue of the United Nations partition plan through General 
Assembly Resolution 181(II) – and November 1948, more than 750,000 Palestinians fled 
or were expelled from their homes and villages.
1
 The inability to peacefully resolve the 
first Arab-Israeli conflict and find a suitable solution for the thousands of displaced had, 
and still has, major consequences for the refugees of the Nakba and their descendants. An 
Arabic word that literally means „catastrophe‟, Nakba refers to the Palestinian 
„catastrophe‟ of 1948 in which thousands of Palestinians lost their homes and have been 
displaced and scattered mostly beyond Israel‟s boundaries with no chance of returning to 
their villages. It implies not only the loss of their land and nationality, but also meant 
separation from families and their beloved. 
For a long time Palestinians have been waiting for the implementation of the right 
of return sanctioned by General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948, as well 
as for their rights as citizens to be reconstituted as nationals of a Palestinian state.
2
 
Awaiting the solution to their predicament, the Palestinian refugees have certainly been 
pawns of certain states‟ interests – of the Middle East region as well as beyond it – 
unresolved Arab-Israeli conflicts and tensions, and inconclusive diplomacy for which the 
international community
3
 should and must be accounted for too. 
Denied the right of return to their homes and villages because of Israel‟s refusal to 
accept the refugees back on the ground that the Jewish state had no responsibility for their 
„voluntary migration‟, the Palestinians found themselves guests of different Arab states 
that alternated a welcoming and benevolent hospitality with harsh and confrontational 
relations (Takkenberg, 1998). The bareness of their life, as Agamben (1995a, 1998) would 
                                               
1 For the full text of the Resolution, see the United Nations website at 
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (last accessed August 2011). 
2 Ibid. 
3 The use of this expression may be an epistemological trap as it leads to generalisations. As 
Campbell (1998a: 221) affirms, „to speak in terms of “the international community” is to overlook the 
significant differences between “its” members and constitute[s] an agent of dubious unity‟. Whilst referring 
to the case of Bosnia and the ways in which external actors addressed the conflict in Bosnia politically, 
mediatically and strategically, the use of the expression „international community‟ was still appropriate as 
„given the dominance of a shared political anthropology concerning Bosnia, the commonalities of the 
imagined community of international society are more important than the tactical differences‟. The same 
applies to Palestine: given the commonalities in different states‟ decisions and opinions as regards the 
question of Palestine, these supersede „tactical differences‟. 
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argue, was soon manifested by their being de facto and de jure stateless, and at the mercy 
of their hosts‟ moods and the availability of humanitarian aid. Indeed, the main hosting 
countries – Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria – never felt responsible for the Palestinians‟ 
displacement. As a consequence, relief and assistance was left in the sole hands of 
humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross first and UNRWA (United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) later. Focusing on the 
refugees‟ survival, however, these agencies are not able to grant them a qualified and 
political life or any legal protection.  
While the treatment reserved for the Palestinians in each country has been different 
and varied according to historical moments and states‟ interests, among the main Arab 
countries that have since 1948 hosted the refugees, Lebanon is the one in which they found 
the harshest situation. Mainly, but not exclusively, due to the peculiar confessional 
character of Lebanese politics and society that among the countries of the Middle East 
registers the highest number of Christians, the presence of a mostly Muslim refugee 
community constituting about ten percent of the total population has always been 
perceived as a potential and major destabilising force (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997). For 
these reasons, and with the aim of maintaining the fragile political status quo of the 
country, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have endured harsh repression. The unwillingness 
of the Lebanese government to naturalise them soon materialised in the refugees‟ spatial 
segregation through the establishment of refugee camps and the issue of discriminatory 
laws, decrees and orders that exclude the refugees from rights guaranteed to Lebanese 
citizens. The rejection of tawtin (settlement and naturalisation of the Palestinian refugees) 
has always been used to justify and „legalise‟ such discriminatory practices. 
Given the all encompassing marginalisation that the Palestinian refugees face in 
Lebanon, the aim of this research is to uncover their predicament while stressing the 
urgency for a solution to their condition. Almost on a daily basis through the media we, in 
the West, witness the violence of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank or multiple sieges 
of and blockages on the Gaza Strip. Less often we know and hear about stories, 
experiences and how the Palestinian everyday life is lived beyond the West Bank, Gaza 
and Israel. Palestinians who no longer can touch the Palestinian lost and occupied lands are 
too often overlooked and forgotten, even media reports with their emphasis on the 
Occupied Territories seem to „over-reflect‟ the pace and direction of the failed Peace 
Process. Officially commenced about twenty years ago with the Madrid Peace Conference 
in 1991, negotiations held by Israeli and Palestinian delegations have often been stalled 
Introduction 
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and, when resumed, have always proved unsuccessful and inconclusive. Never properly 
addressed, the refugee issue has since then been postponed leaving refugees outside Israel 
and the Occupied Territories to face alone their everyday struggles and deprivation. 
Moreover, the recent Palestinian bid for statehood would further cast a shadow on the 
future of the diasporic Palestinians who still hope for the right of return to be implemented. 
If the Palestinian Authority were guaranteed full membership in the UN as a sovereign 
state, the Palestine Liberation Organisation‟s (hereafter PLO) observer status would 
disappear and with it the formal representation in the international fora of all the 
Palestinians no matter where they live. Despite promises that the 1948 refugees and their 
descendants would not be forgotten, diasporic Palestinians fear oblivion. Their removal 
from the negotiations table might represent the highest price that the Palestinian delegation 
would be ready to pay in the „land for peace‟ deal.4 
It is beyond the scope of this study to engage in a discussion and analysis of the 
Peace Process itself. Yet, it is pressing and paramount to uncover the everyday life of 
diasporic Palestinian refugees in order to not forget of their existence and their political 
significance. In offering a contribution to the disciplines of Geography and Refugee 
Studies, this research aims at revealing the net of complex (local and global) power 
relations in which Palestinian refugees, especially those living in Lebanon, are caught. 
Theoretical premises and questions: Agamben and beyond 
At the beginning of this research, my understanding of the Palestinian life and 
refugee camps in Lebanon drew heavily on Agamben‟s (1995a, 1998, 2001, 2005a) 
reflections on the „exception‟, the „camp‟, „sovereign power‟ and „bare life‟. This was also 
reinforced by a literature that, while focusing on displacement and understanding power in 
terms of law and rights, constantly referred to refugees and asylum seekers as „bare life‟ 
while refugee camps and detention centres were seen as „spaces of exception‟ where 
inmates‟ and inhabitants‟ lives are at the mercy of state authorities and their arbitrary 
decisions. Although Agamben is not explicit in identifying sovereign power with the state, 
his focus on law and on a sovereign that produces law does not leave much scope for other 
kinds of interpretations. 
                                               
4 On 15th September 2011, in an interview with The Daily Star (Lebanese newspaper), the 
Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, Abdullah Abdullah, affirmed that Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon 
would not be granted citizenship automatically in the eventuality the Palestinian bid for statehood proved 
successful. See in the newspapers and online articles section of bibliography Slemrod, 2011. 
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Agamben‟s work has been widely referenced when investigating the condition of 
refugees, immigrants or asylum seekers. Yet, his reflections have also prompted critiques. 
If in 2006 Ek (2006: 370) suggested that Agamben‟s insights may have found applicability 
in the social sciences and humanities in relation to situations experienced by refugees as 
well as asylum seekers, he also reminded us that the applicability of Agamben‟s notion of 
exception and bare life is not universal. Agamben‟s legal approach that pivots around the 
triangle composed of law, politics and life tends to identify the sovereign with the state, in 
this way, missing other kinds of power relations. But is the state the sole and undisputed 
sovereign that affects refugees‟ lives? In the context of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, is Lebanon solely responsible for the production of the Palestinian bare life? Was 
it Lebanon that originally stripped the Palestinians of their rights? Is Lebanon the one 
preventing the solution of the refugee issue and the peace process in the Middle East 
today? 
This research is situated within a literature that, while engaging with Agamben‟s 
theories, investigates the refugee condition and spaces. While building a critique of 
Agamben (and scholars that so heavily relied on the notions of sovereign power and bare 
life in uncritical state-centric ways), this study moves on two different levels. On the one 
hand, as this use and understanding of Agamben‟s work overlooks the significance and the 
reach of sovereign power that moves at different scales, this research explores the 
multiplicity of sovereigns and decisions affecting Palestinian life. On the other hand, I 
contend that state-centric approaches and investigations exclusively based on law and 
rights prevent us from recognising lived experiences. In other words, a state-centric and 
law-centric approach would under-play the macropolitics operating on the global scale as 
well as the micropolitics on the ground constituted by multiple and micro forms of 
resistance displayed by refugees in their ongoing struggles. 
Certainly, the ways in which Palestinian refugees have been treated in Lebanon 
since their arrival may at first glance justify the use of a literature that identifies power 
with the state‟s policies and practices, and bare life with the refugee. In Lebanon, 
Palestinians have been facing the harshest social, economic and spatial marginalisation 
when compared to other countries hosting the Palestinians (Syria and Jordan). They have 
been prevented from working, using public services, and have been spatially marginalised 
by means of the refugee camp. Whereas one of the main reasons for the refugees‟ 
predicament in Lebanon is certainly rooted in the peculiarity of Lebanese society and 
political system based on a power-sharing formula among the different religious 
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communities, it is also true that an important role in the production of the Palestinian bare 
life has been played by actors other than Lebanon, and events or decisions occurring 
beyond its boundaries at the regional and international levels. These deeply influenced the 
Lebanese attitude and policies towards the refugees. Sovereignty, in fact, is external and 
internal. It operates on the global level where other actors (other states as well as suprastate 
organisations) are also masters of decisions (Connolly, 2005, 2007; Hardt and Negri, 
2000). But it also works inwards as state‟s authority is performed over its citizens and 
residents while control over the state‟s territory is formally unchallenged.  
In order to question the assumption that sovereign power is embodied by the state 
and that it must be identified with the official realm of politics, this research broadens the 
scope of enquiry to include multiple actors (and indeed multiple sovereigns) that through 
their agency operate within the landscape of power relations. Firstly, by adopting a 
multiscalar approach (that includes the international, regional, national level, but also the 
level of the individual), this study uncovers the ways in which sovereign power operates 
and the ways in which different actors might affect the Palestinians‟ lives in Lebanon. 
Although this work does not intend by any means to justify the Palestinians‟ discrimination 
in Lebanon, in the denunciation of the ongoing oppression, it seeks to contextualise the 
perpetrated physical and political violence that the Palestinian people have been enduring 
in the country since 1948. Where are decisions rendering the Palestinian life bare life 
taken? Who is responsible for their marginalisation? 
The second contribution of this research is the inclusion of the refugees‟ agency within 
the landscape of power relations. Although Agamben‟s theories may be useful to 
investigate the juridical status of refugees and their spaces of references, they fail to 
explain and take into consideration everyday struggles and forms of resistance. Agamben, 
in particular, places the prerogative of the decision over the political and juridical value of 
lives in the solely hands of the sovereign. Moreover, although his take on politics pivots 
around life as object of power – therefore politics turns into biopolitics – he seems to 
overlook life itself. As he examines the technologies of a power that is obsessed with lives 
and forms of life, he neglects to consider processes and transformations occurring beyond 
the realm of law. As Foucault (1997: 300) argued: 
If you try to analyse power not on the basis of freedom, strategies 
and governmentality, but on the basis of the political institution, 
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you can only conceive of the subject as a subject of law. One then 
has a subject who has or does not have rights, who has had these 
rights either granted or removed by the institution of political 
society; and all this brings us back to a legal concept of the subject. 
By reducing the figure of the refugee to a „mere biological life‟ stripped of rights, 
Agamben seems not to recognise the agency of those affected by the sovereign decision. 
Extending this point, he, therefore, misses the complexities of power relations and forms of 
resistance (from the most spectacular to the most ordinary) enacted by the refugees and 
ordinary people. While respecting their predicament, this study intends to reject the 
uncritical victimisation of the Palestinians and embraces an analysis of the ways in which 
the refugees may resist and challenge the sovereigns‟ decision. Considerations that would, 
indeed, be critical in view of future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the 
birth of a Palestinian state and potential consequences in missing the political value of 
Palestinian life beyond Palestine. 
Moreover, in addressing the spatialisation of techniques of power, this study 
critically engages with Agamben‟s (1995a, 1998) logic of the camp. According to him, the 
camp is the site in which the normal juridical order is suspended. By virtue of the 
deactivation of all legal determinations, the camp becomes the space in which everything – 
including arbitrary violence – becomes possible. Reflecting on the Nazi concentration 
camp, Agamben urges us to recognise the logic of the camp in the production of structures 
that aim to enclose the political and biological threat that today is mostly represented by 
those who cannot be integrated in the nation and constitute a security threat for the state. 
As Agamben, and before him Hannah Arendt (1968), suggested that the most unprotected 
figure of our times is the refugee since the lack of state protection renders him/her bare 
life, many have argued that the logic of the camp must be recognised in the proliferation of 
spaces of exception such as refugee camps and detention centres. These structures, geared 
at enclosing the undesired and separating them from the nation, are conceived as temporary 
locations. While this view, to some extent could be accepted as regards detention centres 
that temporarily host asylum seekers and immigrants before these are expelled from the 
country, this perspective seems lacking consistency in the case of refugee camps. As the 
population of detention centres is ever changing, the one inhabiting refugee camps is fated 
to live within these sites until a solution to their displacement and statelessness is found. 
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The case of the Palestinian refugees and their camps challenges the temporary 
character of such structures. Born as spaces that contribute to freezing the refugees‟ status 
and lives, refugee camps are sites in which the refugees await repatriation, naturalisation in 
the host country or resettlement in a third country. Yet, as Agier (2011) maintains, these 
sites are increasingly becoming the fourth solution to the refugee problem. After 
repatriation, naturalisation or resettlement, the camp, from a temporary solution and 
because of their prolonged existence, turns into a permanent temporariness or, in Bauman‟s 
(2002) words, a „frozen transience‟. If the logic of exception, that by definition is limited in 
space and time, expands indefinitely – like in the case of the Palestinian refugees – what 
happens to the space exception? Although placed outside the normal juridical order, is the 
refugee camp a frozen and never changing space? 
In order not to generalise and fall into the law-trap that would indefinitely and 
inevitably reproduce the logic of the camp while missing processes, life and resistances; 
empirical analyses are paramount to recognise evolution as well as potential change in the 
function and identity of these spaces. By taking the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatila 
(metropolitan Beirut) as case study, I reflect on the politico-juridical structure of the camp, 
technologies of power applied to these sites in different periods of time and circumstances, 
and forms of resistance enacted by the Palestinians. Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, 
in fact, represent a peculiar and interesting example of spatialised exception and its 
management. Although Lebanese authorities established the camps in conversation with 
humanitarian agencies and for a long time controlled and managed these sites, from 1969 
the disengagement from and abandonment of these spaces seem to dramatise the 
exceptional character of the refugee camps. Today administered and controlled by 
Palestinian factions, Palestinian camps appear as islands of non-Lebanese territory. So I 
wonder, what happens to state sovereignty if state authorities willingly disengage from the 
control of the space of exception? Born for the protection of the state and the nation, could 
the exception itself represent a threat for the state‟s security and the nation? What are the 
technologies of power applied to these spaces and what are the ways in which they operate 
in and on these sites? 
While addressing these questions, this research contributes to the discipline of 
Geography by urging a reconsideration of the exception itself. While investigating the 
normal politico-juridical structure of the camp, the exception is also understood through a 
time-and-space relational approach. While I do not argue that time itself would change the 
status of the camp, I maintain that the prolonged existence of such spaces challenge the 
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exceptional and temporary character of these sites. Though born as spaces of exception and 
as spaces where time freezes as refugees wait for the reconstitution of their rights as 
citizens, these sites develop through the agency of states‟ authorities, humanitarian 
organisations, refugees and other people who may inhabit them. 
As discussed above, while focusing on „forms of life‟ (qualified political life as 
opposed to bare life), Agamben misses the notions of life-as-process and life-as-lived-and-
everyday-experience. As the legal status of the camp could be extended indefinitely, life 
inhabiting the camp can (if circumstances and a certain degree of freedom so allows) act 
on the camp shaping its function, its identity and giving it meanings that were not 
originally intended by the sovereign‟s decision on the exception. In other words, the 
refugee camp is not a static site. As the improvement of the refugees‟ shelters – from tents 
to buildings in concrete – testifies, if the landscape of the camp might change so could its 
function. To this end, this research explores the ways in which refugees‟ agency is 
performed and the ways in which a certain degree of normalcy is restored after the 
sovereign‟s decision. 
An innovative approach inspired by anthropologist Michel Agier (2002, 2003, 2004, 
2008, 2011) who looks at refugee camps as city-like structures and as urban spaces in 
formation, the camp is also understood in its relation to the city. The peculiar urban 
location of Shatila and the presence of non-Palestinians, including Lebanese citizens, 
living in the camp today inspire an analysis that, on the one hand, looks at power relations 
and dynamics occurring within the camp. On the other, it prompts a reflection that rejects 
the understanding of the camp in its isolation. The social differentiation of the camp 
inhabited by both Palestinians and non-Palestinians might challenge the function for which 
the camp was established. This not only threatens the character of the camp as a refugee 
space, but also stimulates an analysis of the kind of exception applied in Lebanon. By 
questioning the logic of legal exception as promoted by Agamben, this study welcomes an 
understanding of the exception as working on social and economic lines too. 
Outline of thesis 
 With the aim of uncovering the complexities of sovereignty, the exception, the 
ways in which power operates at different scales and the spatialities of the exception, the 
thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 looks at the genealogies of sovereign power and 
exception. It explores the triangle composed of law, politics and life and the structures and 
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spatialities of sovereign power: the ways in which through law and the camp, it casts out 
certain lives from the normal juridical order producing bare life. While Agamben‟s theory 
of the exception constitutes the core of the chapter, Foucault‟s understanding of power as a 
relation and as circulating and distributed is utilised to show how after the sovereign 
decision chances of resistance are maintained.  
Chapter 2 offers a reflection on research methodologies. A multilayered 
methodology made up of ethnographic practices, archive research and interviews reflects 
multilayered scales of sovereign power and exception. While justifying research choices 
and concerns, in this part I reflect on the use of a combination of methods, issues of 
„representation‟, power relations and research ethics that inevitably need to be addressed 
and reflected upon when conducting research with refugees and in sensitive environments 
such as refugee camps. 
The analysis of the „where‟ of sovereign power, exception and resistance is then 
followed by a pair of twinned chapters. By looking at the „global dimension of 
sovereignty‟, Chapter 3 investigates decisions taken at different scales and impacting upon 
the life and subjectivity of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Whilst providing a 
historical background of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, I explore the role of the 
international community, the United Nations, humanitarian agencies, other Arab states, and 
the Lebanese government in producing the Palestinian bare life. Not only does this 
investigation contend that one unique sovereign does not exist, but also argues that 
sovereignty is a relation in which different actors seek to influence each other‟s decisions.  
As Chapters 3 and 4 are complementary, while the first investigates power relations 
in the official realm of politics and its consequences on lives and subjectivities, the second 
reverses the analysis and focuses on non-institutional sites of power and the agency of 
ordinary people. Rejecting a discourse that depicts the refugees as passive objects of 
interventions, by focusing on the refugees‟ – as well as Lebanese citizens‟ – practices of 
resistance, it is shown how power is not a prerogative of the sovereign only, but a relation 
in which even ordinary people may be able to challenge the sovereign‟s authority. This 
twinned relation between the chapters is also manifested in the use of sources and 
materials. While in the first, examining the official realm of politics, the voices of the 
refugees remain unheard as if embodying the silence imposed by official discourses, in the 
second, that looks at the other side of the power relation chessboard, the voice of the 
marginalised and excluded emerges recognising the subalterns‟ political value and agency. 
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The logic of the twinned chapter is also maintained for Chapters 5 and 6. As the 
first utilises a legal approach that looks at the politico-juridical structure of the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon, the second adopts an urban perspective that examines the 
function of the camp, its evolution and its relation with the outside. In Chapter 5, I 
investigate the birth of the camp, the status of the land on which the camp is established 
and the ways in which the exception has evolved in Shatila. From disciplinary power that 
controls the camp, to the Lebanese authorities‟ abandonment of surveillance, I discuss the 
different technologies of power deployed on this space and on the body of the refugees. I 
argue that while the exception seems to be dramatised as the refugee camps are turning 
into islands of Palestinian territory within Lebanese sovereign territory, what is at stake in 
Lebanon is the deployment of a securitarian mode of governance that let things be and 
reduces intervention and control. While I do not suggest that intervention on the space of 
the camp is never resumed, I argue that control is exercised in „potentiality‟.  
Chapter 6 looks at the kind of biopolitics produced in Lebanon and, in so doing, 
examines the refugee camps in relation to the city and its outside. Prompted by the 
presence of a high percentage of non-Palestinians in Shatila, I argue that bare life is not 
only produced through law and through the Palestinians‟ body. If a legal exception places 
the Palestinians at the margins of politics by stripping them of rights, other kinds of 
exceptions running along social and economic lines cut through the very Lebanese body. 
As the Lebanese and other foreigners live in the Palestinian refugee camps and in their 
proximity, the exceptional character and function of the camp may change as its 
boundaries increasingly blur with what lies outside. By examining the relation of Shatila to 
the city of Beirut and the informal settlements around the camp, I argue that the exception 
is no longer confined to the space of the camp as legal and symbolic barriers, that allegedly 
keep the camp and the „slum‟, the refugee and the citizen separated, seem to disappear. 
These exceptional continuities constitute a new spatial model of analysis that I call 
„campscape‟. Yet, as different outcasts – Palestinian refugees and non-Palestinian 
inhabitants – meet in the space of the camp, I also explore the consequences that this 
transformation in the utilisation of the camp have on the exception and Palestinian life. 
These chapters are then followed by a conclusion. In this part I highlight the 
contributions of this work to the understanding of the refugee condition and the refugee 
camp. I, moreover, propose new frameworks of analysis for the discipline of Refugee 
Studies and the sub-discipline of Political Geography. 
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1- Genealogies of sovereign power and the camp: 
Bare life and beyond 
There are a certain number of things that one can say 
with some certainty about a concentration camp to the 
effect that it is not an instrument of liberation, but one 
should still take into account – and this is not 
generally acknowledged – that, aside, from torture to 
execution, which preclude any resistance, no matter 
how terrifying a given system may be, there always 
remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, 
and oppositional groupings... liberty is a practice. 
 
(Foucault cited in Elden and Crampton, 2007: 10) 
From refugee camps and detention centres to gated communities  and tax shelters, 
recently scholars have been particularly attentive to the proliferation of what Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1995a, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005a) has called the 
„space of exception‟. „[A] piece of land that is placed outside the normal juridical order‟, 
the camp is not simply an external space as „what is excluded in the camp is, according to 
the etymological sense of the term “exception” (ex-capere), taken outside, included 
through its own exclusion‟ (Agamben, 1998: 170, emphasis in the original). Although not a 
recent phenomenon, quite provocatively Agamben shows how the logic of the exception 
pervades our society up to the point that the „camp‟ could be considered as the biopolitical 
paradigm and the nomos of the modern political space. Conceptualised and spatialised to 
pursue different goals, these particular structures are produced to either achieve a measure 
of authenticity and homogeneity – as in the case of refugee camps, detention centres or 
gated communities – or to simply create a space devoid of law and financial 
responsibilities in order to satisfy specific economic goals – like in the case of tax shelters 
and offshore heavens (among others Diken, 2004; Diken and Laustsen, 2005; Easterling, 
2005). 
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But how does the exception function and what is its purpose? Following Carl 
Schmitt‟s (2005) reflections on the notion of sovereignty, these camp-like structures 
respond to the logic of the exception in as much as they are all established as 
extraterritorial spaces to oppose, disrupt, as well as create and suspend the norm. The 
exception is, in fact, a necessity for the establishment of the norm and the space of its 
applicability. As Schmitt (2005: 15) put it: 
[T]he exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves 
nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the 
rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. 
The norm is better known and understood through its exception, just like society and 
normalcy to be constituted must know what is excepted and excluded. To Schmitt, not only 
is the exception essential to create and maintain the norm, but it is also the concept without 
which our society would not find its order. While to Schmitt the exception is indispensable 
to create and maintain the norm, the camp to Agamben becomes the regulatory tool that 
nowadays creates and maintains a certain logic, coherence and order. Justified by the 
necessity to protect the state and society, the suspension of the normal juridical order 
becomes the new technique of government which aims at excluding and distancing those 
elements that threaten the security of the state and the national body. Refugee camps and 
detentions centres must therefore be addressed as spaces that function as purifying filters 
that hide the foreigner and the alien who disrupt the ideal homogeneity and authenticity 
needed by the national community to be constituted as such (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 
2007). 
According to this understanding, borders are no longer to be found at the limit of 
the state (Vaughan-Williams, 2009a, 2009b) and must not be identified with the frontier 
that once used to be perceived as the outer edge of a specific political community. With the 
advent of biopolitics where life as such is at the centre of power‟s concerns, borders are 
continuously constituted and reproduced everywhere and within state boundaries by means 
of the camp and a plethora of temporary facilities which share many similarities with both 
the model of the prison or the concentration camp. 
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This chapter aims to show different reflections and angles on the concepts of 
sovereignty and power as well as to give an historical account of the camp, the way it was 
born, and its significance and use today. While Agamben‟s position on biopolitics triggers 
the discussion and critique that follow in the next pages, I rely on different authors and 
disciplines (such as sociology, geography, refugee studies and anthropology) to trace a 
genealogy of sovereign power, the camp and technologies used to govern and order 
society.  
As Agamben‟s reflections on the space of exception and the camp have constituted 
the theoretical point of departure of the present research, the first part of the chapter is 
dedicated to a discussion of his understanding of sovereign power and bare life. The 
discussion on biopolitics is then followed by a reflection on the spatialisation of the 
exception. In this section, I further investigate the relationship between juridical order and 
exception as understood in spatial terms and, to this end, Carl Schmitt constitutes the point 
of departure for an analysis of the camp, the context in which it was born and where it was 
used. With these reflections on the camp, the discussion touches upon different contexts 
and uses of the camp: from its appearance in the colonies to its use in Europe at the 
beginning of twentieth century until the end of the Second World War; to its use in the 
contemporary era when spaces of exception are produced to defend the national body and 
the security of the state from any sort of external or internal threat. While Agamben‟s 
position on the exception and the camp seems to propose a very negative and pessimistic 
viewpoint, the argument concludes by questioning the possibilities of resistance to the 
camp and within the camp. In order to do so, I reflect more on Foucault‟s notion of power. 
Sovereign power and bare life: 
Politics, life, law 
In ancient Greece there was no single term for the word „life‟. Rather, there was a 
clear distinction between zoē, the bare life or simple fact of living, and bíos, the qualified 
and political life. While the latter was included in the polis and embodied the good living, 
the former was excluded from the political space. Drawing on this example from the 
classics, Agamben (1995a, 1998) offers his definition of biopolitics, namely the inclusion 
of life in the mechanisms of power. Though deeply indebted to Foucault (1991, 1998, 
2003, 2007) and his studies on power, Agamben‟s reflections differ from Foucault‟s 
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arguments and outcomes. Whereas both agree on the principle that what is at stake today is 
a form of power that operates over, on and for life as such, the two thinkers disagree on its 
rationale, birth as well as the dynamics through which power operates. As regards its 
appearance, while for Foucault biopolitics emerged in the seventeenth century when 
power‟s concerns began focusing on the population as a whole, conceived as a political, 
scientific and biological problem (Foucault, 2003: 245) to which I return later on this 
chapter; for Agamben (1995a, 1998) biopolitics is not a modern phenomenon, as ever since 
ancient times the main task of the sovereign has been that to produce bare life, a life 
stripped of any political and juridical value. Relying on the diametrically opposed but 
symmetrically constituted figures of the sovereign and bare life, Agamben shows the 
mechanisms of exclusion and exception that allow for the production of figures such as 
homo sacer, the one that in Roman law could be reduced to bare life by virtue of the 
suspension of the law. On the one hand, the withdrawal of the law strips him from the 
protection of civil law – in the case of Roman law the jus humanum – rendering this figure 
less „human‟ and killable with impunity. But on the other, the suspension of the divine law 
– jus divinum – reduces him to a life that cannot even be sacrificed. Neither part of the 
profane world nor part of the divine sphere, this captures the Latin root and etymology of 
the word sacer that means both „sacred‟ and „damned‟, therefore also associating the word 
to the idea of taboo, something „banned‟, dirty that cannot be touched (1998: 78-79). 
The fact that bare life, rather than the qualified life of the citizen, is at the centre of 
power‟s concerns marks the indissoluble and secret bond that links sovereign power and 
law to bare life. It is precisely the life of homo sacer, a life exposed to potential death, that 
constitutes the „originary political element‟ as the vitae necisque potestas – in ancient 
Rome the authority of the father over the life of his sons – has been transmitted from the 
father to the figure of the emperor. This transition is also metaphorically revealed by 
Brutus‟s gesture who, after having his sons killed, decided to adopt the Roman people in 
their place and, in so doing, transferred his power over life and death from his sons to his 
subjects (pp. 88-89). 
For Agamben, sovereignty is the power to dispose of life. To him, and inspired by 
Schmitt‟s reflections, the sovereign is he who has the potentiality to decide who is worthy 
of  life – thus included in and protected by the juridical order – and who is not worthy – 
excluded from the sphere of law and, for this reason, killable with impunity. The sovereign 
is not so much the one who rules, but the one who manifests himself the most through a 
decision that radically exposes the life of homo sacer leaving him in a zone of indistinction 
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between sacrifice and homicide (pp.78-79). However, for Agamben, this gray zone 
inhabited by bare life is not a space completely excluded from the normal juridical order. 
The relation of bare life with the political space is a relation of „ban‟ as: 
He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law 
and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, 
exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, 
outside and inside, become indistinguishable (p. 28, emphasis in 
the original). 
The fact that homo sacer is the one with respect to whom potentially everybody can act as 
sovereign by killing him without committing homicide explains why in Romance 
languages, the „banned‟ stands for both „being at the mercy of‟ and „excluded‟, as well as 
„open to all‟ for „the originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment‟ 
(p. 29; emphasis in the original). In other words, the condition of homo sacer is the same 
experienced by the werewolf – the mythical figure half human and half animal – in as 
much as both these figures are excluded from, and at the same captured within, the 
juridical order revealing the hybridity and indecidability of their status. Not only excluded 
from society and placed outside the realm of law, the banned also maintain an intimate 
relation to both the community and law. The case of the werewolf here is illuminating as, 
banned from the community because of his/her/its animal features, he/she/it cannot 
completely be said of belonging to the animal realm because of his/her/its human 
condition. This threshold of indecidability represents precisely what Agamben defines as 
the „inclusive exclusion‟. It is the gray zone that hosts the human and animal aspects, both 
captured in the figure of the werewolf.  It is the zone of indistinction that can be defined 
neither as part of the city – the community – nor part of the forest – the state of nature 
where law does not apply (pp. 104-105). The ban creates the threshold that renders the 
werewolf and homo sacer both excluded from community as well as open and disposable 
to it, and the threshold that holds the sovereign and bare life together into an unbreakable 
grip. 
This kind of relationship, that highlights the impossibility to draw a clear-cut 
boundary that would separate the inside/inclusion from the outside/exclusion, leads us to 
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examine Agamben‟s (2005a) theory of exception so as to further explore the 
intertwinement that holds together the triangle composed by law, politics and life. As he 
argues, „a theory on the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of 
the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law‟ (p. 1). 
Driven by the outbreak of the „war on terror‟ following the 9/11 events and the increasing 
production of exceptional measures and spaces to fight terrorism
1
, Agamben takes his 
analyses on the relationship between sovereign power and bare life, initiated with „Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life‟, further by questioning the sense of law, its 
applicability or suspension and the intimate relation between law and politics, the 
sovereign and the decision. As he argues (Agamben, 2005a), the state of exception 
originated from the state of emergency. If the sovereign is the one that can cast out lives 
from the space where law is applicable, the sovereign is also he who can decide on the 
state of emergency and, by doing so, renders everyone potentially homines sacri.
2
 Up to 
the eighteenth century the declaration of the state of emergency was limited to war time 
situations and was the sovereign‟s temporary response to an immediate external or internal 
danger aimed at protecting the state. However, from then on the necessity to defend the 
state and public order has expanded so far that now the progressive increase of exceptional 
measures has led to the production of a new technique of government where the exception 
has become the rule (pp. 2-6). Whenever the security of the state is endangered, not only 
are all measures to protect order deemed necessary, but they also allow for the unpunished 
elimination of all political adversaries or entire categories of people that cannot be 
integrated into the state and its national body or are simply suspected of constituting a 
threat (see also Agamben, 2002b, 2002c; Raulff, 2004).  
While Schmitt (2005) stressed the bond that links the state of exception – the 
suspension of the normal juridical order – to sovereignty and, in so doing, placed the 
exception within the sphere of law, Agamben stresses the paradox of the exception as 
having the legal form of something that by definition is placed outside the sphere of law. In 
order to understand whether the exception lies within the realm of law or whether it must, 
instead, be conceived as a fact, Agamben examines the state of exception through the lens 
                                               
1 For an in depth discussion on the „war on terror‟ and the use of exceptional measures in this 
context see, amongst others, Amoore, 2006; de Goede, 2008; Gregory, 2004. 
2 For an interesting critique of the use of the notion of homo sacer in the context of the „war on 
terror‟ as well as refugees, asylum-seekers or immigrants, see Puggiani (2010). She argues that the figure of 
homo sacer should not be associated to Guantanamo prisoners, refugees or asylum seekers so indistinctly. 
Homo sacer was the one that was rendered sacer, or bare life, after a crime he/she committed. Therefore, the 
figure has more affinity to the condition of criminals condemned to the death penalty (pp. 7-8). 
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of the state of necessity. The adage „necessitas legem non habet [necessity has no law]‟ 
would already unhinge Schmitt‟s position (Agamben, 2005a: 1). Since the necessity – 
necessity to defend public order and the state – must be identified as the source of the 
exception, this ancient maxim places the exception and the suspension of the law outside 
the juridical order and would lead to examine the exception as a mere questio facti, as a 
political inevitability. As jurist De Martino (in Agamben 2005a: 1) also puts it, if the 
normal juridical order is suspended to face a political crisis, the exception must certainly 
be placed outside law. But neither Schmitt‟s desire to situate the exception within the 
juridical order nor De Martino‟s position on the exception as being outside the normal 
juridical order can fully exhaust the complexity of the case. 
As Agamben continues (p. 24), the adage „necessity has no law‟ leads us to 
consider two possible interpretations: „necessity does not recognise any law‟ or „necessity 
creates its own law‟. Both these interpretations give the idea that necessity legitimises the 
exception, but the ways in which they welcome the exception is different. In the expression 
„necessity does not recognise any law‟, at stake is a dispensation from the law when 
applying the norm would be counter-productive. As the dispensation from the law granted 
by the sovereign is applicable only to a single and very specific case, we are not dealing 
with the suspension of the whole juridical order. The release of a specific case from law 
permits exceptional measures to remain outside the normal juridical order and until 
medieval times, this kind of exceptions allowed for extralegal acts to be committed without 
any legal consequence. Nonetheless, the second interpretation offered – „necessity creates 
its own law‟ – inscribes the exception within the juridical order. The necessity, here, is not 
only identified as the source of exception, but must be understood as the source of law too. 
This explains the reason why it is no longer possible to talk about dispensation from law 
just like it is not possible to talk about transgression of the norm, as what is at stake here is 
a true suspension of the juridical order. This inscription of the exception within the 
juridical order is, as Agamben argues, the determinant aspect of the modern era. The state 
of exception, that before was declared for single cases to release them from the 
applicability of law, began being regulated by constitutions of Western democracies 
themselves. But while in the original drafts of modern states‟ constitutions, as testified by 
the French tradition in its 1815 constitution, the state of exception – or state of siege in 
war-time situation – could be declared only by the legislative power that issues laws, the 
authority to declare the state of emergency gradually passed to the hands of the executive. 
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As Agamben (2005a: 23) points out, it is precisely this the moment in which fact and law, 
politics and law cannot be distinguished anymore as: 
[…] the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the 
juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a 
threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do 
not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. 
Agamben places the exception at the point where politics and law intersect in a zone of 
indistinction allowing the sovereign to play with fact and law. The zone of indistinction is 
the zone that hosts spaces like Guantanamo (see also Butler, 2002; Reid-Henry, 2007). In 
the context of the „war on terror‟, in fact, the increasing use of exceptional measures and 
the proclamation of a sort of permanent state of emergency is the moment in which 
everybody deemed to be a danger or threat to the security of the state could be deprived of 
their rights and be turned into homines sacri. To Agamben, therefore, the overarching 
development of the modern era is the fact that bare life has penetrated the political space 
and the fact that the space of exception, where zoē was hidden and confined, comes to 
coincide with the political space of the polis as „modernity creates a zone of indistinction 
not so much between inside and outside (of the nation, the town, or the home) but by 
cutting through every subject and the political‟ (Diken and Laustsen, 2002; on this see also 
Amoore, 2006; Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2007). To him the 
newness of the modern is represented by the exception as a new technique of government 
that renders all of us potential homines sacri. According to this understanding exclusion 
and inclusion, law and politics, and life worth living and the one not worth living cannot be 
distinguished anymore and they all respond to a logic that only the sovereign knows and 
decides upon. 
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The spatialisation of the exception 
The nomos of the earth 
The relationship between sovereign power and bare life explored so far has also to 
be understood in geographical terms. While scholars at times overlooked the spatial 
dimensions involved in the exception and in practices of exclusion, Minca (2006, 2007) 
stresses the ontological relationship between law and territory, politics and space. To him, 
and in this indebted to Schmitt‟s thought, the norm is never applicable to the chaos and the 
„where‟ of its applicability must always be identified. As he points out: 
[…] the norm – to allow for its repetition, its enforcement, its very 
concrete existence, to allow for its „measure‟, and the constitution 
of its „outside‟ and its exception – must necessarily be spatialised. 
The repetition of an act without sanction […] requires a topography 
able to describe, to grant materiality to the (exceptional) act; it 
requires a concrete space, a space that is indistinct though not 
indescribable, merely exceptional (Minca, 2007: 83). 
Therefore, not only must the norm be created, but to acquire force its same validity must be 
localised. By the same token, the exception responds to the same logic in as much as the 
dis-application and suspension of the law must refer to a particular space. 
The relation of the ban is a spatial relation. Not only does the ban separate bare life 
from the political qualified life, but it also establishes their locations. Similarly, the relation 
of the werewolf to the community is a relation that, on the one hand, binds together bare 
life and the sovereign but, on the other, determines spheres of belonging that are translated 
into mutually constitutive spaces: the city – as inhabited by the community – and the forest 
– the wild space inhabited by the werewolf. The relation of the figure of the werewolf with 
the community is a deeply geographical one. Echoing Hobbes and his distinction between 
the state of nature and the commonwealth, Diken and Laustsen (2005: 24) argue that in 
medieval times the forest, inhabited by the wolves and werewolves, was the wild space of 
chaos where law was not applied and the space that was separated from the civilised space 
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of the city. Historically, the city with its walls has constituted the paradigm of social and 
political life. The walls marked the beginning of civilisation as they physically delimitated 
inclusion and exclusion as well as divided the political space from the state of nature 
(Diken, 2005). As the Landnahme – the taking possession of the land – is what gives 
society its order (Schmitt cited in Diken and Laustsen, 2006), the erection of the fence is 
the originary gesture that creates both order and disorder, law and its suspension, political 
space and state of nature. While the state of nature must not be understood on a temporal 
basis, and therefore as preceding the constitution of civilisation, Diken and Laustsen 
contend that the uncivilised space is constituted and „produced within the legal domain‟ 
(2005: 24; emphasis added). It is precisely through the ban that both law and its suspension 
are generated at the same time along with their spaces of reference. 
According to Schmitt (in Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 39-43), the taking of the land 
and the establishment of referential spaces such as the forest and city, was constituted by 
the link between localisation (Ortung) and order (Ordung). It is in this way that the 
geographical ordering of space and the establishment of the juridical order were merged 
together in a single act creating the city and excluding bare life from it. Reflecting on this 
taking possession of the land on a global scale, Schmitt developed his theory of the „nomos 
of the earth‟ where nomos, from the Greek, stands exactly for the „appropriation of land‟. 
To him, the „nomos of the earth‟ was the global spatial order that regulated the principles 
of land appropriation until the First World War when this global order definitively 
collapsed. What has been defined as „Euro-American exceptionalism‟ responded, in fact, to 
the need for the establishment of a space of order where law was created and applied – 
Europe – and of a space devoid of law – the colonies (see Gregory, 2006). As Agamben 
(1998: 36) rephrasing Schmitt puts it, „the link between localisation and ordering 
constitutive of the nomos of the earth always implies a zone that is excluded from law and 
takes the shape of a “free and juridically empty space” in which the sovereign power no 
longer knows the limits fixed by the nomos as the territorial order‟. The Jus Publicum 
Europeum, therefore, created the space where juridical order was established – Europe – 
and the space devoid of law – America – where everything could happen. On the one hand, 
the frontiers of Europe defined the limits of law and its application and, on the other, also 
established the space inhabited by those who, being excluded from that order, were 
rendered bare life. 
According to Gregory‟s (2006) reading, with the nomos of the earth Schmitt 
intended to demonstrate how the new principles of „just war‟ promoted by the Church 
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aimed to control conflicts and the use of violence within Europe. The Jus Publicum 
Europeum, in fact, was a two-fold system that, on one hand, regulated diplomatic, 
commercial or military relations among European states only but, on the other, also had a 
global scope as by regulating the „inside‟ it excepted the „outside‟, rendering it 
conquerable. While there was a code to be respected in warfare in Europe, such code could 
be transgressed outside its boundaries. Since unlimited violence, abhorred by new 
theological-moral views of the Church, could no longer be performed in Europe, it became 
necessary to export this uncontrolled violence to America where no rule was applicable 
and where no punishment could be sanctioned for any act transgressing the law (ibid). The 
result of this was the destruction, mass murders, economic exploitation as well as 
enslavement of indigenous people the colonies went through (Dean, 2007: 31). The nomos 
of the earth was in fact a spatial ordering that was also conceptualised along the lines „us‟ 
vs. „them‟.  In order to fight the enemies, law was suspended and in this way legal 
implications in the use of force or violence were deactivated (Ek, 2006: 365). This state of 
emergency was applied to the space of America that came to resemble the state of nature 
where there is no order and where no law is applicable. Hobbes conceived of this kind of 
space devoid of law as a state of nature where men are no longer to be considered as 
humans, and where the law of the stronger applies (in Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 41). 
Indeed, in the colonies „man was no longer homo homini homo, that is “a man to man”, but 
homo homini lupus, that is “a man who is a wolf to other men”‟ (ibid). It is precisely this 
spatial and legal distinction that led to conceive of the Native Americans as less than 
„human‟. The inhabitants of the colonies were not human beings and subjects to protect, 
but were just objects to govern, separate or even enclose. Significant was the colonisation 
of the „great plain‟ in the second half of the nineteenth century when American Indians 
were forced to relocate in the reservations that soon were fenced with barbed wire (see also 
Campbell, 1998b: 97-105; Mawani, 2003). 
All overseas territories conquered and governed by European powers were 
perceived as lands where it was possible to assert control by seizing, delimiting and at the 
same time imposing new sets of social and spatial relations. It was also the space where 
new social hierarchies and classifications were produced and imposed (Mbembe in Diken 
and Laustsen, 2005: 41). While disciplinary techniques of government in Europe in the 
same period aimed at producing docile and skilled bodies to increase the productivity of 
society (Foucault, 1998), in the colonies the same techniques responded to a different 
logic. At stake was not only the administration and control of the colonies, but also 
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exploitation and domination itself as racial distinctions allowed the supposed-to-be 
superior race to rule in the state of exception that rendered the inhabitants of the colonies 
bare life. 
From the colonies to Auschwitz: The birth of the camp 
As Agamben (1995a, 1998) points out, the camp is the space that is produced when 
the exception becomes the rule and the space where its inhabitants are stripped of any 
juridical and political value. It is a piece of land that is cast out the normal juridical order 
and the space where, by virtue of the suspension of this same order, everything becomes 
possible. Reflecting on the politico-juridical structure of the concentration camp and the 
practices of the Third Reich, Agamben argues that the camp represents the nomos and the 
„hidden matrix‟ of modern times. But where and how the camp was born? 
As Bashford and Strange (2003: 2) contend, „[p]ractices of exclusion emerged well 
before the modern period, and are far from limited to Western cultures‟. They include, 
among others, the exclusion of the lepers in medieval Europe, Indian social separation and 
classifications, as well as Jewish ghettos that first materialised in Venice in 1516. Yet, as 
they go on to suggest, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed the proliferation of 
confinement practices such as the prison and the concentration camp. However, to examine 
the proliferation of the camp-like structures in modern times, Foucault‟s reflections on 
biopolitics will prove essential. 
Whereas for Agamben what is at stake with biopolitics is the production of bare 
life, in one of Foucault‟s (1991, 1998) conceptions, biopolitics is the system that produces 
„normality‟ and aims at the normalisation and regulation of the social body. For him, it is 
the power that, having considered certain economic developments occurring in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, acts on space to divide and separate the population as 
well as on bodies through disciplinary techniques and constant surveillance. Since this 
gears at producing a more skilled and ordered society to increase its productivity, it is no 
wonder that these kinds of techniques emerged with the birth of the capitalist society. 
Nevertheless, in one of his course of lectures at the Collège de France (1975-76) entitled 
„Society must be defended‟, Foucault (2003) thought of biopolitics in different terms. 
Investigating if politics is a continuation of war by other means – hence reversing 
Clausewitz‟s proposition that considered war as the continuation of politics – he explored 
power through the model of war. According to Foucault (2003: 59-61), peace and order 
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mask relations of war that divide society into different groups. He defined this struggle and 
confrontation in terms of „race war‟ whereby „the social body is basically articulated 
around two races‟ opposing each other (p.60). This race war underwent two different 
transcriptions: the biological transcription that gave birth to the theory of races; and the 
second that based on the theory of social war understood racial conflicts in terms of class 
struggles. Both these understandings gave rise to the biological-social racism where the 
„other‟ race is not the one that comes from somewhere else. At stake is one single race that 
split into two: the „superrace‟ – the one dominating – and the „subrace‟ – the one deviating 
from the norm. In this position similar to Agamben‟s take on sovereign power that 
excludes certain lives, this discourse of race struggle functions as a principle of exclusion 
and segregation. 
It is in the mid-nineteenth century with medical and biological discourses on race 
and racial purity that this race war was transformed into a true biological struggle where 
the political opponents were turned into biological enemies excluded from the national 
discourse and space (Cavalletti, 2005: 219). The discourse of race struggle coincided with 
the discourse of the struggle for the existence and survival. And the society that until that 
moment was conceived as made up by two different races was replaced by the biologically 
monist society where foreigners were perceived as aliens and, for this reason, were to be 
excluded (ibid). Hence, the appearance of „state racism‟ according to which the state 
defends its referential race by eliminating the others.  
The advent of state racism marked a shift in the way politics is conceived. It is the 
moment in which politics becomes biopolitics as life, in its biological sense and as the 
mere fact of living, becomes the centre of power‟s concerns as it operates on individuals 
that are conceived as being members of a biological species (see also Cavalletti, 2005: 9-
10). While the old theory of sovereignty pivoted around the figure of the monarch and was 
bound to a form of power that was exercised over the land, the new form of power focused 
on the population as a whole. From the nineteenth century on, wars were not waged in the 
name of the monarch and with the purpose of defending his territory or wealth. New forms 
of conflict appeared and wars were now waged to guarantee and protect the existence of 
the whole population (Cavalletti, 2005; Foucault, 1998: 137). The latter, in fact, did no 
longer constitute the strength of the sovereign, but instead came to represent the end of the 
government (Cavalletti, 2005: 43). 
It is precisely the transformation of the political opponent into the biological enemy 
that led the newborn Western democracies to „take care‟ of their national communities by 
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segregating or even eliminating the biological threats constituted by those deemed to be 
alien. In this both Foucault and Agamben agree that biopolitics is the power which 
„differentiates and divides in order to introduce a distinction that is literally “vital”: the 
distinction between those who must live and those who must die or perhaps between those 
who must die in order for others to live‟ (Montag, 2002: 121; see also Foucault, 2003: 254-
255). As both Agamben (1995a, 1998, 2005a) and Foucault (2003) maintain, Nazi 
Germany embodied „state-racism‟ in its most brutal form as, trying to protect the Germanic 
race, systematically segregated and even eliminated all the categories of people that could 
not be integrated and absorbed into the national political body. The Jew, in fact, was „the 
privileged negative referent of the new biopolitical sovereignty and [was], as such, a 
flagrant case of homo sacer in the sense of a life that may be killed but not sacrificed‟, a 
life that had no value and, as such, reveals its „capacity to be killed‟ without committing a 
crime (Agamben, 1998: 114). As Arendt (1968: 275) also asserted, this is the moment in 
which a radical transformation of the state takes place as it turns from an „instrument of 
law‟ into „an instrument of the nation‟ whereby the nation definitively seizes the state 
affirming its priority over law. 
The appearance of the concentration camp in Europe definitively revealed the 
collapse of the nomos of the earth and of the order and cohesion that was guaranteed so far, 
at least in Europe. The camp was, in fact, the incarnation of colonial practices transplanted 
within the European space. Not only was the definitive rupture of the nomos the direct 
cause of the outbreak of the two World Wars within very few decades, but the collapse of 
the frontiers allowed for the penetration of unlimited violence in Europe. As Foucault 
(2003: 103) argued, whereas during the phase of colonisation Europe managed to export its 
models to the colonies, it did not remain completely immune from side effects: 
[...] while colonisation, with its techniques and its political and 
juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other 
continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the 
mechanisms of power of the West, and on the apparatuses, 
institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial 
models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the 
West could practise something resembling colonisation, or an 
internal colonialism, on itself. 
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Although forms of segregation and exclusion were not new in Europe, the camp as such 
was a colonial invention: first thought, designed, applied and experimented in the colonies 
as a technique used by European powers to face an immediate danger (among others 
Deacon, 2003). Without forgetting the practise of enclosing Native Americans in the 
reservations in the nineteenth century, the first camps made their appearance in Cuba 
where in 1896 to face a local insurrection the Spanish established the campos de 
concentraciones where rebels were interned (Agamben, 1998: 166). But it was with the 
beginning of the twentieth century, during the South African War (1899-1902) that the 
camps were established as strategy to segregate and divide different races. As Stephen 
Royle (1998: 54) argues, in order to cut any form of supplies or shelter that might have 
been provided to the guerrillas confronting the British Army, about 30,000 farmhouses 
were destroyed. As result of the massive displacement provoked, the British set up forty-
six refugee camps. Yet, the politics of encampment that characterised this war was not 
limited to allegedly humanitarian purposes. Particular spaces were used to enclose POWs. 
Yet, the most resonant event was the establishment of sixty other specific camps that 
imprisoned 114,000 black Africans only, as if spreading the early seeds of the racial 
distinction and segregation that would have followed in the coming years in South Africa. 
The boomerang effect that brought colonial practices back to the space of Europe 
seemed to first appear in France where with the outbreak of the First World War the 
French government set up concentration camps in the region of Drôme after 1915. The aim 
was to intern foreign nationals – not necessarily combatants – coming from enemy states as 
a priori suspected of being spies or potential informers. Though Gypsies in France had 
been experiencing persecution since the sixteenth century, only a small number of them 
were interned. On the one hand, their nomadic tradition might have affected their loyalty to 
France, but, on the other, the shared perception was that „national‟ Gypsies still represented 
less of a threat if compared to foreigners coming from hostile countries (Fogg, 2008). 
Germany represented another case in which the encampment practices developed in 
the colonies moved to Europe. However, contrary to common belief, the first camps were 
not set up by the Nazi regime. In 1923, before Hitler‟s rise to power (1933), the 
government of the Social Democrats appealing to the Schutzhaft – preventive custody – 
established camps in order to intern political opponents and, in particular, communists who 
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threatened the political status quo in the country (Agamben, 1998: 167).
3
 The Schutzhaft 
was a juridical concept born in 1851 and was linked to the state of emergency that, as soon 
as declared, could suspend all the articles of the constitution dealing with the personal 
liberties. With the declaration of the state of exception, and the subsequent suspension of 
the parts of the constitution guaranteeing personal liberties, everybody could potentially be 
taken into custody or interned for an indefinite period of time. This was the legal – or 
better, extralegal – foundation that permitted the establishment of the concentration camps 
in Germany as well as in the territories occupied by the German army during World War 
II.
4
 While the state of emergency is by definition a temporary measure to face an 
immediate danger, in Germany it lasted twelve years (1933-1945) transforming this 
temporariness into a permanent civil-war-like situation (Agamben, 1995a, 1998, 2005a). 
As the Schutzhaft was disenfranchised from the martial law and continued being applied 
under normal circumstances, the exception began being confused with the rule itself. The 
consequence in this situation of „indecidability‟ and of the exception becoming the rule is 
precisely the camp as „the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension 
of the state of law, acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains 
constantly outside the normal state of law‟ (Agamben, 2000: 36). As Agamben (1998: 168-
169) argues, when Dachau, a concentration camp for political prisoners, was set up, it was 
kept independent from the normal juridical order and, in particular, neither penal law nor 
prison law were applied. However, despite the fact that the camp is placed outside the 
normal juridical order, we cannot affirm that this is a space external to this same order. Just 
like bare life is never completely excluded from the political community and the sphere of 
action of the sovereign, so is the camp included by virtue of its same exclusion as the 
sovereign can still decide and act upon it. The camp is, in fact, placed in the „zone of 
indistinction‟ where every determination – distinction between fact and law – is no longer 
applicable and is „the structure in which the state of exception – the possibility of deciding 
on which founds sovereign power – is realised normally‟ (p. 170 emphasis in the original; 
see also Giaccaria and Minca, 2011). 
Those interned entered a zone of indistiction in which law, legal protection and 
rights no longer made sense, revealing and exposing their bare life. Having created a space 
                                               
3 For an example of other forms of exception applied in that period to fight communism see 
Landzelius 2006. 
4 For Schmitt (2005) the state of exception is part of the juridical order to the point that article 48 of 
the German Constitution of 1919 provides the chance to declare the state of emergency and suspend law. 
According to Schmitt, the exception is to be placed within the juridical order as the declaration of the state of 
exception is still something different from chaos and anarchy (p. 12). 
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devoid of law, everything became possible in the camps and the suspension of the normal 
juridical order allowed for the elimination of the biological threat represented by Jews 
(mainly), but also Gypsies and homosexuals: all categories of people that could not be 
integrated into the German national political body. As Agamben (1998: 171) puts it, 
„[i]nsofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to 
bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realised, 
in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation‟. 
While at the very beginning concentration camps were thought to serve an 
utilitarian purpose – that of extracting labour and productivity from the encamped subraces 
as well as political prisoners – later on, and especially after the decision on the „Final 
Solution‟, the camps became death factories. Once the utilitarian aspect was abandoned, 
they were turned into spaces where „absolute power‟ could be exercised and the superiority 
of the German race affirmed along with the inmates‟ „capacity of being killed‟ (Arendt 
cited in Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 50). Reflecting on the mechanisms of absolute power
5
, 
Sofsky (1997) points out that this form of power can never be confused with its 
disciplinary or punitive forms. It takes the exercise of power to the limit where terror, 
excessive violence and unpredictability are essential. This, nevertheless, does not imply 
that disciplinary techniques could not be applied. Quite the contrary as in the camps there 
was a meticulous ordering of space, time and social structures. It ordered space, 
determined and localised sites for any event dividing work zones from residential blocks 
and exterminating areas. It applied a precise system of classification as not all the prisoners 
were considered the same. According to this structure, social positions were determined 
based on the inmates‟ origin or status. But also temporal ordering was at stake as any 
action was carefully planned in detailed intervals and durations – to eat, sleep and work. 
What, according to Sofsky, differentiates absolute power from disciplinary power 
was the monopoly of the decision and arbitrariness. In order to nullify any attempt of 
resistance or rebellion, it had to be unpredictable in every aspect so as to avoid any form of 
resistance. It was a form of organised and systematic terror that could change and hit at any 
moment. Just like the Führer was the „living nomos‟ during the Third Reich – as he could 
decide on the rule or its exception constantly – the SS (the Schutzstaffel) could be seen as 
the „living nomos‟ within the camp boundaries as they could arbitrarily change rules, 
                                               
5 I use the notion of „absolute power‟ as developed by Sofsky (1997). 
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classifications and plans without any notice as systems of classifications, actions or times 
could never be predicted or calculated.  
As Sofsky (1997: 47) goes on to suggest, while other forms of power act on space 
and time to guide social relations and actions, absolute power in the concentration camps 
turned space from „a domain for acting and living‟ into an instrument of discrimination and 
death. Inmates, under these circumstances, were no longer subjects. The Muselmann – 
literally „Muslim‟ – is the term that defined the most common prisoners of the 
concentration camps as „living corpses‟, those that touching the bottom cannot, and most 
of all do not, want to take care of themselves anymore. It was precisely the loss of will and 
consciousness that characterised der Muselmann at the point in which he/she could not 
even hope for death to come: death, pain and sufferance could not be felt anymore. It was a 
man turning into a non-man (see also Agamben, 2002a: 41-86). As Primo Levi (1987: 93) 
put it: 
All the musselmans who finished in the gas chambers have the 
same story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the slope 
down to the bottom, like streams that run down to the sea. On their 
entry to the camp, through basic incapacity, or by misfortune, or 
through some banal incident, they are overcome before they can 
adapt themselves; they are beaten by time... Their life is short, but 
their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the drowned, form 
the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually 
renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and labour 
in silence, the divine spark dead with them, already too empty to 
really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call 
their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are 
too tired to understand (emphasis in the original). 
Prisoners of the camp were no longer people, not only in the eyes of the Nazi officers 
running the camp, but, as the instance of the Muselmann shows, even to their own eyes. 
They were the „scum of the earth‟, men, women and children whose life had no value and, 
for this reason, became killable. The Jews, that came to embody the „stereotypical figure‟ 
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that inhabited the camp, revealed the rupture of the link between order (nation-state) and 
localisation (territory) that was mediated by the inscription of life by virtue of the birth 
(Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 50). As Jews could not fit into the nation, their life had to be 
localised in the camp, the space of exception, where they could be exterminated to protect 
and preserve the German state and race. 
Yet, according to Agamben (1995a, 1998), despite promises and pledges that 
Auschwitz – and similar structures – would have never appeared again, the politico-
juridical system that allowed for all this to happen, is still part of our democracies. 
Certainly in other forms and with different purposes, but not only has the camp not been 
abandoned, but it has become the new biopolitical tool that still regulates, governs and 
orders our societies. 
‘Society must be defended!’: Refugee camps and detention facilities 
The advent of biopolitics marks a definitive shift in the ways in which politics and 
sovereignty are conceived. In his courses at the Collège de France entitled „Society must 
be defended‟ (1975-1976) and „Security, Territory, Population‟ (1977-1978), Foucault 
(2003, 2007) asserted that in the seventeenth century mechanisms of power began 
changing. As discussed above, rather than focusing on land and territory, power began 
operating on bodies and the population as a whole. Although the passage is never 
immediate as one system does not completely replace another (Foucault, 2007: 8), along 
the classic theory of sovereignty elaborated by a juridically-oriented thought that centred 
on the figure of the monarch, other paradigms and forms of government emerged. 
Different systems might coexist and though techniques of subjugation might be similar, it 
is the end of government that changes giving more prominence to certain concerns over 
previous others. 
Whereas the problem of the monarch was to find any means to preserve his 
relationship with what he dominated – hence, his principality comprised of territory, 
subjects and wealth that constituted his strength – with the advent of biopolitics power 
could no longer be understood in terms of law or rights of the sovereign. As discussed 
above, in the disciplinary society from the seventeenth century the problem of the 
sovereign – or better the newborn bourgeoisie – was not so much the preservation of his/its 
strength. A new form of power was rising, a power that in two distinct ways abandoned 
concerns over territory and shifted its interest on bodies and the population as a whole 
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(Foucault, 1998: 139). With the aim of increasing and optimising the capabilities and 
productivity of subjects, it operated on „bodies as machines‟ while disciplining them. It 
acted on different fields and through different institutions – such as schools, prisons, 
hospitals to name but few – in order to regulate and „normalise‟ the subjects and their 
behaviour. With the rise of capitalism, in fact, the population emerged as an economic and 
political problem to the extent that even sexuality needed to be regulated. On the other 
hand, it was a system that focused on control and, in doing so, applied a „biopolitics of the 
population‟ whereby life and „body as species‟ constituted the focus of its preoccupation. It 
no longer dealt with the power of death over subjects as it was with the case of the 
monarch. Since death was now perceived as a limit, power began focusing on life and had 
to guarantee the survival of its population. The seventeenth century, in fact, is the moment 
in which knowledge and power revealed their most intimate link as, in order to take care of 
the population, governments needed knowledge about mortality and birth rates, longevity, 
causes of death, and medical treatments or cures to fight diseases (ibid). 
The advent of the era of governmentality and security in the eighteenth century as 
well as the gradual consolidation of the state system after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) 
brought another significant change in the ways in which power operates. While focusing 
on the health and well-being of the population and responding to the rules of liberalism, the 
new governmentality and security paradigm lets things be. While working on probabilities, 
possibilities and preventive measures, power does not prohibit or correct anymore as it was 
the case with the precedent systems. Focusing on the effects on the whole population – 
abandoning in this way its concerns with single individuals – the governmentality system 
calculates costs, risks and consequences with the aim of preserving the whole (see also 
Amoore, 2009; Amoore and de Goede, 2008). This is the moment in which also a new 
concept makes its appearance. The Raison d‟État becomes the principle that guides 
governments as it aims to defend the state and its integrity (Foucault, 2007: 255-283). In 
particular, and by extension of this concept, from then on the aim of the nation-state would 
be that of preserving its population conceived as nation.  
It is exactly at this point that Agamben‟s (1995a, 1998, 2005a) reflections on 
contemporary politico-juridical systems, especially in the context of the „war on terror‟, 
reunite with Foucault‟s thought. As Agamben suggests, the gradual expansion of the 
executive power, that issues decrees having force of law at the expenses of the legislative 
power whose task is to issue laws, is the peculiar manifestation of the state of exception of 
our democracies allowing for extralegal and extraordinary measures to be taken. 
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Nevertheless, as Foucault (2007) highlighted, one of the consequences of this change in 
systems of power has led to the gradual regression of the juridical order as dictated by law. 
While in the disciplinary society the „norm‟ – to be understood as normalisation – acquired 
prominence over the law, in the era of governmentality Raison d‟État supersedes law to the 
extent that, in its task to defend the state and its population, it can even command, modify 
or suspend law. It is a politics that does not recognise law as its first and guiding principle 
since the necessity, as also Agamben (2005a) points out, is „over and above the law‟ 
(Foucault, 2007: 262). 
Old techniques of power are used to face new realities and problems. A whole 
series of geographies of exception are more than ever becoming the rule today as they 
attempt to enclose, control or even eliminate threats or supposed threats. As Agamben 
(1998: 174) asserts: 
If this is true, if the essence of the camp consists in the 
materialisation of the state of exception and in the subsequent 
creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter 
into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find 
ourselves virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a 
structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime that are 
committed there and whatever its domination and specific 
topography. 
The „return of the camp‟ is ever more prominent as we consider the proliferation of 
structures like Guantanamo or if we think about the whole network of secret prisons 
around the world (Aspe and Combes, 2000; Minca, 2005). While some would argue that 
the issue here is not the mere defence of the state but an imposition of a new colonial order 
or the unlimited exercise of power (on this see Gregory, 2004, 2006), the defence of the 
state is still very significant as we witness the tightening of controls at the borders as well 
as the establishment of off-shore processing centres or camp-like structures that can stop or 
slow down income fluxes (Afeef, 2006; Bigo, 2007; Dikeç, 2009; Hyndman, 2000; 
Hyndman and Mountz, 2007; Loesher, 1999; Salter, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a, 
2009b).   
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Nonetheless, the protection of some states and their security is not the only reason 
for the proliferation of detention facilities and refugee camps as the defence of the nation 
that constitutes the state becomes the government‟s concern too. From „society must be 
defended‟ to „nation must be defended‟, the encampment of the foreigner – immigrant, 
asylum-seeker or refugee – is therefore justified on the ground of security reasons but also 
renders more explicit new forms of racism no longer based on biological assumptions. As 
Étienne Balibar (cited in Montag, 2002) asserts, modern racism does not seem to be funded 
much on racial distinctions since today dominant themes that exclude the „other‟ work 
more on cultural differences. Indeed, biological racism based on the theory of races and on 
„nature‟ that looked at the foreigner as the „unhealthy‟, the „unnatural‟ and the „abnormal‟ 
has been superseded by a new form of racism based more on culture. More differences in 
human subjects are „recorded‟ in the field of culture than in that of science as the latter 
seems to agree on a sort of „egalitarian universalism‟ on the biological level. As genetics 
and biology no longer provide a flourishing ground for racism – having proved that race is 
nothing but a social construction – exclusionary practices are grounded both on security as 
well as on cultural/national reasons (Montag, 2002: 117-119). 
Reflecting on the problem of the nation-state and the employment of camp-like 
structures, Paul Gilroy (1999) affirms that state racism is still performed today in 
governments‟ attempts to separate people and „races‟ by means of camp. To him, the camp 
is first of all a mentality and a frame of mind that responds to the need for a more 
homogenous society that cannot be corrupted by the different. As Gilroy goes on to 
suggest, from „mental‟ camps to actual ones, though, the step is short as fences 
geographically separate the undesired from the rest of society. Though the encampment of 
illegal immigrants, refugees and the like is today justified in order to defend the 
population, guarantee its security and protect the nation, the „ban‟ takes the form of a 
multilayered marginalisation. Perceived as a threat to the „national body‟ and  criminalised 
by contemporary discourses on immigration, immigrants and refugees are considered the 
modern homines sacri excluded from the political life and, at the same time, included in 
the sphere of the sovereign that manages their lives through different techniques of control 
(among others Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004).
6
 
As Agamben explains, it is not a coincidence that the „camp‟ makes its appearance 
again today. With the collapse of the old nomos that used to hold together the trinity – 
                                               
6 For a deeper discussion on the „invasion complex‟ see also Papastergiadis, 2006 and Shapiro, 
1998. 
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localisation (territory), order (the State) and birth (the nation) – from which modern nation-
states originated, the main task of governments is that of constantly defining who can be 
considered as part of the political community and who is to be excluded. As a result, in its 
multiple forms and with the aim of containing those considered to be external to the order 
of the state, the camp becomes the hidden matrix of modern political spaces as it has come 
to embody „the fourth, inseparable element that has now added itself to – and so broken – 
the old trinity composed of the state, the nation (birth), and land‟ (Agamben, 1998: 176). In 
this context, the refugee, in particular, proves to be the most unprotected figure of our 
times as having broken the link between birth and territory and perceived as a disrupting 
element of the consolidated nation-state system reveals his/her bare life (Agamben, 1998: 
126-135 and 174-176; see also Agamben, 1995b; Lui, 2002; Malkki, 1995b). As Arendt 
(1968: 267-302) argued, the problem lies with the fact that the French Revolution had 
associated the Rights of Man with the rights of the citizen since the image of the man in the 
„Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen‟ was not the „bare‟ human being but the 
people conceived as national body. Hence, the loss of the nationality corresponds to the 
loss of human rights and that is why the refugee is the figure that most renders explicit and 
visible his/her bare life as law – state order – abandons him/her. Deprived of any political 
and juridical value, the refugee as well as the asylum-seeker is therefore exposed to any 
form of violence. Though conceived as temporary sites where refugees wait for their rights 
as citizens to be reconstituted by means of resettlement programs or repatriation, refugee 
camps reveal themselves as true biopolitical spaces that keep the refugees far from society. 
While designed as spaces where the refugee can receive assistance and relief as he/she lost 
any means of livelihood, they are more likely to turn into „spaces of humanitarian 
exception‟ where the humanitarian cause is appealed to pursue well other political aims 
(see also Elden, 2006). In her analysis of the refugee regime and the responses of the 
international community in cases of mass displacements due to conflicts or poverty, Lui 
(2002) argues in fact that „[t]he refugee regime is a form of geopolitical humanitarianism 
that has as its‟ “core business” the preservation of the value of the nation-state form and 
the institution of national citizenship‟. 
The containment, the limitation of the freedom of movement, constant surveillance, 
not to mention the many other restrictions refugees have to face, clearly show the purpose 
of prohibiting their assimilation with the surrounding environment and the national order. 
With the aim of protecting society and preventing integration, the discursive distance, 
whereby the alien is criminalised and constitutes a threat also in terms of access to 
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common resources, always turns into a geographical distance as refugee camps or 
detention centres are usually set up in peripheries (Diken and Laustsen, 2005; Hyndman, 
2000; Perera, 2002; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004). Illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers 
and refugees are all subjected to containment practices and unlimited physical or 
psychological violence for which no legal consequence applies as camps and structures 
alike are kept independent from the normal juridical order just as it happened with respect 
to the concentration camps. They become true biopolitical spaces that render inmates at the 
complete mercy of the police or state authorities that act as sovereigns. But camps, 
designed to limit the contact with the public are supposedly transitory spaces that can often 
turn into permanent spaces of exception where the fence marks the geographical, economic 
and social marginalisation of its inhabitants. Turning temporality into permanency, this 
same fence becomes the breaking tool dividing normalcy from misery, and the life of the 
citizen – the one deserving to live – from the life of our contemporary homines sacri 
(Diken and Laustsen, 2005). 
The ‘where’ of resistance 
Agamben‟s reflections on the contemporary political space and sovereign power 
have widely resonated within different disciplines. As regards the camp, although many 
found Agamben‟s association of the concentration camp to other kinds of containment 
structures like refugee camps or detention centres very disturbing (see Isin and Rygiel, 
2007), the camp to be defined as such does not have to be identical to those spaces that 
once had been administered and run by the Nazis (Campbell, 2002a, 2002b). It should not 
be forgotten that the Nazi concentration camps were never still and frozen spaces and, at 
the beginning, were certainly not set up as death factories. Concentration camps evolved 
with the time: from spaces where to intern the political opponents and labour camps where 
the inmates were forced to increase the productivity of the Nazi forces, to extermination 
sites for those who could not be integrated and assimilated (Campbell, 2002b: 149-152).
7
 
But, are we allowed to talk about „camp‟ only in the presence of a space designed to pursue 
extermination and where gas chambers are built? 
                                               
7 Not all the Nazi camps have been established as „death factories‟. As Campbell (2002b: 151, 167 
note 16) argues, there were only six extermination camps and they were all located in Poland. Four of them 
have been established as death factories (Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka), while Auschwitz-Birkenau 
and Lublin were first established as concentration camps and only later turned into extermination sites. 
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Without denying the „uniqueness‟ of the Holocaust for its weight in terms of mass 
and systematic killing of a race, we should instead focus on the political and juridical 
structures that allow for certain categories of people to be cast out from the political 
community. As also Elden (2009: 57) contends: 
It is essential to recognise that the Nazis appropriated an earlier 
model of the camp from colonial practice and used it in at least two 
different ways: the concentration camps, which were used as 
administrative tools to deal with domestic opponents and those 
deemed medically degenerate, and the later extermination camps. It 
is the first of these that provides a model for contemporary 
analyses, not the second. 
As Agamben (2002d) himself admitted, the way he reflects on the camp does not 
certainly aim at drawing unchallenged parallels between Nazi concentration camps and 
present day refugee camps or detention centres (see also Raulff, 2004). Working with 
paradigms, and in this way taking historical phenomena and figures as singularities 
occurred in the past that share similar structures with present day situations, he suggests 
that we should avoid focusing on the extermination practices of the Third Reich that 
unquestionably did not know equals. Rather, we should realise that the mechanisms that 
allowed for the setting up of the concentration camp are still so real and prominent. In 
order to avoid unfair associations, the proliferation of numerous and very diverse „spaces 
of exception‟ requires us to consider every single case through specific empirical analyses 
rather than through a-historical and generalised considerations. 
As regards the refugee condition and refugee camps, some studies have already 
suggested how the refugee camp is not a unique and general space, but that most 
importantly is historically and geographically situated (among others Malkki, 1996; Peteet, 
2005). Especially in situations of protracted refugeehood, it has been shown that although 
their inhabitants are not assimilated or integrated, refugee camps are ever-changing spaces 
to the extent that fences can disappear and it is no longer possible to distinguish the camp 
from its outside. 
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A second point of contention of Agamben‟s insights regards the concept of 
exception. Many have drawn on his theories and approach to understand and explain the 
modern „exceptional‟ times. While some scholars seem to agree and apply Agamben‟s 
insights (also uncritically, therefore identifying sovereign power with the state and homo 
sacer with the refugees), many have also raised concerns on potential epistemological 
leaks in Agamben‟s argument. Firstly, if we are to accept that we live in exceptional times 
and that the state of exception is expanding indefinitely, we have to assume that there is a 
„normal time‟. Yet, throughout the last century or so, exceptional measures have constantly 
been taken in different countries to face non-war time situations. In particular, as 
Neocleous (2006: 198) argues, we are facing too many crisis management situations to talk 
about exceptions. In other words, the so-called exception is just part of the „plain, 
everyday, political management, the modern state of affairs‟ as law and politics are not 
separate domains, but they feed each other (ibid). Moreover, rather than a suspension of 
the law, we witness a very opposite phenomenon. Law is used to „except‟, and legal 
experts and advisers are increasingly consulted to „create‟ laws that justify so-called 
exceptional measures. As Johns (2005) puts it, it is more the case that the exception 
retreats rather than ascends as law operates in excess. No wonder that the executive of 
governments shapes and creates norms and rules.  
Rather than focusing on a law-and-right perspective, it could be more interesting to 
adopt another approach. This brings us back to the quotation with which this chapter has 
begun and leads us to investigate and question more deeply the relations of exception, law, 
politics and bare life today. Can we really associate the figure of the refugee to that of 
homo sacer? Certainly, Agamben‟s position on sovereign power does not leave much 
space for resistance, but if we address these spaces through Foucault‟s lenses of power, the 
answer to the question would not be positive (Connolly, 2005; Foucault, 1998: 92-102; see 
also Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2004). Only abandoning a perspective that looks at power in 
terms of law can we uncover different forms of resistance that might even take place in 
abject spaces such as refugee camps. Power, in fact, is first of all a process in which 
different struggles take place and must never be understood in terms of a unilateral 
relationship in which the dominant will always exercise his/her authority over the 
dominated. It is, in fact, a reciprocal process whereby different actors „seek to affect each 
other‟ and have reciprocal impacts (Dean, 2007: 9). Domination is never absolute and, just 
like Gramsci‟s notion of hegemony, is always disputed, negotiated and contrasted as 
wherever there is power there is a form of resistance (see Mauffe, 1979). It is in this way 
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that power can be conceived as positive and productive rather than negative and restrictive. 
It is exactly this change of perspective that allows us to look at the relationship between 
governments and refugees as a strategic encounter where the latter do not necessarily 
embody the impotent bare life. 
Although Foucault analysed institutions (such as schools, prisons, hospitals) to 
explore the ways in which power operates and affects subjects, he also welcomed a 
disengagement of power from the idea of the state. This passage is crucial so as to uncover 
power relations and responses that constantly develop in refugee camps, detention centres 
or similar structures  and essential to explore the „how‟ that binds the state, its practices (as 
well as so-called non-state actors) with the life of those encamped. Most of all, also the 
„decision‟, that to Agamben and Schmitt is a prerogative of the sovereign allowing him an 
absolute control, must be disenfranchised from the figure of the sovereign himself as the 
power to decide lies with the whole spectrum of society where each of us are everyday 
called to make a decision. Sovereignty in fact „is neither limited to the law nor to the state 
[… as] the exception cannot be restricted to a formally declared “state of emergency” in 
which law is suspended and martial rule or emergency powers are brought into force‟ 
(Dean, 2007: 189). 
Focusing on lived experiences and daily struggles, we might be able to uncover 
multiple ways of „resisting‟, or better surviving, the sovereign‟s dictates that want the 
refugee, asylum-seeker or immigrant turned into a bare life. It is essential to recognise 
„[t]he value of a more flexible, small-scale, and unbureaucratic activism‟ (Bayat, 2004: 87; 
see also Papastergiadis, 2006). Political agency must therefore be disenfranchised from the 
state and its institutions. Echoing Isin and Rygiel (2007), this means that the life of those 
interned in detention facilities or refugee camps is highly political as one becomes a 
political subject when he/she enacts and claims the rights that she does not have (Rancière, 
2004). Immigrants and asylum-seekers sealing their mouths and eyes are a strong instance 
as they protest and resist governments‟ multiple attempts to hide and silence them as if 
they did not exist (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2004; Isin and Rygiel, 2007). Yet, life after the 
decision does exist. 
Concluding remarks 
In the previous sections, I have discussed the ways in which sovereign power 
operates on life and space. In particular, it was shown that as sovereign power casts certain 
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lives outside the normal juridical order – therefore producing unprotected and killable bare 
lives – at the same time referential spaces are established too. The camp, built today as 
filter of the nation, is the space in which the alien and foreigners are enclosed and kept far 
from society. Refugee camps and detention centres share some similarities with the model 
of the concentration camp in so far as the normal juridical order within their boundaries is 
suspended creating a biopolitical space where the life of its inhabitants and inmates is 
exposed to any violence. Yet, as Agamben‟s position on sovereign power and bare life 
seems to not leave any space for resistance or counter-politics, Foucault‟s understanding of 
power will prove crucial in the following chapters to exit the logic of sovereignty as 
developed by Agamben. Moving away from a law-and-right approach, multiple strategies 
for survival are developed within the very space of exception (see Chapter 5 and 6) as well 
as beyond it (Chapter 4). 
Although many have identified sovereign power with the state and state‟s 
authorities controlling and managing the camps, it is paramount to remind that strategies of 
refugees‟ and asylum-seekers‟ encampment have a wider resonance than the state and are 
not technologies used by state authorities only. These temporary facilities also reflect 
global concerns over the maintenance of a geopolitical order grounded on the well-
established nation-state system. 
By investigating the case of Palestinian refugees and their presence in Lebanon, it 
will be shown how sovereign power cannot be identified with the state only. By exploring 
multiple scales (international, regional, national and subnational including the individual), 
I demonstrate how sovereign power extends beyond the state‟s boundaries (Chapter 3) and 
how resistance can still be performed (Chapters 4, 5, 6). 
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2- From the ‘field’ to the ‘representation’: 
Reflections on methods, power relations and 
ethics 
We cannot know everything, nor can we survey power 
as if we can fully understand, control or redistribute 
it. What we may be able to do is something rather 
more modest but, perhaps, rather more radical: to 
inscribe into our research practices some absences 
and fallibilities while recognising that the significance 
of this does not rest entirely in our own hands. 
 
(Rose, 1997: 319) 
 
Ethnographers are more and more like the Cree 
hunter who (the story goes) came to Montreal to 
testify in court concerning the fate of his hunting 
lands in the new James Bay hydroelectric scheme. He 
would describe his way of life. But when administered 
the oath he hesitated: “I‟m not sure I can tell the 
truth…. I can only tell what I know.” 
 
(Clifford, 1986: 8) 
Sixty-three years after the Nakba (1948), Palestinian refugees and refugee camps 
are still very much a reality (i.e. 2011). In particular, Palestinians in Lebanon have suffered 
the most acute social, economic and spatial marginalisation. My interest in the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon began some years ago when an undergraduate student of „Oriental 
Languages and Cultures‟ in Ca‟ Foscari University of Venice (Italy). Concerned with the 
inconclusiveness of the Peace Process that started in the early 1990s, at the time my 
investigation pivoted around the Palestinians‟ legal status in the country. Fieldwork in 
Beirut in 2004 was based on archival research to find out more about the ways in which 
Lebanese legislation contributes in placing the Palestinians at the margins of politics. Very 
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little time was dedicated to the visit of the camps or to encounters with the Palestinians. I 
thought that knowing about what they are excluded from and the official politics towards 
them could reveal their predicament and condition. In the pages of what became my BA 
dissertation, laws, decrees and administrative orders „spoke for and about them‟ as if 
official statements and politics could narrate their everyday life and struggles (Martin, 
2005). 
While the analysis of past researches and methodologies is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, previous experiences have shaped the ways in which this doctoral investigation 
has been undertaken. My previous lack of consideration of Palestinian „voices‟ was a gap I 
felt needed to be filled. Documentary testimony represented by the Lebanese legislation 
and discrimination against the refugees needed to be supplemented with life experiences 
and accounts of everyday struggles. Aware that refugees‟ accounts would have always 
been filtered through my interpretation and authorship and therefore aware of the 
impossibility of escaping the „speaking for‟ dilemma, my doctoral investigation was two-
fold. On the one hand, and aware that responsibility for the conditions of the Palestinians 
in Lebanon does not lie on the Lebanese state only, I became increasingly interested in 
uncovering the complexity and multiplicity of sovereign powers that affect the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon. While looking at different geopolitical scales (international, regional, 
national, and sub-national including the individual), I seek to examine how different 
interests, representations and concerns conflate into the Palestinian life and how 
technologies of power acquire a spatial form through the establishment of refugee camps. 
On the other hand, and in this countering a literature that tends to locate power in the 
official sites of politics, I was interested in exploring the refugees‟ everyday practices of 
survival and forms of resilience that resist and challenge their political, social and 
economic exclusion.  
In order to address these concerns, a combination of sources and methods was 
essential. A multilayered method which includes archival research, interviews with 
stakeholders, and ethnography in the refugee camps seemed the right approach to 
investigate the exception itself: the way it is produced, the sovereign/s deciding on it, and 
the ways it is „received‟. In line with my critique of Agamben‟s state and space of 
exception, combined methods would uncover multilayered exceptions decided by different 
actors (see Chapter 3 and 5). As representation of the Palestinians and their camps has been 
the focus of archive research and interviews with stakeholders, official statements and the 
official politics needed to be supplemented with and analysed along „subaltern‟ and „de-
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subjugated knowledges‟ of the refugees (Foucault, 2002, 2003). As this doctoral 
investigation does not claim any objectivity or universal understanding of what it means to 
be a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, some clarification on research methods, ethics and 
unequal power relations are explored in the following sections to contextualise the 
production of this knowledge. In so doing, I intend to situate my claims as well as reflect 
on the different „texts‟ (interviews and documents) on which the analysis of the following 
chapters is based. While drawing some reflections on the methodologies adopted, this 
chapter critically addresses significant stages of the research process before, during and in 
the aftermath of the fieldwork. As reflection on the research as a whole required an 
investigation of the self – personal and academic concerns and ethics – the reader may 
notice a different writing style from the one adopted so far. Less formal and perhaps less 
„academic‟, I intended that my methodology could be read the way I „lived‟ it and 
„experienced‟ it stressing the potential biases, difficulties, the complexity of power 
relations in the field and its aftermath as well as issues of authorship and representation. In 
order to further problematise sensitive and ethical concerns of doing research, a sense of 
failure is included too. Although failings seem not to appear often in research 
methodologies, I believe that the only way to provide an honest account of the research 
process, constraints and difficulties should emerge along with reflections on complex and 
unequal power relations that inevitably mark Western investigations of the Palestinian 
predicament. 
Planning and negotiating before the field 
As discussed in the Introduction, the first considerations of the Palestinian 
refugees‟ lives and camps in Lebanon heavily drew on Agamben‟s (1995a, 1998, 2005a) 
reflections on „sovereign power‟, „exception‟, the „camp‟ and „bare life‟ (see Chapter 1). 
Literature on the refugee‟s condition and spaces seemed to identify sovereign power with 
state‟s authorities who, from legislation to actual control of the camps, are deemed 
responsible for the production of the refugee‟s bare life. Yet, this framework seemed 
problematic. The scope of the question of Palestine was not only a Lebanese preoccupation 
as different governments (beyond Lebanon and Israel) and international institutions (such 
as the UN) have greatly contributed to the Palestinians‟ marginalisation and exclusion from 
a just political solution. Decisions taken at different scales needed to be investigated to 
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locate and identify the multiplicity of sovereign powers that affect the Palestinian life in 
the country (see Chapter 3 and 5). Moreover, interested in exploring what happens after the 
decision on the exception has taken place and what the Palestinians‟ forms of resistance 
are, refugees‟ voices and spaces needed to be included in order to problematise the often 
taken for granted assumptions that „refugees equal bare life‟ and „refugee camps equal 
space of exception‟.  
In order to address these concerns, I decided to adopt a qualitative approach 
through ethnographic practices and archival research. On the one hand, archival research 
accompanied with interviews with Lebanese government‟s officials, UN and Palestinian 
representatives, would have provided insights into the politics of exclusion of the 
Palestinian refugees‟ and refugee camps in Lebanon. While this approach would have been 
essential to uncover the juridical and legal aspects of the Palestinians‟ lives and camps in 
Lebanon, only ethnographic practices and participant observation in the camps could 
reveal the lived experiences, everyday struggles and resilience of the refugees. Direct 
observation could uncover the extent to which we might consider the refugee camp 
through Agamben‟s lenses of exception. As Nick Megoran (2006) argues, in fact, there is 
an urgent need to bring ethnography and ethnographic practices into the sub-discipline of 
political geography. In his research on the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan boundary, Megoran 
(2006: 627) suggests that ethnographic participant observation combined with „technico-
legal studies‟ might be the right key to understand political and geopolitical decisions as 
well as their impact on communities. In particular, ethnographic practices offer the chance 
to observe the ways in which people react to marginalisation and discrimination to which 
they are confined by developing different strategies of survival. 
Fieldwork in Lebanon was crucial to address the research questions. Although it 
would have been interesting to access and research camps in remote areas far from Beirut, 
staying in the capital could allow observation of one of the camps of Metropolitan Beirut 
and facilitate access to archives, libraries and stakeholders. Moreover, while the camps of 
the capital could be easily accessed with no checkpoint obstructing entries and exits, this 
was not the case for the rest of the Palestinian camps. Indeed, my attempts to enter El-Buss 
camp in Tyre failed as I was stopped at the checkpoint and refused entry claiming that a 
special permission from Lebanese intelligence was required. 
Considering the time constraints and potential risks in accessing other camps, I 
therefore decided that my investigation would have focused on Shatila (Metropolitan 
Beirut). Although Shatila is one of the most studied camps in Lebanon and the Middle East 
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as site of one of the most tragic events of twentieth century history – the massacre of Sabra 
and Shatila in 1982 – it could still be approached from different angles and perspectives. 
Rosemary Sayigh‟s (1994) and Julie Peteet‟s (2005) work have offered an excellent 
background on the history of the camp, its evolution and the predicament of its inhabitants. 
While the political structure and administration of this camp has been partially covered 
(Kortam, 2007, 2008), Shatila‟s present day urban location also stimulated the examination 
of the relation of the refugee camp to informal settlements and the city. Very often, in fact, 
refugee camps are considered as separate spaces worth of attention and as spatial devices 
aiming at separating the figures of the refugee and the citizen. However, in this research I 
wanted to also move the enquiry beyond the camp boundaries to investigate in innovative 
ways the relationship of the camp with what lies outside (see Chapter 6). Therefore, 
although Shatila has extensively been written about, new perspectives could still be 
uncovered and revealed. 
In the field: Between ‘Ethics’ and ‘ethics’ 
Ethnographic practices and ‘embodied’ research 
Fieldwork in Beirut was conducted in three months between October 2008 and 
January 2009. As it included ethnographic practices, residing in the camp would have been 
the preferable solution to undertake ethnographic observation and to contribute to the life 
of the camp. However, a combination of strict university regulations and unfamiliarity with 
the camp led me to opt for accommodation outside Shatila. While „proper‟ ethnography 
would require living with and fully participating to the community‟s life, the approach of 
my research could still be considered ethnographic as I planned to regularly commute to 
the camp throughout the length of my stay in Beirut for some three days a week (Crang 
and Cook, 2007: 39; see also Bennett, 2002). Although I kept open the possibility to move 
to the camp once I had established trustworthy contacts, this possibility did not materialise 
as in December 2008-January 2009 „Operation Cast Lead‟ and the siege of Gaza at the 
hands of the Israeli army compromised my research in Shatila (discussed in more detail 
subsequently). 
Access to the camp was obtained through the Institute for Palestine Studies where I 
began working on their archives. Moreover, I was known through previous contacts and 
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research at the Institute in 2004. Through them I was introduced to an NGO with an office 
in Shatila and went through an interview in which the director of the NGO enquired about 
my research and aims. I fully explained the intention of my visits, information I was 
interested to know about the camp and the ways in which the material collected would 
have been disseminated or used. Once „cleared‟, they accompanied me to the camp and 
from there my research in Shatila began. 
In May‟s (2001: 155-156) terms, I was not a „complete participant‟. I was not doing 
covert research, nor was I an outsider able to be fully engaged with the activities in the 
camp or the camp life. Rather, I was between being a „participant as observer‟ and 
„observer as participant‟, meaning that my intentions and aims had been fully explained, 
but my visits to the camp were not solely for the conduct of interviews. Although I was not 
a participant in the activities of the NGO or in the camp life, I used to spend time walking 
around observing the camp and people‟s activities as well as observing the NGO workers 
and their activities. As this NGO is involved in the economic and social assistance of the 
people in the camp, observation and conversation with social workers offered precious 
insights into the camp‟s life and history. It also allowed me to acquire knowledge of the 
struggles faced by the inhabitants (such as families left with no income or support, 
individuals with serious health issues that cannot be cured through UNRWA or the 
problems of children and young people dropping out of school and education). As the 
social workers shared their work experiences with me, glimpses on daily difficulties for 
Palestinian people emerged so vividly. 
Keeping a diary to record my encounters, the stories I was told and my 
observations in Shatila and the surrounding areas became an essential part of my 
fieldwork. The diary became a mixture of witnessing, observing, and interpreting the 
„field‟ that was filtered through my eyes and senses. As notes on lives and experiences are 
inherently selective, fieldnotes, as Emerson et al. (2001: 353) suggest, are representations 
that „reduc[e] just-observed events, persons and places to written accounts‟ (see also 
Rabinow, 1977: 38). What the researcher misses or includes is part of what he/she might 
see or perceive as different. A diary might not be about „facts‟ only (provided we can 
easily discern facts from opinions or subjective constructions of events). Diaries could be 
seen as „data‟ or as „me‟ (Jackson in Coffey, 1999: 119). As some might be tempted to 
keep the „data‟ and the „me‟ separated in a vain attempt to give their work a nuance of 
objectivity, in my fieldnotes  I left my „data‟ enmeshed with „me‟. As the diary was meant 
to remain „private‟, I wanted to leave my impressions guide my writing. Although it could 
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be argued that this was not a scientific approach as I left the „self‟ encroach the „field‟, it 
proved the right strategy in helping reveal my own biases. This did not mean that the „me‟ 
prevailed on the „data‟ in all the aspects of my research. As the „me‟ influenced and 
described the field, I was in turn transformed and shaped by the „data‟, the camp, its 
surroundings and my encounters as my position and research questions were constantly 
challenged. 
After each visit to Shatila, I would write about my day in the camp, stories I was 
told, my observations and perceptions. As it was not intended for publication, my diary 
(scratch papers and digital files written in both English and Italian) was made up of 
statements written as a non-stop flow. Since as time goes by memory fades and details are 
forgotten, no attention could be paid to the use of the right word or phrase or to the 
production of an „embellished‟ and well-thought account. Personal journals are often 
„messy‟ in this way reflecting the confusion about the „field‟, the sense of displacement 
and misunderstandings. They are left open-ended with multiple questions and 
interpretations. They are not a finished work, but an ongoing process that does not 
necessarily reflect coherence, careful analysis and are also tied to emotions (see also Zara, 
Forthcoming). I was moving from a „realist tale‟, which considered events or the accounts 
of the people interviewed to a „confessional tale‟ in which my own thoughts and reflections 
became central too. So as to keep myself constantly aware that I was not immune to 
misjudgement and partiality, I decided that I would have not re-read my notes to correct 
wrong statements or interpretations. I left them open, incomplete with space on the side 
that would have allowed me to later revise opinions and to track misinterpretations in this 
way leaving my biases there to remind me of mistakes. On the one hand, the pages of my 
diary became a reminder of situations experienced. On the other, and perhaps more 
importantly, those pages became reminders of the fragility of my knowledge, my failures 
and misjudgements. The fieldnotes became also a record of difficulties and complexities of 
the life of the camp as well as doing research in an environment in which people are 
perceived, and perhaps rightly so, as disadvantaged; a place where the researcher, coming 
from a much better social and economic position, has to come to terms with an unwanted, 
undesired and sudden sense of empowerment and, at times, the resulting great sense of 
guilt. 
These complex power relations, emotions and perceptions of the field needed to be 
exposed. Although it may seem a „confessional tale‟, it is part of doing more „embodied‟ 
research with no claim to objectivity or to the right distance to observe and understand. 
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Nor is it a claim to an insider status that would not guarantee a truthful and objective 
account (see also Sidaway, 1992). Planned as private reflections, it became very much part 
of the research itself as my own way of tackling the „crisis of representation‟ by revealing 
fragilities and failures beside successful achievements. The account of the latter, in fact, 
would only place the researcher on a pedestal, tripping once again on the „god trick‟, on the 
gaze from nowhere that sees everything and, in so doing, promises objectivity (Coffey, 
1999: 122-123; Haraway, 1988: 581). 
Fieldnotes are not only essential as reminders of biases, but also offer preliminary 
analytical insights (see also Emerson et al., 2001: 361). The field was affecting me. It 
influenced my perspectives and challenged my position and research questions. As I re-
read my notes, I can clearly remember my first day in Shatila as well as my recording of 
thoughts and encounters when I left. The camp boundaries were not visible and only those 
who accompanied me to the camp for the first time could tell where the camp „began‟ and 
„ended‟. I drew rudimentary maps and sketches to remind myself where the actual northern 
camp boundary was (the side from which I used to access the camp). Only a net with open 
access divides the northern part of the camp from non-camp areas. While I am not arguing 
that the camp has always been this open and accessible (during the multiple sieges of the 
„War of the Camps‟ in the 1980s it was encircled and closed by checkpoints until the early 
1990s), the present day openness needed to be investigated as well as the relation of the 
camp to its outside. From that very first day, I realised how this peculiar aspect of Shatila 
could have easily turned into a section of the thesis I was about to write investigating the 
openness of the refugee camp that at times is neglected (see Chapter 6). While I inevitably 
arrived at Shatila with my pre-packaged theoretical notions of what a refugee camp is, I let 
the „field‟ guide my enquiry too. 
Yet, other negotiations between my plans ante-fieldwork and what was actually 
achievable or ethically doable needed to be considered once in Shatila. Originally, in fact, I 
planned to also use visual methods such as photography. In order to understand the camp 
and the camp life through Palestinians‟ eyes, I planned to enrol participants in auto-
photography, encouraging them to take pictures with a Polaroid camera of parts of the 
camp, objects or scenes that could be meaningful to them (Crang and Cook, 2007: 111-
113). This could have been an interesting method to explore the ways in which the 
Palestinians interpret and understand their own environment. Pictures taken could have 
also stimulated discussions in the aftermath about what was important to them, such as 
events and places. Unfortunately, while not formally prevented, taking pictures in the camp 
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would have been problematic. It would have attracted undesired attention towards those 
accompanying me. Furthermore, also my taking pictures seemed not to be a wise option. 
Security concerns and alerts are high as the presence of informants and spies in the camps 
has given the Palestinians a hard time. Although some informants came from the 
Palestinian community, non-Palestinians are often viewed with suspicion. At the time of 
my fieldwork and its aftermath, news about spies in Lebanon trained and paid by Israel 
were common. Although this seemed to be more related to the Israel-Hezbollah ongoing 
hostilities and confrontations, keeping a low profile in the camp was the safest and wisest 
option. 
While security may seem to be the first and most important concern for refusing to 
take pictures, I moreover felt that photographing the camp was rather unethical. As Crang 
and Cook (2007: 31-32) maintain, there is a difference between „Ethics‟ with a capital „E‟ 
and „ethics‟ with lower case „e‟, meaning that there is no unique ethics to follow. While 
„Ethics‟ is embodied in the standardised guides of social research practices, „ethics‟ is part 
of everyday negotiations and translation of different ways of understanding ethics 
according to cultures, contexts and circumstances. This means that practices that according 
to „Ethics‟ are appropriate or recommended could even become „unethical‟ in different 
contexts or cultures. As regards my taking pictures in the camp, even though I had 
obtained permission to do so and I was told that it was fine – therefore ticking the „Ethics‟ 
box – I felt it would have been inappropriate. My very presence in the camp necessarily 
involved representation and reproduction of uneven power relations. I was also told that 
recently tourists had begun visiting the camp, perhaps in search of a bit of adventure in a 
site that witnessed unprecedented violence. Further voyeurism and spectacularisation 
would have been unethical and unnecessary. 
Interviews in the camp and beyond 
Original plans before fieldwork contemplated the collection of some forty semi-
structured interviews with Palestinians living in Shatila. Semi-structured interviews could 
have given the chance for Palestinians interviewed to reply on their own terms, expanding 
their answers if so they wished. This was also ideal for me as I could have asked them to 
re-elaborate or propose other questions following their answers to deepen certain aspects 
that were not clear or were worth exploring more (May, 2001: 123-124; Valentine, 2005). 
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Once in the „field‟, however, things did not go as planned and I needed to be as 
open and flexible as I could. Zahra, the social worker, accompanying me for the interviews 
asked me what kind of people I wanted to meet. As if respecting the cold sample 
requirements of social scientists preoccupied with issues of representativeness, I said that 
having the widest range of people – in terms of age and gender – would have been best. 
While a well-balanced sample was achieved, I did not manage to collect as many 
interviews as I originally planned. Fieldwork started as scheduled in October 2008, but 
events on 27th December 2008 and their aftermath made conducting research in the camp 
difficult and inappropriate. The siege of Gaza by the Israeli army through „Operation Cast 
Lead‟ also had effects on the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and on people‟s mood. 
The people of Shatila felt the siege personally. Everyone had their fellow Palestinians in 
Gaza in their minds. Discussion about any other topic was felt to be deeply inappropriate. 
Hence, formal recording and interviews on camp life stopped on that day with only twenty-
one interviews collected in Shatila. 
The ways in which participants were contacted was mainly through Zahra. These 
were either pre-arranged interviews or interviews with people as result of causal 
encounters in the streets of the camp while we were walking together. Snowballing through 
Zahra and other participants was fundamental to gain the trust of all the people I managed 
to meet and talk to in the camp as well as outside. Being introduced to someone by their 
relative or acquaintance automatically brought a sense of trust in me (Valentine, 2005). 
While at the beginning I planned to interview Palestinians living in Shatila, once in 
the camp I realised how boundaries, physical and national, could easily blur. On my first 
day of interviews, Zahra and I visited people that were all living outside Shatila, and one 
encounter out of three was with a Lebanese woman. The following days I realised how the 
distinction between the camp and its outside was not only imperceptible and how the camp 
seemed to never begin or end, but also how lines categorising people were not clear-cut 
and definite. Palestinians lived alongside Lebanese. Intermarriages were also quite 
common. Living in the camp or outside of the camp seemed not making much difference 
as people lived and worked in Shatila as well as outside. I simply let things be. I also left 
Zahra‟s intuitions and experience guide my research and encounters: since her birth she 
has been living, experiencing and „breathing‟ Shatila as well as the adjacent areas. She 
knew many Palestinians living outside the camp and commuting to the camp to work, as 
well as many Lebanese living inside the camp and commuting outside to work. There were 
no fences separating them, nor distinctions between camp and non-camp. Everything was 
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so fluid that my „sample‟ was made up of Palestinians (mostly) as well as Lebanese, living 
in the camp and in its immediate proximity. This shows how social science categorisation 
and samples might reduce complex realities such as these to bare names, numbers and 
categories and, in so doing, forget to take into account processes, experiences and life itself 
that blur boundaries between different nationalities, citizenships and identities.  
Interviews usually took place in the participant‟s home, a comfortable place where 
they (and I) could feel at ease talking. The familiarity and informality of the environment 
where our encounters took place needed to be preserved in the encounter itself. While 
getting a formal and written consent for the interviews is a recommended practice of 
research „Ethics‟, introducing formalities in an environment that is intended to be informal 
would not be a wise move. Besides, refugees, who for long have been subjected to 
disciplinary forms of power by state authorities, might have seen such formalities with 
suspicion and fear while this would have undermined the trust that was reflected on me 
through Zahra‟s presence. Although I made sure that everyone knew who I was, where I 
was studying, the purpose of my presence as well as the use of the interviews in the 
dissemination of the research, a written consent signed by the participants was felt to be 
inappropriate and possibly a significant hindrance. 
Interviews were mostly conducted in Arabic, and when possible in English and also 
Spanish when the participants so wished. As Desbiens and Ruddick (2006: 4) maintain, 
language is never neutral or placeless but always deeply entrenched in precise geographies 
and social and political structures (see also Desbiens, 2002). I was aware that the use of 
English, in particular, could have been deeply problematic and could be associated with 
quite unpleasant geopolitical scenarios: to the Palestinians, and many others, the British 
were responsible of their displacement and Nakba. Someone coming from a British 
University and speaking English perhaps might have not been seen as an innocent and 
unproblematic presence. I therefore privileged the use of Arabic over other languages.  
Despite my study of Classical Arabic during my BA, I was not able to conduct 
interviews myself in Arabic. I knew the basics of conversation in Modern Standard Arabic 
or Egyptian dialect learnt through my stay in Cairo some years before (February 2003-May 
2003), but these could significantly differ from the Levantine Arabic spoken in Lebanon 
and Palestine. Although I was also attending some courses of Levantine Arabic during my 
stay in Beirut, the language learnt only allowed me to introduce myself and have a basic 
conversation. While language and cultural fluency are preferable for the successful 
completion of a research project in different environments and contexts (Gade, 2001; 
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Veeck, 2001), I had to rely on the translation of Zahra who became a key mediator in the 
research process. The use of English or Spanish was limited to the interviewees‟ consent 
and/or desire to have a conversation in a language other than Arabic. 
While conducting the interviews by myself in Arabic was preferable, the positive 
aspects of having a translator that comes from the same background of the participants are 
numerous. From a linguistic translator, Zahra became a precious cultural interpreter too. 
An asset for my research, she facilitated accessed to information and trust that otherwise I 
could not have obtained. Not only was she able to contextualise certain expressions or 
provide precious insights about the camp, she could also explain why some people behaved 
in a certain way. I clearly remember the day when we were in the house of Abdallah, a 
Palestinian man in his 70s. His son came in the living room during the interview. Although 
he kindly introduced himself when I put my hand forward to shake his, he refused to touch 
it while placing his hand on his chest and shaking his head. I felt embarrassed, but had also 
mixed feelings of anger and surprise. Why did he refuse to touch my hand? Is it because I 
am not Muslim? Or because I am a woman and therefore inferior? Only some days after 
that encounter I understood why that boy refused to touch my hand as we were about to 
meet a doctor and Zahra explained to me how to behave in that specific occasion. She did 
not know about the views of the person we met some days earlier, but she had a clear sense 
of the views of the doctor we were about to meet. She explained that pious religious men 
are not allowed to touch a woman who is not their wife, mother or sister. Simply as it was, 
with no harm meant on their part, these two men simply could not touch me. Until I knew 
the explanation, I mistook their respect for their religion, for something else or a lack of 
respect towards me. In this instance local translators become „intermediaries‟ between 
different languages, people and cultural backgrounds, while my diary kept track of my 
misjudgements and assumptions (Bujra, 2006). 
While the use of a translator may lead at times to the researcher‟s loss of control of 
the interview process, after some early frustrations for not being able to ask my „list of 
questions‟ I decided that I had to trust Zahra. She knew what she was doing. She knew the 
context and the people. She understood the matters that were too sensitive and matters that 
she thought people would not be interested in being asked. She was an incredible asset in 
getting people to talk. She was pressing the right buttons at the right time and I recognised 
her key role in also getting people to trust me and be willing to talk to me. As discussed 
above, the period in which I was conducting fieldwork was particularly delicate as news 
about spies was spreading on an almost daily basis. Although people have been extremely 
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welcoming and generous, the camp population remains vigilant. Anyone pretending to be 
an NGO volunteer or a researcher could easily get into the camp and gain any information. 
Zahra‟s presence next to me during the interviews was a reassurance for those who opened 
up and talked. 
Although her presence was a reassurance for the participants and a precious 
interpreter of extralinguistic information for me, I was aware that the use of translator must 
be carefully reflected upon. My knowledge of Arabic was not good enough to conduct 
interviews by myself, but it was enough to understand that at times translation may have 
not been entirely accurate. As Burja (2006: 176) points out: 
Translators are not simple ciphers without political or social views 
of their own. They may find it hard not to betray this in their 
translations, presenting one side‟s position with more conviction 
and elaboration than the other, or even contradicting the accounts 
that are given in order to present their own opinions. 
As I foresaw these risks, I asked Zahra to provide a brief summary of answers that would 
have allowed me to keep the track of the conversation or ask new questions as a result of 
what was said. The use of tape recorder, with the consent of all participants, became 
essential. The transcription process would have looked at both Arabic and English texts of 
those conversations so as to distinguish Zahra‟s thoughts and opinions from the 
participants‟. There was also the risk of Zahra missing passages in the translation process 
that could have been recorded and analysed in a second moment.  
Beyond Shatila and its neighbourhood, other interviews were conducted with two 
Palestinian scholars working in Mar Elias camp (Souheil El-Natour and Jaber Suleiman); 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation (hereafter PLO) representative in Lebanon (Abbas 
Zaki); an UNRWA source; and a Lebanese official, advisor of the government. The last 
two sources wished to remain anonymous. Interviews with Souheil El-Natour and Jaber 
Suleiman took place in their offices in Mar Elias camp and were conducted in English. 
They have published extensively on the violation of the Palestinian refugees‟ human rights 
and camps in Lebanon. Both of them work for the improvement of the Palestinian 
From the „field‟ to the „representation‟ 
52 
 
refugees‟ condition in the country (Al-Natour, 1997; El-Natour, 1993, 2003; El-Natour and 
Yassine, 2007; Natour, 2005; Suleiman, 1999, 2001, 2006).
1
 Both of them, refugees themselves and working in the camps, could provide precious 
insights on the ways in which the Lebanese government has been addressing the issue of 
the Palestinian refugees in the country since 1948, and the ways in which security is dealt 
by the Palestinian factions controlling the camps and the Lebanese authorities. 
While El-Natour and Suleiman, along with the interviews conducted in Shatila and 
adjacent areas, could also offer accounts on the life of Palestinians in Lebanon, other 
sources – such as the representative of the PLO, the UNRWA source and the Lebanese 
official mentioned above – provided more „official‟ and „diplomatic‟ accounts. 
Representing and speaking for an institution and having to justify certain policies and 
decisions led them to carefully weigh their statements according to their agenda or the 
agenda of the organisation/body for which they work. Yet, while some of them hold key 
positions in the management of the life of the Palestinian refugees, they themselves have 
no direct, or little, contact with the reality of the camps or disadvantaged Palestinians 
living outside the camps. For this reason, their words have been considered as providing 
the representation of an official account that might be unrelated to or dismissive of the 
reality on the ground. 
Reflection in the field and after the field: Power relations and the problem of the 
‘truth’ 
„First World researchers‟ doing research in „Third World countries‟ are faced with 
challenges before, during and in the aftermath of fieldwork (Sidaway, 1992; Porter, 1995). 
The spectre of colonialism, the presumption of knowing, and the arrogance of representing 
are dilemmas that we, as researchers, constantly face. „Speaking for‟ – as political 
representation – and „speaking about‟ – as description and discursive representation of 
other realities – are an inescapable trap that researchers need to carefully consider (Spivak, 
1988). For long postcolonial and feminist theorists have been questioning the objectivity of 
the knowledge produced and the complex landscape of power relations that takes shape 
during research as well as in its aftermath through dissemination (among others see 
Haraway, 1988; Said, 1978; Rose, 1997). Haraway (1988) argues that objectivity can be 
achieved only by „situating‟ our knowledge and claims. Thus reflexivity becomes a „must‟. 
                                               
1 Differences in the spelling of El-Natour‟s name as reported in his publications. 
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Not only limited to the dissemination of our results, reflection should accompany each 
stage of our projects: from the design of the research and collection of material, to the 
production of knowledge. Reflexivity is paramount to contextualise and situate our claims 
as well as the claims of multiple texts (written, oral or visual and more) we are to analyse. 
As regards the research in developing countries, Sidaway (1992: 403) suggests that 
the politics of the encounter with the other is a relation that needs to be reflected upon. In 
the complex landscape of power relations, we, as researchers, may find ourselves shifting 
positions. From a relatively low, middle or working class positions that we may occupy in 
our everyday life in the developed world, we can become „(relatively) rich‟ and powerful. 
From our offices and departments to the field, we not only travel through different 
geographical locations, but also through multiple social and economic scales. Moreover, 
we are political subjects that through our „being there‟ and our freedom of movement re-
install oppressive and unequal power relations of the past and the present.  
Who gave me the right to be there? I can easily travel, move to different countries, 
even able to get visas at the arrival airports with no need to go through the hassle of slow 
and sometimes offensive procedures that other people with a different passport have to 
undergo to be able to move. I, the one who could move so freely, was facing people who 
did not have a passport and a recognised nationality! Who gave me the right to ask 
questions? A sense of inadequacy accompanied me throughout the fieldwork. The 
dominant position in which I found myself was at times unbearable. Questioning the 
morality of what I was doing was constant. While these reflections are important to the 
extent that they reveal the enormous disparity and inequality between the researcher and 
the „researched‟ in certain contexts, self-indulgence is never a solution. Even though 
„ethnographic honesty about such feelings is one response‟ to the power relation 
discomfort (Robinson, 1994: 223), we must always face differences and conflicts not as 
failures and insurmountable problems but as political spaces and opportunities to re-
negotiate oppressive power relations (Rose, 1997). As Rose suggests, if the researcher 
feels too empowered, the solution is to redistribute power „excesses‟.  
For me this redistribution and re-negotiation of power translated in the ways in 
which the interviews were conducted, or better, at times not even „directed‟. Although I 
prepared a set of questions to ask or themes to be covered, I did not force those questions. I 
had to listen to what people wanted to say even if at times I felt conversations were moving 
rather far away from my research. I appreciated the ways in which at times I was myself 
challenged during the interviews with expressions such as „Now I want to ask [you] a 
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question!‟ as Yusuf,  a Palestinian of Shatila, questioned my research on their life in the 
camps when they should not even be in Lebanon. Why was I not researching what 
happened in 1948?
2
 I also appreciated the way in which sometimes, in a very polite way, 
some participants have taken the stage. For example, to show me what the Nakba and the 
dispossession meant to them, Mahmoud, a Palestinian in his 80s, suddenly grabbed my 
recorder and said: 
I am the one who has rights, who has legal rights… and someone 
comes to take it from me by force… But it‟s mine! […] This 
camera is hers… I can take it from her by force, but it‟s still her 
camera!
3
 
Some wanted to focus more on what happened on 1948, or about the „saga‟ of their 
families (who married whom, how marriages could turn into family fights as some 
members of the family disapproved the matrimony). Letting them speak about what they 
felt like saying was my strategy to renegotiate (although never completely balance) the 
power relations. While at times I felt that conversations were moving far away from the 
information I was looking for as planned semi-structured interviews turned into open-
narratives, the stories of their several displacements (in 1948 as well as during the 
Lebanese civil war) or the account of their families‟ everyday struggles and joys also 
revealed their relatively „normalcy‟ of being a Palestinian and a refugee in Lebanon. 
Between the lines, one could also read definitions of what is a „camp‟ to them for instance, 
or the difficulties of building their shelters and houses in certain periods (more so before 
1969, as I discuss in Chapter 5) as well as their relationship with the Lebanese authorities 
or the Palestinian factions administering the camps in different periods. 
Another important aspect of the research process and a key means through which to 
situate the knowledge we produce, as well as the one we receive from informants, is a 
reflection on our own positionality (Rose, 1997). This means being attentive to our own 
identity: the way it is constructed and the way it is „read‟ by our participants. I must be 
aware that my identity or the place in which I may be positioned by the participants may 
                                               
2 Yusuf, Shatila, 18 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
3 Mahmoud, Shatila, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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affect people‟s accounts. In Shatila and the surrounding areas where I conducted my 
interviews these issues became even more significant because of the different positions that 
my participants and I occupied in the chessboard of power relations. I was an outsider: an 
Italian student doing a doctoral research in a British institution on the Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon. My identity or the way they may see me might have affected their account. 
While most of the people I had conversations with reiterated their wish to return to 
Palestine, I have also wondered if that was an „official statement‟ on their part that would 
not compromise their claims on the right of return and compensation. Would they have 
said the same to another person? To a Lebanese or a fellow Palestinian? Were their 
statements reflecting their deepest desires?
4
 
These kinds of reflection inevitably lead us to discuss also the positionality of the 
participants. We do not know the participants‟ intentions and agendas. As the researcher 
gets to choose the topic of research and the questions to ask, consciously or unconsciously 
participants select what to say and the way to say it. Their account may follow an agenda. 
As Rabinow (1977: 119) suggests, we should be careful in our analysis and consider that: 
first, [...] we ourselves are historically situated through the 
questions we ask and the manner in which we seek to understand 
and experience the world; and second, that what we receive from 
our informants are interpretations, equally mediated by history and 
culture. Consequently, the data we collect is doubly mediated, first 
by our own presence and then by the second-order self-reflection 
we demand from our informants. 
 
My respondents might have „stored‟ certain memories and events over others because they 
are more meaningful to them (like we all do). Some events or experiences might be 
emphasised while others completely excluded. Or what they say might be conditioned by 
the very presence of the researcher and, therefore, they tell what they think the researcher 
might expect to hear. In particular, one of the positive, but also negative, aspects of doing 
                                               
4 On the ways in which researchers‟ identity may influence the information received see also 
Soukarieh, 2009 and Sayigh, 1994b: 8-9. 
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research in Shatila is that many academics and journalists have visited this camp before. 
On the one hand, people are prepared for these kinds of situations that are not new to them 
and they are used to talking to strangers and foreigners. On the other, they might think that 
all researchers or journalists want to know the same things and they might shape their 
account according to what they think I wanted to hear. Some may have pre-packaged their 
life stories. As some people I met in Shatila told me they had been previously interviewed, 
they may have understood what people look from them and present the researcher with a 
„pre-packaged‟ account. 
For long academics have being questioning the ways in which we can obtain and 
produce objective and truthful knowledge. Yet, we have to accept the fact that one truth 
simply does not exist. Discussing the epistemic consequences in using oral history as 
research methodology, anthropologist Sayigh (1994: 6) suggests that we do not have to 
take the accounts as historical „facts‟, but just see them as historical experiences. In her 
investigation of the Hutu refugees in Tanzania living in the camps, for example, Liisa 
Malkki (1995a) refuses to look for „truthful‟ statements and is not interested in verifying if 
the story she is told is true or not. But she is interested in the ways in which narration is 
constructed, what stories are used by the refugees to make sense of their past and present. 
In particular, individual and collective memories play an important role in the 
Palestinians‟ accounts. Collective memories of the Nakba are constructed and preserved by 
the refugees to challenge the „sanitised‟ history told by official accounts interested in 
erasing the abuse and violence that the Palestinian people endured. The strength of 
collective memories was particularly felt during my encounters in Shatila as I perceived 
the importance for the Palestinians to still talk about the Nakba in order to not forget their 
past and rights and to re-affirm these in front of visitors (see also McEwan, 2003: 755-
757). 
At the same time, collective memories are part of more fragmented stories and 
individual experiences that the respondent chooses to stress, tell or omit. When participants 
are asked to talk about their life, we cannot expect to be told the truth (as if one truth 
exists). Narrating one‟s life means constructing it and „constructions may lead to different 
kinds of “truths”‟ as „life stories are not and cannot be objective: they are always 
“artificial, variable and partial”‟ (Plummer, 2001: 401). This does not mean that they are 
not valuable, it could well be that some statement that are „untrue‟, „unrealistic‟ may be 
„psychologically true‟. The ways in which we can evaluate life stories are, as Plummer 
(ibid) maintains, different. We can do what he calls „reality checks‟ – looking at the 
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„internal consistency‟ of the life story; we can focus on the „narrative truths‟ by „see[ing] 
the world through their point of view, even if this world does not “match reality”‟; or life 
stories can be considered for the ways in which they function and we might look for „the 
role they play in personal and cultural life‟. 
Although researchers should not make judgements on information received, it is 
always paramount to contextualise certain stories we may be told. While I did not judge the 
reliability of the people I encountered and interviewed, I reflected on the reasons why in 
certain cases accounts may have appeared distorted or lacking consistency. Looking at the 
genealogies of the account – what people chose to tell and privilege – we might realise that 
if the knowledge produced by researchers is partial and situated, so is the narrative 
produced by the participants. Whilst still revealing a narrative of predicament and struggle 
of the Palestinian life in Lebanon, some „embellished‟ – to me – accounts of their life or 
fictional and fabricated identities – as we all do – were a way to produce what I call a 
„cognitive resistance‟. As collective memory re-instate the refugees‟ rights and 
predicament, individual truths or stories may be constructed to better justify their presence 
in the camp as their own choice rather than showing that their living there is an indirect 
obligation caused by the rampant discrimination that would not allow them to rent 
anything outside the camp (see Chapter 3). As my and their partial and situated 
knowledges met, I have always attempted to cross-reference people‟s stories about the 
same situations and events and to compare interviews‟ accounts and assumptions with 
other official accounts or anthropologists‟ work. 
Archival research and other written secondary sources 
Ethnographic practices and interviews in the camp could address the everyday 
Palestinian refugees‟ struggle. They could also reveal the multiple ways in which the 
refugees resist and fight back the sovereign‟s decision. But who is the sovereign? And 
what are the decisions that affect the Palestinian life? On the one hand, from informal 
discussions in the camp as well as interviews with refugees and the popular committee 
administering the camp, the governance and power relations in the camp space could 
emerge. On the other, as part of this research was to reveal the multiplicity of scales on 
which sovereign power operates, archive research became essential. In particular, I was 
interested in the multiscalar sovereigns‟ decisions as well as the politico-juridical structure 
of the camp, so I looked for texts and documentation that could uncover the legal status of 
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the camp. As different sovereigns were at stake – beyond the Palestinian factions that 
today administer the camp – it became essential to look for Lebanese government‟s and 
UNRWA‟s documentation addressing the status of the refugee camps and the land on 
which they have been established. 
Archives are the primary source to gain historical, but also contemporary, 
information. Yet, we must be careful in taking for granted the truthfulness of documents 
and assume that their categorisation is without biases or interpretations (Foucault, 2002). 
As Hannam (2002b: 113) argues, „[t]he formation of archives is a characteristic of 
modernity that emphasised values of ordered, systematic knowledge and the scientific 
search for truth and classification‟. The creation of archives is the outcome of 
governments‟ obsession with controlling knowledge and the knowledge of the past. But as 
Hannam reminds us, archives are inherently „selective‟ in what could be displayed, open to 
the public access, but also collected, and preserved. Paraphrasing Foucault (2002), also 
May (2001: 177-178) stresses that documents must not be considered as „self-evident‟, „but 
as part of the ways in which truth is produced‟. While they claim neutrality, they are 
deeply embedded in power relations. As a result, archives are highly contested sites that 
shape history and what is deemed worthy reporting and preserving, as well as reject certain 
knowledges and accounts. 
Aware of the partiality of knowledge of archives and facing the risk of not having 
access to documentation I was looking for, I searched texts that could indicate the legal 
status of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, in general, and Shatila camp in 
particular. When enquiring into the legal status of the camp I have often been told that 
refugee camps have been established by UNRWA in conversation with the Lebanese 
authorities and that special agreements have been signed by both parties. During my 
fieldwork in Lebanon, I searched the archives of the American University of Beirut 
(AUB), the Institute for Palestine Studies, and ESCWA (United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia). UNRWA does not have an archive in Lebanon. 
Some UNRWA records are kept in the ESCWA library of Beirut, but most of the 
documentation is preserved in UNRWA headquarters in Amman and some files are to be 
found in the UN Archives in New York. My archive research in Beirut proved 
unsuccessful. I, therefore, attempted to obtain this information or to enquiry into the 
existence of such documentation during a couple of encounters with officials, but I was left 
with very vague answers implying that certain agreements exist but they are not public. 
Even my attempts to bypass the restrictions in Lebanon and to see if these agreements 
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could be available somewhere else proved unsuccessful as I searched the UN Archives in 
New York. 
My last frustrating attempt to get some clarity on who could be legally responsible 
for the camps and their management materialised as I visited the National Archives in 
London. While the latter is the best primary access to British government‟s papers and 
documents, it also contains documentation pertaining to former colonies or British 
overseas interests (Jennings, 2006). In particular, Foreign Office folders include 
communication with former colonies or British embassies abroad that follow the interests 
of the government. Unfortunately, as Jennings (2006: 245) points out, „[u]nder British law, 
most official papers are closed for 30 years‟. As expected some documents were classified, 
but I managed to retrieve letters and reports produced by and dispatched from the British 
Embassy of Beirut and sent to the Foreign Office of London in the late 1960s until the 
mid-1970s. This documentation relates to the management of the Palestinian refugee 
question in Lebanon as well as the Lebanese government‟s decision to abandon the control 
of the camps in 1969 with the signature of the Cairo Agreement (this material is discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 5). 
Although the files retrieved from the National Archives were useful to understand 
the complexity and multiplicity of sovereign powers affecting the refugees‟ lives including 
the British interest in containing the Palestinian problem, no mention of the legal status of 
the land could be found. This was not forthcoming from discussions with stakeholders in 
Lebanon, nor was it apparent in any archive visited or explored. After a sense of failure in 
not being able to retrieve this information, I realised that the only way to circumscribe the 
obstacle was to acknowledge and examine the „absence‟ of that information. If information 
was classified in Lebanon as well as somewhere else, the „absence‟ of these documents 
might have said as much as their presence. This is discussed, for example, in Chapter 5 
where I examine the status of the refugee camps in Lebanon. 
Other secondary sources that have been used are the UNRWA statistics constantly 
updated in the UNRWA website as well as its working documentation that is not published 
on the website but is available from UNRWA‟s offices at request. Yet, beyond the 
utilisation of more official sources such as statistics and different organisations‟ and 
committees‟ reports on the Palestinian refugees‟ presence in Lebanon, I have also followed 
blogs and web-users‟ comments on news pertaining to the Palestinians refugees and 
refugees camps in the country. While this approach seems unscientific, popular 
understandings and opinions should not be underestimated. On the one hand, the inclusion 
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of blogs and web-users‟ comments could contribute to the de-subjectification of 
knowledge as formal and official understanding of politics are not the only way through 
which we come to understand the world. On the other, ordinary people‟s thoughts, as it is 
shown in Chapter 4, can even become crucial and determinant in the ways in which 
„official politics and decisions‟ are dealt with and taken. 
Analysis and translations: 
An ongoing negotiation 
The first step to start the analysis of the material collected (interviews as well as 
archive documentation) began with the transcription of the interviews. As interviews in the 
camps were mostly conducted in Arabic through the help of a translator, transcription of 
conversation in Arabic and the English became paramount. The writing down of both 
Arabic and English parts of the interviews would have uncovered details that the 
translation might have missed during the interview or render justice to what was actually 
said by the participants as in some occasions Zahra added information that was peculiar to 
her own experience or view of Shatila. 
Working across languages is never a straightforward process though. Echoing 
Derrida, Smith (1996: 161) reminds us how translating is a necessity but also an 
impossibility. Words and their original meanings are lost in the passage from one language 
to another. Translating is betraying the original text and its nuances that could not be 
transplanted into another language and culture as social and political meanings differ from 
context to context. Translating also means „fighting between two fires‟: between working  
on a literal word-by-word translation – facing the impossibility of reproducing the original 
text – and working on adaptation of meanings from one language to another bearing in 
mind that translating also stands for „interpreting‟ (see also Bannet, 1993). When 
translation became necessary, I gave prominence to the meaning and the sense of people‟s 
statements and affirmations. Attempts were therefore made to maintain the translation as 
literal as possible. However, given the different linguistic and cultural contexts, some 
changes were necessary in order to maintain the sense of statements in the original 
language used, be it Arabic, Spanish, or Italian. 
Yet, translation does not only mean moving a text from one language to another, 
from one cultural and social context to another. It moreover involves the translation of an 
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oral text (the interviews and conversations) into a written one where nuances of tone, 
pauses, accents, giggles, cry, silences have meanings on their own but can hardly be 
reproduced. In order to overcome this, I made use of punctuation to help reproduce pauses 
and changes of tones as well as notes aside the transcriptions that could remind me of the 
atmosphere of the interview, ironic or more serious tones. 
As regards the analysis, interviews have been coded according to different themes. 
On the one hand, I was interested in understanding the ways in which sovereign power at 
different scales affect the Palestinians‟ lives. On the other, I was interested in revealing 
their coping strategies of survival. I, therefore, created a catalogue with themes which 
helped addressing and answering my research questions. The catalogue has been divided 
according to different main headings such as „movements‟ (How did they find themselves 
living in Shatila camp? Was it free choice or were they forced?); „housing/built 
environment‟ (Were they forced to reside in a certain area? How did they manage to build 
their houses despite the restrictions?); „work‟ (How did they manage to survive 
deprivation?); „family‟ (stories of families and marriages became insights into the 
refugees‟ everyday life in Lebanon); „camp governance‟ (How is the camp administered? 
Who is the sovereign in the camp? Whom do they refer to in case of any problems?); 
„Palestinians/Lebanese relations‟ (to see to what extent we can say that the camp is the 
spatial device that separates the refugee from the citizen); „camp as Palestine and 
resistance‟ or „camp as entrapment‟ (What is the participants‟ perception of the camp?); 
„Palestinian bare life‟ or „Palestinian resistance‟ (In what instances do they highlight the 
discrimination and manifest a sense of impotence? In what cases refugees show their 
ability to cope with discrimination or even physical assaults?). These headings and 
categorisations were accompanied by quotes and extracts from the interviews as well as 
extracts from my fieldnotes that helped to remember the contexts in which interviews took 
place.  
The investigation of the camp administration, in particular, raised quite sensitive 
issues as some complained about the Palestinian leadership in general and the ways in 
which the camp security is managed (see Chapter 5). For this reason and to protect those 
who took part to this research, anonymity has been guaranteed (see also Oliver, 2003: 78). 
Although the Palestinians and Lebanese I interviewed in Shatila and adjacent areas agreed 
on the use of their real name, I thought that extra precaution should have been placed on 
my part. While some may argue that the use of anonymity might undermine their right to 
self-determination in the research (the use of their real name and acknowledgment of their 
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role), ultimate responsibility on the use of information and participants‟ safety always lies 
with the researcher who should always bear in mind potential consequences for the 
respondents. 
The analysis of other interviews – Souheil El-Natour, Jaber Suleiman, Abbas Zaki 
(PLO representative in Lebanon 2006-2010), the UNRWA source and the Lebanese 
official – and the archive materials has been pivotal to investigate the legal and political 
aspects concerning the management of the refugee camps as well as the treatment of the 
Palestinian refugees. Representation of the camps and their alleged insecurity and 
instability, was explored discursively as each source provided different reasons for the 
„exceptionality‟ of the refugee spaces in Lebanon. As governance, control and legal issues 
pivoting around the camp were investigated, I paid attention to the discourses that were 
produced and reproduced through the interviews or the documents I have analysed (on this 
see in particular Chapters 3 and 5). 
Concluding remarks 
Being a privileged academic doing research in developing countries always raises 
innumerable concerns about the right of being there, ask people about their exclusions, 
problems and violence endured and then going back home and „speak for and about‟ them. 
Reminiscent of colonial inequalities over who might have the right to „represent‟ and who 
is kept silenced in the research process, the inescapable problem of representation 
accompanied the project from its early planning until the dissemination. Being an outsider 
raises numerous issues. The problem of the language was particularly felt. Translation, 
moving from one language to another and from an oral text to a written one, is an 
inevitable betrayal of the original. Zahra‟s role in this sense was fundamental. She was not 
only a linguistic interpreter moving between Arabic and English, but also an incredible 
asset for the whole research process. From a linguistic mediator, she became a cultural 
translator. 
Ethical concerns of doing research in the field as well as the issues of analysis and 
interpretations have been discussed, showing how delicate the process of getting 
information and interpreting what participants say is. Although it will never erase the 
inequality that exists on social, political and economic levels between the researcher and 
the researched, renegotiating power relations in the field was partially achieved through 
leaving participants to talk about what they more felt to talk about. Even though the 
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problem of representing politically and discursively – „speaking for and speaking about‟ – 
will never be solved, in order to redistribute power excesses and reduce the gap between 
researcher and researched, I also left Zahra‟s insights and intuition guide my research too.  
Conscious of these problems, writing was a process that needed careful reflection 
too. As Coffey (1999: 139) and Hyndman (2001: 266) suggest, fieldwork may legitimise 
our claims as if touching other realities could be enough to claim objectivity. Ultimately, 
however, we are responsible for finding patterns and interpreting the material collected. 
Representing is about choosing what to write, selecting what according to me and my 
research question is relevant. But is what I write the kind of knowledge that the 
participants to the research expect to see and read? In my writing I may have excluded 
accounts that instead are more important for those who took part to this project. Or I may 
have written sections that those I have encountered in Shatila might not be interested in 
reading at all (see Murphy and Robert, 2001). 
Other negotiations needed to take place between what my participants may want to 
see as research results and what another audience expects to read. Research that involves 
the participants in all stages of the research process (from the planning of the research 
questions and methods, to the dissemination stage) may be difficult to implement, 
particularly for doctoral researches where research proposals are scripted long in advance 
of any fieldwork (see also Porter, 1995). In order to not claim false or unrealistic 
expectations, I have tried to adopt a reflective approach by rendering visible my 
„authorship‟ (Coffey, 1999: 132). As the only way to claim or aspire to objectivity is 
situating our knowledges, I made myself visible as „crafter‟ of the final document. Through 
the following pages I do not claim any objectivity or truthful representation of what being 
a Palestinian in Lebanon and living in the refugee camp means. I do not pretend I am in the 
position of presenting the Palestinian refugees‟ point of view or experience in a truthful 
and objective way. In the attempt to render visible the position of those who for long have 
been discriminated, excluded and put at the margins of politics while being silenced, I 
share a commitment in the denunciation of oppression and unequal distribution of power in 
which I myself am embedded in through my privileged position as Western researcher. 
Echoing Spivak and Gramsci, McEwan (2009: 69-70) suggests that we need to combine 
the „pessimism of the intellect‟ – the problematisation of the possibility of fully and 
truthfully representing the subaltern view and agency – with the „optimism of the will‟, a 
political commitment in striving to avoid pitfalls of „speaking for‟ and „speaking about‟, 
and striving to reduce inequality and marginalisation through more ethical ways of 
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researching. Perhaps not all the following pages reflect the Palestinians‟ thoughts about 
their condition. Being honest about our interpretations of other realities is perhaps the only 
way to situate the production of our own accounts and stories. 
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3- Decentering the state: 
The global scope of sovereign power and the 
production of Palestinian bare life in Lebanon 
While attending to the modern intensification of 
biopolitics, Agamben pays little heed to the changed 
global context in which sovereignty is set. Once you 
acknowledge that an ethos is internal as well as 
external to sovereignty, you appreciate that territorial 
sovereignty has always operated within global as well 
as an internal context. 
 
(Connolly, 2007: 35-36) 
The first Arab-Israeli conflict left more than 750,000 Palestinians displaced and 
forced to leave their homes and villages of what once was Palestine under the British 
Mandate. While waiting for their right of return to be implemented as sanctioned by 
General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948), the Palestinians have found themselves guests 
of neighbouring Arab countries that alternated welcoming and benevolent hospitality with 
harsh and confrontational relations. De facto and de jure stateless since 1948, Palestinians 
have been at the mercy of their hosts‟ moods and relying on the availability of 
humanitarian aid. In fact, as the main hosting countries – Jordan, Lebanon and Syria – 
never felt responsible for their tragedy, since 1948 humanitarian agencies such as the Red 
Cross first and UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East) later, have been „taking care‟ of the refugee life. Focusing on making the 
Palestinians survive, humanitarian agencies are still not able to grant them a qualified and 
political life whose value was lost in 1948 with the proclamation of the State of Israel and 
the dissolution of the Mandate Palestine citizenship (Takkenberg, 1998). 
While the treatment reserved for the Palestinians in each country varies, Lebanon is 
the one in which they face the harshest conditions. Mainly, but not exclusively, due to the 
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peculiar confessional character of Lebanese politics and society (as discussed in the 
Introduction), the presence of the Palestinian refugees has always been perceived as 
threatening the country‟s stability and order. Institutionalised discrimination and further 
legal abandonments materialised as the Lebanese government prevented the refugees from 
enjoying basic rights such as the right to work, access to health and education services. 
While these rights have partially been addressed and implemented by humanitarian 
agencies operating in Lebanon, the government has since 1948 adopted policies that have 
socially, economically and politically excluded the Palestinians. This marginalisation was 
exacerbated by the establishment of refugee camps (see Chapter 5) that physically 
separated the Palestinians from the Lebanese citizens. 
Certainly, the Lebanese government‟s decisions over the last sixty years aggravated 
the position of the Palestinians refugees that in other countries seem to enjoy better 
treatments (Syria and Jordan) (Brand, 1988a; FMO, Undated a; Hanafi, 2010b; 
Takkenberg, 1998: 155-158, 167-169). But is Lebanon solely responsible for the 
production of what Agamben would define as Palestinian bare life? Most of the studies 
focusing on the Palestinian refugees‟ condition in Lebanon seem to blame the Lebanese 
government for the discrimination that the Palestinians endure in that country. While 
Lebanon‟s complicit role in the production of the Palestinian bare life is undeniable, 
further reflections and clarifications on the ways in which power and sovereign power 
operate is needed. 
 If by sovereign we mean the one that deciding on the exception creates a certain 
political community – the nation-state – and excludes certain lives from his protection, we 
might share the view that the sole responsibility for the Palestinian refugees‟ condition in 
Lebanon lies exclusively with the Lebanese government‟s decisions that has never 
included the Palestinians in its national body.  Some studies relying on Agamben‟s figures 
of the sovereign and bare life have identified the sovereign with state authorities. Yet, 
sovereign power is a too complex notion to be reduced to the state‟s exclusive authority 
and responsibility to dispose or protect life. While sovereign‟s task is that to include or 
exclude lives in and from the normal juridical order, the inclusion/exclusion operation is 
not the prerogative of one single sovereign. Hence, the impossibility of identifying 
sovereign power with states‟ authorities only. 
What some studies seem to overlook is the global context in which sovereignty is 
enacted and performed. As Connolly (2007) in the opening quote of the chapter suggests, 
sovereignty operates internally within a specific territorial area (and therefore over a 
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specific population that lives in that area), but also externally as part of the global order 
(see also Connolly, 2005: 148-154). The latter, in fact, is never static but is everyday 
negotiated, shaped and resisted at multiple geopolitical scales. While one of the main 
reasons for the refugees‟ predicament in Lebanon is certainly rooted in the peculiarity of 
Lebanese society and political system, also true is the fact that an important role in the 
production of Palestinian bare life has been played by actors other than Lebanon. Events 
and decisions occurring beyond Lebanon‟s boundaries, at the regional and international 
levels, have deeply influenced the Lebanese policies towards the refugees. 
As sovereignty should be disengaged from sovereign statehood solely (Edkins and 
Pin-Fat, 2004), this chapter develops an investigation of the broader extent of sovereign 
power and expands the scope of enquiry to include both international and regional scales. 
Relying on the analysis of mainly secondary written sources and with the aim of revealing 
the intricate network that manages and so strongly impacts upon Palestinian life, it 
illustrates how power is not a prerogative of the Lebanese state only. It also argues that 
decisions taken beyond Lebanon‟s territory contribute to the depoliticisation of the 
Palestinians and affect their subjectivity as much as Lebanon‟s discriminatory laws,  
decrees or administrative orders. As the chapter focuses on the multiplicity of sovereign 
powers affecting Palestinian life, the reader may notice that refugees‟ voices do not appear 
in the following sections. The latter, however, constitute an essential part of the remaining 
chapters which reveal and recognise their being political and their agency. 
With the purpose of showing the global extent of sovereign power in shaping the 
refugees‟ life and subjectivity, the first part of the chapter considers the international level. 
Starting from the international community‟s1 inability to implement the refugees‟ right of 
return, it explains how this inability to find a political solution to the Palestinians‟ 
displacement led to the deployment of humanitarian organisations in the management of 
the refugees‟ life. The second section considers how Palestinian life is not only 
depoliticised at the hands of the international community, but also in the context of Arab 
countries‟ policies and decisions pertaining to the Palestinian cause. For a long time they 
have proclaimed themselves as the truest defenders of the Palestinian people and rights, but 
for long they have also been playing the Palestinian card to maintain their power or 
influence in the Middle East. The third section of the chapter examines the Lebanese 
context and the government‟s policies regarding the Palestinian refugees in the country. It 
                                               
1 For an explanation of the use of the expression „international community‟ see note 3 in the 
Introduction. 
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demonstrates how the government‟s decisions in particular occasions are not only the 
consequence of the country‟s peculiar political confessional system, but are the direct and 
indirect consequences of regional or more international events and agencies. The latter, in 
fact, influence the ways in which the Lebanese government responds towards its 
Palestinian community. 
From the political to the humanitarian: 
Refugees’ subjectivity in formation 
Protection gaps: From political life to bare life 
Despite the numerous attempts to resolve the Palestinian refugees‟ displacement 
allowing them the return to their homes and villages in Palestine, Israel has since 1948 
resisted and rejected the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The 
return of the Palestinian refugees, especially within the newborn state‟s boundaries, would 
have certainly threatened the Jewish character of the state and its very existence as home 
for the Jewish people. To justify this refusal, Israel has always claimed that it holds no 
responsibility for their displacement and that the refugees, as labelled by the international 
community, are nothing but „migrants‟ who deliberately decided to leave Palestine or that 
voluntarily decided to follow the Arab armies‟ orders to leave their homes and villages 
during the first Arab-Israeli war (Takkenberg, 1998: 14). 
 Although historians have shown that the causes of the Palestinian displacement are 
the results of a combination of different factors – massacres carried out by Jewish military 
organisations, fear of persecution and direct Arab Armies‟ command – Israel‟s position has 
yet to change (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997: 130-137; Sayigh, 2007). Even pressures to 
guarantee the refugees‟ return from the United States – widely known for their support of 
the Jewish state politically, economically and militarily – or suggestions of the UN 
Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, back in 1948 found nothing but deaf ears 
(Chomsky, 2001; Takkenberg, 1998). As the implementation of the right of return could 
not be imposed without Israel‟s consent, the political solution to their predicament has 
remained suspended and, as a consequence, what was deemed to be a temporary 
displacement soon turned into a more permanent emergency. 
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In the neighbouring Arab countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria and in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip – until 1967 administered respectively by Jordan and Egypt – the first 
relief operations were carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the League of the Red Cross Societies (LRCS), and the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC). This was in conjunction with the UN Relief Palestine Refugees 
(UNRPR), the UN agency responsible for coordinating the humanitarian assistance 
provided to the displaced, which was operative until 1950 when it was replaced by 
UNRWA (Takkenberg, 1998: 19-24). 
Facing the impossibility of repatriating the refugees, the international community 
and the UN began considering the option of a permanent resettlement of the refugees in the 
neighbouring Arab states. Following consultations with special commissions and 
committees established to find a feasible solution to the refugees‟ predicament, the UN 
suggested that the first step towards their naturalisation in the neighbouring Arab countries 
should have been based on economic programs. The UN, in fact, firmly believed that the 
combination of development programmes from which the rising economies of the Middle 
East would have benefitted along with the creation of job opportunities for the refugees to 
alleviate the economic burdens on hosting countries, would have convinced governments 
to accept the Palestinians‟ naturalisation (pp. 26, 29-30).  
It is in this context that we must understand the establishment of UNRWA through 
General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949.
2
 As Bowker (2003: 124) 
points out, „it appears likely that the main reason for establishing UNRWA was to foster 
stability among Arab states while working to integrate the Palestinian refugees in their new 
locations‟. With the aim of improving the chances of the refugees‟ assimilation in the host 
countries and to prepare the region for the moment in which humanitarian relief and 
assistance would have ceased, UNRWA‟s duties according to Resolution 302 (IV) were as 
follows: 
a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct 
relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic 
Survey Mission; 
                                               
2 For the full text of the Resolution, see the United Nations website at 
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (last accessed August 2011). 
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b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments 
concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time 
when international assistance for relief and works projects is no 
longer available;
3
 
However, as much as the right of return was a politically sensitive issue for Israel, 
the naturalisation of the Palestinians in the Arab countries hosting them was a highly 
sensitive matter that could not be implemented without the consent of the governments 
involved. Despite these attempts to „sugar the pill‟ for the Arab states hosting the refugees 
by providing job opportunities for the refugees and development programs for the states, 
Lebanon and Syria, in particular, strongly opposed the Palestinians‟ integration 
(Takkenberg, 1998). Having to face both Israel‟s and the Arab governments‟ refusal to 
accept the refugees, UNRWA, from a „Works Agency‟, as its acronym would suggest, 
assumed control of the humanitarian aspect. Its mission was limited to the provision of 
rations, health care and education to refugees living in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West 
Bank and the Gaza strip where refugees‟ presence was more significant than in other 
Middle Eastern countries. The humanitarian relief was therefore seen as a valid substitute 
for the political solution further manifesting the depoliticisation of the Palestinian life. 
While the Palestinians, during the British Mandate era, could enjoy the rights 
deriving from the Palestinian citizenship and the diplomatic protection that the mandate 
power could grant them, the moment the state of Israel was proclaimed on 15 May 1948 
and the British troops withdrew from Palestine, citizenship and protection automatically 
ceased to exist. Whereas Palestinians who remained within the newborn state boundaries 
and who never left their homes were included in the laws regulating the acquisition of the 
Israeli nationality, those who fled, found themselves refugees in foreign countries, were 
prevented the return, and lost rights and protection that only a citizenship status could grant 
(Takkenberg, 1998: 53, 178-183).  
The loss of citizenship rights coincided with the production of Palestinian bare life 
because a politically qualified life could only be identified with the belonging to a national 
community and the possession of a formal citizenship. In 1948, the bareness of their life 
was not only proved by their displacement and lack of protection, but has been exposed 
since the nation-state system accords political subjectivity to citizens only. As Arendt 
                                               
3 Ibid. 
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(1968) and Agamben (1995a, 1995b, 1998) have suggested, no one better than the refugee 
could embody the cracks and leakages of the nation-state system. Losing a nationality, as 
in the case of Palestinians, means the loss of human rights as „[t]he Rights of Man, 
supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable whenever people appeared who were 
no longer citizens of any sovereign state‟ (Arendt, 1968: 292-293). According to this 
reading, only if national rights are re-established – through the creation of a Palestinian 
state or the naturalisation of the refugees in the hosting countries – could human rights and 
protection be enjoyed again. 
However, the political value of the Palestinian life was also lost through a process 
that involved multiple actors including the international community, the United Nations 
and the traveaux preparatoirs of conventions and statutes of agencies dealing with the 
refugees more broadly. As Takkenberg (1998) suggests, while the preparatory works for 
the draft of the „Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees‟ (1951), the 
„Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons‟ (1954) and the statute of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have been rather 
controversial, the decision not to include the Palestinians from the benefits and protection 
they might have enjoyed from these conventions and the attached bodies – UNHCR – was 
almost an unanimous one. If we take the „Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees‟ 
as an example, the refugee is any person that: 
[…] owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
[sic] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his [sic] former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
4
 
                                               
4 For the full text of the convention see the UNHCR website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (last accessed November 2011). 
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While the convention seems to include, at least formally, the Palestinian refugees because 
of their inability to return to their homes and the lack of protection that should be granted 
by a state, the exclusion from the protection that bodies such as the UNHCR could have 
guaranteed comes in the following lines where the text declares: 
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or 
assistance (emphasis added).
5
 
As Takkenberg (1998) goes on to say, the same kind of exclusion of the Palestinians on the 
ground that they are already receiving „protection or assistance‟ from another UN agency 
is applied to them in the UNHCR statute and in the „Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons‟. It goes without saying that protection and assistance are not 
interchangeable or synonymous as the first provide diplomatic and physical protection, 
while the second is associated to the humanitarian intervention. However, everybody 
involved in the drafting process of the conventions and the UNHCR statute agreed on the 
fact that Palestinians represented a separate case that needed special attention. Although 
there is no guarantee that these conventions could actually provide the protection needed 
by any refugee or stateless person beyond the Palestinian refugees‟ case because of the 
weak international law system and the right of sovereign states to decide whether to sign 
and apply the said conventions, the decision not to include the Palestinians in these organs 
and provisions left them with no representation, no legal protection and literally abandoned 
by law. They were not only abandoned by Western democracies that deemed the 
Palestinian refugees a special case deserving special attention, but also abandoned by their 
own „brothers‟. Unwilling to equate the Palestine refugee question with any other situation 
of refugeeness, the governments of Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
pressed for the exclusion of the Palestinians both from the conventions relating to the 
refugees and stateless as well as the UNHCR statute. According to them, and also 
subsequently according to the PLO that was established only in 1964, the inclusion of the 
Palestinians in those conventions and in the mandate of UNHCR would have neglected the 
                                               
5 Ibid. 
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political significance of the injustice they endured. In particular, the implementation of the 
right of return as envisioned by the „Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees‟ is 
an individual right that would obscure the collective nature of the Palestinians as a people 
with self-determination rights (ibid).
6
 
Left with no protection whatsoever, refugees and stateless at the same time, nobody 
better than the Palestinians could embody the figure of homo sacer, stripped of any 
political and juridical value as any right and protection have been taken away from them. 
As the materialisation of Agamben‟s understanding of the exception according to which 
„[t]he originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment‟, the sovereign, 
or better the multiple sovereigns, prove themselves clearly not in their applicability of the 
law but in their exclusion of certain lives from its protection (Agamben, 1998: 29; 
emphasis in the original). 
In the case of the Palestinian refugees we are witnessing the production of a double 
exclusion and exception. On the one hand, they are excluded from the nation-state system 
and denationalised through the creation of the state of Israel not followed by the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other, they are excluded from the mandate of 
UNHCR that could have „replaced‟ the legal and diplomatic protection that a state could 
and should have guaranteed. Instead of having an inclusion by virtue of an exclusion (as 
the Agambenian inclusive exclusion would imply), the double exception applied to the 
Palestinian refugees further restricted the ways in which life can be lived. As the political 
value of their life is neglected through the double exception, Palestinian refugees were left 
only with the pure management of their life at the hands of humanitarian organisations: 
UNRWA since 1950 when it became operative and other NGOs that provide assistance 
and relief. The political solution to their predicament and the comprehensive regional 
peace was abandoned in favour of a mere keep-them-alive strategy. 
The inclusive moment, that follows the double exclusion, must be identified 
through the care provided by the humanitarian agencies since 1948. As the international 
community and the UN are responsible for the double exclusion of the Palestinian life from 
a qualified political life, humanitarianism reveals as deeply implicated in this process. If it 
is true that „[t]he separation between humanitarianism and politics that we are experiencing 
                                               
6 While some would argue that the body in charge of the protection of the Palestinians would be the 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), which among other tasks was established 
to work for the implementation of the right of return, since 1952 this agency has ceased to operate towards 
the return of the refugees. Its mission today is that of merely keeping the registration records of properties 
and losses of the Palestinian refugees in the event a compensation to the refugees would be agreed upon in 
the future (Akram, 2001, 2002; Bitar, 2008). 
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today is the extreme phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the 
citizen‟, also true is the fact that humanitarianism and politics are not that separated and 
independent (Agamben, 1998: 133). As the UN and the international community strip the 
Palestinians of their rights by revealing their bare life, humanitarian organisations capture 
and further expose the very bare life they should protect and save through relief programs 
and rations that aim at making them survive but not live. As sovereign power abandons and 
excludes the refugees, the inclusion of their life is left to the humanitarian agencies who 
reveal their intimate link with the sovereign as they further contribute to the denudation of 
a life already stripped of its political and juridical value by a state or, as in the case of the 
Palestinians, its absence. 
As „movable sovereignties‟ (see Pandolfi, 2000, 2003), ready to run after each and 
every emergency around the world and to provide relief and assistance, humanitarian 
organisations are caught in the net of the nation-state interests and act as what French 
anthropologist Agier (2003, 2011) has labelled the „left hand of the Empire‟. The right 
hand of the Empire strikes by deciding on the exclusion that renders life bare, killable and 
disposable; a humanitarian left hand heals, cures, corrects and makes live (Agier, 2011: 
200). Apparently outside the sphere of a sovereign power that decides on the life and death 
of people, and apparently separated from the political arena, these organisations disclose 
their complicit role in the production of expendable lives as the humanitarian is not 
separated from the political: the humanitarian becomes the essential instrument of the 
political (Abu-Zahra, 2005; Bocco, 2009; Hardt and Negri, 2000: 35-37; Loesher, 1999). 
Beyond the „geopolitical‟ motivations of preserving the status quo and the nation-
state system, the link between the humanitarian and the political is unveiled by the fact that 
the sovereign decision on life and death is not a prerogative of states or political 
institutions only (see Caldwell, 2004; Hyndman, 2000; Lui, 2002; Soguk, 1999: 190). The 
same operation is performed within refugee camps and refugees‟ bodies by the same 
humanitarian organisations who can decide whom to „save‟ and whom to „let die‟ because 
they are too old, too ill, too undesirable. These kinds of decisions on life and death 
resemble the pure administration of life occurring in the concentration camps, where 
officers and guards were called to make a decision on whose life was worth living because 
it is productive and essential to the growth of the Nazi economy, and whose life could be 
lost with no grief and with impunity. 
As much as sovereign power produces bare life and shapes new subjectivities and 
objects of intervention, humanitarian assistance also manages and administers bare life by 
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drawing lines through operative definitions that include who might be in need and exclude 
those that can be abandoned. In this context we should examine the ways in which 
Palestinian refugees, already excluded from the diplomatic protections of states and the 
international community, were included in the mandate of UNRWA and had the right to 
receive its services.  
While UNRWA became operative only in 1950, other agencies before – such as the 
League of the Red Cross Societies (LRCS) – took care of the registration process to 
provide those in need with tents, rations or medical services. However, registering the 
Palestinians was not an easy task: not all of them could prove their identity because of the 
lack of documents; no definition adopted could easily distinguish between the temporary or 
permanent Lebanese migrants in Palestine before 1948 and the Palestinians who lived in 
Palestine ever since (Sfeir, 2008: 136). It was also difficult for these organisations to 
separate the „real‟ Palestinian refugees from the poor Lebanese of South Lebanon where 
most of these registrations took place. This was because of the proximity to the Israeli-
Lebanese border, area in which refugees remained for a considerable amount of time 
before moving elsewhere in the country. The lack of transparency and adequacy in the 
registration process is demonstrated by the fact that while some Lebanese managed to 
register with these organisations and thus benefit, some Palestinians never did so. As some 
considered their condition only temporary, they decided not to register, convinced they 
could provide for their own survival until the return was allowed. Others preferred not to 
register as they were too ashamed of their condition as refugees and displaced people 
unable to provide for themselves and their families (Bocco, 2009; Sfeir, 2008). 
When UNRWA became operative in 1950, methods of registrations were not so 
clear. Working definitions aimed solely at humanitarian relief have always been preferred 
to proper legal definitions that might have had political and juridical consequences (i.e. 
right of return above all). When UNRWA started its operations, not only did it inherit the 
registers of the humanitarian agencies operating before, but also working definitions that 
included anyone in need of assistance. It is in this context that some Lebanese were passed 
from the registers of the League of the Red Cross Societies to those of UNRWA. As the 
name of the UN agency also suggests, UNRWA had been established to take care not of 
the Palestinian refugees – meaning former Arab citizens of Palestine under the British 
Mandate – but all those that for one reason or another found themselves in Palestine at the 
moment of the conflict and had been displaced losing their means of livelihood and house. 
While this opened up the possibility for non-Palestinians to register, this chance was 
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precluded to Palestinians that did not register in the first years of UNRWA operations – 
because wealthy enough, being helped by relatives or ashamed to do so – and could not 
register later on as the agency by the mid-1950s closed the registration process.
7
 
While a detailed investigation of the refugees‟ registration process is beyond the 
scope of this enquiry, it is worth noting that as statistics seem to constitute the basis of 
certain policies affecting the Palestinians in Lebanon, UNRWA registrations and numbers 
will never reflect the actual number of Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon and do not 
reflect the actual needs of the Palestinians. As working definitions based on economic and 
assistance needs have been preferred to comprehensive legal and political definitions of 
what being a Palestinian refugee means, it seems that these registrations also prove the 
failure of the humanitarian solution. Whereas the humanitarian approach was meant to 
substitute the political solution of the refugee issue, the inability to address even the 
humanitarian needs of the refugees further reveal the intimate relation holding together a 
sovereign power deciding on the exception and a biopower concerned with the survival of 
a population.
8
 
Humanitarian biopower: Shaping refugees’ subjectivity 
As discussed, we are increasingly witnessing humanitarian organisations‟ complicit 
role in the sovereign decision. The „left hand of Empire‟, as much as the sovereign power 
that draws lines, holds the prerogative of the decision on the life and death of the millions 
of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and elsewhere. The naming, classification, 
enumeration and categorisation process represents political choices that aim to include 
some and exclude others as humanitarianism, conceived and set up to „undo‟ or „repair‟ the 
wrongs of the „right hand of the Empire‟, has instead „a major role in the transformation of 
individual lives, of social and cultural models, in the places where it operates‟ (Agier, 
2011: 5). 
Humanitarian interventions aim to make the refugees live producing them as bare 
life to be saved with no „political voice‟ (Edkins, 2000:50), but their role in constructing 
and shaping new subjectivities and perceptions of the self should not be underestimated. It 
is important to remember that although Palestine before 1948 experienced an economic 
transition that particularly hit the rural communities and the agricultural sector which 
                                               
7 For an excellent analysis on refugees‟ registrations, see Takkenberg, 1998: 68-83. 
8 For other insights into biopower as „supplement‟ of sovereign power see Neal, 2005a and Tagma, 
2010. 
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succumbed to the introduction of new machinery and capitalist modes of production, the 
Palestinians before the Nakba were independent and could rely on their own means to live 
with dignity (Sayigh, 2007). After 1948 the situation was reversed and suddenly they 
found themselves without a home, without their land on which for centuries they had relied 
for their subsistence, and displaced in another country that, despite some early welcoming 
and help, treated them like aliens. It was not only the loss of their homes and lands. As 
Sayigh (2007) argues, a deeper sense of loss infiltrated their minds and bodies as if that 
physical displacement was as unsettling as the temporary loss of the self, their path and 
identity. It is in this context that the humanitarian aid acted on and shaped their 
subjectivities. From being independent and self-reliant, they became passive receivers of 
aid and relief (p. 134). 
The provision of aid and, in particular, of rations aimed at „the subjective 
transformation of the displaced from angry, potentially volatile refugees to docile 
recipients of food aid‟ (Peteet, 2005: 76). However, for the Palestinians in Lebanon and 
elsewhere, being referred to as „refugees‟ was a constant shame as their conditions implied 
„powerlessness, denationalisation, and the disdain of being charity cases‟ (p. 124). 
Accepting the assistance and the rations from the Red Cross and UNRWA was, and for 
many of them still is, a humiliation that they endured every single day because of their 
inability to provide for themselves and their families. Not only did they have to go through 
the embarrassment of receiving food, but as Peteet (2005) points out, the food received was 
a constant reminder of their refugee condition and impossibility of working their own 
lands.  
Rations, the way through which humanitarian organisations penetrated the 
refugees‟ body, became the expression of a power that drew lines separating survival from 
starvation through the meticulous calculations of the amount and type of food needed by 
the Palestinians. In the 1970s, for instance, Howley (1975: 50-51) reported that: 
[t]he refugees continue [...] to be supplied a basic ration of 1,500 to 
1,600 calories per day. This ration consists of 79 percent of flour, 5 
percent pulses, 5 percent sugar, 4 percent rice or burghol and 7 
percent oils and fats. In the winter it is supplemented by 300 grams 
of pulses and 500 grams of dates. 
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As Howley goes on to say, these figures are much lower if compared to the calories 
consumed by people living in other regions of the Middle East or the United States. 
Moreover, they entailed an unbalanced diet that lacked important nutritional items such as 
meat, fruit and vegetables (Khalidi and Majaj: 1963; UNRWA, 1961: 3). While this was 
the ration calculated for the „average refugee‟ that aimed to „keep body and soul together‟ 
(UNRWA cited in Howley, 1975: 52), other supplements were provided for categories of 
people classified as more in need than others. Drawing lines within lines as further 
fragmentation of the refugee body occurred, classified as more vulnerable refugees, 
children, women and the sick were included in special nutritional programs that provided 
supplements to the average diet and extra doses of powdered milk. Yet, the problem 
relating to the rations was not only confined to the quantities of food and calories that the 
refugees received as a secondary and equally important issue, was also the provision of 
„culturally inappropriate foods‟ that Palestinians were not used to consuming before 
(Peteet, 2005: 77). This was not only associated with the hypothetical humanitarian 
workers‟ lack of knowledge of their traditions including their culinary customs. There were 
also other more latent cultural and political implications. As Peteet (2005) argues, in Arab 
societies more broadly, and in Palestinian society in particular, the acceptance of any form 
of help – money, food, shelter, gifts – is always reciprocated with loyalty. In this context, 
receiving food for free might have been perceived as highly problematic because accepting 
the rations and the help of the humanitarian organisations and UNRWA had to be 
reciprocated with the acceptation of their displacement and the abandonment of their right 
of return. 
While, to some, receiving the rations triggered the fear of having to reciprocate the 
humanitarian relief by compromising their political rights, for others UNRWA rations and 
assistance were seen as the UN‟s way to pay their debts to the refugees for the predicament 
caused to them through the issue of the Partition Plan in 1947. According to this reading, 
some managed to compromise the acceptance of the rations justifying this on the ground 
that it was simply the UN duty to pay the refugees back for what they had done (Howley, 
1975: 58).  
Whereas biopower penetrating bodies was so evident with the provision of the 
rations that affected the refugees‟ perceptions of the self and their role in society, other 
forms of biopower were performed in the sphere of education. Relief and assistance, in 
fact, were not confined to food, shelter and medical aid only. Since the early years of its 
operations and in cooperation with UNESCO, UNRWA opened elementary schools in the 
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camps or in their proximity. However, due to the limited availability of funds and rather 
than coming up with targeted syllabi for the Palestinian people, the UN agency decided to 
opt for curricula adopted in the host countries. As Ernst (1989: 91) points out, „this meant 
using Jordanian curriculum in UNRWA schools in Jordan and the West Bank, the Egyptian 
curriculum in the Gaza Strip, the Syrian curriculum in Syria, and the Lebanese curriculum 
in Lebanon‟ (see also Alami, 1996). This further fragmented an already geographically 
divided community through the teaching of subjects that never considered the history of 
Palestine and the reasons for their displacement. As so well explained by Turki (1972: 58) 
who, in his childhood and youth, experienced the displacement as refugee living in a 
refugee camp of Beirut: 
The schools that UNRWA sponsored were designed – unwittingly 
or not, no one can say – to raise Palestinian children on, and 
educate them in, accepting their plight in life as a preordained 
thing. They degraded the minds of the Palestinian youngsters and 
trained, indeed pressured, them into viewing their reality as the 
norm of existence, never transcendable in its dimension. They were 
taught about and given as a model a world where their destiny was 
left in the hands of the others; a worlds and a society with 
directions that they did not understand and were growing up unable 
to reconcile to the order they saw around them. No attempt was 
made to explain the situation and the forces behind it that ruled 
their lives, or how they were supposed to respond to them. They 
were thus made more defenceless. No courses were offered to show 
where they came from, the history of Palestine, who the Jews, who 
the Zionists, who the Arabs were. No reasons were offered to 
explain why Palestinian children were studying the American Civil 
War, the invasion of Russia by Napoleon, and the defeat of the 
Spanish Armada – rather than the story of their own civilisation 
and cultural heritage, so rich in literature and ideas. 
Decentering the state: The global scope of sovereign power 
80 
 
While UNRWA justified its decision to make the refugees study other subjects and other 
histories on the ground of economic shortages, it is obvious that education was, and still is, 
a highly sensitive and political matter. Teaching them their history and the history of their 
homeland would have certainly created a highly politicised community ready to stand up 
for their rights and ready to fight back. From Turki‟s words one can certainly capture the 
disappointment in realising that certain subjects imposed and certain histories omitted in 
the curricula were intended to make the refugees forget about their origins, identity and 
rights. 
As the depoliticisation of the refugee‟s life also went through the erasure of 
Palestinian history and identity, school curricula were not only a concern for the 
Lebanese.
9
 Nor did they represent a concern confined to the question of Palestine only. 
Broader geopolitical considerations conflated into the schools set up in the Palestinian 
refugee camps in the Middle East and deeply affected the ways in which education was 
provided. During the Cold War, when the fear for the rise and spread of Communism was 
at its highest, other countries were particularly concerned about the subjects taught in 
school as well as priests‟ sermons. In a confidential letter reporting on the situation of the 
refugee camps in Lebanon and schooling for the Palestinian children sent by the British 
chancery of Beirut to the Middle East Secretariat of the Foreign Office of London, the 
British Representative in Lebanon, Mr. Highwood reports that: 
In regard to anti-Anglo-American work for the refugees, the Red 
Cross official, who is Orthodox, told me that the Orthodox priest in 
charge of Tyre is indoctrinated with Communist ideas and has a 
group of young men as followers. A political group has been 
working hard to stimulate anti-British feeling with the result that 
Miss Fitzpatrick of the British Syrian Mission has had an 
uncomfortable time. [...] The LRCC
10
 representative there [Tyre 
area], who was a magistrate in Acre, has done splendid work and is 
doing much to improve feelings towards Anglo-Saxon efforts [...] I 
understand that conditions are improving. I have thought it worth 
telling the LRCC officials that the fact must be faced that Great 
                                               
9 For education as a Lebanese concern, see also Brynen, 1990: 25-27. 
10 Unfortunately, I was not able find what LRCC stands for. 
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Britain and the United States have for humanitarian reasons 
contributed most to the welfare of the Palestinian refugees and all 
those that work to destroy these acts of humanism are pursuing no 
other end than to create disruption for sinister purposes contrary to 
the interests of the refugees (emphasis added).
11
 
The concluding remarks of the letter provide suggestions to be put in place to fight the 
anti-Anglo-American sentiments: 
I am of the opinion that heavy-handed propaganda against 
Communism and the distribution of pamphlets will meet with no 
success and would at the moment embarrass those who are working 
on the spot for our best interests. I believe that the schools when 
they are going well will be the ground on which we can gently 
work through interesting films and a production of the right kind of 
books (emphasis added).
12
 
These words are highly representative of British, as well as American, interests in the area 
and the refugees‟ education on multiple levels. On the one hand, Great Britain wanted to 
provide the refugees with a washed and well polished image of British intentions and be 
depicted as the power that along with the United States is „taking care‟ of their needs the 
most, for which refugees should therefore be grateful. On the other, beyond the fact that 
this might have softened the refugees‟ position towards Great Britain, the United States or 
even the UN which were complicit in the Palestinians‟ plight, the involvement in specific 
programs and subjects to be taught in schools was functional in the context of the Cold 
War. As Communism and its spread was „fought‟ at the diplomatic level, civil society was 
not spared from the world‟s bipolar division and indeed involved and indoctrinated on the 
„rights‟ and „wrongs‟. Light propaganda programs could be delivered through the showing 
of specific films or documentaries that could have induced the refugees to support the West 
                                               
11 FO 371-75328, „Refugee Camps in Lebanon‟, 1949, the National Archives (London), letter dated 
10 July 1949 sent by (Sgd.) R. W. Highwood (British Representative in Lebanon) to a Minister (unknown). 
12 Ibid. 
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in its struggle against the Soviet Union and its Communist satellite allies and, indirectly, 
accept their condition as the West, more than anybody else, was providing relief and 
assistance for them. The fact that Great Britain and the United States were focusing so 
much on the humanitarian aid more broadly, and in the education sector in particular, 
shows how even the programs and subjects the refugees were taught at school were part of 
a broader picture and aim. Refugees had to turn their anger towards the West that caused 
their predicament into gratitude because of the tents, food, medical care and schooling 
provided. They had to be transformed from independent beings into passive and powerless 
receivers of rations for their survival, and taught lessons to make them support a certain 
alignment or make them accept their condition. 
Rations and a certain kind of education and indoctrination were the means through 
which biopower as performed by the humanitarian organisations and UNRWA penetrated 
the refugees‟ bodies and consciences. For a sovereign power deciding on the non-political 
value of their life as they were stripped of their rights – self-determination, return, 
compensation and protection – there was a biopower ready to supplement and back the 
sovereign decision through the provision of humanitarian aid and care. However, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, whilst these attempts were very well planned and to some 
extent effective in shaping the refugees‟ subjectivity and self perception, they could not 
transform them for good as different forms of resistance began rising. 
Interweaved biopolitics: 
From global to local impacts on Palestinian life 
The regional context: Palestinian life between Arab unity and interests 
As I have argued, Palestinian refugees lacked any form of diplomatic and legal 
protection. Especially in the countries in which they found refuge, they have been 
subjected to a power that neglected their political rights and claims in favour of a 
humanitarian approach that, putting their bare life at the centre of its concerns, focused on 
making them live, or better, survive. The neglect of the Palestinians‟ political life and 
value was not only a consequence of the international community‟s decisions. It was also a 
consequence of the impact and effects of Arab countries‟ agency, decisions and policies at 
the point that so often made the Palestinians feel like pawns in the hands of Arab regimes‟ 
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games and interests. Concerned with the problem of maintaining their powers and 
positions in a delicate moment of the Middle East history, countries like Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan and Egypt used the Palestinian predicament for their own calculations. As Brynen 
(1990: 21) suggests, in their emphasis on the importance of Arab unity, a strong „vocal 
support for the Palestinian cause became a central element of both domestic legitimacy and 
regional foreign policy‟. 
In the aftermath of the first Arab-Israeli war, the Palestinians found themselves 
displaced with no piece of land left for them and for the reconstruction of their fractured 
society. Under the administration of different Arab countries, their destiny was fragmented 
and inevitably interweaved to that of their Arab hosts. They had no free land from where to 
start their resistance and no freedom to pursue their return and the establishment of a 
Palestinian homeland. The Palestinian cause, however, had always resonated in all Arab 
leaders‟ speeches as it has always been representing the quintessential example of old and 
new imperialist projects at the expenses of the Arab nation/s. Yet, not only was the 
Palestinian predicament a symbol of the umpteenth imperialist attempt to oppress the 
Middle East and its inhabitants; the Palestinian cause stood for the road towards the 
unification of the Arab nation that could be achieved only once Palestine was liberated and 
all the Arab people united. 
Despite the ephemeral support, all Arab states, especially those sharing a border 
with Israel, have always been cautious in waging wars of liberation for the sake of the 
Palestinians and have always tried to strictly control the Palestinians‟ movements and 
activities (Kapeliuk, 1969). Only when this control on Palestinians‟ activities could not be 
performed any longer unless ready to face the protest of their own public opinion, Arab 
states began to timidly sponsor the Palestinian cause through economic and military aid. 
This step was also essential in order to intervene in Palestinian internal affairs and to 
control the different militant and political groups. The latter, being sympathetic to one 
regime or another deeply contributed to the further fragmentation of the Palestinian 
political body (see Cobban, 1984; Nassar, 1991: 115-148). 
It is in this context that we should understand the establishment of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, a move that aimed at better controlling the rising 
Palestinian national sentiments „to contain potential nationalist pressures among 
Palestinians within manageable proportions‟ (Brynen, 1990: 22). It was an organisation 
that no one in the Arab world wanted to see as acting independently from the chorus of 
anti-imperialist struggles affecting every state in the Middle East after the defeat of the 
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Arab armies against Israel and years of foreign domination that culminated with British 
and French protectorates and mandates in the Middle East and North Africa Arab 
countries. 
All these struggles left the Palestinian refugees with no effective political 
representation for a long time. The PLO, the only organisation that could have intervened 
on their behalf, at least until 1967 was highly dependent on the mood of Arab states and 
their interests. Despite the fact that the Palestinian cause and the solution of the refugees‟ 
predicament have always been perceived as the road to the pan-Arab unity and the struggle 
against imperialist forces, as Owen (2004: 61) argues, the Palestine cause had also a strong 
power to also divide the Arab regimes interested in strengthening their national interests 
and influences in the region.  
Despite the desire of unity for a greater Arab nation that could include all the 
present day states in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and former 
Palestine), rivalries between newly founded states were fought on the issue of Palest ine 
and on the Palestinian refugees abandoned because of foreign policies and internal 
interests. It is widely accepted that both Egypt and Syria have used the Palestinians by 
showing their support for them against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The latter was, 
and still is, considered as a puppet in the hands of Western countries and a traitor to the 
Palestinian cause because of its attempt to annex the West Bank and to „erase‟ the 
Palestine question and people by granting the refugees Jordanian citizenship (Brand, 
1988b: 22-25). In addition, Egypt‟s and Syria‟s rivalries came to the surface at the expense 
of the Palestinians and their rights. While Egypt supported the creation of the PLO, it also 
wished to control the organisation; Syria, meanwhile, supported the newborn militant 
Fatah group – at the time still independent from and opposed to the PLO – by opening 
training camps in its soil and demonstrating the true support of the Syrian government for 
the Palestinian cause and the liberation of Palestine (Cobban, 1984; Owen, 2004; Peretz, 
1994). However, what contributed the most to the abandonment of the Palestinian refugees 
was perhaps the fragmentation of the Palestinian political and military organisations as 
each Arab state supported their own guerrilla movement or created groups sympathetic to 
their policy and stand, one of which was Saiqa established in Syria in 1966. The PLO 
became more independent only in 1969 when Yasser Arafat, leader of Fatah, became the 
new chairman of the PLO. Arafat was capable of using Arab moods and concerns in the 
Palestinian movement‟s best interest as well as able to unite, at least for a while, all 
Palestinian efforts for the liberation of the homeland. It is only from this moment that the 
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Palestinian refugees, especially those in Lebanon, could enjoy some diplomatic protection 
and political representation also within the international community forums (see for 
instance, Arafat, 1975). 
Between national concerns and broader influences: Palestinian bare life in 
Lebanon 
If we accept that among all the Arab countries hosting the Palestinian refugees 
since 1948 Lebanon is the one in which they found the most hostile treatment, one of the 
main reasons for their predicament must be sought in the delicate confessional balances 
that characterise the Lebanese state since its establishment in 1920 (Salibi, 1965, 1988). 
While in other Arab countries the Palestinian refugees have been treated on an equal 
footing with nationals or were, to some extent, integrated, Lebanon represented a thorny 
reality for all those that found refuge there. As the refugee population amounted to some 
ten percent of the total Lebanese population, the presence of such a high number of 
refugees, mostly Sunni Muslim, has always been perceived as a political, identity and 
security threat for a country whose balance rests on weak confessional compromises and 
equilibriums. 
While sectarian divisions and rivalries have always been present in the area that 
today is part of Lebanon, these have been exacerbated and politicised during and in the 
aftermath of the French Mandate over present day Syria and Lebanon which was officially 
assigned by the League of Nations in 1920. As the mandatory power had an interest in 
creating an entity always in need of supervision and help, the arbitrariness with which 
Lebanon‟s boundaries have been defined has always been a matter of strong contention. 
The autonomous former Ottoman province of Mount Lebanon predominantly, although not 
solely, inhabited by Maronite and Druse communities became part of Greater Lebanon as 
other provinces, mainly inhabited by Muslims, were annexed: South Lebanon, the North, 
the Bekaa Valley on the east, and the coastal towns of Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli (see 
Figure 1).
13
 The artificial creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 by the French authorities 
had to include enough Christians as to justify the creation of a state independent from the 
rest of Arab provinces, but also enough Muslims as to legitimise the continuous control 
and interventions to protect the Christian communities. The latter in fact, while 
representing the demographic majority in Lebanon – as according to the 1932 census – still 
                                               
13 The city of Saida is also known by the name Sidon. 
Decentering the state: The global scope of sovereign power 
86 
 
represented a minority in a Middle East that for centuries had been ruled by Arab 
caliphates and the Ottoman Empire (Hudson, 1997; Peretz, 1994; Salibi, 1965, 1988; 
Traboulsi, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Greater Lebanon including the province of Mount Lebanon (Mutasarrifiyah) and later 
annexations (in Traboulsi 2007: 42). 
As Salibi, one of the most accredited Lebanese historians, affirmed, this artificial 
creation had serious consequences as „to create a country is one thing; to create a 
nationality is another‟ (Salibi, 1988: 19). The divide-and-rule system was a strategy that 
was not merely geographical, but also applied to the inhabitants of the newborn state. 
Rather than contributing to creating a common sense of identity, the mandatory power 
further stressed differences, and encouraged sectarian divisions and rivalries also 
supporting the political ascendancy and supremacy of some – the pro-West Maronite 
community – at the expenses of the others. In this sense, the census conducted in 1932 
became the milestone on which the whole Lebanese political system was based as it paved 
the way to „the distribution of the political power according to findings of the census, and 
[to] the resulting politicisation of the demographic figures‟ (Maktabi, 1999: 223). As a 
consequence, the presidency of the republic, the most important post in the executive, was 
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reserved for the Maronite community that in 1932 still represented the demographic 
majority.
14
 Further confessionalisation of the political system was applied to the chamber 
of deputies where a ratio of six Christians every five Muslim was in place, and to the other 
main offices of the executive: the office of Prime Minister reserved for the Sunni Muslims, 
that of the Speaker of Parliament for the Shi‟ite Muslims.15 
Postmandate Lebanon was, therefore, the result of sectarian differences exacerbated 
by the mandatory power that made confessional divisions and identity the base for political 
participation and belonging. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the 
nature of Lebanese politics and identity that for long and still today render the country so 
vulnerable to external influences and pressures as well as internal divisions, suffice it to 
say that this kind of system has led to the fragmentation of the Lebanese body along 
confessional lines as regards foreign and internal policies and especially as regards the 
Palestinian cause and the refugees‟ presence in the country.  
These fractures were particularly manifested when the Palestinian refugees arrived 
in Lebanon in 1948. Except for an initial welcome and sense of hospitality for their Arab 
brothers, as soon as expectations of temporary displacement were betrayed by Israel‟s 
refusal to accept the refugees back, the Lebanese government dramatically changed its 
attitude. After efforts in coordinating the humanitarian assistance for the refugees through 
the League of the Red Cross Society especially, and feeling no responsibility towards the 
refugees and fearing the Palestinians‟ inevitable naturalisation, the government declared 
that no further humanitarian assistance would have been offered to the refugees. As, 
according to the Lebanese government responsibility for the creation of the refugee 
problem lay with the international community, the United Nations had to take care of the 
relief until the return of the refugees could be implemented. 
While humanitarian assistance soon became the responsibility of the United 
Nations, and UNRWA in particular, the government was mainly concerned with the 
security aspect and adopted policies aimed at controlling the refugee presence. Spatial 
control, as well as a separation of the Palestinians from Lebanese society, could be 
achieved through the establishment of refugee camps (see Chapter 5). The management of 
the Palestinians‟ life was realised through the setting up of special committees attached to 
                                               
14 For a deeper investigation on the ways in which the census took place and was contested see also 
Chapter 6. 
15 This kind of seat distribution in the chamber of deputies was in place at least until 1989 when the 
Taïf Agreement putting an end to the Lebanese civil war, among other things, established a new and a more 
equitable ratio of representation between Muslim and Christian members in the parliament. 
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the Ministries of Interior and, later on, of Foreign Affairs. The Central Committee for 
Refugee Affairs was created in 1948 through Decree No. 11567 and while no specific task 
has been assigned, among other things, this administrative organ had to cooperate with 
UNRWA in the registrations of the Palestinian refugees and for the consideration of their 
opportunities of employment in the private sector in the regions of the Bekaa Valley, South 
Lebanon and Akkar (Al-Natour, 1997; Said, 2001; Sfeir, 2008; Suleiman, 2006).
16
 Whilst 
this was the first move of the Lebanese government to address the presence of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, since their arrival the refugees have been living in a legal 
limbo as no legal definition has ever been issued that could clarify their position, rights or 
duties in the country. As all forms of legal protection were withdrawn from them, it 
became easy to exploit the refugee community especially from the labour point of view. In 
the early 1950s, the Minister of Labour Affairs assured the Lebanese that priority of 
employment would have always been given to Lebanese nationals (Sfeir, 2008: 125-127). 
The exploitation of the Palestinian labour force became the norm as, in order to find a job 
and be able to sustain their families, many Palestinians were ready to accept salaries that 
could be even half the amount of money received by a Lebanese for the same job.
17
 
In the 1960s the Palestinians‟ position seemed to be, at least partially, framed by 
the law of July 1962 regulating the entry, exit and residency of non-Lebanese, which 
indirectly included the Palestinians in the category of foreigners. Certainly, the period that 
between the end of the 1950s and the end of the 1960s was not one that Palestinians like to 
remember. In 1959, legislative decrees No. 42 and No. 927 established the Department of 
Palestine Refugees Affairs in Lebanon attached to the Ministry of Interior and according to 
these the duties were as follows: to coordinate the relief and provision of various services 
such as health care and education to the Palestinian refugees; to coordinate with the office 
of the General Security on matters regarding the issue of IDs and passports (laissez-
passer); to register any document relating to the personal status of the refugee (i.e. 
marriages, births, deaths, change of residency and sect among others); to deal with issues 
of family reunifications; to deal with any problems arising from the lease or the ownership 
of the lands on which refugee camps had been established; to consider requests for the 
transfer of residency from one camp to another or transfer the said residency without any 
                                               
16 While according to some this committee was created in 1950 (i.e. Al-Natour, 1997; Said, 2001), 
Suleiman (2006: 11-12) and Sfeir (2008: 85) affirm that this committee was instead established in 1948. 
According to Suleiman the decree No. 11657 was issued on April 4, 1948 with a publication in the official 
Gazette in May 5, 1948. 
17 Insights from unrecordered conversations with some refugees in Shatila camp during fieldwork. 
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requests from the refugees if security concerns required so. While this along with others 
was one of the first pieces of legislation addressing the refugees‟ right of residency in the 
country, as well as management of their life through registrations that would have granted 
them the freedom of movement through the obtainment of laissez-passer and IDs, security 
concerns in the period had the upper hand. The creation of this agency was, in fact, 
followed by the establishment of a new committee through Decree No. 2867 approved on 
December 16, 1959 and by Decree No. 3909 approved one year later. The new body 
attached to Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the Higher Authority of Palestinian Affairs. 
While the first decree declared that the General Director of the Department of Palestine 
Refugees Affairs had to liaise with various offices of different provinces of the country on 
matters of security, the latter included cooperation with different ministries in the Lebanese 
government (i.e. National Defence including intelligence services offices, Interior, 
National Economy and Tourism including the Israel Boycott office; Foreign Affairs 
including the Palestine Division) in order to gather any information regarding political, 
military, economic aspects of the Palestinian cause and to monitor any development that 
might have constituted a security threat for Lebanon. Fundamental in this period was the 
monitoring of refugees‟ social and political activities. The establishment of „observers‟ in 
the camps, transfers of certain refugees‟ residency, close monitoring of refugees‟ lives 
even in their more intimate aspects (approval of marriages for instance) and severe 
restrictions on the refugees‟ movement reflected  a very delicate period of the Lebanese 
history (see Al-Natour, 1997; El-Natour, 1993; Martin, 2005; Said, 2001). 
Certainly, the precarious sectarian political system in Lebanon further fractured 
after the independence from France in 1943. Although it would be banal to generalise as 
each sect did not constitute a homogenous and cohesive bloc, but presented nuances and 
differences in opinions as regards various questions including the Palestinian presence in 
the country, it is important to mention that the latent issues of identity or Lebanon‟s 
position as regards the West, the Middle East and the Arab world were still constituting 
serious ideological differences. Despite the National Pact in 1943 – an unwritten accord 
between all the different sects that Lebanon‟s identity would have been Arab in culture, but 
as a state it would have developed policies independent from the rest of the Arab world – 
the demographic balances in the countries were about to change due to the high birth rate 
among the Muslim sects, the low birth rate among the Christian communities and the high 
rate of emigration among the latter. Since much power was in the hands of the Maronite 
community, Muslims and other sects were less politically represented and marginalised. 
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Feeling second class citizens, these sects began pushing for a new census that would have 
changed the political status quo, also threatened by the rise of pan-Arabism. 
Particularly influential in the rise of pan-Arab sentiments spreading also in 
Lebanon was the Egyptian president, Gen. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became the symbol 
of anti-imperialist battles (i.e. see the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the 
following clash with the British, French and Israeli armies), the hero that would have 
united the Arab world after having liberated Palestine from the Zionist occupation and 
freed the Palestinian people from oppression and injustice. While the Palestinian cause had 
been used as a decoy for ever increasing influences in the region, Egypt and Nasser 
became increasingly identified as the centre of Arab politics, identity and nationalism, able 
to appeal to oppressed people‟s frustrated sentiments hoping for freedom and equality. The 
road towards Arab unity seemed paved once Egypt and Syria united in 1958 through the 
creation of the United Arab Republic (hereafter UAR). 
The effects of these developments were strongly felt in Lebanon too. Problems of 
political representations and significant economic inequalities (see also Chapter 6) melded 
with a foreign policy that seemed to be withdrawing any support for the Arab cause. This 
was because during the Suez crisis (1956) the then Lebanese president Camille Chamoun 
(1952-1958) did not break diplomatic relations with France and Britain involved in the 
conflict. As a consequence, Muslim sects and others felt increasingly alienated. Following 
the proclamation of the UAR, general strikes, mass demonstrations and upheavals broke 
out in Lebanon in March 1958 calling, among other things, for the union with the UAR. 
Fearing the overthrow of the political status quo, Chamoun called for the US intervention 
within the framework of the Eisenhower doctrine. Peace could be restored through the 
election of the new president, Gen. Fouad Chehab (1958-1964), who appealed to Lebanese 
unity, declared the equality of Muslim and Christian citizens and adopted more neutral 
foreign policies (Farsoun and Wingerter, 1981/1982; Peretz, 1994; Traboulsi, 2007). While 
this kept the Arab nationalists silent for a while, the high presence of Palestinian refugees 
in the country could still represent a thorny challenge for the unquestioned Christian 
supremacy in the political arena. A harsh repression of the Palestinian community was 
exercised during the period of the so-called Deuxième Bureau (1959-1969) named after the 
Lebanese intelligence services. Surveillance was applied in the camps and repression of 
any social and political activity was harsh. This not only prevented the Palestinians from 
establishing any political organisation or party, but refugees were in the hands of 
bureaucrats and intelligence officers who disposed of their life with threats, arbitrary 
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beatings and detention, forced transfers of residency from one camp to another, all under 
the umbrella of „security reasons‟ (see also Chapter 5). Any aspect of the refugees‟ lives 
was strictly monitored to prevent the establishment of dangerous alliances between the 
Palestinians and the unsatisfied layers of Lebanese society. As Chehab affirmed, these 
kinds of repressive measures towards the Palestinian refugees were justified on the basis 
of:  
Let‟s speak frankly. Lebanon is a country of sects; and we treat 
everyone according to this reality. If we treat you [Palestinians] as 
a sect, you will dominate the others because of your large numbers, 
your concentration in the same places, and your passion for 
politics. The Lebanese state is unable to deal with these problems 
and thus we have to replace social measures with security 
measures. In other words, the Palestinian problem is bigger than 
Lebanon. For Lebanon will either repress the Palestinians or be 
repressed by them – and no third solution exists (Chehab cited in 
Brynen, 1990: 29). 
In the camps police and intelligence officers exercised a pure administration of life 
where they could decide on the life or death of the refugees. Those suspected of taking part 
in any political movement or activity were cast out of the normal order or tortured 
arbitrarily. 
This discretionary power was not only exercised in the camps. It was also a mobile 
power that affected all the Palestinians living in the camps as well as outside the camp. 
While the refugees were subjected to arbitrary treatment and decisions over their 
hypothetically secret and subversive activities in the camps, „legal‟ discriminations through 
decrees and administrative orders captured the life of Palestinians living outside the camps. 
The issue of two decrees concerning the entry, exit, residency and work of foreigners in 
Lebanon equalised the refugees to any foreigner wishing to live and work in the country. In 
particular, Decree No. 17561 issued on September 1964 regulated the work of foreigners 
on Lebanese soil and sanctioned that all foreigners had to obtain a work permit. Whilst 
Palestinian refugees are not directly mentioned, they were included within these provisions 
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as the law regulating the entry, exit and residency of foreigners issued on July 1962 
defined as foreigners any person not holding the Lebanese nationality. Trapped between 
legal discriminations and arbitrary repression typical of the period of the Deuxième 
Bureau, the Palestinians found it very difficult to obtain permits as many professions were 
excluded to them because the reciprocity principle was applied. Not only were qualified 
professions such as medicine, law and engineering forbidden to them, even though they 
had the qualifications to work in those sectors, but also, in the unlikelihood of them 
obtaining a work permit, the principle of reciprocity precluded them from receiving the 
same treatment reserved for Lebanese or other foreigners. Not being citizens of a state that 
could guarantee the same treatment to Lebanese nationals, even if the refugees managed to 
legalise their jobs, they would have paid taxes for the social security scheme but could not 
benefit from it (Al-Natour, 1997; El-Natour, 1993; Said, 2001; Suleiman, 2006). 
Exploited in the industrial, construction and agricultural sectors, the Palestinians in 
Lebanon were excluded from the enjoyment of basic human rights. Their life became 
expendable and disposable as no protection was accorded to them. No protection from the 
international community that provided the mere humanitarian assistance without 
intervening in their political rights as individuals or collectivity; no protection from the 
Lebanese state that treated them as a security threat to be closely monitored and hit 
arbitrarily; and not from a Palestinian national movement that still in formation was unable 
to represent the rights of their people or would-be citizens. Ever dependent on the 
humanitarian relief, discriminated against because of their refugee condition and 
impossibility to return to their homes and villages by then part of Israel, the Palestinians 
have paid the price of the Lebanese ruling classes too afraid of granting them any rights as 
well as of regional events that impacted on their life. 
This marginalisation continued until 1969 when, thanks to the rise of the 
Palestinian Resistance Movement (hereafter PRM) and the ever increasing clashes between 
the feda‟yeen (Palestinian combatants) and the Lebanese army, the Lebanese government 
was forced to sign the Cairo Agreement.
18
 Not only did this accord give the Palestinian 
resistance the right to train and attempt to liberate their homeland by launching operations 
from the Lebanese soil, but, most importantly, the agreement gave them the right to self 
                                               
18 According to Cobban (1984: 45) and Cooley (1979: 30), the Cairo Agreement, signed by the 
Lebanese government and the PLO, were announced as secret and official notes. Although they have never 
been officially divulgated, some unofficial publications appeared in the Lebanese newspapers and have never 
been contested by the Lebanese government (see for instance the text in Arabic published by Al-Diyar 
newspaper on 12 June 1991). The text has then been reproduced in other publications. Amongst others, see 
Chamoun, 1977: 171-174 and Shiblak, 1998: 25-26. 
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administer their spaces and the right to work. While, as we shall see in the next chapter, the 
rise of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon freed the refugees from the grip of the 
Lebanese authorities within and beyond the camps and implanted in them a new sense of 
empowerment, the involvement of the Palestinian factions in the Lebanese civil war 
precipitated their condition (see Serious clashes over the Palestinians in Lebanon, 1975). 
The presence of the Palestinian resistance in the country and their cross-border activities 
led the Israeli army to carry out retaliatory attacks, at times disproportionate, and to 
deliberately hit both Palestinian and Lebanese civilian areas in the hope of inducing the 
Lebanese government and army to expel and crush the Palestinian armed resistance. The 
Palestinian resistance and civilian presence was again dividing the country and whilst 
much blame was attributed to the Palestinians for the start of the Lebanese conflict, there 
were other motivations including the growing economic inequality spreading in the 
country and in particular among certain sects (see Chapter 6). Yet, much of the blame for 
the outbreak of the civil war as well as two heavy Israeli invasions and multiple attacks 
was placed on the Palestinians. Physical violence towards the refugees, combatants as well 
as civilians, took the upper hand as Lebanese militias as well as the Israeli army that 
invaded the country twice (1978 and 1982), assaulted the camps and the civilian population 
in their attempts to erase the Palestinian military and political presence and decrease the 
civil presence in the country (Schiff and Ya‟ari, 1984).19 
The second Israeli invasion in 1982, „Operation Peace for Galilee‟, in particular, 
had disastrous effects on the Palestinian refugees. With the aim of destroying the PLO‟s 
military and political capacity and, in agreement with would-be Lebanese President Bachir 
Gemayel to hopefully reduce the number of the Palestinian civilians residing in Lebanon, 
the Israeli army heavily bombarded and attacked densely populated areas and PLO 
headquarters in Beirut (Fisk, 2001; Janse, 1982; Schiff and Ya‟ari, 1984). The brutality of 
the Israeli invasions and attacks was not limited to the arbitrariness and violence which did 
not distinguish between civilian and military targets. Despite the use of unconventional and 
prohibited weapons on civilians – like phosphorus bombs – the Israeli army by any means 
seriously obstructed and delayed relief operations carried out by UNRWA, the Red Cross 
and the Palestinian Red Crescent by arresting medical and humanitarian staff (Fisk, 2001). 
It was as if the Palestinian life already depoliticised through the withdrawal of diplomatic 
and legal protection, the non-solution of their predicament, and hit with such violence 
                                               
19 For Israeli geopolitical interests in the region see also Norton and Schwedler, 1993. 
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could not even deserve any longer survival through humanitarian aid (food, medical 
supplies, shelters or hospitalisation). 
Diplomatic pressures of the Lebanese as well as US envoy in charge of the 
mediation with the PLO to officially leave Lebanon or to face the destruction of the whole 
Beirut led the Palestinian leadership to agree on withdrawal. After obtaining assurance 
from the US envoy that the civilians would be protected by a multinational force, the PLO 
left Lebanon from the main ports at the end of August 1982. However, the PLO and the 
Palestinian fighters‟ withdrawal had major consequences for the Palestinian refugees. 
Notoriously famous was the three-day massacre of „Sabra and Shatila‟ started on 
September 16, 1982 and carried out by the Lebanese Forces militias with the tacit consent 
of the Israeli army in control of West Beirut once the multinational force withdrew and just 
few days after the PLO‟s departure (among others Al-Hout, 2004). 
In the wider context of the civil war in which hundreds of thousands of Lebanese 
civilians also lost their lives, one must remember that the Palestinians in Lebanon were 
subjected to a process of double dehumanisation and exclusion. First, they were depicted 
as the cause of the Lebanese internal divisions and as „terrorists‟ by the Israelis (see also 
Said, 1991); and secondly, they were slaughtered and killed with impunity as no measures 
have been taken against the perpetrators of the massacre. As I discuss below (Chapter 5), 
the approval of the Amnesty Law in 1991 washed away all the crimes committed during 
the civil war as if never happened. But the Sabra and Shatila massacre was not the only 
violent event the refugees endured during the Lebanese civil war. Also mentioning of the 
„War of the Camps‟ (1985-1987) revives heavy and painful memories as refugee camps 
became the target of Lebanese militia Amal‟s attacks. Result of a desire to free the nation 
from the „Palestinian plague‟, the „War of the Camps‟ was also the consequence of broader 
geopolitical interests that saw the indirect involvement of Syria in the siege of the camps to 
erase any pro-PLO faction. 
To question the responsibility and accountability for their conditions and the 
production of their bare life in the truest Agambenian sense of killable with impunity, one 
must certainly take into consideration actors beyond the Lebanese army or government and 
embrace an analysis that could contextualise their being trapped between the pursuit of 
their cause and external f/actors. It is worth noting that Lebanon and the Palestinian life 
became battlegrounds of broader geopolitical, regional as well as international interests 
that affected the refugees directly and indirectly. Commenting on Lebanon‟s role in the 
Middle East, El-Khazen (1997: 276) suggests that „Lebanon was [and perhaps still is] a 
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passive actor in regional power politics, in inter-Arab rivalries as well as in Arab-Israeli 
politics‟. It was not only influenced by regional events that had a tremendous impact on 
Lebanese internal affairs, but also wider struggles have been fought on its territory and the 
Palestinian refugee camps. As Cold War winds blew across the Middle East, different 
armies and states‟ interests conflated there and as Farsoun and Zacharia (1997: 164) argue: 
Lebanon became the battleground of domestic, regional, and 
international (superpower) proxy wars. Practically every Arab state 
or political movement, Israel, Iran, many European states, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union intervened in Lebanon 
diplomatically, politically, militarily, financially, and through in-
kind grants and many other services (training, intelligence, etc.). 
More bewildering, such interventions often favoured one 
subfaction or another of the opposing coalitions (right-wing 
Christians vs. the LNM [Lebanese National Movement] and 
PRM/PLO) and complicated enormously the course of conflict and 
the prospects of resolution of the civil war. 
If it is true that among the Arab countries that host the refugees, the Palestinians 
found in Lebanon the harshest conditions and treatment because of its particular and 
delicate balances, it is also true that their life was not only dependent on the Lebanese 
government‟s or authorities‟ decisions. A significant part of their predicament and also 
violence to which they have been subjected was the consequence of broader geopolitical 
influences, all conflating in Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps. As the sovereign 
is the one that decides on the life by drawing the line between those deserving to live and 
to die, it cannot be localised at the level of Lebanese government only. Rather a complex 
network of diverse sovereign powers, which included the Lebanese militias as well as 
foreign armies intervening in Lebanon during the civil war, was circulating and had tragic 
effects on the life of the refugees. 
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Regional and international influences: Refugees in the post-conflict era 
During the civil war the Palestinian refugees have been particularly 
instrumentalised revealing their being disposable, but the end of the Lebanese conflict 
through the signature of the Taïf Agreement in 1989 did not represent a watershed and a 
radical change of their condition.
20
 If the period of the civil war was marked by 
unprecedented violence as they were subjected to assaults, siege and massacres, the post-
conflict era signalled the return of legal measures aimed at alienating them and forcing 
them to leave the country. Whilst one of the main reasons for this renewed discrimination 
lay with the fear of tawtin – implantation and naturalisation of the Palestinians – and with 
the sectarian political system that despite the promises contained in the Taïf accords has 
yet to be „deconfessionalised‟ (see text of the Taïf Agreements in Menassa, 1995), the 
precariousness of the refugees‟ condition in Lebanon is also the outcome of the launch of 
the Madrid Peace conference in 1991 and the collapse of a bipolar system that for long 
granted the Palestinian full, though conditional, support from the Soviet Union. 
In addition to these two great changes in the world political scenario – the end of 
the Cold War and the beginning of the Peace Process – a multiplicity of factors have 
greatly affected the Palestinian refugees‟ life in Lebanon. The withdrawal of the PLO from 
Lebanon in 1982 left them with no political representation and no one that could actually 
engage in a diplomatic defence of their basic human rights. As the Palestinians were 
excluded from the reconciliation talks taking place in the aftermath of the civil war, 
diplomatic representation of the Palestinians‟ interests was too fragmented as the 
Palestinian movement split in pro-PLO and against-PLO factions (among others Salah, 
2000). Also the great infrastructure and services established by the PLO in the 1970s
21
 
were all destroyed during the war and the Palestinians that at least until 1982 could work 
and enjoy services provided by the Palestinian institutions were left unemployed and 
without social care. Restrictions on the right to work in particular became particularly 
deleterious. The unilateral abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 1987, that for long has 
granted them the right to work with no need of work permit, along with new restrictions on 
their right to work approved in 1983 were aimed at protecting the Lebanese labour from 
                                               
20 While the Taïf Agreements (1989) officially called for an end of the civil conflict, effectively 
clashes stopped in 1990 when Gen. Aoun, self-declared Christian Prime Minister contravening the rule 
according to which the office is reserved for the Sunni Muslim sect, definitely surrendered and found refuge 
within the French Embassy (Peretz, 1994: 398-399). 
21 On the PLO infrastructures and services, see Chapter 4. 
Decentering the state: The global scope of sovereign power 
97 
 
the potential competitiveness of the refugees and made the unemployment rate of the 
refugee community rise dramatically (Knudsen, 2009: 2).  
While for a long time the Gulf states have represented a good alternative to the very 
limited job opportunities in Lebanon ever since the 1960s, after the Gulf war some 40,000 
to 50,000 „Lebanese‟ Palestinians working in the region were either expelled or forced to 
leave because of the PLO‟s support of Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991). This arose 
because Saddam Hussein promoted himself as the new anti-imperial fighter ready to 
protect the Palestinian cause (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999: 17). Since then job 
opportunities in the Gulf states have been severely curtailed to them as well as the chance 
to send remittances to their families in Lebanon to help them deal with the difficult 
economic situation. Furthermore, as a consequence of the PLO‟s support for Saddam 
Hussein, in the 1990s many states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf 
countries that had previously supported the PLO cut their funding. This reduced the PLO‟s 
ability to pay the pensions to the families of the „martyrs‟, vital for those who lost a male 
family member that could have sustained the family economically (Takkenberg, 1998; U.S. 
Committee for Refugees, 1999). 
As the Gulf states were forbidden for the Palestinian labour force and as new 
restrictions on the right to work in Lebanon were applied, Libya in the 1990s came to 
represent the chance to improve their economic condition and that of their families in 
Lebanon. However, this opportunity did not last for long as, following the UN Security 
Council‟s economic block on the country in response to Ghedaffi‟s refusal to extradite two 
men accused of carrying out terrorist acts, Libya decided to limit foreign workers‟ presence 
and in 1995 expelled all the Palestinians in protest towards a peace initiative that still did 
not show any result. The reaction of the Lebanese government to the possibility of having 
about 5,000 refugees back was rather swift as new travel restrictions were approved by the 
Ministry of the Interior in the same year. Decree No. 478 regulated the entry and exit of the 
Palestinians. According to the decree, each Palestinian abroad had to apply for an entry 
visa through Lebanese embassies or consulates and these provisions left many stranded in 
airports and ports, and in a legal limbo: rejected by the Libyan authorities and denied 
return to Lebanon (Doraï, 2006: 177; Knudsen, 2009). These regulations were in place 
until 1999 Prime Minister Selim Hoss revoked the decree. 
As regards the right to work, the departure of the Syrian troops from Lebanon in 
2005 marked a minor change as the Ministry of Labour signed a memorandum that 
formally allowed the Palestinians to be employed in manual and clerical jobs. This lifted 
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the ban on about fifty professions though the ban on qualified professions is still in place. 
Although this was perceived as a great step towards the implementation of their right to 
work, still the memorandum did not lift the requirement of the work permit nor guaranteed 
that a social security scheme would be applied to the Palestinians through the cancellation 
of the reciprocity principle for their case (Natour, 2005). As Amnesty International (2007) 
points out, the problem with this limited concession is that it has yet to be passed into law 
and, therefore, can still be amended at any time depending on the economic conditions of 
the country or the moods of the government. 
According to Shiblak (1996: 39), this is another instance of the executive taking the 
upper hand and confirms that the management of life through ministerial decrees and 
administrative orders not only allows for different interpretations, but also allows for the 
perpetration of endless abuses of power according to changing political conditions. As 
Knudsen (2009) argues, not only does the issue of these administrative orders and decrees 
reveal an erosion of the legislative power in favour of the executive, but this kind of 
management of material life also shows no attention to the juridical value of life itself. This 
also demonstrates how „the legal process was [and still is] throughout subservient to the 
host countries‟ and governments‟ foreign and domestic agendas and, in Lebanon 
especially, placed the judiciary and the legislature under executive patronage‟ (ibid; see 
also Agamben, 2005a). 
This demonstrates how the war waged against the Palestinians during the civil war 
is fought in the post-conflict era through legal procedures and legal discriminations. 
Reversing Clausewitz‟s proposition, Foucault (2003) questioned whether politics is the 
continuation of war by other means. In so doing, he also engaged in a reflection of law 
itself: 
The organisation and juridical structure of power, of States, 
monarchies, and societies, does not emerge when the clash of arms 
ceases. [...] The law is not born of nature [...]: the law is born of 
real battles, victories, massacres, and conquests which can be dated 
and which have their horrific heroes; the law was born in burning 
towns and ravaged fields (p. 50). 
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Law does not mark „normal‟ times as opposite to „exceptional‟ times as „beneath the law, 
war continues to rage in all the mechanism of power, even in the most regular‟ (p. 50). In 
this way critiquing Agamben‟s (2005a) reflections, executive power exceeding their roles 
through the issues of decrees having „force of law‟ may be read in a different way. Rather 
than being the evidence that the exception has become the rule, it shows how life is today 
managed through an excess of legal measures (Johns, 2005; Neocleous, 2006). 
Certainly these decisions are not only outcome of the Lebanese fragile system, but 
taken on the ground of wider contexts and events. As mentioned above a comprehensive 
peace process for the Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War, began in 
Madrid in 1991 under the auspices of the American administration and with the aim of also 
solving the Palestine question. As regards the latter, the peace initiative contemplated a 
series of multilateral and bilateral talks. Whilst the former saw the participation of Israel 
and Arab countries for the solution of pending questions in the Middle East region – such 
as the problem of water resources sharing – the latter provided a framework for discussions 
to be held between Israel and each Arab country and the Palestinian representatives. The 
Madrid peace process never produced any tangible results, but parallel and secret talks 
between Israeli and PLO representatives in Norway led to the signature of the Oslo 
Accords in 1993. This led to the mutual recognition of the PLO and the state of Israel and 
plans were made to establish the Palestinian Authority that would have achieved gradual 
autonomy in the Occupied Territories starting from areas of the West Bank. While these 
plans were aimed at the creation of a Palestinian state and although the Road Map that 
should have led to the gradual independence was itself disputable as no territorial 
continuity was granted to the Palestinians for the administration of their areas, the refugee 
issue has always been postponed. At the time of writing no significant step forward 
towards the solution to the displacement of the millions of refugees has yet been 
undertaken, leaving the Palestinians in a legal limbo.
22
 
Yet, if the peace process has already proved inconclusive, the disclosure of alleged 
negotiation documents involving the Bush administration, Israel and the Palestinian 
                                               
22 As of September 2011, the last developments involved a potential recognition of the Palestinian 
state on the Occupied Territories. The Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations is expected shortly. 
Whilst one could argue that the establishment of the Palestinian state would guarantee citizenship rights to 
the Palestinians, the situation of the Palestinians refugees of the diaspora remains unclear. The worst, and to 
some most likely, scenario would see a Palestinian state neglect the refugees‟ right of return. The birth of a 
Palestinian state might also lead to the dissolution of the PLO that, in this way, could no longer represent the 
rights of all the Palestinians no matter where they live (amongst others see the newspapers and online articles 
section El Laz, 2011; Sherwood, 2011). 
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Authority casts a dark shadow on the fate of millions of Palestinians of the diaspora. 
According to the „Palestinian leaks‟ released in January 2011 and following only by some 
months the publications by Wikileaks of secret files and cables concerning the war on Iraq, 
the Palestinian Authority would have approved massive concessions that would have 
favoured Israel including the annexation to Israel of most of East Jerusalem – a sacred city 
for both the Jews and Muslims and city that both the Palestinians and the Israelis see as 
their future capital. Most importantly, what these alleged negotiation files reveal is the 
definitive abandonment of the diasporic Palestinians because the right of return sanctioned 
in many UN Resolutions has been totally neglected in favour of a symbolic return of just a 
very few thousands refugees – about 10,000.23 
Lebanon‟s policies towards the refugees must, therefore, be understood within a 
broader framework. It is worth noting that if Israel will not accept the return of the 
Palestinians within its boundaries, this will constitute a major political problem for 
Lebanon. According to 1992 UNRWA figures, only 1% of the „Lebanese‟ Palestinian 
refugees come from the West Bank and Gaza and the rest might not have an interest in 
settling in a Palestinian state as they do not have any connections or memories linked to 
those lands (Brynen, 1997: 48-49). Moreover, not only is their right of return to their 
villages in present day Israel questioned and doubted, but also their hypothetical transfer to 
a future Palestinian state is still perceived as a „demographic security‟ problem for Israel 
(Pappe, 2001). In this scenario, the Lebanese authorities fear an inevitable naturalisation of 
its Palestinians that would trigger renewed sectarian divisions and disorders. As this is 
opposed by the government, the rejection of the naturalisation of the refugees is translated 
into the discriminatory and embittered legislation towards the Palestinians in the hope that 
sooner or later the refugees will leave or be settled in other countries (Drake, 2000; El-
Khazen, 1997; Salam, 1994; Sayigh R., 1988, 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 2001). Quite revealing 
was the declaration of Lebanese President Elias Hrawi that the government was ready to 
expel all the Palestinians residing in the country if the whole peace process failed to 
adequately address the refugee issue (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999: 12; see also 
Hudson, 1997: 258; Knudsen, 2007: 7). 
Beyond the discriminatory decrees and orders concerning the right to work, other 
legal measures were taken in order to give the international community a strong signal of 
Lebanon‟s position and to convince the Palestinian refugees to leave or be ready to face a 
                                               
23 For more information on the Palestinian leaks, see the newspapers and online articles section BBC 
News, 2011; Carlstrom, 2011; Milne and Black, 2011. 
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miserable life in Lebanon. As El-Natour (2003) argues, in 2001, an amendment of the real 
estate law concerning the non-Lebanese‟s acquisition of properties – law No. 11615 issued 
on 1969 – was clearly intended to exclude the Palestinians from the right to buy any real 
estate or even inherit properties. As the amendment sanctions that any person that is not a 
citizen of a recognised state cannot acquire any real-estate property in Lebanon, it is 
obvious that the modification was approved to address the Palestinian refugees because 
they still do not hold any citizenship and a Palestinian state still does not exist. This led 
many that for years managed to live outside the camps to either face illegality or to return 
to the camps where reconstruction or new constructions are severely restricted, and where 
overcrowding increases exponentially as camp‟s boundaries cannot be expanded. The right 
to acquire property for the Palestinians was perceived as the road to naturalisation and to 
justify this position Sami Gemayel, MP of the Phalange Party, in an interview aired on 
LBC TV in March 2010 declared that „allowing Palestinian refugees the right to own a 
home risks keeping them in Lebanon rather than helping their return home‟. He further 
argued that granting them rights in Lebanon is nothing but „an Israel and US plot to 
prevent their return to their homeland‟.24 It is in fact widely perceived that granting the 
Palestinians any basic right in Lebanon would stand for an acceptance of their 
naturalisation and denial of their right of return. 
Discrimination in Lebanon seems to constitute the norm, but the bareness of the 
refugees‟ condition is also dramatised by a general political and gradual humanitarian 
abandonment. As the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 marked an already 
negative change in terms of diplomatic representation of the refugees in the Lebanese 
context, their abandonment was further revealed after the signature of the Oslo Accords in 
1993 as the Palestinian Authority began focusing on the West Bank and Gaza where a 
Palestinian state might be born one day. Yet, despite the reopening of a PLO office in 
Beirut in 2006 after Syria‟s withdrawal in 2005 and the re-establishment of a dialogue with 
the Lebanese government, the talks with the Lebanese have yet to show concrete results in 
the improvement of the refugees‟ conditions that appear to be among the most desperate in 
the Middle East, at times even equalising Gaza figures on matters regarding health care, 
camp populations and conditions of the camps among others (see Brynen, 2009). 
The political abandonment was in fact followed by a gradual humanitarian 
abandonment as the relief and assistance provided by the international community through 
                                               
24 See the newspapers and online articles section Lamb, 2010. 
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UNRWA was reduced. After Oslo, in particular, donations have decreased as the donors 
felt that a solution to the Palestinian cause would have soon been found. Moreover, since 
Oslo much of the limited funds have been used to support development projects in the 
territories that should one day be part of the Palestinian state and, as a consequence, 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have seen their UNRWA budget considerably reduced. 
Yet, while in other countries they are allowed to access public services such as schools and 
health care, in Lebanon they can only rely on UNRWA support because they are prevented 
from using public services. However, UNRWA‟s support is insufficient. As regards health 
care, for instance, because of serious budgetary problems, UNRWA can only partially 
cover a hypothetical hospitalisation, forcing refugees to rely on other sources or to ask the 
help of relatives and friends to be able to get a necessary surgery.
25
 Moreover, biopolitical 
considerations of whom should be supported and helped materialise as „this kind of limited 
support is offered only to Palestinian refugees below the age of 59 years rais[ing] serious 
questions about the ethics of UNRWA aid‟ (Othman, 1998). The biopolitics of aid is 
rendered so explicit as if the oldest are no longer worthy of saving or curing. The politics 
of life and death is, therefore, manifested in the decision to let the elderly die and 
concentrate the limited resources on younger people. This shows the transformation of the 
„politics of keeping alive‟ – typical of humanitarian intervention, biopower – into a politics 
of „letting die‟ (Agier, 2011: 211). Beyond a legal and diplomatic abandonment already so 
explicit, as funds are increasingly reduced and humanitarian relief gradually stops, we are 
perhaps witnessing the total abandonment of the Palestinian cause as refugees are left to 
themselves to fight as much as they can their legal, political, economic and social 
exclusions. 
Concluding remarks 
The inability to find a solution to the Palestine and refugee question had disastrous 
consequences for the refugees. Displaced and left with no means of livelihood, the 
Palestinians were also left stateless and without the diplomatic protection that a state would 
guarantee to its citizens. Victims of a double exclusion, the refugees have also been 
excluded from the legal protection that bodies such as the UNHCR could have guaranteed. 
The Agambenian inclusive exclusion materialised only after the second exception – from 
                                               
25 According to Othman (1998), an open heart surgery costs up to $15,000 of which UNRWA 
covers only $2,700. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1999), instead, costs of these kinds of 
surgery vary between $7,000 and $12,000 with UNRWA being able to pay no more than $1,500. 
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the mandate of UNHCR – as the Palestinians are entrusted to UNRWA and humanitarian 
organisations whose main task is to keep them alive. Humanitarianism can, therefore, be 
seen not as the response to sovereign power‟s exclusion, but as sovereign power‟s „left 
hand‟. As biopower becomes the supplement of sovereign power, humanitarian 
organisations capture the life of the refugees rendered bare by the sovereign‟s decision. 
With the aim of making the refugees survive, humanitarian organisations, as much as the 
sovereign does, deny the political and juridical significance of the refugee‟s life by 
drawing lines on whom to cure and whom to let die. 
The chapter also demonstrated the impossibility of identifing sovereign power with 
the state only. The decision on the Palestinian life is not a prerogative that the Lebanese 
government holds exclusively. Decisions taken at different scales – international and 
regional– affect the Palestinians as much as the Lebanese government‟s measures. While it 
may seem that sovereignty has migrated from the nation-state to the global level moving 
on biopolitical and exceptional terrains (Cladwell, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2001), power 
must still be seen as a relation in which different actors decide and act in a concert of 
actions and responses that depend on circumstances and interests. As if occurring on a 
horizontal plan, power moves and circulates through the Lebanese state, suprastate 
institutions (UN and UNRWA), the international community and the neighbouring states. 
For an international community that attempts to impose the naturalisation of the refugees, 
there is a state that, though arguably, resists the refugees‟ implantation through the 
management of their life and the discrimination. 
State-centric perspectives are not useful to understand the ways in which power 
operates. Nor are the global biopolitical views that would rather see a global sovereignty 
where nation-state have no authority or prerogative of decision as the right key to 
investigate the production of bare life. Precisely because power is a relation and not an all-
encompassing one-direction relation where the oppressed is fated to remain such, multiple 
sovereign decisions can be resisted, challenged and contested. While freedom, Foucault 
sustained, is an essential precondition, the next chapter explores crucial moments in which 
sovereign power reveals leakages and weaknesses and the loss of control of its population. 
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4- Decentering the state and empowering people: 
Resistance between civil society and military 
struggles 
For if we had indeed acquired that „hate and 
bitterness‟ that the Western world claimed we were 
reputed for, we also danced the dabke, played the oud, 
and the women worked their embroidery. And those 
people outside the camp (not to mention the Western 
„tourists‟ with their blessed sympathy, their cameras, 
their sociology degrees, and their methodological and 
statistical charts), seeing our tattered rags hanging on 
us like white flags of surrender, but not hearing our 
„ya leil, ya aein‟,  [my night, my mind] did not know 
what we had. A feeling within us. Growing. A hope. A 
hope. 
 
(Turki, 1972: 46) 
If the Palestinian refugees have been depoliticised through a legal abandonment 
and the humanitarian management of their life, certainly the sovereign exception does not 
correspond to the withdrawal of their political value and chances of resistance. Multiscalar 
sovereign power forces have since the Nakba been affecting the refugees‟ lives. As 
decisions were taken to directly or indirectly withdraw any form of legal and diplomatic 
protection, the „left hand of the Empire‟ intervened by taking care of them and their 
survival. As their bare life was put at the centre of the sovereign power‟s and biopower‟s 
concerns, the Palestinian refugees have often been represented as speechless, helpless and 
at the mercy of different security, governmental and humanitarian apparatuses. But is this a 
comprehensive picture of their experience in Lebanon? 
Passive recipients of humanitarian aid and at the mercy of the Lebanese authorities 
as well as different states‟ interests and decisions, the Palestinians have often been depicted 
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as victims. Whilst this description is true since decisions taken by different „sovereigns‟ 
have deeply affected their lives, the account of their displacement is somewhat incomplete 
and inaccurate. Although Agamben‟s understanding of sovereign power and his theory of 
exception may shed some light on the condition of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
especially as regards their life in the camps (discussed in the next chapter), it seems that 
the application of his reflections could not entirely grasp the actual condition of the 
Palestinians in the country. This is not only because a more complex network of sovereign 
powers impact upon their life (as seen in the previous sections), but also because sovereign 
power as described by Agamben does not leave any space for resistance or power relations 
to take place. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have always been treated as objects of 
intervention by both the humanitarian agencies and the Lebanese authorities. Yet, the 
impression that the Palestinians remain objects of intervention and exclusion, incapable of 
any agency is much indebted to a literature and an international legal system that equate 
political subjectivity or agency with citizenship only. The assumption that political 
subjectivity is „possessed‟ or „enacted‟ only by those officially entitled to political rights – 
citizens of a state – is in fact misleading and would not render a more complex picture of 
the Palestinians‟ experience in Lebanon. 
If we instead abandon an idea of power understood only in terms of law and rights 
and embrace a Foucauldian understanding of power as productive, dispersed and 
circulating, we might be able to reveal a different perspective of the refugees‟ subjectivity 
and life. As discussed in the first chapter, unless caught in the net of a power that tortures 
or kills systematically, there is always the chance of resistance and dissent. Power is a 
process and a relation through which struggles and confrontations take place. Although 
power could be identified with the state, this localisation is rather limiting as what is at 
stake for Foucault is not the „political power‟ but human relations (Foucault, 1997: 283). It 
is „everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere‟ (Elden in Coleman and Grove, 2009: 499).  Power is a continuity with 
multiple centres and is not only negative and limiting, but can be positive and productive. 
Most of all, it is not pyramidal (Deleuze, 1988: 27). It does not move on vertical 
hierarchical lines, but relations of power occur on the same surface. This means that even 
if refugees are excluded from citizenship and protection, they may still act politically 
resisting forces that want their life disposable. Practices of resistance and coping strategies 
are in fact constantly developed through the refugees‟ most ordinary and everyday 
practices (see also Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Malkki, 1996; Rajaram, 2002).  
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The firm rejection of the discourse that depicts the refugees as passive objects of 
intervention and exclusion is necessary to uncover other aspects of the refugee experience. 
In order to reject universalistic generalisations of their suffering, a „genealogical approach‟ 
is essential to recognise „the contingency, multiplicity, and complexity of refugee events 
and experiences‟ not only for the causes of their displacement but also in relation to its 
aftermath (Soguk, 1999: 8). This requires one to look closely at the ways in which the 
Palestinians themselves develop strategies of survival and resistance. While overestimating 
their possibilities would be disrespectful of their predicament and condition, in this chapter 
I frame the Palestinian „resistance‟ focusing on their extraordinary reaction, activism and 
problem-solving. 
In this chapter, the dispersal of power is investigated in both the refugees‟ coping 
strategies as well as Lebanese society‟s fundamental role in contributing to the 
Palestinians‟ emancipation or further exclusion. In so doing, I rely on different secondary 
and primary sources to provide evidence of the ways in which Palestinian resistance could 
be framed. While primary sources such as interviews have been both collected and 
analysed by myself, some secondary sources provided precious insights on other ways in 
which the Palestinians have challenged sovereign decisions in different context. Secondary 
materials have been re-interpreted in light of a reflection on power relations. 
In the first section of the chapter, the Palestinians‟ determination is explored. By 
focusing on their refusal of a life made of eating, sleeping, obeying and hoping, it is shown 
how the refugees react to their displacement and condition of deprivation by re-
establishing their dignity and re-constructing their shattered and divided society. As forms 
of controls are turned into strategies of survival, refugees reconfigure power relations 
through their hope and actions.  
Although the refugees‟ activism was essential for their emancipation, the following 
part investigates the impact of Lebanese public opinion in their life and explores the nature 
of the Lebanese-Palestinian relations from the initial solidarity to the breakup of their 
bonds. From the sharing of pan-Arab sentiments to the sharing of an economic, social and 
political marginalisation, the alliance between the Lebanese and the Palestinians became 
essential for the ascendancy of the PLO and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) 
in Lebanon. Yet, the breakup of these relations during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) 
meant for the Palestinians the loss of their emancipation and strength as in the 1980s 
former allies attacked the refugee camps. 
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The last part of the chapter discusses the aftermath of the civil war. As much as the 
Lebanese had a positive role in the emergence of a more confident and self-reliant 
Palestinian community, they also deeply and negatively affected the Palestinians‟ life later 
on. As Lebanese public opinion seems to matter as much as regional and international 
decisions, it is shown how society may play an important role in the way in which the host 
government might treat the refugees. As the Lebanese government and society agree on the 
marginalisation of the Palestinians to prevent their naturalisation, discriminatory laws and 
orders are passed undisturbed as no, or very timid, opposition arises. 
The chapter concludes with a section in which I reflect on the meaning of 
Palestinian resistance today. Despite multifaceted exclusions and oppressions, the 
Palestinians demonstrate their ability to resist. By acting on their very zones of exclusions, 
bypassing legal impediments and transgressing the law, their individual agencies practice 
the rights they claim. Challenging law and state‟s decisions, the multiplicity of individual 
and „incidental resistances‟ might lead to a change. 
Palestinians in the aftermath of the Nakba: 
From the reconstitution of Palestinian dignity to the struggle 
It is undeniable that for most of the Palestinians that found refuge in Lebanon life 
has been very hard. Displaced and left with no means of livelihood, the majority of them 
could rely only on the humanitarian organisations‟ support or were forced to move to the 
refugee camps. Though their life for a great part had to revolve around the humanitarian 
relief, the Palestinians found their own ways of resisting a power, or a multiplicity of 
powers, that positioned them as passive recipients of aid. Never giving up their hope in a 
better future and resisting their condition, refugees in Lebanon developed different 
strategies to improve their situation and to avoid exclusive dependence on the humanitarian 
agencies or external help. 
Among others, the ration that is one of the most evident signs of a biopower 
penetrating the refugees‟ body and insinuating a sense of obligation towards those that 
provide the food, became itself an instrument of resistance for some. Whilst explaining the 
cultural and gendered logic that surrounded the reception of food according to which only 
women and children would queue and bear the humiliation of getting the humanitarian 
relief, Peteet (2005: 78-80) argues that some used to re-sell their rations to purchase other 
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basic necessities  and consumer staples not provided by UNRWA. The re-selling of the 
rations was common for those families whose numbers were declining or for those who 
had relatives abroad who could send remittances. This strategy was essential to escape the 
circle of passive reception of food and aid. On the one hand, it was used to resist a power 
which imposes quantity, quality and kind of food to be eaten and, on the other, the act of 
re-selling became an instrument of liberation. As Peteet (2005: 78) suggests in fact, „by 
selling rations, refugees gained some measure of control over the domestic economy of 
food and consumption‟. This meant that the ration became a materiality that did not 
maintain the role for which it was designed – penetrating the refugee‟s body to make 
him/her survive and install a sense of obligation. The ration was utilised by recipients in 
different ways as it entered a system of exchange in which refugees could decide what to 
sell, what to buy and what to eat. As Foucault (1997: 295) argued, „one escape[s] from a 
domination of truth not by playing the game that was totally different from the game of 
truth but by playing the same game differently, or playing another game, another hand, 
with other trump cards‟. The „acceptance‟ of the ration did not stand for a passive reception 
of aid and, along with it, a passive reception of the humanitarian regime to which the 
refugees have been confined. The Palestinians accepted the rations, but some of them 
managed to actively change the purpose of the aid received. A different economy is 
installed and with it power relations are re-instated too. Through the money earned they 
could choose what to buy without being forced to eat the products that UNRWA 
distributed and were able to vary their diet.  
However, early forms of resistance emerged also in other contexts. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the education that the Palestinian refugees received was a matter of 
deep contestation because of the adoption of syllabi that did not consider the history of 
Palestine and the reason of their displacement. The teaching of these kinds of subjects to 
young Palestinian children would have been too dangerous in that they could have grown 
up with feelings of resentment and anger. Yet, for a power that wants them to forget about 
their past, origins, identity and rights, there is a resistance that contrasts and fights the 
attempted erasure of pages of their history. While the reasons for their displacement and 
the nature of their culture and traditions were discussed during occasional meetings in the 
camps or in the cafes, the teaching of the history of their homeland and the Palestinian 
people became also the prerogative of the families. Asked about the ways in which he 
managed to „keep in touch‟ with his Palestinian origins despite being so young and being 
born in Lebanon, Seif, a Palestinian living in Shatila says: 
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I knew Palestine through my father because he lived there, he 
remembers it… he was ten years old when he left. He knows 
Palestine and he taught us to love it, to dream about it… [He talked 
about Palestine] all the time... in every occasion… he told us about 
Yaffa, Haifa and the beautiful Jerusalem… he told us about the 
British occupation and how problems started in 1917 until 1948... 
[...] He implanted the idea of return in our hearts [...] in the same 
way I am teaching my own kids, telling them we are only guests 
here in this country, one day we should return, we should make this 
justice happen, this dream… we wish this dream could happen.1 
Both the discussions in the private and public spaces of the camps became essential for 
keeping alive memories, stories and events that humanitarian organisations, as well as 
some states‟ interests attempted to erase. As ideas and history were therefore passed from 
generation to generation in the family context or in the alleys of the camp, hopes and 
dreams were kept alive too (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1994; Turki, 1972, 1974).  
Though the camp is the spatial tool that aims at excluding, marginalising and 
controlling the refugees, the preservation of their traditions as well as the development of 
the their political thought and activities were indeed facilitated by the presence of the camp 
and the concentration of refugees in the same place (see also Chapter 5). While the camp 
was – and for some aspects still is – an instrument of containment and control at the hands 
of the Lebanese authorities, the refugees turned this same containment and separation from 
Lebanese society to their own advantage as the Palestinians‟ social and economic 
marginalisation strengthened their sense of identity and belonging (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 
1994; Turki, 1974). The spatial, juridical, social and economic exclusion of the Palestinian 
refugees from the rest of society had the effect of increasing the refugees‟ cohesion and 
reinforcing their sense of community. Therefore, exclusion and exception that are the main 
tools of sovereign power that renders life bare life are transformed into strategies of 
resistance as refugees refuse to forget their past, the reasons of their tragedy, and to give up 
their hopes for a return. 
While the exceptionality of the camp is discussed in more depth in the following 
chapter, the camp became the space in which multiple strategies have been enacted to 
                                               
1 Seif, Shatila, 24 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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overcome difficulties. Well before the refugees were officially allowed to improve their 
rudimentary households in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Palestinians began 
constructing walls within their tents to shelter from the cold winters and adverse weather 
conditions. Despite the prohibition on building with solid materials that would have given 
the impression of permanency, many have succeeded in eluding the controls and violating 
the regulations of the Lebanese authorities since the mid-1950s. Ahmad, for example, a 
refugee in his 80s living in Shatila, told me how his wife used to get solid material and 
stones from Beirut public spaces in order to improve their shelter:   
 We didn‟t have enough money... my wife brought stones. She 
carried them on her head... you see this wall that doesn‟t have any 
bricks? It‟s all made of stones.. she brought them on her head... [...] 
My wife brought the stones from Bir Hassan [district of south 
Beirut] on her head... that road was made by the French.. she took 
out stones from the paved pathway and brought them here.
2
 
The example offered by Ahmad clearly shows how power relations occur at the same level. 
Power does not move vertically, downwards or upwards, but circulates horizontally on the 
same surface (Deleuze, 1988: 26-28). Power and resistance coexist in the space of the tent 
and they are in a dialogical relation of act-and-response, prohibition-and-transgression. The 
tent becomes the visible power of the Lebanese authorities that prevent the permanent 
settlement of the refugees. This power, however, meets the invisible resistance of the 
refugees that stone after stone challenge the Lebanese authorities‟ dictates on construction. 
As bricks or stones become materialities that reinstall power relations, refugees refuse to 
obey and put their wellbeing at the centre of their concerns. Petty acts, such as the theft of 
stones from public spaces, are instances of what Scott (1985) defines as „incidental 
resistance‟. We cannot, in fact argue, that Palestinian refugees‟ resistance through these 
actions is organised or would lead to revolutionary changes. While it would be a mistake to 
over-romanticise these acts, we cannot dismiss these agencies as insignificant. The theft of 
stones from public spaces and the construction within the tent is an endorsement of what is 
perceived to be the refugee‟s right: having a shelter that protects him/her from the cold 
                                               
2 Ahmad, Shatila, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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winters and severe weather conditions. Although these acts do not undermine or remove 
the basic structure of domination – the Lebanese authorities preventing Palestinians from 
building in concrete – it is a practice of self-help and self-indulgence that at the end of the 
day gives the refugees what they sought for – a more secure shelter – by not complying to 
the Lebanese authorities‟ dictates. 
But the refugees‟ agency, activism and determination is also shown by their ability 
to provide basic services to the camps. In Shatila, electricity came only towards the end of 
the 1950s and it was the results of refugees‟ own ability to provide the service to the camp. 
As Sayigh (1994: 40) explains, it was an inhabitant of the camp, Abu Turki, who decided 
to personally meet Prime Minister Sami Solh in 1956 and later on negotiated with the 
Electricity Company for the provision of electricity for the camp. In doing so and 
personally paying for the installation and prolongation of cables, he obtained electricity 
that he used to rent to other camp dwellers. Through his personal negotiations and skills, 
and without the intercession of anybody, he was able to provide the whole camp with a 
service that until that moment was neglected for the people of Shatila. 
After the Nakba, a new sense of enterprise was also felt in the context of working 
opportunities. Coming from a society that was based on the cultivation of the land, the 
Palestinians in Lebanon managed to either use their skills or to adapt themselves to new 
professions and jobs. According to law expert and Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, Souheil 
El-Natour, the Palestinians, even the poorest, contributed to the growth of the Lebanese 
economy. They may have been economically exploited and underpaid, but many refugees 
who worked as agricultural seasonal workers made an essential contribution to the 
development of the citrus cultivation as the Lebanese did not have any expertise to expand 
this sector.
3
 Yet, agriculture was not the only sector in which the refugees worked as many 
learnt and developed new professional skills becoming builders, plasterers, painters, 
workers in the industry or opening small business or shops (Sayigh, 1994).
4
 
These initiatives and the spirit of adaptation show the refugees‟ potential, their 
determination to overcome their predicament and to be more independent from the 
humanitarian relief. Only by moving away from a legal consideration of their condition can 
we uncover the multiple forms of resistance and deny any possibility of assimilating the 
Palestinians in Lebanon to the figure of homo sacer as developed by Agamben. Despite a 
                                               
3 Insights from the interview with Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008. Interview 
conducted in English. 
4 Insights from different interviews and informal conversations in Shatila during fieldwork. 
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network of powers that act on their life and exclude them from the benefits of citizenship, 
the Palestinians found their ways towards the amelioration of their condition by working 
hard, reinventing their roles, transferring their skills and opposing forces that would rather 
see their cause forgotten. This was not only manifested in their daily and most ordinary 
activities – working, getting basic services for the camps, discussing their condition and 
maintaining their traditions alive – since the refugees also developed an awareness of their 
political role both within the scope of the Palestinian cause as well as within Lebanese and 
Arab society. While in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 displacement, the Palestinians 
appeared as „politically paralysed‟, fragmented and unable to reconstruct their society, this 
moment did not last for long. Mainly but not exclusively guided by the Palestinian upper 
class and elites, a new wave of political activism began taking shape in the 1950s in the 
Arab capitals (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997: 173-174). This resulted in the establishment of 
the PLO and of different Palestinian unions and organisations such as the associations of 
workers, students and women.
5
 According to Laurie Brand (1988b: 4), the PLO must in 
fact be seen as the natural result of the effort of all the Palestinians of the diaspora in 
shaping and rebuilding their dispersed and divided community. Yet, since the PLO was 
still perceived as too elitist and distant from the people‟s basic needs, alongside the PLO 
other grassroots groups and activities were established and undertaken. As the lower 
classes‟ initiatives accompanied the upper classes‟ organisations, Palestinian refugees‟ 
activism in Lebanon was manifested through their involvement in student unions and in the 
Arab Nationalist Movement (hereafter ANM) based in Beirut. In this context, the 
Palestinians‟ political awareness and potential was revealed through the enormous 
contribution that Palestinians gave to the foundation of this movement in the campus of the 
American University of Beirut in the 1950s. One of the co-founders and masterminds of 
the project was George Habash, a Palestinian student that afterwards also founded its own 
Palestinian group: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Brynen, 1990; 
Cobban, 1984). As the Palestinian cause was part of the broader Arab cause, the ANM 
managed to unite the Palestinians and the Lebanese in their struggle against new forms of 
imperialism or pro-Western policies adopted by any Arab government. 
While Arab nationalist tendencies united people from different national 
backgrounds in the Middle East, an awareness of their own Palestinian cause as distinct 
                                               
5 In 1952 Arafat, who in 1969 would have become the PLO chairman, founded the Palestinian 
Students Union in Egypt. Also in Egypt, the League of the Palestinian Women was founded in 1962 while in 
the 1960s, members of Fatah, a guerrilla organisation based in Kuwait of which Arafat was a member and co-
founder, established the Palestinian Workers Committee and Women Committee (Brand, 1988b). 
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from the rest of the Arab world led to the organisation of Palestinian cells and clubs as well 
as the establishment of elementary military training (Turki, 1972: 100). From this moment 
on, the Palestinians of the camps too began acquire a new and more active subjectivity as 
fighters as well as political actors. Underground movements rising independently from the 
PLO as well as guerrilla groups conflated into what later on was known as the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement (PRM).  People joining these movements strongly believed that the 
achievement of their rights could be obtained only through the liberation of their land and 
through the military struggle as Arab states‟ unsuccessful diplomacy and strategies did not 
achieve any success. 
Inspired by other Third World liberation movements, such as those developed in 
Algeria, Cuba, China and Vietnam, the PRM slowly began taking the upper hand and 
managed to shadow the efforts of the PLO which was still guided by Arab states‟ interests 
and unable to shape an independent policy (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997: 178). However, 
while separate at the beginning, the PLO and the PRM became closer after the 1967 Arab 
defeat. The sense of defeat that dominated in the post-1967 War – the „Six Day War‟ in 
which the Israelis crushed the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies in less than a week – 
was such that the inconclusive politics of the PLO and Arab states was obscured by the 
PRM activism and military achievements.
6
 The ascendancy of the PRM and the popular 
support that the latter gained throughout the 1960s was such that, if the PLO still wanted to 
represent all the Palestinians, it had to come to terms with the grassroots resistance 
movement and include it in the diplomatic, political and military decisions. By 1969 the 
PRM completed its infiltration of the PLO by seizing the most important post as Yasser 
Arafat, until that moment leader of Fatah and firm antagonist of the PLO, was elected 
chairman (see also Brynen, 1990). From 1969 more importance and attention were 
reserved for the liberation struggle and the needs of the Palestinian people. Also, the 
ascendancy of the PRM within the official realm of politics imbued the refugees with great 
confidence in their own capabilities and with a new spirit and strong rejection of a „life of 
eating and sleeping only‟ (Sayigh, 2007: 12). 
„From peasants to revolutionaries‟, the Palestinians overcame oppression and 
exclusion while embracing a new optimism and hope in their future (Sayigh, 2007). The 
1960s, in particular, represented a watershed for them. This was because Palestinian youth, 
                                               
6 Starting from small raids and operations from the West Bank and Gaza well before 1967, the 
guerrilla groups, among which Fatah was one of the most important, gained such a popular support and 
approval that the PLO had to include them or facing the alternative of losing the subjects they wanted to 
represent (among others, Cobban, 1984) 
Decentering the state and empowering people 
114 
 
repressed and mistreated by the Lebanese authorities during the period of the Deuxiéme 
Bureau, possessed the right combination of discontent and anger to be ready to act, react 
and fight back (Hudson, 1997: 249). Even during the harshest repression at the hands of 
the Lebanese authorities, the Palestinians managed to organise undercover activities and 
elude the controls of the secret services both within and outside the camps. As refugees 
began increasingly calling for the armed struggle, the uprising in Lebanon occurred 
gradually. If mass mobilisation could not be achieved because of the tight controls over the 
camps, a „new mass atmosphere‟ could be recreated through the distribution of pamphlets 
and other undercover activities such as using Boy Scout groups to mask real purposes of 
training.
7
 As in the 1960s new training camps were opened in Syria, Algeria and Egypt, 
„[g]radually the mood in the camps changed from one of patience and suppressed anger to 
one of revolutionary readiness, which Lebanese oppression only made more explosive‟ 
(Sayigh, 2007: 156). Networks of training were established and those who managed to 
receive training from abroad, once back in Lebanon could train their fellows in the camps. 
Though this shows the Palestinians‟ courage and readiness to challenge the Lebanese 
authorities and their veto on training and joining political activities, this was certainly done 
at high costs. Families of would-be fighters as well as trainers and trainees themselves 
were living with the constant fear of being caught and persecuted, tortured or killed. Yet, 
tight controls and threats to their lives did not succeed in discouraging the Palestinians. 
The first cross-border operation ever undertaken in Lebanon occurred in 1965 and by 1968 
the number of incidents at the Lebanese-Israeli border increased to twenty-nine and 
hundred-and-fifty by 1969 (Hudson, 1997: 251; Brynen, 1990: 46). 
As demonstrated so far, the Palestinians through their determination firmly rejected 
a life of exclusion. Without relying exclusively on the humanitarian relief, refugees have 
managed to improve their condition and to build more confidence in their possibilities by 
developing a new political and militant subjectivity. Despite the tight controls and 
oppression of the Lebanese authorities, they met up, discussed their situation and strategies 
to improve it, and organised activities that ultimately led to their success in liberating 
themselves and the camps from the repression of the Lebanese intelligence services and 
police. Capable of reinstalling power relations that allowed them to fight back against their 
oppressors, the Palestinians‟ agency and confidence in their own potential was essential. 
                                               
7 Insights from the interview with Jaber Suleiman, Palestinian independent researcher, Mar Elias, 2 
January 2009. Interview conducted in English. 
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While their tenacity is the main reason for their success, also fundamental were the support 
and solidarity of some Lebanese that joined them in their struggle. 
Lebanese solidarity and hostility: 
Essential features for the Palestinian success and failure 
Lebanese support: Paving the way to the Palestinian ascendancy 
Of fundamental importance for the liberation of the camps from the grip of the 
Lebanese authorities in 1969 was the Palestinians‟ own spirit of initiative and 
determination. Yet, as some pointed out, without the support of Lebanese civil society the 
ascendancy of the Palestinian resistance and the PLO in Lebanon would not have taken 
place (Hudson, 1997; Sayigh, 2007). The improvement of the Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations occurred in the context of the rise of the pan-Arab sentiments and movement. 
However, a great part was also played by the country sectarian system that has always 
impeded the Lebanese from building a common national identity and this strengthened the 
chance of alliance between the Palestinians and certain sects. This was an alliance that 
proved crucial as not only did it threaten the political status quo in the country, but also 
helped the Palestinians to free themselves from the tight control of the Lebanese 
authorities. 
While the pan-Arab ideals were a strong factor connecting the Lebanese and the 
Palestinians, other internal and unresolved Lebanese issues led some to identify themselves 
with the Palestinians and their cause. The arbitrary way with which the Lebanese state was 
created was still a thorn in the side for many. Dominated by a ruling class that did not 
represent the whole population and kept on pursuing their own interests rather than those 
of the whole nation (see also Chapter 6), Lebanon was on more than one occasion at the 
edge of a civil war well before 1975 (Peretz, 1994; Traboulsi, 2007). Not only were there 
divisions over the meaning of Lebanese national identity, but struggles developed also 
along economic and class lines as certain sects and people remained excluded from the 
advantages and benefits of the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. Social and 
economic marginalisation hit the Palestinians as well as the Lebanese of the rural areas or 
remote regions. This was especially so for those living in the south or in the Bekaa Valley 
and far from urban centres as basic services like electricity, schools, clinics and hospitals 
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seemed luxurious infrastructures that the poor could not afford and, most of all, did not 
have the right to enjoy. On their part, members of the government and the ruling class, 
busy in strengthening their positions, focused on maintaining a political status quo that 
would have guaranteed privileges also in their own economic activities. 
Dissatisfied with Lebanon‟s political and economic system, a very heterogeneous 
opposition to the government was taking shape and discontent about the Lebanese system 
and missing reforms soon merged with the defence of the Palestinians and their cause. 
Tired of the Maronite supremacy in the country despite the decline in the number of the 
Christians, different forces allied together to fight this political stagnation and lack of 
representation. The Lebanese opposition movement that included also members of the 
Christian sects was „an untidy amalgam of Muslim traditionalists (Sunni and Shi‟ite), 
Muslim radicals (left and right), secularists (left and right), pan-Arabists of every brand, 
socialists, student activists, trade unionists and a tiny sprinkling of Marxists‟ (Cobban, 
1984: 65; Farsoun and Wingerter, 1981/1982: 100). 
The solidarity that during the 1950s and 1960s was established between some 
Lebanese and the Palestinians was in fact the direct result of two main factors. On the one 
hand, the sharing of pan-Arab ideals led many Lebanese of the upper and low classes to 
sustain and support the Palestinian cause and the resistance presence in the country. On the 
other, the sharing of a social and economic marginalisation brought the lowest layers of 
Lebanese society and the Palestinians closer. As solidarity worked along poverty lines, the 
Shi‟a community of the south felt a strong affinity with the Palestinians and became one of 
the firmest supporters of their rights and cause. There is no coincidence in the fact that 
„[t]he rise of the Palestinian resistance movement in the middle and late 1960s occurred at 
the beginning of a period of political, economic and social stagnation in Lebanon‟ 
(Hudson, 1978: 262). According to a survey undertaken by the daily Lebanese newspaper 
Al-Nahar in 1968, 79% of the Lebanese looked with favour at the Palestinian resistance‟s 
activities and this support increased in the following years (Brynen, 1990: 47, 56; Hudson, 
1978: 264). Discontent with the government and solidarity with the Palestinians were also 
manifested in street demonstrations taking place in the second half of the 1960s and first 
half of the 1970s (see also Kapeliuk, 1969; Traboulsi, 2007: 269-170). While protesting the 
government‟s inability to take care of their citizens through the approval of the necessary 
reforms, during these demonstrations people also raised concerns for the inadequacy of the 
Lebanese army and doubts over its role. As Israeli retaliatory attacks were increasing 
following Palestinian guerrilla operations at the border or attacks to Israeli interests abroad, 
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the Lebanese army remained impassive. To some, the armed forces were not an institution 
aimed at the defence of the country, but an instrument of oppression in the hands of the 
ruling class to stop the civil unrest and opposition (Traboulsi, 2007: 174-175). 
The wide support for the Palestinian cause seriously limited the government and the 
army chances to crush the Palestinian guerrilla groups, especially after the Arab defeat of 
1967. It is precisely in civil society that one must identify the strength of the Palestinian 
resistance movement. While in Lebanon this manifested support led the government to 
„indulge‟ their citizens to avoid worse confrontations, in Jordan this did not occur and the 
authorities easily crushed and expelled the Palestinian movement in 1971 when the PLO 
transferred its headquarters to Beirut. Unlike Jordan, in Lebanon the mobilisation of the 
masses made the difference. A Palestinian militant interviewed by Rosemary Sayigh 
(2007: 171) explains how they managed to liberate the camps: 
What helped the liberation of the camps was the state of 
mobilisation of the Lebanese masses, which prevented the 
authorities from hitting the camps fiercely. It wasn‟t the force 
inside the camps, or the quantity of arms, but the mood of the 
masses, and the continuous demonstrations that paralysed the state. 
These open demonstrations for support of the Palestinian cause led the government to sign 
the Cairo Agreement on November 2, 1969. This accord officially liberated the camp from 
the control of the Lebanese authorities, handed the camp security and administration over 
to the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command – a sort of police body attached to and 
controlled by the PLO – and granted the resistance the right to conduct its struggle from 
Lebanese territory. As Sayigh (2007: 163) points out, „[t]he course of the Revolution was 
thus quite different in Lebanon from Jordan, with a much higher degree of mass 
spontaneity, a closer alliance between the Palestinians and local forces, and more lasting 
effects in terms of autonomy of the camps‟. The Lebanese mobilisation was therefore one 
of the essential ingredients for the success of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon. To this 
power of the masses no army and no government could do anything to impede the 
ascendancy of the PLO in the 1970s.  
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Perhaps overcoming national differences was not difficult as a sense of national 
belonging in the Middle East at the time was rather weak because of the recent divisions 
and creations of states out of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. To some extent, it can be 
affirmed that the Lebanese-Palestinian solidarity resembles Agamben‟s (2001, 2005b) 
notion of „whatever being‟. In thinking about a new politics and ways of escaping the net 
of sovereign power and the production of bare life, Agamben thinks of a „community 
without presuppositions‟ formed by whatever singularities with no particular sense of 
belonging and claiming no identity (2005b: 65). The whatever being „has no identity, it is 
not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is 
determinate only through its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities‟ (p. 
67). In this context, one might be able to recognise a politics of whatever being embodied 
by the cohesion of the Lebanese and the Palestinians in protesting against the government 
and its policies. As a politics that is not mediated by any sense of belonging or any sense of 
common identity, the extremely heterogeneous opposition movement in Lebanon was 
simply a struggle between the state and the non-state, between the state and the humanity 
(pp. 85-87). For some aspects, in fact, the Lebanese and the Palestinians in that moment 
were whatever beings as they did not possess any common feature or identity that they 
could assert. Moreover, these forms of solidarity between different individuals with 
different backgrounds could be assimilated to the rejection of the idea of state or the firm 
opposition to the drawing of boundaries that separate people. This mass mobilisation 
certainly shook Lebanon as a separate entity and state. As Agamben argues, the whatever 
being is sovereign power‟s worse enemy as the sovereign can no longer draw lines and 
distinctions because no belonging or identity is claimed. The Lebanese government 
became all for sudden impotent, unable to cast out the Palestinians, unable to make the 
separation and distinction between its citizens and the refugees, between Lebanese 
civilians and Palestinian resistance (see also Edkins, 2007). 
While the power of the state is undeniable as it is in a privileged position to decide, 
narrate and represent in this way influencing the citizens‟ perceptions of danger and risk 
(see Campbell, 1998b), the alliance between the Lebanese and the Palestinians clearly 
shows how civil society can decide too, by reacting and defending the refugees and their 
cause. This alliance and solidarity of a good part of the host society led to the ascendancy 
of the PLO and the resistance movement and was destined to last until the first years of the 
Lebanese civil war. 
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The state-within-the-state era: Strengthened solidarity and cooperation 
Despite the fact that Lebanon recognised the PLO in 1964, the year of its 
establishment, it was only in 1971 that the PLO transferred its headquarters to Lebanon. 
Thanks to the support of many Lebanese, it was not difficult for the PLO to make of Beirut 
and Lebanon the centre of its political and military activities until 1982, the year of its 
withdrawal. Although Lebanon for some years represented a much more favourable host 
for the PLO and the resistance when compared to Jordan, the Palestinian movement is 
today remembered mostly for its military might, for provoking massive Israeli retaliations, 
and for its involvement in the Lebanese civil war when civilians were killed and 
massacred. But what is sometimes forgotten in the account of the Lebanese today is the 
extensive infrastructure and opportunities that the PLO created and established in those 
years prior to 1982. Not only could the PLO be considered a true „government-in-exile‟ 
taking care of its own people, but it also created job opportunities and services from which 
the same Lebanese, especially those neglected by their own state and government, 
benefitted (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997: 188).  
While today those years are remembered in negative terms and known as the „state-
within-the-state‟ era, the PLO never aimed at intruding upon Lebanon‟s internal affairs or 
turning the country into a new homeland for the Palestinian people. The main goal of the 
PLO was to reconstruct the Palestinian divided community and, most of all, to develop 
political, social and economic institutions in preparation for the birth of a Palestinian state 
on any piece of land liberated through the military struggle or diplomacy. To this end, 
emphasis was also placed on nation building, the preservation of the Palestinian culture 
and traditions and the development of state-like institutions and departments (Brynen, 
1989,1990; Cobban, 1984; Rubenberg, 1983a, 1983b). 
Beyond the unions of students (General Union of Palestinian Students), workers 
(General Union of Palestinian Workers), women (General Union of Palestinian Women), 
teachers (General Union of Palestinian Teachers) and others already established in the 
1950s and 1960s by the Palestinians themselves, the PLO developed different departments 
to meet the refugees‟ economic and social needs. Along with the Palestinian National Fund 
that operated as a ministry of economy and as department of revenues, other organisations 
functioned as state ministries. The Institute of Social Affairs and Welfare for the Families 
of the Martyrs and Prisoners, for instance, provided social and economic support for the 
families of those killed in battle or imprisoned, and also paid compensation for those 
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families that lost a relative during the Israeli retaliatory attacks in Lebanon. This latter 
service was extended to Lebanese families who lost someone during the Israeli bombings. 
Yet, the Institute of Social Affairs was not the only one that opened its services to 
Lebanese citizens without distinctions. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) that 
operated as the PLO health department took care of the prevention and cure of the 
Palestinians supplementing the poor health services provided by UNRWA. As in Lebanon 
the refugees have always been denied access to Lebanese health facilities, by 1982 the 
PRCS was running eleven hospitals and sixty clinics in Lebanon only (Rubenberg, 1983b). 
While these services were not free for anyone as a nominal fee was applied, the Palestinian 
health care was open to the Lebanese that found the PRCS machinery at the vanguard and 
its services much cheaper than those of Lebanese hospitals and clinics. Not only were the 
PRCS facilities opened to non-Palestinians, but also its staff included Palestinians doctors 
and nurses as well as Lebanese, Iraqis and more as a clear sign that no discrimination was 
applied, and that Palestinians services and opportunities were open to anyone (ibid). 
But the PLO improvement of refugees‟ lives included other spheres such as that of 
education. Despite the official adoption of the Lebanese syllabus for the UNRWA schools, 
UNRWA education program was integrated by special curricula developed by the PLO 
through its Palestine Planning Centre that issued new textbooks for children that included 
the teaching of the history of Palestine and its traditions (Sayigh, 2007: 184). This sector 
was also improved by opening kindergartens in which Palestinian culture was taught and 
by establishing the Open University (Rubenberg, 1983a: 55-57).
8
 Moreover, interested in 
creating a self-sufficient and skilled society, the PLO and some Palestinian factions offered 
scholarships to Palestinians to study in universities abroad mainly, but not exclusively, in 
Eastern European countries with which the PLO had good diplomatic relations.  
As the right to work was severely restricted for them at least until 1969 and as 
Lebanon‟s economy was in decline, the PLO also created job opportunities through the 
Palestine Martyrs Works Society, better known as SAMED. Established as a vocational 
training for the orphans in Jordan in 1970, SAMED had two main aims: providing training 
and jobs for the Palestinians; and manufacturing products for the Palestinian community 
such as leather goods, handicrafts, clothing, and so on, at prices that could be more easily 
afforded. In Lebanon SAMED built about forty-six factories employing two thirds of the 
                                               
8 Though Rubenberg (1983a: 55-57) talks extensively about the Open University no other 
information about this institution seems available. 
Decentering the state and empowering people 
121 
 
Palestinian labour force and hiring also Lebanese citizens (Doraï, 2006: 125; Rubenberg, 
1983b: 66). 
In addition to providing jobs and taking care of the Palestinians‟ welfare, the PLO 
expanded its state-like institutions and jurisdictions beyond the space of the refugee camps 
through the establishment of Palestinian prisons, tribunals and courts to adjudicate the 
cases involving Palestinians, both civilians and combatants. Although this could be read as 
an attempt to challenge Lebanese sovereignty and jurisdiction, the establishment and 
development of these institutions was not a way to escape the Lebanese judiciary system as 
cases in which a Palestinian and a Lebanese were involved were adjudicated by the 
Lebanese courts only (Peteet, 1987; Sayigh, 1994: 94).  
All these institutions and infrastructures created a sense of independence and 
autonomy that the refugees did not experience before. Even though the refugees managed 
to react and to escape the total submission to the humanitarian agencies and the Lebanese 
authorities even before the PLO‟s arrival, the creation of Palestinian institutions insinuated 
in them a new sense of pride. Proud of being able to take care of themselves, of being 
taken care of by their Palestinian representatives as well as being able to extend the 
services to the poor Lebanese neglected by their own government. This institutional, 
political and economic growth benefited Lebanon too as the whole Palestinian economy in 
Lebanon „generat[ed] more than 15 per cent of the Lebanese gross national product, and 
[…] the PLO and affiliated institutions had created 10,000 jobs directly and 30,000 
indirectly‟ for Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens (Hudson, 1997: 254). 
The inclusion of the Lebanese strengthened the already good relations between 
them and the Palestinians. As Peteet (2005: 81-82) suggests, this move was essential as it 
aimed at „a distance-reducing intervention with the intent of putting into practice a political 
rhetoric of sameness as victims of dominant economic and political systems‟. As the PLO 
and the Palestinian institutions substituted themselves to the Lebanese government in the 
care of the most neglected Palestinians as well as Lebanese, national boundaries no longer 
made sense. Geographical proximity (living in the same areas) and the sharing of a 
marginalised condition offered the „glue‟ that for long would have kept them together in 
their challenge of the Lebanese state and government. 
As Souheil El-Natour explains about the nature of the relations between the 
Lebanese and the Palestinians and the great contribution that the different Palestinian 
groups along with the PLO gave to Lebanon: 
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We were something different also because we gave the Lebanese 
ways on how to think about their rights. For example, Bint Jbail 
[village in South Lebanon]... if a Lebanese had an accident [...] the 
only small and unqualified hospital was in Tyre and there was no 
asphalted rout [road], and to take any Lebanese ill [...] to Tyre it 
took usually six hours by donkeys and etc. When the Palestinian 
commands [commandos] began having their centres, we began to 
asphalt small alleys [...] we went with our jeeps and land rovers etc. 
We began to bring a lot of stuff for the injured feda‟yeen 
[combatants]. So the people, they began receiving a lot of 
capacities “What is the state? What is the meaning of state? Why 
these people are offering all assistance like that and they are 
treating us like them. So this is equality, this is what we want”... 
and that‟s why a lot of Lebanese they began to say “If those leaders 
of us already twenty, thirty years of [from] the creation of Lebanon 
they didn‟t visit our areas, never! They didn‟t pay a penny for us, 
for the schools etc... The Palestinians are making hospitals, are 
giving medicaments, even surgical operations and a lot of others 
are coming and working and when there is a moment of hardship 
they are cooperating with us. Why these differences?”9 
Despite the fact that the Lebanese benefitted from the presence of the PLO and the 
establishment of its civilian institutions, hosting a resistance movement could be a serious 
security and political risk.  As Brynen (1990: 10) maintains, the Palestinian revolution 
constituted a significant threat in Lebanon as: 
By their very nature revolutions pose a standing challenge to the 
socio-economic and political structure of the states, and more 
specifically to the social, economic, and political positions of their 
dominant classes [...] The insurgents cannot advance a socio-
political agenda for their own country (agrarian reform, 
                                               
9 Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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redistribution of wealth, democratisation, and so forth) without 
potentially causing similar questions to be raised within the host 
sanctuary. So too revolutionary ideology, organisation and the 
notion of armed struggle may spread to groups within the 
sanctuaries in which they shelter. 
While it is true that „Lebanon had the ingredients for a civil war prior to the emergence of 
the Palestinian commandos‟, equally true is the fact that „[t]he Moslem [sic] and 
underprivileged elements of the population saw in the commandos a strong ally against the 
ruling elites who represented the status quo‟ (Nassar, 1991: 135). Taking advantage of the 
Palestinian institutions and supporting their cause, many Lebanese also joined the 
Palestinian resistance. Hoping to challenge the political stagnation and the elite, joining the 
resistance also meant getting a secure job as fighter of the Palestinian cause. Among those 
that joined the resistance there is Fadi, a Lebanese married to a Palestinian and living not 
far from Shatila camp that I encountered in one of my visits to the surrounding areas of the 
camp. He joined Fatah ranks in the 1970s and even though he abandoned the military 
struggle in the late 1970s, he still joins meetings of Palestinian groups and organisations. 
Having grown up in Shatila camp with the Palestinians, he felt that joining their cause and 
the resistance was a natural outcome. But he was not the only one in his family as his 
father and brother joined other Palestinian factions and movements. Making jokes on the 
divergences that from time to time arose between the different Palestinian groups, he stated 
that „if there was a misunderstanding among the organisations, we had troubles at home‟.10  
As many Lebanese took part to the resistance widening the already deep fracture in 
Lebanese society, clashes between the resistance and the Lebanese army and militias 
defending the status quo were inevitable. While „essential ingredients‟ for a civil 
confrontation were already present since the establishment of Greater Lebanon (1920), the 
situation precipitated paving the way to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. 
Even though the PLO and Fatah decided not to intervene at the early stages of the civil war 
(only the Rejection Front led by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and 
Saiqa were involved in the fighting), the siege of the Palestinian camps of East Beirut 
(Dbayeh, Tell El-Zaatar
11
 and Jisr El-Basha) prompted an intervention and indirectly 
                                               
10 Fadi, Sabra, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
11 This camp is also known with the name of Dikwaneh. 
Decentering the state and empowering people 
124 
 
proclaimed the official engagement of the Palestinians in the fighting. While the war 
started because of sensitive internal affairs and inequalities, the Palestinian resistance and 
civilian presence represented the fuse that led to the outbreak of a war that would last for 
about fifteen years. 
From solidarity to the break-up: The failure of the Palestinian movement and the 
abandonment of the civilians 
During the first years of the civil war the alliance between the Lebanese opposition 
and the Palestinians persisted, but solidarity bonds soon weakened and broke under the 
pressure of multiple events and factors. Until the 1970s some Lebanese supported the 
Palestinian resistance, but the attitude soon changed, especially for the Shi‟a community. 
While the reasons for this change are multiple, two main motivations must be found in the 
misbehaviour of some Palestinian fighters and the repeated Israeli attacks and invasions, 
for which the Lebanese civilians of the south paid the highest price because of the presence 
of the resistance in Lebanon. 
It is worth noting that the signature of the Cairo Agreement in 1969 did not leave 
the Palestinians completely free to launch operations from the Lebanese territory. 
According to the unofficial texts of the agreement (among others see Shiblak, 1998: 25-
26), Palestinian resistance had to limit the launch of their operation to the sole Arqoub 
region (south east of Lebanon, close to the Lebanese-Israeli border).
12
 Moreover, fighters 
were allowed to infiltrate Israel from the Lebanese border but had to avoid cross-border 
fire that would have endangered Lebanese sovereignty and security provoking Israeli 
retaliatory operations. Palestinian resistance groups had also to establish training camps 
and military positions at least one or two kilometres far from towns or villages.
13
 The 
violation of these regulations, however, had serious consequences for the civilians, 
especially for the Shi‟a community inhabiting mainly in the southern areas of the country 
where the resistance presence was more concentrated and triggered more Israeli 
retaliations. 
Without doubt Israeli strategy was that of hitting the civilians and inhabited areas in 
order to destabilise Lebanese support for the Palestinian resistance. In the 1960s and 1970s 
                                               
12 As mentioned in note 18 of Chapter 3, the official text of the Cairo Agreement has never been 
published. 
13 See FCO 17-1708 “Reports on fedayeen in Lebanon 1972”, the National Archives (London), 
newspaper article dated 19 September 1971 and entitled “Le „mémorandum‟ libanais limite la presence des 
Fedayin au Haut – Arkoub”, source unknown. 
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increasing attacks on villages, crops and groves began turning the Lebanese population 
against the Palestinians. Not only did this lead to the killing of Lebanese civilians, but also 
to the destruction of all the economic activities in areas that the Lebanese government had 
already long disregarded.
14
 As the costs of the Palestinian resistance presence increased, 
Lebanese public opinion became less supportive of the Palestinian cause and less tolerant 
of their presence in Lebanon (see also Khalili, 2006, 2007; Sayigh, 1994: 168-179). 
While before 1975, the PLO respected the provisions of the Cairo Agreement and 
to some extent managed to control groups that did not follow the restrictions, with the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1975 „[t]heft, assault, corruption, and extortion by ill-
disciplined guerrillas became all too common amid the chaos of the war‟ (Brynen, 1994: 
85). Though these acts during the civil war were committed by Palestinians as well as 
Lebanese, according to Brynen the excesses perpetrated by the Palestinians „attracted 
particular opprobrium, partly because of the scale of the Palestinian military presence, but 
even more so because they were committed by non-Lebanese‟. The decline of the image of 
the Palestinian cause led the inhabitants of the south to organise their own militia to 
counter-balance and resist the presence of Palestinian groups (see also Farsoun and 
Zacharia, 1997: 165; and Fisk, 2001: 109). 
The definitive collapse of former alliances between the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese occurred in 1982 following the Israeli invasion denominated „Operation Peace 
for Galilee‟ that left 19,000 dead, 30,000 injured and thousands of internally displaced 
people, both Lebanese and Palestinian (Brynen, 1994: 86; see also Jansen, 1982). During 
the first years of the civil war, Palestinians and the camps were attacked by Christian 
militias belonging to the Lebanese Front that aimed at maintaining the Maronite political 
dominance, but after the 1982 Israeli invasion attacks endured by the Palestinians were 
waged also by their former allies. As the consequences of the Palestinian civilian and 
military presence were far too visible and perceptible to the Lebanese, sharp military 
confrontations followed and culminated in the so-called „War of the Camps‟. Between 
1985 and 1987 Palestinian camps of Beirut, Saida and Tyre were besieged and attacked by 
the Shi‟a militia Amal. In search of political and social emancipation for the Shi‟a 
community in Lebanon after years of abandonment, militia Amal used the Palestinian card 
to gain recognition of its fundamental role in the punishment of those who, it argued, for 
years had been causing insecurity and sorrow to the Lebanese people. Taking advantage of 
                                               
14 Between 1968 and 1974 Israeli army violated Lebanese territory 3,000 times, killed about 880 
civilians, and inhabitants of the south were forced to leave (Brynen, 1994: 85). 
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the Syrian support and following Lebanese public opinion calling for the disarmament of 
the camps, Amal‟s siege and repression was ferocious. As the PLO was forced to withdraw 
from Lebanon in 1982, Palestinian refugees were left unprotected or with a handful of 
civilians that had only basic and rudimentary training. With this violence taking place, it 
was difficult to restore normal relations (see also Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1994). The 
consequences of this breakup are particularly manifested in the aftermath of the civil war 
when mistrust and discrimination still seem to prevail. 
Palestinian refugee’s life in the post-civil war era: 
Between marginalisation and resistance 
Lebanese government and civil society: United against the refugees? 
The Lebanese-Palestinian split during the civil war was followed by a 
dramatisation of the antagonism of the Lebanese towards the Palestinians in the post-
conflict era. Before the outbreak of the civil war Lebanese society was deeply fragmented 
and divided on the presence of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. However, in the 
aftermath of the war it seems that the „Palestinian factor‟ gave the Lebanese the cohesion 
and unity that for long had been lacking. If the support of the Palestinians before the civil 
war was strongly divisive, hostility towards the Palestinians became unifying in the post-
conflict era (Peteet, 1996). As the Lebanese focused on the reconstruction of their shattered 
and destroyed country, the only issue on which they could agree was the exclusion and 
repression of the refugees. Depicted as being responsible for the outbreak of the civil war, 
for the significant loss of human lives, and for the fragmentation of Lebanese society and 
politics, these convictions about the Palestinians managed to keep the nation united for a 
while as the refugees became the scapegoat for all the political, securitarian and economic 
problems of the country. Today, as much as some would welcome their right to live with 
dignity and would favourably welcome the ease on restrictions placed on them at multiple 
levels, many see their presence as a challenge that Lebanon cannot afford. 
The Taïf Agreements, which officially marked the end of the civil war in 1989, 
managed to unite all the Lebanese groups involved in the conflict who agreed on one 
important point. At Taïf (in Saudi Arabia) provisions were made to amend the constitution 
in a way that the granting of any right to Palestinians became unconstitutional. The 
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preamble of the constitution, which was added in the early 1990s, declares that Lebanon is 
the homeland of the Lebanese and that each and every Lebanese has the right to live in any 
part of the country. However, as the preamble goes on to declare, there shall be no 
discrimination based on any kind of belonging, no fragmentation or partition of the 
territory as well as no „tawtin‟ (settlement), a clear reference to the Palestinians in the 
country.
15
 It is precisely on the ground of this that the Palestinians are „legally‟ 
discriminated against in Lebanon since, according to the Lebanese, granting the 
Palestinians basic economic and social rights might constitute the first step towards their 
definitive settlement. Indeed, it is according to this interpretation and spirit that the 2001 
amendment of the law on the acquisition of real estate by foreigners has been approved as 
it clearly prevents the Palestinians from buying or inheriting any real estate (see Chapter 
3).
16
 
If before the civil war many Lebanese so vehemently supported the Palestinian 
civilian and military presence, in its aftermath the Lebanese government is left almost 
undisturbed in its issue of discriminatory law and orders targeting the Palestinians and their 
ability to buy or inherit any property. Perhaps overlooking the fact that many rich Gulf 
Arabs are buying the most expensive and luxurious apartments in the reconstructed centre 
of Beirut, web user „maria‟ commented an article online on the Palestinians‟ civil rights 
published on the Lebanese weblog „Ya Libnan‟:  
[...] Beseides [sic], libon [sic] is a tiny country, if you allow them 
[the Palestinians] to start buying up land and property, palestinians 
[sic] from all over the world will buy up libon, making it their 
homeland, further creating price hikes, and possibly opening up 
more militant facilitation thruout [sic] the country.
17
 
Although a proper survey on Lebanese perceptions on Palestinian‟s acquisition of real 
estate has not been undertaken, it seems that „maria‟‟s concerns may be quite common. 
                                               
15 For the text of the Lebanese constitution in Arabic, see 
http://www.lp.gov.lb/SecondaryAr.Aspx?id=12 (last accessed November 2011). 
16 As the government as well as the Lebanese reject the naturalisation and permanent settlement of 
the refugees, timid protests raised by some MPs judging the law as a clear violation of basic human rights did 
not result in the withdrawal of the amendment that was approved by the parliament (El-Natour, 2003). 
17 See in the newspapers and online articles section, Ya Libnan, 2010. 
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Conducted in 1994, the Hilal Khashan survey, in fact, showed quite worrying results as 
fourty percent of the participants stated that they would have even reacted militarily to a 
potential tawtin – naturalisation (Haddad, 2000, 2003; Sayigh, 1995a). Whether the 
Lebanese support the Palestinians‟ right of return because they truly believe in their cause 
or because they are too scared of the Palestinians‟ settlement, their naturalisation is still 
firmly rejected and basic human rights denied.  
Indirectly comparing their acquisition of real estate to a plague that would end only 
with the total occupation of Lebanon, the Lebanese today seem united on the refugees‟ 
marginalisation. As symptoms of biopolitical concerns for the future of the country in a 
moment of difficult reconciliation after the horrors of the civil war, the Lebanese needed to 
identify a common danger or enemy to be able to build a new sense of national identity and 
peace. While the identification of the external danger fell on Israel because of the ongoing 
occupation of part of South Lebanon until May 2000, the internal danger has been 
produced through the Palestinians identified as the cause of all troubles, the war, and 
fragmentation of the Lebanese body (on the production of internal and external security 
dangers, see Campbell, 1998b). 
In this context, and following Soguk‟s (1999) understanding, the refugees seem to 
no longer represent a potential disruption of the order of the nation-state. If refugees‟ 
presence might have been unsettling during the period preceding the outbreak of the war, 
in the post-conflict era quite the opposite occurs. Rather than disturbing or disrupting the 
state and the nation, since 1990s the Palestinians in Lebanon could be seen as „recuperative 
of sovereign practices‟ and essential factors for the unification of a divided nation. From 
threats, refugees become resources to reaffirm the Lebanese nation (or alleged so), the state 
and sovereign control. While control of the refugees‟ spaces is still not achieved for 
reasons that are explored in the next chapter, management of the Palestinian life have been 
re-installed through the issue of discriminatory laws and decrees that this time do not find 
any opposition from civil society. As law and society go hand in hand and influence each 
other in the treatment of the Palestinians, refugees become an essential otherness that 
„help[s] remake the conventional language in which the tales of the so-called citizenry, 
national community, and territorial state are told‟ (Soguk, 1999: 14-15). As Soguk goes on 
to suggest, laws and decrees are fundamental instruments of power that „work as sites or 
arenas for the articulation and rearticulation of a specific program of government‟, inform 
behaviours and „act as grids for perception and evaluation of things‟ (p. 98). While 
nationality laws constitute the best examples of the power of law to include some and 
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exclude others, a plethora of other administrative orders and decrees refine the definition of 
whom should be included in a national community and whom should be excluded and 
stripped of basic rights. The denial of the right to work, restrictions on the right of 
movement or the right to own real estate belong to the set of acts and legal dispositions that 
define the alienness of the Palestinians in everyday life. As law becomes the performative 
act through which the state constitutes itself as a specific political and national community 
excluding the others from the enjoyment of basic rights and protection, the absence of any 
opposition to it may represent a tacit consent. Indeed, while the government, parliament 
and state have the prerogative of issuing laws, decrees and administrative orders and the 
latter have the power to influence the public opinion, acceptance or refusal of these could 
still be civil society‟s choice. If laws and orders have an impact on the way people think 
about themselves, their position and rights within a political community, civil society must 
not be taken as passive and receptive only. As law does not exist “above” or “apart from” 
human society and never as „a timeless and acontextual body of knowledge‟, law also 
becomes a central battle field in which „political struggles, rights and realities are enacted 
and contested‟ (White, 2002: 1057). Never above politics. Never objective. But deeply 
embedded in struggles for power, rights, freedom, law must be understood as the 
„codification of hegemonic interests and as a potent site for empowering [or excluding] 
different groups‟ (p. 1060). 
Fundamental was the Lebanese support for the liberation of the refugees from the 
oppression of the Lebanese authorities in 1969. Yet, today Lebanese acceptance of the 
discriminations that the Palestinians endure in their everyday life is perhaps the symptom 
that the Lebanese rather than reconciling with the Palestinians, have reconciled more with 
their authorities. In this context, illuminating is the case of the Qrayya project proposed in 
the early 1990s by some politicians to relocate the Palestinians displaced from the civil war 
in a plot of land in the region of Al-Shouf (South of Beirut). As public indignation soon 
manifested, waves of protests led the cabinet to withdraw the proposal leaving many 
Palestinian families homeless (El-Natour, 2003; Sayigh, 1995a, 1995b). 
As government and society agree on the exclusion of the Palestinians, the power of 
public opinion should not be underestimated. As Connolly (2005: 143) contends, „[c]itizen 
participation in the ethos of sovereignty takes place through the micropolitics of 
sovereignty‟. Connolly means that sovereignty cannot be identified with government 
decisions only, but oscillates „between the official site of sovereignty and the 
institutionally embedded ethos flowing into it‟. As it happens during the rise of two of the 
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most totalitarian systems (Nazism and fascism), citizens may provide passive support to 
marginalisation and exclusion (pp. 144-145). A role, that of civil society, that Agamben 
seems to dismiss and neglect in favour of a focus on the state‟s sovereignty. As civil 
society is „a permanent matrix of political power‟ (Foucault, 2008: 303), the support of 
ordinary Lebanese allowed the Palestinians to liberate and emancipate themselves. Yet, 
their tacit consent to discriminatory policies today contributes to the refugees‟ further 
marginalisation. However, as much as the state and host society are hostile towards the 
Palestinians, resistance and coping strategies are still a prerogative of a community that 
legally deprived of their rights still fights to improve its condition. 
The Palestinian refugees and the ‘quiet encroachment’ 
While in the post-conflict era discrimination and marginalisation seem to prevail, 
the Palestinians are not completely at the mercy of legal, social and economic exclusion. 
As the political and juridical value of their life is denied by a plethora of laws and orders 
that strip them of the enjoyment of basic human rights – right to work, to own property, to 
travel as discussed in the previous chapter – the Palestinians are still able to resist forces 
that deem them disposable. If we focus on the refugees‟ everyday and most ordinary 
practices, we might see the development of different strategies that allow them to survive 
despite the harsh living conditions. Similar to what Scott (1985: 295-303) has defined as 
„incidental resistance‟, there are multiple ways and gestures through which the Palestinian 
counter their discrimination. 
In an attempt to get more rations, in the first years of their displacement the 
Palestinians avoided registering the deaths in their families or marriages with UNRWA. 
From informal chats and conversations with refugees, it seems that this practice is still 
used. As the UNRWA relief decreased, „cheating‟ on their registrations and numbers is a 
way to cope with continuous deprivation. In one of my encounters in the neighbourhood of 
Sabra, I had the chance to meet Mona, a Lebanese widow of a Palestinian man who 
stopped receiving the help from UNRWA when her son reached adulthood. To UNRWA it 
does not matter if the son is unemployed as just the fact of being an adult is sufficient to 
withdraw the relief to the family as potentially he could provide for them. Zahra, the 
woman that accompanied me in my visits and encounters in the camp, urged her to „cheat‟ 
in order to get more help. This is perhaps a method already used by other refugees in the 
hope to get extra rations; thus Zahra advised Mona not to tell UNRWA that her 
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unemployed daughter Nadia is getting married. The registration of her daughter‟s marriage 
with UNRWA and her future husband being able to provide for her would not give Mona 
the chance to claim help for herself. If she keeps Nadia registered with her household, the 
mother would be able to show that two unemployed women with an underage boy (Mona‟s 
son), requiring treatment for an illness, cannot afford to live without assistance. In this way 
being the widow of a Palestinian with Palestinian children to sustain, she would be 
registered in the „special hardship cases‟ program that helps families living in extreme 
poverty. In turn, this would provide them with extra rations.
18
 
„Cheating‟ on numbers is not the only way to try to improve their condition. 
Prevented from working in many menial and qualified jobs, the Palestinians in Lebanon 
are included in the Lebanese system by virtue of their own exclusion. As this logic leads 
them to be exploited, refugees throughout the years have been adapting themselves to this 
discrimination by elaborating new strategies to cope with everyday expenses and 
difficulties to guarantee their survival. While it seems that recently in 2005 and summer 
2010 restrictions on the right to work have been eased up and work permits could be 
obtained for free, until 2010 for Palestinian refugees obtaining the permits has always been 
difficult and expensive, costing up to $1,300 for one year only (Knudsen, 2007: 13). 
Perhaps it would be too early to judge if the legal changes applied up until now will 
actually relieve the Palestinians from the economic marginality to which they have been 
confined, but other strategies have been adopted to be able to work and sustain themselves. 
Hanafi and Tiltness (2008) suggest that despite the harsh restrictions, the Palestinians 
manage to find some opportunities overcoming legal barriers to their employability. 
Although for Palestinians today it is very difficult to access higher education due to their 
difficult economic situation, those that manage to get a degree still have a chance to work 
in areas related to their areas of study. Among the refugees interviewed by Hanafi and 
Tiltness, ninety-three percent are considered to be professional workers. According to 
Hanafi and Tiltness (2008) and their sample, UNRWA is one of the main providers of job 
opportunities as it employs about thirty-seven percent of Palestinian graduates for 
professions in which they have been trained, and an additional twenty-two percent of 
Palestinian graduates that are employed as semi-professionals. Another nine percent of 
graduates find jobs through the PRCS or other NGOs while thirteen percent work with the 
PLO or other political factions. 
                                               
18 Insights from interview with Mona, Sabra, 13 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic.  
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The refugees do not need a work permit to work with UNRWA or the Palestinian 
organisations, but this is required for working with other institutions. As according to the 
reciprocity principle, Palestinians would not be allowed to work in certain professions – 
law is barred to all foreigners – the only option for them is to be employed without a work 
permit. This means that they constantly have to maintain a low-profile in the work place 
and hide from potential Lebanese authorities‟ checks and controls. Although underpaid, 
Palestinian architects and engineers, for instance, manage to work informally for some 
Lebanese enterprises or „Palestinian‟ companies such as the „Khatib & Alami‟ – an 
architectural and engineering enterprise founded and owned by Palestinians who, even if 
they acquired Lebanese citizenship, keep on providing jobs for their former compatriots. 
Alternatively if they wish to work independently, since Palestinian engineers and architects 
cannot officially sign off on projects, they can do so by working in tandem with a 
Lebanese colleague who could sign the papers or by „hiring‟ a Lebanese professional to 
provide the signatures.
19
 
The same could be said for doctors. For the latter it is impossible to satisfy the 
reciprocity principle; they can either work with the Palestinian institutions, UNRWA, or 
work for Lebanese hospitals informally. This is the case of Dr. Suleiman, a Palestinian I 
met in Shatila who received a scholarship from the PLO and studied medicine in Spain and 
Cuba. After several specialisations obtained in different countries, he decided to go back to 
Lebanon, but practicing his profession here is impossible because of the work restrictions. 
The only way to have a secure job as a doctor was to open a clinic in Shatila camp. As 
refugee camps in Lebanon are increasingly becoming true spaces of exception, out of reach 
of the Lebanese authorities – as we shall see in the next chapter – these spaces provide 
opportunities that are severely limited or restricted outside the camps. Unhappy with his 
condition and worried for the future of his children who are studying medicine too but will 
not be able to work in Lebanon unless restrictions are lifted, Dr. Suleiman sometimes 
works for Lebanese hospitals. His specialisations made his name well known in the sector 
and some Lebanese doctors prefer to „hire‟ him unofficially for some surgery operations to 
offer their patients the best treatment. While this allows him to increase his income and 
that of the family, he feels constantly discriminated against. Not paid as a Lebanese would 
                                               
19 Hanafi and Tiltness 2008 and insights from different interviews and encounters during the 
fieldwork. 
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be for the same job, he gets only twenty percent of the costs of the operation as the 
Lebanese doctor „hiring‟ him retains eighty percent.20 
The ways in which the Palestinians manage to cope despite the harsh economic and 
social exclusion resonate widely with both Bayat‟s (2010) and Scott‟s (1985) reflections. 
While Foucault‟s reflections are central to the conceptualisation that wherever there is 
power there is resistance, Bayat (2010: 54) suggests that if it is true that such 
conceptualisation is essential to recognise the agency of the oppressed, equally important is 
to remember that „although power circulates, it does so unevenly‟. In contrast to social 
movements that are a more organised, collective and public platform to claim the rights 
that some do not have, Bayat develops the concept of the „nonmovement‟ and „quiet 
encroachment‟ as strategies utilised by the excluded to survive. While social movements 
make explicit demands to authorities, „nonmovement actors directly practise what they 
claim‟ as, not guided by an ideology of a leadership, the disenfranchised survive „through 
direct action in their very zones of exclusion‟ (pp. 19; 5). Rather than performing a 
„politics of protest‟ typical of social movements, working informally, tapping water and 
electricity, not paying taxes, not registering deaths in order to get more rations are all ways 
through which the Palestinians perform a „politics of practice‟ or „incidental resistance‟ as 
in Scott‟s (1985) words. Undeniable is the fact that recognising their basic human rights 
would be more desirable and in line with principles of social justice, but these „collective 
actions of non-collective actors‟ resemble a chorus of unplanned protest and resistance. 
While open subversive actions and resistance would be easily crushed and overthrown, 
these unplanned and silent practices could achieve more. In Scott‟s (1985: 32) words, „the 
massive withdrawal of compliance [with laws and regulations] is in a sense more radical‟ 
as they directly enact what they claim with no need of direct confrontation with the state 
authorities. 
While these coping strategies are still today at the expenses of the excluded and the 
disenfranchised as no right is recognised to them, the unconscious collective agency of 
hundreds of Palestinian doctors, engineers, architects and other professionals, who 
throughout the years have kept on working behind the scenes and have been underpaid, 
could lead to a potential success and social and economic change. As their individual, 
discreet and prolonged ordinary acts render their cumulative effect visible, economic 
advantages to be deduced from the Palestinian work may be rather appealing. Particularly 
                                               
20 Insights from interview with Dr. Suleiman, Shatila, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in 
Spanish and English. 
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illuminating are the words of a Lebanese official I met during my fieldwork in Beirut as he 
expresses the desire to change the discriminatory laws towards the Palestinians. Aware that 
many Palestinian doctors, engineers or architects manage to practice their professions 
„under the table‟, he affirms that „it‟s better to make it official, public so that the 
government can benefit from taxes‟.21 While one must always be careful in labelling these 
unplanned collective gestures as conscious resistance as refugees see these practices as 
mere strategies of survival that do not change the system, the success of this unorganised 
movement comes when authorities decide to surrender and grant them the rights that so 
silently they have been claiming. In Foucault‟s (2008: 307) words: 
The history of humanity in its overall effects, its continuity, and in 
its general and recurrent forms […] is nothing other than the 
perfectly logical, decipherable, and identifiable form of a series of 
forms arising from blind initiatives, egoistic interests, and 
calculations which individuals only ever see in terms of 
themselves. If you multiply these calculations over time and get 
them to work, the economist say, the entire community will enjoy 
ever increasing benefits. 
Though more needs to be done for the Palestinians to be able to live in dignity, 
since 2005 some restrictions on menial jobs regarding their right to work have been lifted 
and from late 2010 Palestinian refugees must no longer pay for the work permit. Realising 
that making them working legally rather than illegally would economically benefit the 
country, the Lebanese government is discussing ways to grant the Palestinians the right to 
work while discouraging their naturalisation. 
The strength and tenacity of the Palestinians is not only seen through their hard 
work. Despite the very limited opportunities to them, they do not give up their dreams and 
remain positive about their future. Despite the difficult economic and social condition and 
the limited job opportunities, they do not surrender their education or that of their children. 
As Abdallah, a Palestinian in his 70s, affirms: 
                                               
21 Interview with Lebanese official who wishes to remain anonymous. Beirut, 28 November 2008. 
Interview conducted in English. 
Decentering the state and empowering people 
135 
 
[...] despite the siege and the miserable life we had, my son 
graduated from the university, he is studying computer sciences… 
My daughter also graduated… Despite everything, we like to be 
educated…. The education is a base for everything in human 
beings‟ life.22 
While some like to spend their free time writing poems or lyrics for songs, Hakim, 
a twenty year old Palestinian, works hard to achieve what he desires as he studies and 
works full time. As he says, if he ever needs more money, he freezes his studies, works 
more and goes back to the university as his dream is that of becoming an interior 
designer.
23
 
Notwithstanding their difficult situation, happiness could still be seen in their eyes. 
Joy and excitement could be felt in their account of their future life: getting married, 
remaining in the camp, furnishing the house, find a job for which they so hard worked and 
studied too. Despite the terrible conditions in which they live, optimism and faith are still 
so strongly manifested in their everyday smallest gestures that lead them to never give up. 
Concluding remarks 
Although sovereign power is the one that produces bare life, power may also be 
approached in a different way. If we abandon a juridical and legal approach to power 
(typical of Agamben‟s reflection and reading), we may realise that power is not distributed 
at the global level and institutionally only (as discussed in the previous chapter), but is a 
relation that encompasses different points and actors. Life may be bare life (stripped of the 
juridical and political value by the sovereign), but this does not imply that it is deprived of 
agency too. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that although refugees may be stripped of 
protection and rights, still they can develop „incidental resistances‟ (Scott, 1985) and „quiet 
encroachments‟ (Bayat, 2010). By developing different strategies of self-help and survival, 
refugees have managed to challenge the sovereign‟s decision by re-installing power 
relations. This was particularly significant and blatant in the examples of the re-selling of 
                                               
22 Abdallah, Shatila, 17 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
23 Insights from interview with Hakim, Shatila, 17 December 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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the humanitarian rations and the constructions of concrete walls within the tents. In these 
cases, it was shown how materialities that are conceived and designed with a certain 
purpose (for instance the rations), are utilised by the refugees in other ways. Rather than 
leading to big structural changes and liberation, this incidental resistance helps them 
survive and cope with everyday difficulties. As the refugees turn the ration into profits, so 
they shift the roles of the refugee camps. From a biopolitical space that aims at the 
confinement, control and exclusion of the Palestinians, the camp is transformed into a 
possibility of resistance as challenges to sovereign decisions are produced in the very space 
of exception. Born to isolate and separate them from host society, it is transformed into a 
space where it is possible to keep alive memories, traditions and stories that sovereign 
forces such as the Lebanese states and the international community would want 
Palestinians to forget about. As the marginalisation – social, economical and spatial – 
facilitates the strengthening of their cohesion and sense of identity, small and individual 
acts of incidental resistance are followed by more collective and organised agency. Despite 
the negation of the political and juridical value of their life, the Palestinians show the 
capacity of political organisation and struggle. 
By showing how power is dispersed and the way it circulates, the chapter also 
demonstrated how the Lebanese state is not the only responsible for their exclusion and 
how host society may play a significant role too. In the 1960s and 1970s especially, the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese developed an alliance that embodied the notion of the 
„whatever being‟. The opposition to the Lebanese state‟s policies and decisions was in fact 
a heterogeneous movement that did not claim any identity. This movement binding 
together the refugee community and host society, openly confronted the Lebanese state and 
its army. The state, no longer able to draw lines and boundaries dividing forms of life, was 
impotent and forced to comply to the civil society‟s desires and moods. Yet, as much as 
this alliance was fundamental for the liberation of the camps and the Palestinians, the 
break-up of this precious bond meant for the Palestinians the dramatisation of their 
exclusion. As Lebanese public is united with its politics on the blame of the Palestinians 
for the destruction of Lebanon during the civil war, today the refugees are experiencing a 
legal discrimination on which the Lebanese seem to agree too. 
Despite this exclusion and discrimination, the Palestinians keep showing a spirit of 
adaptation. As they develop strategies to survive and transgress the law, they demonstrate 
how even after the sovereign‟s decision there is still a chance to resist. Even if the refugees 
are included in Lebanon by virtue of their exclusion and exploitation (see for example the 
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right to work), countless small daily actions keep them going through the „quiet 
encroachment‟. A politics of practices, rather than protest, the Palestinian quiet 
encroachment directly acts on their zones of exclusions performing the rights they claim by 
working without permits and continuing practising their professions even though legally 
prohibited. 
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5- The refugee camp: 
From a Lebanese sovereign exception to a 
Palestinian territory? 
If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, 
I am one now. Living in Beirut as a stateless person 
for most of my growing up years, many of them in a 
refugee camp, I did not feel I was living among my 
„Arab brothers.” I did not feel I was an Arab, a 
Lebanese, or, as some wretchedly pious writers 
claimed, a “southern Syrian.” I was a Palestinian. 
And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee 
and a burden. 
 
(Turki, 1972: 8)  
 
The ambiguity of exception appears when these 
spaces intrinsically take on the aspects of self-
governing enclaves, and they acquire the potential to 
challenge the absolute authority of the state. 
 
(Weizman, 2007: 20) 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the establishment of the Palestinian 
camps in Lebanon and their evolution as spaces of exception. While in Chapter 3 I have 
discussed the production of new subjectivities by virtue of classifications, the provision of 
humanitarian aid and the issue of particular legal measures, this chapter focuses on the 
spatialisation of techniques of power. The constitution of the Palestinian spaces in Lebanon 
was a long process that initiated in 1948 and ended only in the mid-1950s with the 
establishment of sixteen official camps, which hosted the majority of the Palestinians 
arriving in Lebanon. Today, however, the number of official refugee camps in the country 
amount to twelve only. The camps of Tell El-Zaatar, Jisr El-Basha and Nabatieh were 
destroyed in the 1970s during the civil war or during Israeli retaliatory attacks and have 
never been reconstructed. From the camp of Gouraud in Baalbek (Bekaa Valley), UNRWA 
withdrew its operation during the 1950s or early 1960s and refugees were transferred 
elsewhere (FMO, Undated b). It is also noteworthy reporting that the twelve official camps 
are not the only temporary settlement solutions for the Palestinians in exile. A significant 
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number of unofficial Palestinian gatherings never recognised by the Lebanese authorities 
and UNRWA punctuate the Lebanese landscape. Though it would be interesting to explore 
the history and evolution of these sites and communities, this investigation is beyond the 
scope of the present research and the chapter focuses on the officially recognised camps in 
order to uncover the different struggles for control converging in these areas. 
At the beginning of the Palestinian displacement, refugee camps were instrumental 
for two main reasons. Behind the pretext of gathering the refugees in camps to better 
provide humanitarian assistance and relief, these spaces became essential to the Lebanese 
authorities as the camp was transformed from a space of humanitarian aid into a 
technology of containment and surveillance. Aimed at keeping the Palestinian refugees far 
from Lebanese society and at preventing their integration, the concentration of the refugees 
also allowed for the constant surveillance to take place through police and intelligence 
services offices placed in the camps or in their proximity. For at least the first twenty years 
of the Palestinian displacement, the refugees‟ movements and activities were closely 
monitored. But beyond a security issue, refugee camps also were, and still are, the 
materialisation of the temporariness to which the Palestinians have been confined, the 
suspension of a solution to their predicament as well as a clear sign of their marginalisation 
in Lebanon. Despite their prolonged existence, the camps are still perceived today as the 
embodiment of frozen and suspended rights as if the hands of time have stopped running 
since 1948. 
If at the beginning surveillance of the camp was a prerogative of the Lebanese 
authorities and a necessity to defend the political balances in the country, today the camps 
are described as islands of insecurity challenging the Lebanese order and sovereignty. As 
the Lebanese authorities withdrew from the refugees‟ spaces in 1969, the camps are 
autonomous spaces governed by the Palestinians. Extraterritorial islands conceptually 
disenfranchised from Lebanese political and juridical order, they posit questions on 
territorial continuity and integrity, but also serious questions related to the security of the 
country and the very meaning of sovereignty. 
Drawing on studies investigating the Palestinian condition in Lebanon as well as on 
primary sources such as encounters and interviews from fieldwork carried out in Beirut, 
the chapter aims to uncover the politico-juridical structure of the refugee camps as well as 
the forms of power and struggles converging in these sites. While looking at the 
development of the refugees‟ spaces with a particular focus on Shatila, the chapter is 
divided into three main sections. As the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has been marked 
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by very distinctive periods in which at times they were oppressed and at others they have 
been perceived as the oppressors in a country that did not belong to them, the discussion 
proceeds chronologically in order to highlight particular phases of the history of the camps. 
The first part of the chapter looks at the refugees‟ arrival in the country, the establishment 
of the camps and the state‟s response to the massive Palestinian presence that might have 
constituted a political and demographic danger for the delicate balance of the country. In 
this section, I explore the Lebanese authorities‟ political and securitarian concerns, as well 
as the repressive measures used in the camp and towards the Palestinian population. 
Measures of containment and oppression applied to the Palestinians and their camps seem 
to resonate with Agamben‟s (1995a, 1998) reflection on the exception, sovereign power 
and bare life as the refugees find themselves at the mercy of the Lebanese authorities‟ 
decisions and arbitrariness. While the refugee camp embodies the space of exception in as 
much as it becomes the place in which everything becomes possible, this part also explores 
the rise of an embryonic resistance. Consolidated also through the support of the Lebanese 
(see Chapter 4), in 1969 the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) managed to liberate 
the camps from the grip of the Lebanese police and intelligence services. The signature of 
the Cairo Agreement (1969) is crucial as it formally handed the security and management 
of the camps over to the Palestinian factions and allowed the resistance to launch the 
liberation struggle from Lebanon soil.  
While the first part of the chapter focuses on the camps as controlled and surveilled 
spaces, the second section shows how the camps shifted from humanitarian and 
disciplinary spaces into spaces of autonomy. As laboratories of Palestinian civil and 
military administration and spaces in which to experiment with self-governing practices, 
the camps provided a free platform from which to continue their resistance activities. Yet, 
this period of peaceful autonomy did not last long. With the start of the Lebanese civil war 
(1976) in fact, freedom and emancipation gave way to horrors and violence as the 
Palestinian camps became the stage of appalling massacres and sieges. As the civil war 
transformed the struggle for the liberation of Palestine into a struggle for survival in 
Lebanon, both the camps and Palestinian life were treated as sacer, destroyable and 
killable with impunity. 
The third part focuses on the camps from the end of the civil conflict onwards. It is 
shown how, despite the representation of the camps as spaces hosting outlaws, criminals 
and terrorists, the Lebanese authorities have refused to take control over these spaces. In 
spite of the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement (1987) that since 1969 had prevented the 
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Lebanese from entering and controlling the camps, surveillance seems not to constitute a 
concern. While for a few camps surveillance is applied from the outside only by means of 
checkpoints, I demonstrate how disciplinary techniques of panoptican surveillance and 
control give way to security modes that let things be and happen. From a Lebanese and 
disciplinary space of exception as it was until 1969, the camp seems to be turning into a 
Palestinian sovereign territory that continuously challenges the state security. Yet, this 
apparent freedom and autonomy can be crushed in any moment showing how the Lebanese 
authorities, despite their apparent withdrawal, could still be considered the ultimate 
sovereign and the master of the decision. 
Lastly, the chapter investigates the camps as autonomous places. It is shown how 
the exception and disengagement of the state give rise to a multiplicity of what Judith 
Butler (2004) calls „petty sovereigns‟ and struggles over power and control. As the 
Palestinians may be reduced to bare life by their own representatives, a more positive side 
of the exception is revealed. While escaping the control of the state, the camp and its 
inhabitants are capable of developing self-governance modes and institutions. Moreover, as 
the camp was once established to confine and oppress the undesired, from a space of 
violence and repression it turns into a space of possibility. As everything for the 
Palestinians is excepted outside, within the very camp‟s boundaries refugees can reproduce 
normalcy and ordinary lives in their incessant struggle for survival. 
Establishing the refugee camps 1948-1969: 
From subjugation and violence to freedom 
The birth of the camps: Between control and resistance 
With the birth of the state of Israel and the subsequent outbreak of the first Arab-
Israeli conflict, among the 750,000 Palestinians that fled their homes and villages more 
than 100,000 found refuge in Lebanon. Some of them crossed the frontier by foot, by car 
or other rudimental means of transportation, while others reached the main ports of 
Lebanon by boat.
1
 Whereas the middle and urban Palestinian classes had estate in Lebanon 
and managed to resettle in cities renting flats and integrating themselves into Lebanese 
society (on this see also Chapter 6), for the majority of the Palestinians that came to 
                                               
1 On the 1948 displacement, see also Refugee Interviews, 1988. 
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Lebanon things were different. Partly forced by the Lebanese authorities and partly forced 
by circumstances, the Palestinians who lost their homes and means of livelihood during the 
Nakba had to relocate in the newly established refugee camps where humanitarian 
organisations were coordinating the relief and assistance. 
However, while the establishment of the camps was justified by the need to gather 
the refugees to better provide general services and assistance, the setting up of temporary 
facilities was also instrumental to the Lebanese authorities. Once it was clear that the 
presence of the Palestinian refugees was turning into a more prolonged and indefinite 
temporariness, the concerns of the Lebanese authorities and their responses were soon 
revealed. The Palestinian displaced equalled ten percent of the total Lebanese population 
and could not have been sustained for long without major political and economic 
consequences. The presence of mostly Sunni Muslim refugees who might have ended up 
being naturalised in Lebanon was considered a serious threat for the delicate political 
balance in the country. Established as humanitarian support and a temporary solution, 
refugee camps turned into an effective technology of containment and surveillance. As a 
spatial device aiming at separating the refugee population from the host society, the camp 
became a technology that allowed the easy management of the Palestinian life and the 
strict control of the refugees‟ movements and potentially dangerous activities. Since 
„[t]here is no care without control‟, refugees were turned from vulnerable lives into public 
order preoccupations (Agier, 2011: 4). 
Forced transfers of the Palestinians to designated spaces took place soon after the 
refugees arrived in Lebanon. This was the case of Salma, for instance, a Palestinian woman 
in her 70s that I met in Shatila. Following the death of her father, killed by a bomb while 
shutting down his shop in Yaffa, she fled Palestine with her family in 1948 from the port of 
the city. Arriving at the port of Beirut, Salma and her family spent the first two weeks of 
their stay in Lebanon in the quarter of Qarantina mainly inhabited by Christian families of 
Armenian origin in the eastern part of the capital. While she still remembers with gratitude 
the help that they received from the Lebanese, who provided them with beds and food, she 
tells how she was later transferred to the city of Saida where new temporary facilities had 
been set up for the Palestinians: 
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The Lebanese scouts welcomed us, God bless them… they offered 
us food and drink… we were starving. We stayed fifteen days, then 
the buses came and they took us to Mieh Mieh in Saida.
2
 
With no other choice than to get on the bus and be transferred, this was also the destiny of 
many other Palestinians. In addition to this, it seems that another practice was that of 
„collecting‟ the Palestinians in the south, „loading‟ them on buses and trains and taking 
them to other destinations such as Latakia in Syria where a refugee camp was established 
to accommodate the Palestinians transferred from Lebanon.
3
 Although not all Palestinians 
experienced the same forced transfers, the exercise of power and the sovereign decision 
over the refugees‟ lives and spaces could be arbitrary and sudden. Without any notice as 
part of the logic of emergency, Palestinians could be loaded to busses and trains with no 
possibility to decide where to live or settle temporarily. 
Despite the fact that refugees‟ forced transfer may not have been the norm (as I 
discuss below), sooner or later, forced or voluntarily, the Palestinians had to move to the 
refugee camps. Victims of a widespread institutional discrimination through decrees or 
orders that prevented them from legally working, using national health and educational 
services, the Palestinians were unable to provide for their families. As Peteet (2005: 108-
109) suggests, the discrimination to which they were subjected and the exhaustion of their 
savings led many to move to the camps were rations, free health care and education were 
offered by UNRWA. The exclusion of the Palestinian refugees from the utilisation of 
public services and the chance to work corresponded to their inclusion in the domain of 
sovereign power as their lives in the camps were controlled and managed by the Lebanese 
authorities. As the materialisation of Agamben‟s inclusive exclusion, their being 
„excepted‟ did not stand for a simple exclusion. As Agamben (1998: 18) argues, „the 
exception is truly, according to its etymological root, taken outside (ex-capere), and not 
simply excluded‟ (emphasis in the orginal). As the Palestinians were stripped of their rights 
outside the refugee camps, the management of their life – the care coupled with the control 
– were performed within the camp boundaries where the normal juridical order was no 
longer applied (I return to this point later). 
                                               
2 Salma, Shatila, 20 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
3 Insights from interview with Palestinian scholar and legal expert Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 
December 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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In order to concentrate and enclose the refugees to better control them, by the mid-
1950s sixteen official refugee camps were set up and recognised by the Lebanese 
authorities and UNRWA that began operating in Lebanon in 1950 providing assistance and 
services in the recognised camps (see Figure 2, map of official camps then and now, and 
some informal gatherings).
4
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the refugee camps, Al-Mashriq, at 
http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/300/307/pal-camps/lebanon-refugee-camps.gif (last accessed, August 2007). 
                                               
4 This map does not show the camp of Gouraud in the Bekaa Valley, mentioned in the introduction 
of the chapter. UNRWA withdrew its services from this camp perhaps during the 1950s or early 1960s. This 
camp seems not to have been mapped and no further information about its establishment or closure is 
available. 
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Though the Lebanese government would have preferred establishing the camps in 
isolated areas so as to avoid the refugees‟ integration and the spoiling of urban and natural 
landscapes, the locations of the camps are the results of different factors. The siting of the 
camps was in fact the consequence of different circumstances – such as the availability of 
land, the presence of already existing and abandoned refugee installations or military 
barracks – and the agency of different actors including the refugees themselves (Sayigh, 
1988: 19). Donated land and the involvement of charity and religious organisations 
determined the location of refugee camps of the Metn region east of Beirut – Tell El-
Zaatar, Dbayeh, Jisr El-Basha – and the camp of Mar Elias within Beirut southern 
municipal boundaries (Sfeir, 2008: 231-241). As some Christian churches and charities 
offered their services and assistance to Christian Palestinians, the „confessionalisation‟ of 
the refugee body was achieved through the establishment of mostly, although not 
exclusively, Catholic and  Greek-Orthodox refugee camps whose siting depended 
exclusively by the availability of donated land and these organisations‟ decision. 
Guided by security concerns, the Lebanese authorities would have welcomed the 
siting of the camps in remote areas and far from the Lebanese-Israeli border as to prevent 
any potential clash with the Israeli army. Yet, their desire and success in so doing 
materialised only in the cases of  the Nahr El-Bared camp, sixteen kilometres far from 
Tripoli in northern Lebanon, and the quite isolated camp of Wavell in the Bekaa Valley. 
But if the establishment of these two camps in remote rural areas and far from urban 
centres managed to keep the refugee population separated from host society and far from 
the border in this way preventing any clash with the Israeli army, this success was not 
achieved as regards the southern Lebanese region or other urban centres. Pre-existing 
facilities such as former Armenian refugee camps in Tyre or abandoned French military 
posts in the South prevented the Lebanese authorities from imposing their model of 
temporary settlement. Camps in the South in fact represented the first destinations for those 
crossing the Lebanese-Israeli border on foot or by car and, perhaps because of the ever 
increasing influx, forced transfers here were not achieved. 
In addition to this, the Lebanese economy and the refugees‟ needs dictated the 
locations of most of the camps as well as informal gatherings. As the camps of the South 
and the Bekaa Valley provided cheap labour to the Lebanese landlords and seasonal job 
opportunities for the refugees, camps closer to urban centres such as Beirut offered the 
opportunity to work in the industrial and construction sectors (Doraï, 2006). 
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Yet, despite the marginalisation and difficult conditions, the Palestinians‟ spirit of 
initiative was remarkable and some even managed to chose and secure the land for the 
establishment of the camps. The case of Burj El-Barajneh and Shatila camps (today 
metropolitan Beirut) and the story of their establishment reveal the refugees‟ determination 
to reject the bare life discourse to which refugees are mostly and usually confined to. 
Situated today in the southern periphery of the capital, the establishment of the camp of 
Burj El-Barajneh was the result of the Palestinians‟ own efforts in deciding where to reside 
and in shaping their spaces. According to Gorokhoff (1984), the refugees that at the end of 
the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s settled in the area where the camp is located were 
supposed to be transferred to Aleppo (Syria). Firmly opposing the Lebanese government‟s 
plans, the refugees decided to stay and they themselves secured the land on which the 
camp was later set up through direct negotiations with the municipality of Burj El-
Barajneh, from which the camp took the name. The case of Shatila presents some 
similarities to that of Burj El-Barajneh camp. Today in the southern suburbs of the capital, 
the birth of Shatila camp and its development are the results of refugees‟ own initiative and 
ability. The establishment of the camp was such a remarkable achievement for the refugees 
that still today the Palestinians feel proud while they narrate the history of the birth of the 
camp and how the camp kept on surviving potential demolition plans. Ahmad, for 
example, is a Palestinian in his 80s who after wandering in some villages of South 
Lebanon for a while in 1948, then moved to Beirut and is one of the first refugees that 
settled in the area where the camp was established. In his words: 
I want to tell you how we reached Shatila.. Majd El-Kroum, 
Rmeish, Bint Jbeil, Jwaiya, BNazouriye, Saida, Adloun… In 
Adloun I worked in the field, I didn‟t like this kind of job, so we 
moved to Beirut. There were some refugees in the park. We asked 
about the owner of this empty spot, his name was Abdallah Saleh, 
but the person in charge was Basha Shatila […] People staying in 
the park, like Abu Kamal and Abu Zaarour, went to him and asked 
for his permission. They complained about their bad situation. He 
told them that the owners of the land are Saad‟s family, they live in 
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Brazil… But since he is the responsible, and the representative of 
the landlord, he allowed them to move there.
5
 
The land was therefore secured by the same refugees that decided where to settle having 
found an empty spot of land not far from Beirut. The camp was officially recognised only 
in 1949 by the International Committee of the Red Cross that provided the refugees with 
tents and basic services later guaranteed by UNRWA which started its operations in 1950. 
The examples of Burj El-Barajneh and Shatila are clear instances of the 
Palestinians‟ ability in settling down and dealing with any potential legal impediment or 
eviction without the help of UNRWA or any other authority. Despite a biopower that 
positions them as lives to be saved – that of humanitarian organisations – and a sovereign 
power excluding them from society as „abnormals‟ unable to fit in the nation-state system 
– that of the Lebanese government – the cases of Shatila and Burj El-Barajneh show how 
refugees are not to be understood as passive objects of various management techniques. 
Further evidence of their coping abilities and agency was also shown through the refugees‟ 
determination in guaranteeing the camp‟s survival. Multiple attempts of eviction to make 
space for luxurious residences were resisted by the Palestinians through the increase of the 
camp population. To prevent the dissolution of the camp and the eviction of its inhabitants, 
the founder of Shatila travelled extensively across Lebanon to gather refugees coming from 
the same Palestinian village – Majd El-Kroum – or nearby areas in Palestine (Sayigh, 
1994: 35-38). As Beirut could offer more job opportunities and because of relatives already 
living in the camp, many moved to Shatila. As Hadi, a Palestinian man I met in Shatila, 
explains, his family moved from the camp of Mieh Mieh in Saida to Shatila in 1952: 
I asked [my parents] why they leaved Mieh Mieh, they told me that 
most of the people from Yaffa were here in Beirut.. so we preferred 
to be close to the family. We found an empty spot of land and put 
                                               
5 Ahmad, Shatila, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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two tents. My uncle still lives in the house behind ours.. they came 
here in 1952 and we are here ever since.
6
 
Contesting a literature that addresses the refugees as passive beings incapable of agency 
and at the mercy of state authorities, Hadi‟s testimony shows how forced transfers were not 
always imposed or achieved, and that refugees once in the camp could freely choose where 
to plant their tents and settle. This, in particular, facilitated the reunification of families and 
village communities so as to reproduce the pre-Nakba life in exile (Khalili, 2004a: 11; 
Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1994; and for the case of Burj El-Barajneh see also Roberts, 1999). 
Palestinians‟ effort in securing the land for the camp was remarkable. Presenting 
facts on the ground, not much scope for decision was left to the Lebanese authorities and 
the Committee of the Red Cross that before the start of UNRWA operations had to 
recognise the camp (Sayigh, 1994: 36). Despite this remarkable achievement, however, the 
status of the land on which some camps, including Shatila, was established is a quite 
sensitive matter in Lebanon and remains uncertain. While the literature on the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon describes UNRWA as paying the rent for the land directly to the 
owners or through the Lebanese authorities (among others see Gorokhoff, 1984; Halabi, 
2004), it seems that no rent is paid and that the usufruct of the land is guaranteed by 
agreements between the government and the UN agency or by some administrative order 
or decree. 
In the case of Shatila in particular, consent was given to the refugees from the 
administrator of the property but not by the owner himself. According to UNRWA‟s 
(1961: 29) documents, the owner managed to obtain an eviction order from the court but 
the court‟s decision has never been implemented. Apart from cases in which the land has 
been actually donated to the refugees to settle temporarily, it seems that for most of the 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon there is a de facto expropriation. As in the words of an 
UNRWA source: 
All this issue of the land is very complicated and varies from place 
to place. There is a decision taken by the Lebanese authorities to 
make available for UNRWA a whole series of lands that, according 
                                               
6 Hadi, Shatila, 23 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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to me, are de facto expropriated. The only situations which are 
quite complicated are represented by the camp of Dbayeh for which 
we have a sort of leasing contract according to which we have been 
paying almost nothing since I don‟t know how many years; and the 
other one is Beddawi that was turned into a conflict between the 
owners of the land, the government and us [UNRWA] and has yet 
to be solved and it will be the object of an arbitration but I have no 
idea when this issue will be solved. […] It is not a real decision of 
expropriation. It's a de facto expropriation and that means that this 
simply happened.
7
 
When asked whom the owner of the land may sue, the UNRWA source explains that 
UNRWA is not involved in these legal procedures. According to her, the Lebanese 
government issued a decree in the 1970s that guaranteed UNRWA the use of the land on 
which to establish the refugee camps. Following her words, the responsibility lies on the 
Lebanese state and government that committed with UNRWA and the Palestinians in 
making available the land for the refugee camps. 
Unfortunately obtaining copies of any documentations that might shed some light 
on the status of the land on which the camps were established was not possible and, most 
of all, was refused elsewhere.
8
 Either this documentation does not exist or the government 
does not wish to publicise it. In the first case, this would mean that uncertainty over the 
status of the land has become the rule and perhaps this ambiguity would leave the 
Lebanese government the option to eliminate the camps one day with no legal 
consequences. But according to the UNRWA source, this may not be the case as some 
rights have been acquired by the Palestinians through the prolonged occupation of the land. 
This means that if new development projects are to be pursued on the land that has been 
assigned to the recognised refugee camp, the company responsible for the project would 
have to compensate the refugees or, in cooperation with the Lebanese government, should 
find alternative accommodation for the displaced families. If instead this documentation 
regarding the status of the land on which the camps have been established exists, the hiding 
                                               
7 UNRWA source, Beirut, 22 December 2008.  
8 Having asked stakeholders for a copy of any agreements or any decrees granting UNRWA and the 
refugees the right to operate and live in the designated areas, obtaining such information or clear explanations 
on the juridical basis of the establishment of refugee camps was not successful. 
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of these decrees or agreements remains a dilemma. Perhaps afraid that publicising the 
documents would further formalise the camps and the Palestinian presence in the country – 
most probably leading to the refugees‟ naturalisation – the Lebanese authorities prefer to 
keep this piece of information hidden in this way leaving the option of eviction always 
open and possible. This would probably have the same consequence of the first case – the 
documents might not exist – with the only difference being that if anything was signed it 
was done with the sole aim of better administering and managing the camps. While the real 
reasons for such ambiguity remain obscure, uncertainty over the camp is kept in place. In 
both cases the Lebanese government wants to hold the right to make the ultimate decision 
and dispose of these spaces as it wishes leaving the logic of emergency permanently 
activated. 
From the repression to the liberation of the camps 
If the issue of the land on which the camps have been established is not clear, 
definitely clear and distinct were the roles of UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities in the 
management of the camps. A meticulous division of roles alternated techniques of 
biopower and sovereign power in the space of the camp. As the Lebanese government did 
not want to take any responsibility as regards the humanitarian assistance of the 
Palestinians, UNRWA took care of the camps, their maintenance, and the provision of 
rations and services such as schools and clinics. Moreover, in accordance with the 
Lebanese authorities, in the first years of displacement UNRWA supplied tents to 
newcomers so as to stress the temporariness of the refugees‟ condition. This was not only 
welcomed by the Lebanese authorities, but the use of tents was also preferred by the 
refugees themselves as they still hoped in the implementation of Resolution 194 that 
sanctioned their right of return to their homes and villages in Palestine. Nonetheless, cold 
winters and bad sanitary conditions could not be tolerated for long. While improvement of 
refugees‟ shelters was needed, solid material that would have given the impression of 
permanence was forbidden. For this reason, the Palestinians had to rely on wood, and 
sheets of zinc and aluminium only provided by UNRWA. The use of these provisional 
solutions, in fact, still reflected the temporariness of the refugees‟ presence in Lebanon. As 
any improvement had to be functional to the refugees‟ mere survival, the use of zinc plates 
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was forbidden for the perimeter of the tent, and plates could only be placed underneath the 
tent to isolate the interior from the humid ground.
9
 
While UNRWA took care of the humanitarian assistance, the Lebanese authorities 
were more than willing to take full responsibility for the security aspects pertaining to the 
refugees‟ presence within and beyond the camp boundaries. As regards Shatila, the 
isolation of the camp from the centre of Beirut and other inhabited areas at the end of the 
1940s and for the first years of the 1950s guaranteed the separation of the Palestinians 
from Lebanese society, and this isolation also facilitated the control of the refugees‟ 
activities and movements.
10
 Although the camp could be accessed from multiple points as 
no fence or wall was built around it, a police and Deuxième Bureau (Lebanese intelligence 
service) offices, acting also as checkpoints, were placed inside the camp: the first next to 
the public toilets; the second next to the UNRWA office of the camp and in the proximity 
of one of the main entrances.
11
 Particularly after the brief Lebanese civil war of 1958, 
controls on the refugees‟ movements and activities became far stricter (see Chapter 3). To 
enter and exit the camp, the inhabitants had to put their names on a list in which they had 
to declare the reasons of their leaving and entering the camp. More specifically, if they had 
to visit relatives living in the southern areas of the country, they had to obtain prior 
permission to travel, and if relatives had to come to visit in the camp, permission had to be 
obtained for those who did not reside there (see also Peteet, 2005: 110-111).
12
  
While the main task of the police was that of preventing the expansion of the camp 
and improvement of the shelters through the use of solid material, the intelligence services‟ 
duty was that of closely following the refugees‟ movements and avoiding the formation of 
any political organisation or activity. In particular, after the 1958 conflict, martial law was 
declared in the refugee camps and also on the refugee body (Ajial Center, 2001; Hanafi, 
2010a: 3). Stripped of their rights and dignity, the Palestinians were the objects of any 
form of abuse and violence as if the defence of the Lebanese state and its status quo passed 
through the refugees‟ own body. Although any measure was justified by the need to 
maintain the public order – as materialisation of the state of exception when everything 
becomes possible – Lebanese policemen and officers abused of their position of power 
                                               
9 Insights from interview with Yusuf, Shatila, 18 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
10 Insights from interview with Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December. Interview conducted in 
English. 
11 Insights from interview with Mahmoud, Shatila, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in 
Arabic. 
12 Insights from interview with Abdallah, Shatila, 17 November 2008. Interview conducted in 
Arabic. 
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even in the absence of a clear motivation or accusation. The Palestinians usually remember 
these episodes and that time with great anxiety. If one person was simply suspected of 
being part of a political party she could be arrested and tortured. To prevent any form of 
political organisation or meeting, any festival or ceremony, even weddings, were 
prohibited unless previous permission was obtained through the Lebanese authorities or 
unless Lebanese army officers could supervise the event (Ajial Center, Undated; Faris 
1981; El-Natour, 1993). The Palestinians were also forbidden from introducing in the camp 
any „sensitive‟ material such as leaflets, books and newspapers, and listening to the radio, 
especially „Radio Cairo‟, was classified as a threat to the Lebanese security (Sayigh, 1994, 
2007). 
The main targets, although not the only ones, were political party members or those 
suspected of taking part to any political activity. As in the words of one refugee 
interviewed by Sayigh (1994: 69): 
Membership in the ANM [Arab Nationalist Movement] meant that 
I had political activities. This led to my being followed by the 
Deuxième Bureau. I was arrested many times. There was a law of 
Permanent Emergency under which the police had the right to 
break into our homes at any time to search. 
They used to come at night to listen under my window, to see who 
was with me. Once when my son died and people came to condole 
[sic] me, they broke into my house because they thought I was 
holding a meeting… 
They tried many other kinds of pressure besides arrests and 
beatings. They contacted my friends and told them not to be seen 
with me – “he‟s suspect”. For a period no one dared to say 
“marhaba” (hallo) to me, no one visited me. They found out where 
I was working and told my boss to dismiss me. 
According to another refugee interviewed by Sayigh (2007: 134), the policemen and 
intelligence services officers arbitrarily used violence or fabricated stories:  
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[…] There were two stations near the camp, one for the ordinary 
police, the other the D.B. [Deuxième Bureau] – the two used to 
compete with each other to see which could arrest the largest 
number of people, so as to report this to their chiefs. Almost every 
day, and sometimes at night, they‟d come to take people away. 
Once they came to our house to arrest my brother, and because he 
wasn‟t there they took me in his place. 
The abuse of power seemed to constitute the ordinary activity of the authorities in 
the camp and arbitrariness was the rule. But as Agamben (1995a, 1998, 2005a) reminds us, 
once the state of emergency is declared, everyone becomes potentially homo sacer. 
Violence and abuse are no longer aimed at the defence of the state, but are justified by the 
pure exercise of power on defenceless beings. To some extent and with due precaution in 
drawing the parallel, it seems that the power exercised on the Palestinian life and refugee 
camps during this particular period of history somehow resembles the one exercised in the 
Nazi concentration camps. Whereas power in the concentration camps after the Final 
Solution aimed at the systematic elimination of the biological threat, in the Palestinian 
camps of this period there was no such planned action. However, the ways in which power 
operated was rather similar as in both cases, authorities‟ decisions were arbitrary and 
sudden as in the case of forced transfers in 1948 discussed above. 
From the juridical point of view, parallels can be drawn as the declaration of the 
state of emergency paved the way to multiple forms of violence and abuse. As the space of 
concentration camps was placed outside the normal juridical order, so did the space of 
refugee camp and Palestinian life itself as the declaration of martial law led to the 
suspension of law and normal rules of conduct and allowed for the elimination of all 
political adversaries. While in normal times one person is deemed innocent until proved 
guilty, the opposite occurs in the state of emergency. Terror was exercised in the camps. 
Indefinite detentions in the army barracks or in the General Security facilities were not 
unusual, and the use of torture to gain information on any sort of activity undertaken by the 
camp inhabitants was common (Sayigh, 1994: 69).  New rules were continuously made 
and remade in the moment of the decision and the policeman or the secret services officer 
could apply any means to repress any form of political or non-political activity. 
Arbitrariness and improvisations could hit each and everyone even for no particular reason. 
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The „offences‟ for which Palestinians could have been fined, arrested or beaten up in fact 
ranged from the suspicion of, or certainty about, their involvement in political activities to 
the construction or improvement of their house without permission. Throwing water on the 
street to avoid the dust rising or to dispose of the waste of washing and cleaning in the 
absence of a drainage and sewage system could be punished or fined. When asked how the 
police and the authorities behaved during this period in the camps, Hadi explains: „If a 
woman poured some water in front of the tent, they would fine her and insult her 
husband‟.13 The constant humiliation was the rule. On more than one occasion members of 
the secret services entered the houses and began beating up the head of the family  in front 
of his wife and children (Ajial Center, Undated: 10). Curfew was imposed on the 
inhabitants of the camp after 8pm so as to further restrict their movements and activities 
(Sayigh, 1994: 71). 
If controls of the refugees‟ activities were strengthened inside the camps through 
the recruitment of spies among the inhabitants, security was enhanced outside the camp 
boundaries through the establishment of checkpoints on the main roads. This latter strategy 
was particularly useful to monitor and discourage the Palestinians‟ movements so as to 
isolate the different refugee camps from one another and avoid collective organisation. If 
refugees were caught outside the camp with no prior authorisation to travel, they were 
harassed and imprisoned.
14
 
However, as the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) was increasingly 
attracting attention in the Arab world and gaining support, especially after the 1967 defeat, 
despite the harsh repression, undercover political activities were taking shape in the camps. 
As Jaber Suleiman affirms: 
What I‟m trying to say is that even under the pressure of the 
Deuxième Bureau, Palestinian nationalism continued in many 
secret ways. Sometimes they participated to the Boy Scout 
                                               
13 Hadi, Shatila, 23 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
14 Insights from interviews with Mahmoud, Shatila, 14 November 2008 (conducted in Arabic) and 
Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008 (conducted in English). 
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movement programme and under this cover they could do some 
activities.. you know..
15
 
Not only was the political participation somehow kept alive in the backlines, but also the 
armed resistance was slowly arising. The first weapons were smuggled into the camps in 
the early 1960s and from the refugee camps of Beirut were directed to the South where 
military operations were undertaken to start the liberation of the homeland (Sayigh, 1994: 
75). Fadi, a Lebanese who has always lived in the camp, joined the resistance in the Fatah 
ranks in the 1970s. He so vividly remembers the day in which the first guerrilla groups 
arrived in Shatila. 
I remember once, back in 1968, I was still at school […] There was 
a driver from UNRWA trying to enter […] There was a tanker 
truck full of water trying to get into the camp, and there were some 
mines on the ground. The truck blew up! In 1968-1969 there were 
some clashes with the Lebanese army. We ran away from school 
and on our way home.. we saw them: three or four feda‟yeen 
[fighters]. They had their faces covered.. I saw them between the 
camp‟s allies.. inside the camp..16 
As far as Fadi is concerned, this was the first resistance operation in Shatila camp. The 
feda‟yeen‟s presence insinuated a new sense of empowerment in the camp inhabitants. It 
was the sign that the resistance was coming, not only to liberate Palestine, but to also 
liberate the camp from the abuse and oppression of the Lebanese authorities. Knowing that 
someone was fighting for them was an incentive for the population to riot and defend their 
rights. As Abbas Shiblak (1997: 263) suggests: 
Initially, the struggle to establish the PRM [Palestinian Resistance 
Movement] in Lebanon was a hard one; of those refugees who 
                                               
15 Jaber Suleiman, Mar Elias, 2 January 2009. Interview conducted in English. 
16 Fadi, Sabra, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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joined the PRM underground movement at an early stage of the 
struggle, several were assassinated by the Lebanese army. Once the 
Palestinian movement became more powerful, members became 
increasingly confident of showing their affiliation, and fida‟yeen 
(fighters) of various political groups from Syria and other Arab 
countries came to Lebanon, there they were able to meet with 
relatives for the first time since 1948. 
While at first glance it seems that the power exercised over the camps and on the 
Palestinians during the period of the Deuxième Bureau by the Lebanese authorities was the 
materialisation of the Agambenian camp and idea of sovereign power, an embryonic 
resistance was being born. Indeed, the rise of the resistance movement and the eviction of 
the Lebanese authorities from the Palestinian spaces in 1969 show how multiple forms of 
resistance, including the non-armed struggle, were still surviving in the camp in this way 
showing the impossibility to associate the life of the refugee to the bare life as described by 
Agamben. Although repression was hard and Palestinian life was deemed expendable by 
the Lebanese authorities operating in the camps or in the checkpoints of the main roads, 
forms of resistance blossomed in the very space of exception challenging the sovereign 
decision over the disposability of their lives. The liberation of the camps is the evidence 
that the power exercised by the Lebanese on these spaces was not absolute or all-
encompassing for it failed in completely erasing the refugees‟ agency and their courage to 
react to humiliation. Although, as discussed in the previous chapter, a major role in the 
liberation of the camps was also played by the Lebanese‟s support of the Palestinian cause, 
the determination of the refugee community was fundamental for their emancipation and 
was emerging independently of the Lebanese society‟s solidarity. 
It could also be argued that, as Turki‟s (1972) opening quote of the chapter 
suggests, the very containment strategies that along with discriminatory legislative 
measures and attitudes kept the refugees isolated gave the Palestinians a stronger sense of 
identity: a sense of being Arab but at the same time different; the sense of being excluded 
from Lebanese society and the realisation of their peculiar sense of belonging dramatised 
by their forced displacement in a foreign country, in a land and society that was not theirs. 
At the mercy of the Lebanese authorities for a long time, the camp population itself with 
the support of the resistance groups and the Lebanese, felt finally ready to react to the 
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continuous and arbitrary abuses of the authorities. The road to the liberation of Palestine 
had to pass through the liberation of the camps. The signature of the Cairo Agreement in 
November 1969 was ever closer. 
The refugee camp:  
From freedom and autonomy to space ‘sacer’ (1969-1990) 
Refugee camps as ‘holes’ and ‘leaks’ in Lebanese sovereignty (1969-1982) 
In order to put an end to the ever increasing clashes occurring between the 
Lebanese army and the PRM, representatives of the Lebanese government and the PLO 
met in Cairo to agree on a new and more „positive cooperation‟ that would guarantee both 
the Lebanese state security and the Palestinian interests. Signed on November 3, 1969, the 
Cairo Agreement regulated the relations between the Lebanese state, the PLO and the 
PRM, and guaranteed the autonomy of the refugee camps. The self-administration of the 
Palestinian spaces was regulated by the text of the accords that foresaw „[t]he 
establishment of local Palestinian committees in the camps to look after the affairs of the 
Palestinians residing within them, and this in cooperation with local authorities and under 
Lebanese sovereignty‟ (translation of the agreement in Shiblak, 1998: 25).   
As Lebanese authorities left the camps, the Cairo Agreement, de jure and de facto, 
left the control and management of the camps in the hands of the Palestinians. While 
collaboration was supposed to take place between the Palestinian factions controlling the 
camps and the Lebanese authorities, in effect the agreement allowed for the creation of a 
space beyond the reach of the Lebanese that could no longer enter the camp unless 
escorted by the Palestinians. Full control of the camps and the refugees‟ life was handed 
over the PLO and the different political and military factions. As if the „inclusive 
exclusion‟ broke down, refugee camps were no longer excluded from the normal juridical 
order to be included in the domain of power through the management of their life by the 
Lebanese state. The exclusion from the normal juridical order became dramatised as the 
Lebanese authorities no longer could act and decide on those spaces. 
The freedom enjoyed after the Lebanese left the camp was also a sign that slowly 
the Palestinians were taking control of their own lives. Popular committees acted as sort of 
municipality as their task, still today, is that of administering the camps in all its aspects: 
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maintenance of the water and electricity supplies and roads; collection of garbage; 
resolution of internal disputes between neighbours or any litigation; and finally, but not 
less important, coordination with the Lebanese authorities and the security committee on 
matters concerning the camp security and the respect of Lebanon‟s sovereignty. 
Although the camp population has never democratically elected its representatives 
and the members of committees, as the camp got rid of the Lebanese authorities a new 
sense of empowerment and hope emerged.
17
 This could also be seen in the change of the 
camp‟s landscape and geography. Until 1969 quarters and areas of the camp were named 
after Palestinian lost villages, but with the arrival of the resistance the toponomy of the 
camp changed as areas and streets were named after political factions (Peteet, 2005; 
Sayigh, 1994). Moreover, prevented from utilising any solid material during the first two 
decades of the displacement, once the Lebanese police left the camps everyone began 
building in concrete. While in the 1960s the use of stones was gradually allowed for the 
walls of their shelters, until 1969 the use of any solid material was forbidden for the roof, 
which was still made of zinc so as to prevent the vertical expansion of the camps. In 1969, 
zinc in the roof was replaced by cement and the first two storey houses were being 
constructed to accommodate the natural growth of the population and new comers. The 
expansion of Shatila camp occurred both vertically and horizontally as Beirut attracted 
Palestinian refugees residing in other parts of the country as well as Lebanese and other 
foreign migrants hoping to find better opportunities in the capital (see also Chapter 6). As 
physically and socially the boundaries dividing the Palestinians from the rest of society 
began blurring, Palestinian-Lebanese relations and solidarity became stronger. While 
officially the Palestinians had control of the space of the camp only, their influence and 
decisions began „leaking‟ out the camp boundaries as they encouraged other refugees to 
settle and build houses around Shatila. Although officially the Palestinians had control 
over the camp and could take decisions pertaining to the camp space only, their influence 
outside the boundaries show how even in the space formally controlled and administered 
by the state the exercise of sovereign power is not all encompassing. As if leakages, frames 
of Lebanese territory began escaping sovereign power‟s control allowing for the 
blossoming of Palestinian dominance outside the camps. 
For the first time after two decades the Palestinians were now the „owners‟ of their 
spaces. This had effects on the ways in which they perceived themselves. As Shiblak 
                                               
17 As I discuss later, an experiment of democratic election has taken place in Shatila camp in 2005. 
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(1997: 268) points out, they could feel a new sense of empowerment, confidence and 
security. As the PLO and resistance groups took care of the camps and its security, 
refugees re-appropriated their spaces and lives. Free to join any political or military 
factions, to express their opinions and able to rely on PLO services, they began feeling 
self-sufficient and stronger as they were no longer dependent on the humanitarian aid, nor 
repressed by the Lebanese authorities.  From a space of constriction, the camp turned into a 
space of hope and resistance. While taking part in the political life of their communities 
and camps, militantism was openly displayed and installed in the Palestinians a renewed 
trust in the return. People began carrying weapons openly and training was provided in the 
camps where even the youngest could learn the basics.
18
 Palestinian factions began 
opening their own offices for the recruitment of new fighters and clinics in the camps. 
Fadi, a Lebanese who was a member of the Palestinian resistance, explains how each 
organisation – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Saiqa, Fatah and 
so on – had their own offices in Shatila, their own doctors and clinics that provided extra 
care for the camp population and for the fighters in case they were injured during training 
or resistance operations. In his words: 
I remember in the 1970s.. in front of our house there was a base for 
Saiqa called „The medical‟.. one of my friends got injured during 
the trainings, we took him to one of those first aid points.
19
  
While the Palestinians were enjoying this freedom, this abandonment of control at 
the hands of the Lebanese authorities was raising some doubts in those convinced that the 
Cairo Agreement would have driven the country to destruction. The autonomy of the 
Palestinian camps, the freedom of movement of the resistance groups and operations for 
the liberation of Palestine were increasing the chances of a serious and violent 
confrontation with the Israeli army. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
Lebanese public opinion was yet not ready to see the Palestinian resistance crushed by the 
Lebanese army. Considering these feelings, the Lebanese government and army preferred 
to adopt a stance of „waiting and seeing‟ and opted for closer cooperation with the PLO. 
                                               
18 Zahra‟s (the translator) insights during our encounter with Fadi, a Lebanese interviewed in  Sabra 
on 26 December 2008 (see note below). For an account of Zahra‟s role during the interviews see Chapter 2. 
19 Fadi, Sabra, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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Despite the fact that the PLO did not include all the factions part of the PRM and that 
actually some groups early in the 1970s gave rise to the Rejection Front opposing PLO‟s 
policies, it could still manage to control the „loose splinters‟ of the movement. However 
difficult to keep the Palestinian movement united and disciplined, it was in the Lebanese 
authorities‟ best interest to maintain the status quo through a well pondered decision that 
balanced the pros and cons of an attack of the camps. The British Embassy of Beirut in a 
dispatch addressed to the Foreign Office of London reported: 
As regards reassessing government control of the camps, would 
such a policy in fact solve the problem? If one thought the matter 
out it obviously would not. The various undisciplined groups could 
not be controlled this way and government section to reimpose 
authority in the camps would merely alienate the moderate amongst 
the fedayeen who were at the moment co-operating well with the 
authorities. [...] The Armed Struggle Command, who were the 
Fatah military Police, were now co-operating fully. They had 
arrested and handed over to the police the followers of Dr. Sartawi 
who had recently murdered a Fatah man [...] and had also found 
and arrested the abductors of Lt. Ahmed Khalil Abdu [unclear 
typing] (A Jordanian officer, brother of the Jordan Chief of Staff, 
recently kidnapped in a Beirut hotel by fedayeen and subsequently 
found and released by Fatah). It was very much easier for the 
government to exercise control of the camps through the PLO in 
this way and it was more effective. It acted as a safety valve if the 
fedayeen were encouraged to exert the government backed 
authority. This was considered government policy and in no sense 
a failure to act. In his [Colonel Kana‟an, new Deputy Chief of Staff 
operations of the Army] opinion it was a success, proved by the co-
operation of the PLO and by the fact that fedayeen military training 
had now entirely ceased in Lebanon. (This is substantiated as far as 
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the camps are concerned by a senior UNRWA official) (emphasis 
added).
20
 
According to this, it seems that the Lebanese government thought through the different 
options and decided that the best way to deal with the Palestinian resistance was a policy of 
laisser-faire. As if „in the state‟ but „not belonging to the state‟, refugee camps were 
excluded from Lebanese surveillance and by relying solely on the collaboration of the 
PLO, Lebanon was to some extent giving up portions of its territory. The camp, and as an 
indirect consequence the state‟s security, were handed over to the Palestinians. In this 
sense, the camps became truest spaces of exception as the Lebanese withdrew from them 
leaving a vacuum filled out by non-Lebanese actors and institutions. This is very similar to 
the status of foreign military bases as the camps represented the disruption of state‟s 
territorial continuity and, to some extent, the whole Westphalian model that guarantees a 
state full sovereignty, jurisdiction and control over its territory. While the state of 
exception was imposed on the camps at their very establishment as temporary structures in 
need of special management, another kind of exception materialised in the moment in 
which the Lebanese authorities willingly and consciously handed their management over to 
the PLO and the Palestinian factions.   
As the autonomy of the camps and the freedom of the Palestinians outside 
increased, so, as a consequence, did the clashes with the Lebanese army and Israeli 
retaliatory attacks. The military presence of the Palestinians in the country divided the 
public and merged with general economic and social discontent. The outbreak of the civil 
war in 1976 soon involved the Palestinians in a conflict in which Lebanese militias as well 
as other foreign armies exploited the lack of order to pursue their own interests and hit the 
Palestinians and their camps.  
The ‘sacredness’ of Palestinian life and camps (1976-1990) 
While the civil war broke out because of political, sectarian and economic reasons, 
the discourse underpinning the first clashes was one in which Lebanese nationalists 
confronted the Palestinians. Depicted by the rightist Christian media as a „war for 
                                               
20 Letter from the British Embassy of Beirut dated 7 January 1971, entitled “Fedayeen in Lebanon”, 
FCO 17-1439 entitled “Internal Security in Lebanon 1971”, the National Archives (London). 
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liberating all of Lebanon‟ with a clear reference to the Palestinian presence, the narrative 
warned the Lebanese against the risks of the country‟s partition into „Free and Occupied 
Lebanon‟ (al-Amal Phalange newspaper in Cooley, 1979: 38). Given the rightists and 
Christian parties‟ interpretation of the conflict, it was understandable that they attacked and 
besieged the Palestinian camps that were perceived as the main and ultimate source of 
instability and insecurity threatening Lebanon. The camps of East Beirut were the first 
target in 1976. Eager to expel the Palestinians and erase their camps from the Christian 
enclave of East Beirut, hundreds of civilians including non-Palestinians lost their lives 
while the camps were razed to the ground or seriously damaged. Though the camps of Tell 
El-Zaatar and Jisr El-Basha were completely destroyed and never reconstructed, the 
rightist parties‟ and militias‟ goals were only partially achieved. These attacks, in fact, 
aimed at displacing the Palestinians once again and force them to leave Lebanon. 
However, this did not occur as the survivors of the Tell El-Zaatar and Jisr El-Basha sieges 
escaped to West Beirut or wherever they could find temporary accommodation while the 
conflict was ongoing.
21
 
The tactics of attacking one camp to convince the whole Palestinian population in 
the country to move out of Lebanon was also used later on with even more dramatic 
consequences. While the camps of the north and the Bekaa Valley remained relatively 
untouched throughout the civil war, the camps in the south and West Beirut experienced 
heavy shelling, bombing, death and destruction. Retaliatory attacks from Israel continued 
on the southern areas of the country where the feda‟yeen‟s presence was more significant. 
Taking advantage of the weakness of the Lebanese army which was busy in trying to 
maintain order, the Israeli army invaded the country twice: in 1978 with „Operation 
Litani‟22 and in 1982 with „Operation Peace for Galilee‟, which was particularly dramatic 
for the heavy loss of human lives including Lebanese and Palestinians civilians (Fisk, 
2001).  In motion since February 1982 with troops approaching the border areas, plans for 
the invasion materialised in June of the same year under the pretext of avenging the 
attempted killing of Shlomo Argov, Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom in London. 
Although the attempted assassination was committed by Palestinian members of a group 
outside the PLO and despite Yasser Arafat‟s firm condemnation of the incident, the Israeli 
                                               
21 Insights from interviews with survivors of those sieges. Salma, Shatila, 20 December 2008 and 
Manar, Shatila, 23 December 2008. Both interviews were conducted in Arabic. 
22 „Operation Litani‟ was launched in 1978 and took the name from the Lebanese river Litani of the 
south. Aim of the operation was the erasure of the Palestinian resistance presence in the south and to push the 
Palestinian resistance groups north of the river Litani. 
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government used the event as pretext for the invasion (Fisk, 2001; Jansen, 1982). The 
invasion of Lebanon had two main objectives: erasing the PLO‟s political and military 
might; and creating in Lebanon a state allied to Israel and ready to sign a peace treaty 
(Farsoun, 1982: 101; for the preparation and goals of the invasion see also Kapeliouk, 
1982; Khalidi, 1984b; Schiff and Ya‟ari, 1984). While the destruction of the PLO as 
representative of a national cause claiming a state was the primary goal, as a side effect it 
was also hoped that the massive attack would convince the Palestinian civilians, left with 
no protection, to leave Lebanon. It is in this context that the Israeli army found a precious 
ally in the rightist Christian militias as the desires of the two parties coincided. 
South Lebanon was hit the most through bombardments and the infantry‟s invasion. 
But Beirut – location of PLO‟s headquarters and PRM‟s stronghold – was not spared. The 
siege of Beirut was atrocious as areas inhabited by the Palestinians or in which the 
resistance presence was significant became the target of heavy artillery and aerial 
bombardments. The Lebanese capital and West Beirut, in particular, experienced 
unprecedented destruction and food shortages as the siege operated also through the cutting 
of food, water and electricity supplies. As the number of dead and injured, especially 
among civilians, was increasing, the PLO found itself under extreme pressure to retreat and 
leave the country so as to spare the further loss of innocent lives and the total destruction 
of Beirut (Fisk, 2001; Jansen, 1982). Despite the courageous resistance, under the pressure 
of Philip Habib, U.S. envoy, the PLO agreed to withdraw from Lebanon and relocate 
elsewhere.  
Evacuation, however, was agreed on the sole condition that a contingent of 
multinational troops would look after the Palestinian civilians and camps in Lebanon 
(Cobban, 1984: 123-124). While this negotiation proved the diplomatic abilities of the 
PLO, its evacuation had dramatic consequences for the Palestinian refugees left behind. 
Although aware that leaving Palestinian refugee camps unprotected during a civil war and 
in the midst of an Israeli invasion was a great risk, the last Multinational Force troops left 
Lebanon by September 11, just few days after the PLO completed its own withdrawal on 
September 1 (Al-Hout, 2004: 2). The safety and security of the Palestinians could no 
longer be guaranteed and the assassination of the newly elected Lebanese president Bachir 
Gemayel – founder and former leader of the Lebanese Forces militia – on September 14 
prepared the ground for one of the most appalling events of the twentieth century. Under 
two quite contradictory pretexts, the Israeli army occupied Beirut on September 15, 
contravening the terms of the Habib agreement. Claiming that West Beirut was still hosting 
The refugee camp 
164 
 
about 2,000 Palestinian „terrorists‟ – to use Israeli vocabulary – and that the civilian 
population of the areas needed protection from possible Lebanese Forces militias‟ 
retaliatory actions, Israeli troops encircled the camp of Shatila and the adjacent areas. 
Neglecting to protect the civilians, whilst supposedly in charge of the safety and security of 
West Beirut, the Israeli army let Lebanese Forces‟ and other Christian militias‟ members 
enter the area of Greater Shatila on September 16.
23
  For three days, in the area that 
includes Shatila camp and adjacent quarters inhabited mainly but not exclusively by 
Palestinians, the militias slaughtered more than 3,000 civilians and abducted hundreds for 
interrogations. The exact number of victims could never be determined and perhaps will 
never be known, but mass graves were found around the camp of Shatila and others are yet 
to be discovered. According to witnesses, corpses were also loaded on trucks and their 
destination never known (see Al-Hout, 2004; EAFORD, 1983: 114-134; Fisk, 2001: 359-
400; Jansen, 1982; Sayigh, 1994: 117-122; Shahid, 2002, 2004). 
As witnessed by humanitarian workers, journalists and photographers, the Sabra 
and Shatila massacre came to be known as one of the saddest and most ferocious chapters 
of the Lebanese civil war for the cruelty with which it was carried out (Fisk, 2001; Al-
Hout, 2004). Though it is commonly believed that the massacre took place in the Shatila 
camp and involved Palestinians only, Al-Hout (2004) reveals that this is not the case. 
Certainly the Palestinians were the target of horrific actions and the attack of Shatila camp 
was part of the plan, but the massacre did not spare tens or even hundreds of non-
Palestinians including Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis, all living in the same area and sharing the same marginal condition of the 
refugees. Although the slaughter and destruction did not reach the heart of Shatila, it 
nevertheless hit the camp and its population at its Western, Southern and Northern borders. 
Those who luckily lived in the Eastern part or the centre of the camp managed to escape as 
soon as they heard rumours of what was happening at the borders of the camp.
24
 
                                               
23 According to witnesses, beyond the presence of the Lebanese Forces, there were also members of 
Tiger – a militia linked to former president Chamoun – and of the South Lebanese Army – a militia 
controlled by Haddad, a former Lebanese army‟s general, that was trained and supported by Israel (Al-Hout, 
2004). 
24 Insights from informal conversation with Ibtisam, Palestinian social assistant living and working 
in Shatila, on November, 5, 2008. Ibtisam told me that she was inside the camp when the massacre began as 
her house was located at its centre. She continued her narration of the massacre saying that as soon as her 
family heard about the slaughter of the Palestinians, they managed to leave the camp. Perhaps exits of the 
Eastern border provided them with a more secure escape. Despite plans to siege Shatila from everywhere, the 
attack on its eastern flank was not successful (see also Al-Hout, 2004). 
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While a detailed analysis of the events is beyond the scope of the present study, the 
atrocious acts, the dynamic of the massacre and its aftermath shed light on the ways in 
which the Palestinian life is conceived. The „how‟ and „why‟ will never be entirely 
revealed as proper investigations of the massacre have not been carried out. Yet, the 
perpetrators of the massacre, their thoughts and premises need to be partially covered in 
order to understand the ways in which Palestinian life has become ungrievable and the 
Palestinian residential area destroyable with impunity (Butler, 2009). As both rightist 
Lebanese militias and Israel had common interests in hitting the camps to force the 
Palestinians to leave the country (Al-Hout 2004: 272), responsibility lies with both. While 
direct responsibility is imputed to the Lebanese Forces and other militias carrying out the 
slaughter and destruction, indirect responsibility must attributed to the Israeli army that 
was in control of the areas and in charge of its security – as the occupying power under the 
Geneva conventions – and did not intervene to stop the massacre. 
What is striking about these events is the way in which the killing took place and 
the ways in which the Palestinians were abandoned to their fate by a regular army force 
that not only did not stop the massacre, but at times might have contributed directly to its 
actualisation. The only explanation that could shed some light on this massacre would 
summon the meticulous production of a dehumanisation discourse that prepared the ground 
for the Lebanese militias to be able to perpetrate such violence and for the Israeli army to 
be able to stand by impassively. Unprecedented violence was carried out for three days: 
machine gunning, cold blooded shootings and bulldozed houses with residents to mention 
but a few. It was as if Palestinians were no longer human, no longer deserving respect, 
dignity and mercy. No distinction was made between fighters and vulnerable civilians, 
including the elderly, women, children and disabled, who could not defend themselves. 
After all, „Palestinians are Palestinians‟ as one of the perpetrators of the massacre declared 
years after with so much indifference.
25
 And for those who do not hold indifference to 
human life, violence can be mastered with practice and time as another affirms: 
                                               
25 Taken from the documentary „Massaker‟ (2006), directed by Monika Borgmann, Lokman Slim 
and Herman Theissen. In this documentary, the directors manage to find and interview former Lebanese 
Forces militiamen who took an active part in the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The documentary is an attempt 
to use the Sabra and Shatila event to reflect on individual and collective violence occurred in Lebanon to 
hopefully help society reconcile after the civil war. 
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[...] you go in there. There are hundred people. You kill the first 
against your will. With the second and the third it‟s a bit easier. 
When you get to the fourth you enjoy it. I mean.. Once you have 
killed the fifth you may as well kill the sixth. You don‟t mind 
anymore. With the first one you think “No, that‟s a man, that‟s a 
woman. It‟s a human being”. You look at them in the face but you 
shoot them anyway. The second is easier. You‟ve got used to it, so 
to speak. From then on you stop thinking about it.
26
 
As these words suggest, while the Palestinians go through a process of dehumanisation, so 
do the killers who admit that after some assassinations or tortures one simply gets used to 
violence, as violence becomes a rule and no longer an exception. Although an analysis of 
violence is not the aim of this section, it is paramount to uncover discourses that allowed 
for such acts to take place. While direct responsibility of what happened lay with the 
Lebanese militias entering the camp, the Israeli army holds, at least, indirect responsibility. 
Aware of what might have happened in the Palestinian areas of Beirut after the 
assassination of Gemayel – former leader of the Lebanese Forces – the Israelis did not 
prevent the militias from entering the camp. Although some survivors witnessed Israeli 
soldiers‟ sporadic attempts to save the Palestinians and other civilians, the dehumanisation 
of the victims was a process that affected the Israeli army too. „Preventive criminalisation‟ 
was implanted in the Israeli soldiers‟ minds even before September 1982. Perhaps still 
indoctrinated and influenced by Israeli Prime Minister Begin‟s words of 8 June at the 
beginning of the „Operation Peace for Galilee‟, Palestinians were not perceived as human 
beings who deserved any protection. Begin‟s speech to the Knesset drew dangerous 
parallels aimed at dehumanise the Palestinians. To justify the death and destruction that the 
Israeli invasion was bringing to Lebanon, Palestinian fighters were defined as „two-legged 
animals‟ and refugee camps were no longer humanitarian spaces hosting defenceless and 
innocent people, but were turned into „camps of terrorists‟ whose aim was the destruction 
of the Jewish state (Schiff and Ya‟ari, 1984: 211, 218). This rhetoric certainly promoted 
the annihilation of the Palestinian life and spaces. Furthermore, memories of the 
Holocaust, still so vivid and powerful, emerged again in the Israeli Prime Minister‟s words 
so as to legitimise the death of innocent civilians: „If Hitler had lived in a house where 
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there were still 20 residents, couldn‟t we have bombed that house?‟ (Begin in Kapeliouk, 
1982: 289). After the massacre, the Holocaust was in fact used to justify what was 
happening in Lebanon to an angry Israeli public who could no longer identify itself as 
being part of a democratic state. But it was also a moral blackmail addressed to the whole 
world that could not accuse Israel of committing genocide after being victim of one (see 
also Fisk, 2001). 
Just like the siege of the refugee camps of East Beirut, the massacre of Sabra and 
Shatila was, therefore, turned into the rightist Lebanese militias‟ and the Israeli 
government‟s own „Final Solution‟ to erase the political and biological threat (Khalidi, 
1984b: 260). Biopolitical preoccupations were particularly revealed by the killing of 
innocent civilians, including children and pregnant women. As one of those who carried 
out the massacre later admitted: 
Our orders were perfectly clear. They were “Go in there and kill 
everyone!”. I don‟t know if I can explain it properly. We were 
supposed to go in there and kill. You are asking questions that I 
don‟t know the answer to. You are asking me why I did it. I don‟t 
know what to say. We all went in there to kill everyone. Absolutely 
everyone. Young and old. Back then.. speaking for me personally, I 
thought “this boy could kill me one day. It‟s best I kill him first. 
This woman will have children who will grow up. No! It‟s best if I 
kill her first. This man could have children. I‟d better kill him 
first”. That‟s the way we thought back then.27 
Palestinians of West Beirut had to die and possibly the rest of them be scared enough to 
leave Lebanon for good. 
But the Sabra and Shatila massacre was not an isolated case and certainly not the 
last. Though nothing of similar proportions has occurred again in Shatila, for Palestinians 
in Lebanon history repeats itself. Soon after the massacre in 1982, the Multinational Force 
relocated to Lebanon as French and Italian troops took positions around the camps of West 
Beirut. Though the presence of foreign troops protecting the camps and its inhabitants is 
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still remembered today with gratitude by Shatila‟s people,28 abduction and killings of 
Palestinians, especially men and young boys, continued. These acts were committed by a 
plethora of actors ranging from members of the Lebanese army, to Christian militias such 
as the Lebanese Forces, but also included members of Amal, the Shi‟a militia. Although 
trained and supported by the PLO, and Fatah in particular, Amal‟s actions were a clear 
symptom that the relations between the Palestinians and the Shi‟a community were 
deteriorating (see also Chapter 4). Feeling unsafe and unsure about their future, the 
Palestinians also experienced evictions in the areas surrounding Shatila. As Sayigh (1994: 
222) maintains, „after 1982 [...] Shi‟ites around Shatila began to use their connections with 
the Army and police to occupy houses or evict tenants, asserting their superiority over 
Palestinians as citizens against non-citizens‟. Although the Palestinians could not foresee 
the following sieges, the limitation and denial of their residential areas sounded as a sign 
and an anticipation of the so-called „War of the Camps‟ that occurred in the second half of 
the 1980s. The discourse of citizens vs. non-citizens that at the beginning of the civil war 
was constructed by the rightist parties was turned into a strategy in the hands of the rising 
Shi‟a‟s power. Eager to gain support and formal political recognition after being for so 
long neglected by the Lebanese government‟s policies, Amal militia and its leaders 
invoked the discourse that so heavily relied on the necessity to defend the Lebanese nation 
at the expenses of the Palestinians. 
As Sayigh goes on to suggest, to some extent the Shi‟a community was even 
worse-off than the refugee population in Lebanon with poorer households, lower levels of 
education and a lower rate of professionals. According to the Shi‟ites, the Palestinians had 
always been able to rely on free services provided by UNRWA and had better chances to 
improve their condition. At the centre of the international and Arab communities‟ 
concerns, the Palestinians had been receiving support that the Shi‟ites lacked. This made 
the latter „more receptive to messages of Lebanese nationalism projecting Palestinians as 
aliens, intruders and “destroyers of our country”‟ (p. 222). It is in this context that one 
must understand and situate the „War of the Camps‟. Directing their anger and frustration 
against the Palestinians, Amal militia and their leaders promoted themselves as defenders 
and liberators of the Lebanese nation by attacking and besieging refugee camps of West 
Beirut – Shatila and Burj El-Barajneh – as well as those in the south from May 1985 until 
April 1987. 
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The prolonged siege of the camps was also facilitated by the withdrawal of the 
Multinational Force. Increasingly under attack by Lebanese resistance groups that 
perceived the presence of foreign troops as the umpteenth attempt to occupy Lebanon and 
meddle into its internal affairs, U.S., British, French and Italian troops left Lebanon on 
February 1984 as Amal took control of West Beirut and the former Multinational 
contingent positions (Fisk, 2001: 534). Prelude to the siege were the continuous evictions 
of Palestinians from areas surrounding Shatila camp and occupation of vacant houses of 
flats by displaced Shi‟ites protected and taken care of by Amal in control of the area. As 
Shi‟a Lebanese moved around the camp, Amal fortified their positions in its proximity. 
While the attack on the Palestinian camps and spaces was imminent, rumours that fighters 
sympathetic to Arafat and the PLO may have come back taking position in the camps of 
Beirut and the south constituted the perfect pretext for the siege (Sayigh, 1994: 190; The 
War of the Camps, 1986). Allied with and supported by Syrian intelligence, Shatila was 
the first camp to be attacked and besieged on May 19, 1985 (Brynen, 1989: 57; Fisk, 2001: 
623; Sayigh, 1994: 182-187, 225). 
Considered as the „weakest link‟ because of its reduced size compared to other 
camps, a victory on Shatila would have demoralised the inhabitants of other camps too 
(Sayigh, 1994: 191).  Shatila was also a symbol to destroy as the camp is located in the 
Fakhani area, once headquarters of the PLO and stronghold of the resistance movement (p. 
101).
29
 Shatila endured three sieges. The first and most unexpected was during the 
Ramadan period from May 19 until June 22, 1985; the second one from May 29 until June 
27, 1986; and the third one, the longest and harshest that lasted for five months, from 
November 25, 1986 until April, 6, 1987 (ibid). During these sieges, the population of 
Shatila, Burj El-Barajneh and camps in the south was forced within the camp boundaries, 
subjected to continuous and prolonged shelling and sniping that left hundreds killed and 
thousands injured (Al-Bahr, 1987; Firas, 1986; Sayigh R., 1987; 1994; Sayigh Y., 1988; 
The War of the Camps, 1986). Medicine, food and water supplies had been blocked by 
Amal who rarely let the International Red Cross visit the camps to take out the wounded 
and dead. While their camps were reduced to rubble, the Palestinians were reduced to 
starvation at the point of being forced to eat cats and dogs (Khalili, 2006: 59; Sayigh, 
1987). 
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Despite the atrocious violence and loss of lives, people of Shatila resisted. The few 
feda‟yeen left in Shatila and the civilians organised the defence of the camp with the very 
few light weapons they had. But the resistance was not limited to fighting back as mutual 
help and solidarity were also strategies that kept the inhabitants of the camp alive (Saiygh, 
1987, 1994). As goods and supplies were collectivised and shared, women also gave a 
great contribution to the defence of the camp keeping high the morale of the fighters, 
taking care of the injured, cooking for everyone and digging trenches and tunnels. In order 
to avoid sniping fire outdoors, in fact, tunnels and trenches were dug while some house 
walls were pulled down so as to facilitate communication and the movement of people, as 
well as the moving of the wounded and the passage of people through buildings and 
underground.
30
 Bags full of sand were piled up to build and fortify barriers, especially as 
the houses at the edge of the camp were destroyed (see also Peteet, 2005: 162-163). 
Despite the remarkable resistance and spirit of the people of the camp, destruction 
was wide spread. As the Palestinian life was again revealed as killable with impunity, the 
Palestinian living environment inside and outside the camp was also the target of harsh 
violence. While before the actual siege the erasure of the Palestinian living space 
materialised through the refugees‟ evictions from houses around the camp and the 
occupation of vacant flats by displaced Shi‟ites, the denial of the right of residence and 
peaceful living was produced through the fierce siege of the camp that left many homeless 
and displaced and eighty percent of the houses destroyed (Sayigh, 1994: 322). As people 
were killed and harassed, the deliberate and unnecessary destruction of the built 
environment indicates that also Palestinian spaces were the target of these attacks. As 
embodiment of „urbicide‟ and „spacio-cide‟ techniques, at stake there was the systematic 
denial of the Palestinians‟ living space (Graham, 2002; Hanafi, 2005; Ramadan, 2009). 
„Urbicide‟, as Graham and Hanafi argue, is a term coined by architect Bogdan 
Bogdanovich as he explains the cultural annihilation and destruction of Balkan cities as 
symbols of multiculturalism. If in Balkan cities, and Sarajevo in particular, the space of the 
city became the target of demolition aimed at preventing multiculturalism from flourishing 
again, the Palestinian camps were target of massive bombardment and destruction aimed at 
erasing the refugees‟ presence. Evictions outside the camps, the unnecessary destruction of 
houses inside the camp and the destruction of the whole infrastructures geared at denying 
the refugees their right to live in peace and dignity. As vacant houses and flats outside the 
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camp were occupied by displaced Shi‟ites and as the camp population of Shatila began 
including non-Palestinians, the reasons for the „War of Camps‟ seem to emerge (see also 
Doraï, 2006: 156-161).
31
 Such destruction cannot be understood or justified by the claim 
that would-be terrorists or „Arafatists‟ were still inside the camps. There were only about 
fifty fighters in the camp of Shatila and the capture or killing of those do not legitimise 
such ferocious annihilation but can only be understood within the framework of denying 
the refugees their most basic right, that of living in Lebanon (Sayigh Y., 1988: 18).  
The massacre of Sabra and Shatila, as well as the „War of the Camps‟, shows that 
the Palestinian life and their spaces were treated as sacer. As the materialisation of the 
sacredness in the Agambenian sense (Agemben, 1995a, 1998), the refugees and their 
camps were killed, harassed, attacked and destroyed with indifference and impunity. While 
some would argue that all massacres in Lebanon – including the Damour massacre of 
Lebanese Christians
32
 – treated any kind of life as disposable with no distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens as natural outcome of a civil struggle, I suggest that the 
permanent sacredness of the Palestinian life and spaces was revealed through the killing 
and destruction, inconclusiveness of investigations on these crimes and the issue of a 
Lebanese Amnesty Law (94/91) in 1991 (see also Knudsen, 2007). As regards the Israeli 
and Lebanese investigations on the „events‟ of Sabra and Shatila, the Kahan Report 
published in February 1983 and the Jermanos Report completed only eleven days after the 
massacre, did not charge anyone with responsibility for the massacre (Al-Hout, 2004: 320; 
King-Irani, 2002). As the Israeli and the Lebanese authority blamed one another, those 
accountable for the „incident‟ have yet to be punished and pay their debt with justice. All 
of them have been conducting a normal life with no consequence for the atrocities 
committed. 
While hiding the truth was the goal of both investigations, the issue of an Amnesty 
Law in Lebanon further confined such horrific events to the oblivion. Instead of coming to 
terms with their past and building peace through the rendition of justice and dignity to the 
victims of the war, the Amnesty Law made the Lebanese forget. A law, that in the words of 
King-Irani (2002), „effectively excused any Lebanese citizen or official from prosecution 
                                               
31 Insights from interviews. 
32 As a consequence of the siege and destruction of the Palestinian camps of East Beirut in 1976, the 
Lebanese leftist forces and Palestinian militias besieged the village of Damour in the Shouf region, south of 
Beirut. Inhabited by both Christians and Druze, this village was considered the headquarters of one of the 
Christian party, the National Liberal Party (NLP) led by Camille Chamoun, former Lebanese president. The 
siege resulted in the massacre of civilians and evictions of the residents of Damour to make space for 
Palestinian displaced and survivors of the Tell- El-Zaatar massacre (Cooley, 1979). 
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for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed between 1975 and 1990‟. As 
principles of justice were abandoned just like the forgotten victims of the conflict, the 
government found the time to make ultimate distinctions as Lebanese were excused but not 
the Palestinians. The general amnesty was reserved for Lebanese only while Palestinians 
have been excluded from its benefits. As the law guaranteed the immunity against all the 
crimes committed during the civil war to Lebanese only, Palestinians could still be 
prosecuted and some of them have been sentenced to death in absentia (Knudsen, 2007: 6). 
As Palestinians can be charged and executed for offences committed during the civil war, 
the same treatment is not reserved to the Lebanese whose crimes have been swept away by 
the Amnesty. Drawing once more distinctions between those who are protected and those 
who are abandoned, law is the instrument of a sovereign power that cannot help but 
separate the sacer that could be killed with impunity from the one to be taken care of. 
As a measure abolishing restrictions imposed by law in „normal‟ times, the 
Amnesty law resembles the Iustitium proclaimed by the Roman Senate whenever the 
Republic was threatened (Agamben, 2005a: 41-51). However, while the suspension of the 
law in Roman times was declared at the beginning of the war or insurrection, in Lebanon it 
was applied at its very end. The proclamation of Iustitium rendered all measures, which in 
normal times are prosecuted as criminal offences, necessary and not punishable. 
Committed in a legal void, they were considered as pure facts with no juridical 
consequence. And in Lebanon, although the Amnesty Law is retroactive, it has the same 
effects of the Iustitium because violence against the Palestinians is not punishable as it is 
produced retrospectively in a legal void. Thus the exception hits the Palestinians twice: 
first, killing them with impunity and, second, excluding them from amnesty and 
forgiveness; killed with impunity and yet prosecuted for their own actions. 
Refugee camps in the aftermath of the civil war: 
Whose sovereignty? 
The dramatisation of the exception? 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the process of reconstruction began though not 
without difficulties. If during the „Ayyam Al-Tharwa‟ (The Days of the Revolution 1969-
1982) the camps experienced a vertical and horizontal expansion, thus blurring the 
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boundaries that kept the Palestinians separated from the Lebanese, the „War of the Camps‟ 
so vividly marked the space of the camps rendering their boundaries visible again. 
Checkpoints were erected by militia Amal in coordination with the Syrian troops so as to 
better control the refugees‟ activities and prevent their movement. While in the period 
between 1985 and 1987 the checkpoints were controlled by the Shi‟a militia, at the end of 
the „War of the Camps‟ this control was passed over to the Syrians. Encircled by the 
Syrian army that in Lebanon was acting as peace-keeping force waiting for order to be re-
established after the civil war, the Palestinians were once more confined to a very limited 
space and subjected to harassment (Peteet, 2005: 172-173). 
The camps of Tell El-Zaatar and Jisr El-Basha (East Beirut) that endured violent 
sieges and destruction in 1976 have never been reconstructed. The same fate was reserved 
for the camp of Nabatieh (South Lebanon) that, destroyed during Israeli bombings in the 
early 1970s, was never rebuilt. In addition to the reduction in the number of the Palestinian 
camps, the amendment of the law on property (2001) preventing the Palestinians from 
acquitting real estate induced many to relocate in the remaining camps. Although it is not 
compulsory for Palestinians to live there, they are left with no alternative as „lack of access 
to employment, property, and healthcare, educational and social services outside the camps 
effectively compels many people to reside there‟ (Ramadan, 2009: 158). While in other 
countries a greater percentage of Palestinians have managed to leave the camps, UNRWA 
statistics show how about fifty percent of the refugees in Lebanon still live in the camps.
33
 
This number is equalled only by Gaza which is enduring one of the harshest Israeli‟s 
blockages and where the number of people living under the poverty line is increasing.  
Perhaps, the strategy enacted by the Lebanese authorities is an old one: that of rendering 
the Palestinians‟ living conditions as miserable as possible so as to convince them to leave 
Lebanon. The desire to drive the refugees away seems to constitute the main force that 
would push the Lebanese government to adopt such discriminatory policies so at to force 
the Palestinians to be confined to the camps in extremely overcrowding and unhealthy 
environments (Abbas et al., 1997; Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1996; Zeidan, 1999). 
While some would suggest that these measures would be necessary in order to 
concentrate the refugees‟ presence to better control their activities, this argument is not 
supported by any evidence. The issue of control and authority in the Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon is increasingly becoming a thorny challenge and dilemma. While 
                                               
33 Statistics and numbers are available from UNRWA‟s website at www.unrwa.org (or 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=253 last accessed September 2011). 
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security is depicted as the government‟s main concern in the aftermath of the civil war, no 
effective measure has ever been taken by the Lebanese authorities to reinstate any 
authority over the camps. If after the civil war checkpoints were a reality affecting all the 
camps preventing the free movement and unlimited reconstruction, the surveillance from 
the borders has never been accompanied by that within the camps as it happened during the 
period of the Deuxième Bureau (1959-1969). Indirect control was exercised from the 
outside as soldiers at the checkpoints questioned the inhabitants and visitors on the reasons 
for their movement or presence. While this considerably limited the Shatila inhabitants‟ 
freedom (Peteet, 2005: 171), the removal of checkpoints during the 1990s was a sign that 
perhaps control over the refugees‟ spaces was not the main prerogative and concern of the 
Lebanese government. The only camps around which the Lebanese authorities still 
maintain a presence at their borders are the camps of Nahr El-Bared in the North and the 
camps of the South – Rashidieh, Burj El-Shemali and El-Buss in Tyre, and Ein El-Hilweh 
and Mieh Mieh in Saida. 
Controls in Nahr El-Bared have been strengthened only after the clashes of 2007 in 
which the Lebanese Army fought a ferocious battle against Fatah Al-Islam, a „terrorist‟ 
group mainly composed of non-Palestinians that made Nahr El-Bared their base. The 
clashes razed the camp to the ground and left many civilians dead, injured and displaced. 
As programs of reconstruction of the camp are slowly being actualised, the Lebanese army 
has placed checkpoints to control all the movements of Palestinians as well as non-
Palestinians. According to these projects agreed on by the Lebanese authorities and 
UNRWA, the reconstructed camp will also host Lebanese authorities‟ offices within the 
camp (Ramadan, 2009; see also Brynen, 2009; Hanafi, 2008a). Moreover, according to 
these plans, Nahr El-Bared will be a model to be replicated in the rest of the Palestinian 
camps suggesting that, perhaps, regaining control of the refugees‟ spaces is part of the 
Lebanese plan.
34
 
Nahr El-Bared seems to constitute the exception rather than the rule as no other 
camp has been „hosting‟ Lebanese authorities – police or intelligence services – offices 
since 1969. Surveillance after the civil war could be considered tight only for the camps of 
the South where Lebanese soldiers at checkpoints limit the refugees‟ freedom of 
movement, prohibit the introduction of any construction materials to repair damaged 
houses, and exercise indirect control over the camps from the border by means of 
                                               
34 Insights from interview with Lebanese official who desires to remain anonymous, Beirut, 28 
November 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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restrictions, intimidation and psychological pressures. As Jaber Suleiman explains during 
our encounter, in the camps of the South the Lebanese authorities want to make the 
refugees feel their presence all the time, even damaging the Palestinians‟ job opportunities 
as they do not let people leave or enter the camp after midnight. Thus a young Palestinian 
student working in a restaurant of Saida cannot serve the evening shifts that would end at 
12am. Arguing that perhaps security is not the main concern and reason for the 
surveillance of the camps of the South, Suleiman maintains: 
[...] the function of the control is psychological. They want to make 
people feel that they are controlled. That they are not allowed to 
live a normal life. That “we are here, we are controlling 
everything”.35 
Whilst causing psychological distress seems a valid argument given the history of the 
Lebanese authorities‟ attitude towards the refugee population, according to some Lebanese 
officials there are two main reasons why checkpoints have been established around the 
camps of the South only, with the sole recent exception of Nahr El-Bared in the North. 
Firstly, the camps of the South are much closer to the border with Israel and if any 
resistance activity took place, it is more likely that this would occur in the southern region. 
This explanation would justify Lebanon‟s security concerns: as the camps of the south are 
more threatening than others, surveillance, even though through checkpoints only, must be 
concentrated on these spaces. Although the second reason would not contradict the first 
one, it has more to do with the Lebanese and regional Realpolitik and subsequent 
necessary compromises. According to a Lebanese official, security of the camps has 
always been more of a Syrian concern than a Lebanese one. The long-standing rivalry 
between the PLO-Fatah and the Syrian regime of the late Assad is played on the Lebanese 
ground and at the expenses of the refugees (Cobban, 1984; International Crisis Group, 
2009: 6; Rougier, 2007: 8-13; Sayigh, 1994: 209-210; Traboulsi, 2007: 205).
36
 
From 1976 until 2005 when Syrian troops officially left Lebanon, the Syrian 
authorities were involved in the Lebanese affairs either officially – by virtue of Arab 
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36 Lebanese official who wishes to remain anonymous, Beirut, 28 November 2008. Interview 
conducted in English. 
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League‟s peacekeeping mandates – or without a formal role intervening in Lebanon to 
defend their own interests by supporting different parties involved in the conflict. 
According to some, rather than effectively controlling the camps and the refugees‟ 
activities, the presence of checkpoints in the camps of the South would only serve the 
Syrian interests. As in the aftermath of the civil war Syrian influence in Lebanese politics 
has expanded, Lebanon is turned into a vassal state at the service of Syria‟s struggles and 
best interests. As in the camps of the North, Beirut and Bekaa Valley, Syria‟s control of 
refugees‟ spaces and activities is exercised through pro-Syria Palestinian factions, 
Lebanese regular army‟s surveillance needs to be concentrated in the South where camps 
are in the hands of Fatah and pro-PLO groups. However, there is still a kind of surveillance 
that while working from the outside seeks to control the inside. 
Despite the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in May 1987 through law No 25/87, 
accords that for years have legally prevented the Lebanese from entering the camps, 
Lebanese authorities have never regained control over the Palestinians‟ camps. While for 
this there are multiple reasons that are also analysed later, when asked about the rationale 
of this apparently inexplicable situation, the Lebanese official interviewed replied: 
The answer is very simple. When it [the Cairo Agreement] was 
abrogated, it was abrogated in the Parliament, but don‟t forget that 
the Syrian presence was still in Lebanon. Syria was manipulating 
the whole political and security scene in the country. Syria did not 
want the government to go into the camps. They wanted to use the 
card of the Palestinians still in their hands.
37
 
The card that the Syrian authorities still want to play relates to the Peace Process and the 
Syrian necessity to recover the Golan Heights from the 1967 defeat before Lebanon could 
sign a peace treaty with Israel or before the Palestinian Authority could reach an agreement 
with the Jewish state (Brynen, 1994: 90; Fisk, 2001). Pulling the strings of the Palestinian 
factions in Lebanon serves the purpose of maintaining a potential threat for Israel. It means 
showing that only Syria can control the Palestinian resistance and that no attack will occur 
as long as Syria controls the factions. This would be the reason why the Syrian lobby 
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within the Lebanese government did not allow the Lebanese to enter the camps so as to 
keep the threat to Israel real and possible (see among others Makkawi et al., 2007). 
While these explanations have valid points, this argument would no longer make 
sense after 2005 when Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon and with them, at least 
officially, its influence in Lebanese politics. If the Syrian authorities and their pressures 
were the reasons why the Lebanese did not regain control over the camps, after the 
withdrawal there would be no impediment for the Lebanese to re-establish their rule and 
authority over the refugees‟ spaces. Yet, security seems more of a discursive obsession 
rather than a real concern. Security may be a preoccupation, but it is often summoned so as 
to justify harsh and discriminatory measures taken against the Palestinians. In particular, as 
regards the camps, the discourse constructed around these spaces still bears the signs of the 
civil war and of a reconciliation that has never taken place between the Lebanese and the 
Palestinians (Knudsen, 2009).  
Perhaps reconciliation is the key word to understand the situation of the camps in 
Lebanon while putting them in relation to a broader context. The reasons for the Lebanese 
disengagement from the Palestinians and their spaces must be found in the very aftermath 
of the civil war that coincided with the Madrid Peace Conference (1991). As discussed 
above (see Chapter 3), the Lebanese government was greatly influenced by events 
occurring at the regional and international level and for the „Lebanese‟ Palestinians the 
start of the Peace Process meant the worsening of their situation. This was not only 
because the hopes in their right of return seemed to fade in favour of a diplomatic 
arrangement that would have guaranteed a degree of autonomy on the Occupied Territories 
only, but also because their very condition in Lebanon deteriorated. 
While all the parties involved in the Lebanese civil war were part of the 
reconciliation process in its aftermath, the reconciliation between the Lebanese and the 
Palestinians has never formally taken place. Involved in and accused of having started the 
civil war, the Palestinians were excluded from the Taïf Agreement (1989) that officially 
marked the end of the conflict. While diplomatic encounters between the Lebanese 
government and the PLO as well as other factions not sympathetic to the latter were held at 
the beginning of the 1990s, no formal settlement between the parties has ever been 
reached. And the reopening of a PLO office in Beirut in 2006 has not guaranteed a 
significant improvement of the refugees‟ lives. In the early 1990s the meetings between the 
Palestinian and Lebanese delegations proved unsuccessful. Palestinians promised to hand 
over all their weapons and welcomed the Lebanese to take positions inside the camps 
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provided Lebanon guaranteed the refugees civil and social rights (Makkawi et al., 2007). 
But as heavy artillery had been passed over to the Lebanese authorities no change was 
recorded on the issue of refugees‟ basic rights. Afraid that the Peace Process would have 
pushed Lebanon to naturalise its refugees, the Lebanese authorities did not comply with its 
promises. Light weapons were kept in the camps and the Lebanese authorities never 
entered their spaces (Salah, 2000). 
As if the Cairo Agreement were still effective, the camps are today considered as 
islands of non-Lebanese territory as state jurisdiction and control seems not to apply 
anymore. However, with the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 1987, no legal 
impediment prevents the Lebanese authorities to regain such control (Khalidi and 
Riskedahl, 2007). It is within this context that the representation of the camps can oscillate 
between discourses of lawlessness and freedom. „Zones of lawlessness within sovereign 
Lebanese territory‟ (Khalidi and Riskedahl, 2007), the Palestinian camps are depicted as 
spaces that threaten the security of the country. Because of the lack of control at the hands 
of the Lebanese authorities and the presence of weapons, these spaces challenge the state‟s 
security but guarantee the impunity and freedom of criminals and outlaws. They are spaces 
in which, according to this narrative, all crimes and criminals conflate as drug-smugglers, 
killers, thieves and terrorists take advantage of the absence of the state to hide and escape 
prosecutions. As the late Lebanese journalist Jibran Tuwayni famously affirmed: 
 
How long will the state erect military checkpoints in residential 
areas, treating them as though they were camps sheltering wanted 
people and gunmen, while all the Palestinian camps, which shelter 
criminals and wanted people, enjoy freedom of movement, 
politically, militarily and in terms of security, as though they were 
security islands independent of Lebanon politically, militarily and 
in terms of security?  
(Tuwayni in Khalidi and Riskedahl, 2007; emphasis added) 
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The camps are labelled „security islands‟. „Islands‟ indicates the extraterritoriality of the 
Palestinian camps that resemble spots of non-Lebanese territory abandoned by the state 
and its rule. „Security‟ that is not for the Lebanese state, but for criminals that turn the 
humanitarian refugee camps into refuges for outlaws. By stressing this kind of narrative 
and the problem of the emergence in the camps of fundamentalist ideologies such as 
Salafism, the Lebanese authorities framed the events of Nahr El-Bared (2007) within the 
„War on Terror‟ discourse. As El-Natour has also pointed out, the war between the 
Lebanese army and the terrorist group of Fatah Al-Islam was two-fold: showing the 
Palestinians that their safety is not guaranteed and that the Lebanese army still holds the 
ultimate decision on the camps; and showing the world that Lebanon was fighting its own 
„war on terror‟ too.38 By focusing attention on the problem of the Palestinian camps that 
host „terrorists‟ and urging a solution to the Palestinian refugees‟ issue, the Lebanese 
authorities implied that the „plague‟ of terrorism may expand beyond Lebanese boundaries 
and constitute a threat for the region and Western states too (see also Elden, 2009: 95-96; 
on the rise of Salafism in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon see International Crisis 
Group, 2009: 24-28; and Rougier, 2007).  
Despite this representation of the Palestinian camps as refuges of terrorists and 
outlaws, the Lebanese authorities still do not dare to enter and take any control, a situation 
that dramatises the exceptionality of these spaces and challenges the very Lebanese 
sovereignty. But these islands of extraterritoriality punctuate the Lebanese landscape as an 
„archipelago of exceptions‟. Here, the metaphor of archipelago is particularly appropriate. 
As Weizman (2007: 13) maintains, it is an expression that „describe[s] a multiplicity of 
discrete extraterritorial zones, the spatial expression of a series of “states of emergency”, or 
states of exception that are either created through the process of law [...] or that appear de 
facto within them‟ as „sovereign power is either deposed or challenged‟. The camps are, 
therefore, extraterritorial because „they are positioned outside of the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction that surrounds them‟ (p. 14); they escape the effective control of the Lebanese 
authorities and exist as almost independent spatialities. Although a law that legalises such 
extraterritoriality seems to not exist, de facto the Lebanese government and army have lost, 
or have decided to lose, control over the camps that are administered by the Palestinians. 
While Elden (2009: 59) would define them as „intraterritorial spaces‟ as they are located in 
de jure Lebanese sovereign space, he argues that these spaces „demonstrate the suspension 
                                               
38 Insights from interview with Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008. Interview 
conducted in English. 
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of sovereign control through absence rather than its intensification through executive 
decision‟ as if „the sovereignty/territory relationship has broken down‟. 
In this way making a distinction between Agamben‟s take on sovereign power 
intensified in the space of exception, Elden suggests that quite the contrary may also occur. 
In the case of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon we are not witnessing an intensification of 
sovereign power. It is precisely the sovereign‟s abandonment, because of „absence or 
weakness‟, that dramatises the exceptionality of the camp. Apparently rather than an 
exclusion being followed by an inclusion – the camps as exceptions where normal juridical 
order is suspended but included in the sovereign‟s management of the space – Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon seem to follow the pattern of a double exclusion: spaces where 
the normal juridical order is deactivated and that are further abandoned through the 
withdrawal of management and control. I call it „dramatised exceptionality‟ because it is as 
if the camps are abandoned twice: first, by placing them in a different politico-juridical 
order; second, through an absence and lack of state authorities‟ engagement. 
The absence of the Lebanese sovereign control may indeed open up resistance and 
give rise to the production of other kinds of powers and sovereigns. Echoing Agnew, Elden 
(2006: 483) maintains that the problem is not the territorial continuity but control over it. If 
no control is applied, rule and stability do not exist and exception may expand indefinitely. 
Indeed, warning against the risks of establishing spaces of exception, Papastergiadis (2006: 
435) argues that while this is a measure taken to protect the nation and the sovereignty of 
the state, it could result in „boomerang effects‟. Bearing in mind Agamben‟s reflections, he 
goes on to suggest that „while political philosophers have justified the sovereign‟s right to 
suspend the rule of law and create a state of exception, as the necessary means for 
preserving the ongoing viability of the state or long-term integrity of the law, they have 
overlooked the extent to which this violent means not only becomes an infinite end, but 
also undermines the very security it promises‟. 
The Lebanese decision to not control the camps produces complex geographies of 
exception according to which de jure sovereignty is Lebanese, but de facto jurisdiction and 
control are Palestinian. As the Lebanese state surrenders control over portions of its 
territory, a „contingent sovereignty‟ is produced within its very boundaries (Elden, 2009). 
Far from summoning the „failed state‟ discourse that has for long been produced and 
reproduced to justify invasions or meddling in other countries‟ affairs (Elden, 2009: 63-
109; Jones, 2008; Morton, 2005), the abandonment of the camps leaves a vacuum that 
could be filled by other actors ready to threaten the stability and security of the state.  
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Considering these assumptions, the Lebanese government‟s decision to completely 
withdraw from the Palestinian spaces has yet to find a plausible rationale. Whilst the „why‟ 
may sound less interesting than the „how‟, the key to understand the Lebanese authorities‟ 
reasons may be found in the relation between security and responsibility. As two sides of 
the same coin, the Lebanese do not wish to control the camps as they disclaim any 
responsibility over them and their inhabitants.
39
 Security in facts holds a much wider 
meaning. As Suleiman suggests, it does not mean oppressing people or controlling the 
freedom of expression for the Raison d‟État. Security may bear a deeper social meaning as 
it entails the responsibility for the refugees‟ wellbeing: 
If the Lebanese government are [sic] ready to come into the camps, 
because you want to control security? You have to improve the 
living conditions, to eradicate the causes of instability or any kind 
of security troubles because this is human security, the social 
security. Not only the security which brings the Lebanese army into 
the camps controlling people.. But I think the Lebanese are not yet 
ready for this..
40
 
Improving the living conditions and granting civil, social and economic rights means 
providing security as the latter becomes a synonym of responsibility. This is a 
responsibility that the Lebanese do not intend to take as they prefer to preserve an open 
ambiguity about the political and juridical status of the camps. While at stake is a complete 
abandonment, the uncertain status of the refugees‟ spaces is continuously maintained so as 
to exploit the exception. Precisely because no legal definition is applied, the camp is kept 
in the zone of indistinction where the ultimate sovereign – the Lebanese state/government 
– can still play with the decision. Echoing Minca‟s (2005: 409) reflections, if „the exercise 
of sovereign power is based on potenza and not on force itself‟, this means that at any 
moment the Lebanese authorities may claim back their lost control. It is a potentiality that, 
for example, was actualised in the space of Nahr El-Bared, though with catastrophic 
consequences for the camp razed to the ground and its inhabitants killed and displaced. It is 
                                               
39 Insights from interview with Jaber Suleiman, Mar Elias, 14 January 2009 and interview with 
Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008. Both interviews were conducted in English. 
40 Interview with Jaber Suleiman, see note above. 
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an actuality that, at least in the Lebanese case, seems not knowing of any other means but 
violence. Hence, the spectre and spectacle of the scaffold returns as a public manifestation 
of the sovereign‟s reactivation of his absolute power over life and death of his subjects (see 
Foucault, 1991: 47-49). Speaking about the events of Nahr El-Bared Suleiman suggests 
that: 
[...] they [the Lebanese authorities] needed a victory. The army was 
concentrated in Nahr El-Bared against Fatah Al-Islam and to 
provide it as a model.. this is a model: “We are doing this in Nahr 
El-Bared and we are going to repeat it in other camps if Fatah Al-
Islam or any other group will be generated in other camps”. It was 
some kind of this is.. “We want to give you a lesson”, you know? 
That what happened in Nahr El-Bared can be repeated. So this is a 
message..
41
 
Through the spectacle of Nahr El-Bared, the Lebanese authorities re-instated their power 
and right to intervene at any moment to maintain order. As Foucault (1991: 57-58) 
describing „the spectacle of the scaffold‟ put it: 
An execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so 
in secret, would scarcely have had any meaning. The aim was to 
make an example. Not only by making people aware that the 
slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by arousing feelings 
of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the 
guilty person. 
The message of the Lebanese authorities was, in fact, not only directed to the inhabitants of 
Nahr El-Bared, but to all Palestinians in Lebanon as in the words of Suleiman (see above). 
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From a disciplinary apparatus that operates on space, enclosures and strict control 
and surveillance – as it was during the period of the Deuxième Bureau – we witness a 
passage to a „security apparatus‟ in which different technologies of power – the classic 
theory of sovereignty as understood by Foucault, the disciplinary and regulatory modes – 
are modulated and assembled in different ways (Foucault, 2007, 2008). The old 
sovereign‟s right over life and death of its subjects, re-deployed during the siege of Nahr 
El-Bared, is re-utilised within the security era as Palestinian life is rendered once again 
killable. 
In this context „the spectacle of Nahr El-Bared‟ aims at warning the rest of 
Palestinians in Lebanon living in the camps: if they let other terrorist groups penetrate the 
camp the Lebanese authorities may intervene. Through intervention, a disciplinary one, 
power regains control over the space of the camp in which the army is re-deployed after 
years of absence. But when I argue that the state „may‟ intervene, the conditional was the 
most appropriate modal. As different technologies of power, which Foucault identified 
with different periods of the history, are re-utilised and assembled, less certain is the ways 
in which these techniques are pulled together. Although in the era of security the state lets 
things be and intervention is limited, the latter does not completely disappear. It works on 
modulation. Control may be „free-floating‟ – working on subjectivities more than spaces – 
in which case „what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person‟s 
position‟ (Deleuze, 1992: 7; see also Amoore, 2006; Amoore and de Goede, 2008). This is 
particularly manifested in the ways in which Palestinians are caught in the net of power 
through the stripping of their rights. It is an exclusion that captures them no matter where 
they reside or move and that follows them wherever they are. Yet, it is also a power that, 
on the one hand abandons control over the camp, only to be able to re-territorialise itself at 
need through the utilisation of disciplinary techniques focusing on space and enclosure – as 
the re-deployment of the Lebanese army within the space of Nahr El-Bared (see Collier, 
2009; Foucault, 2007, 2008). 
The concept of potentiality, however, seems to include all these possibilities and 
technologies as the ways in which these technologies are assembled and re-deployed imply 
choices of acting or non-acting, and decisions on the full or partial withdrawal of control. 
The decision of ceding control over the camps is the result of the potentiality of not-to-be 
and not-to-act (Minca, 2005: 409). As master of this decision, the ultimate sovereign power 
remains the Lebanese state. While the latter can decide otherwise in any moment by 
suddenly actualising its potentiality to-be and to-act in the most violent ways, until that 
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moment comes new possibilities are created. As the sovereign withdraws direct exercise of 
power in and on the space of exception, the potentiality not-to-be opens up chances of 
resistance, forms of self-administration and governance. 
The sovereign retreats: The emergence of ‘petty sovereigns’ 
As the Lebanese authorities refuse to enter the camps, and the Palestinians to some 
extent welcome this refusal because of the memories of the Deuxième Bureau period 
(1959-1969), the vacuum left is filled by a plethora of actors that control and administer 
these spaces. Devoid of Lebanese control, the Palestinian camps witness the emergence of 
new forms of power as „petty sovereigns‟ substitute themselves to the state‟s authorities. 
From the Palestinian popular, security and village committees, to humanitarian 
organisations and various political factions, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon 
experience a multiplicity of sources of power (Hanafi, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Kortam, 
2007, 2008; Peteet, 1987, 2006; Suleiman, 1999). 
While some may think that UNRWA could have some say in the administration of 
the camps because of its role in their establishment and recognition, the UN agency has 
never had any decision-making prerogative.  As UNRWA and NGOs operate in the camps 
with the sole aim of providing basic services, ultimate decisions concerning the camp are 
up to the popular committee. As discussed above, from the early 1970s the camps have 
been administered by popular committees whose members were appointed by each 
political group present in the camp in addition to some members of the popular unions – 
such as those of workers and women – independents, and notables of the camps (Kortam, 
2007). As regards their tasks, they operated as municipalities and, thanks to PLO funding, 
they took care of services such as water, electricity, and the general improvement of the 
infrastructures. However, since today funding is no longer available, popular committees 
struggle to fulfil the expectations of the camp population as basic needs are not always 
covered. As Khalil, member of the Shatila popular committee, explained to me, nobody is 
offering any financial support. The committee does not get money from the PLO or 
UNRWA and very rarely it receives some voluntary donations from charities. As they 
struggle to maintain basic standards of living, the committee can indirectly rely on the 
donations that the European Union has offered to the municipality of Ghobeiry where 
Shatila is located. Therefore, cooperation with Ghobeiry authorities becomes essential for 
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the maintenance of the electricity networks and sewage improvements.
42
 Such cooperation 
is not only indispensable for the provision of services to Shatila, but it proves crucial on 
other fronts too. During the civil war, for example, the municipality took care of the rubble 
clearance around the camp and still today is responsible for the maintenance of the Sabra 
and Shatila cemetery outside the camp (Khalili, 2007: 282).  
Beyond the provision of these basic services and supplies, the popular committee is 
responsible for other administrative issues as it keeps notes of names and information of 
people living in the camp. To this end, registers are kept updated with details relating to the 
camp inhabitants and all real estate transactions occurring in Shatila. Anyone wishing to 
buy, sell or rent a house does not refer to the municipality of Ghobeiry but to the popular 
committee that prepares the necessary documentation. While for Palestinians it is 
forbidden to buy or inherit properties outside the camps, because of the exceptionality of 
the refugees‟ spaces these kinds of transaction are allowed to take place within the camp 
boundaries also allowing for informal economies to arise. These are economies that escape 
the control of the Lebanese state. As he shows me copies of a recent contract between a 
Palestinian and a Lebanese for the acquisition of a house in Shatila, Khalil says that it is 
not compulsory for them to register these transactions and the names of people inhabiting 
the camp. Even though the Lebanese authorities do not ask for copies of this 
documentation and registers, the popular committee prefers to do so also for security 
reasons. If any problem occurs, in fact, the committee knows who lives in the camp and 
where. 
While the committee holds information about everyone living in the camp and on 
everything happening, this knowledge is not possessed by Lebanese authorities. As this 
knowledge is essential to provide better security and services to the residents, the 
possession of this information makes the popular committee the first key interlocutor for 
everyone who wishes to have statistics about Shatila and its population. UNRWA, for 
example, is constantly in touch with the committee in order to gather information about the 
Palestinian residents to publish reports or to provide better services. As this knowledge 
becomes precious, Khalil makes clear that anyone who wants to know anything about the 
camp needs to contact them stressing that „They need us. We don‟t need them‟.43 While 
developing a governance system independent from the Lebanese authorities, the committee 
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43 Ibid. 
The refugee camp 
186 
 
is, at least formally, solely responsible for the security of Shatila in collaboration with the 
security committee functioning as a police force. By developing a sort of territorial 
competence and jurisdiction, the two committees‟ authority is not limited to the 
administration of the Palestinians‟ affairs only as it also includes non-Palestinians that, by 
virtue of their residence in the camp, fall under the committees‟ jurisdiction and decision-
making. 
Though formally the popular committee has competence over the space of the camp 
only, it seems that its authority may also leak outside Shatila‟s boundaries. Afef, for 
instance, whom I met in Shatila, lives in a house right next to Shatila‟s boundary. As her 
house lies outside the space of the camp as agreed by the Lebanese authorities and the 
League of the Red Cross in 1949, she would not be entitled to the assistance of the popular 
committee. Yet, as she explains, Shatila popular committee arranged the installation of a 
small electricity generator in her house.
44
 This shows how the committee‟s territorial 
competence may be supplemented by a „national‟ one as the exercise of control exceeds 
the camp to include Palestinians residing right next to the boundary. Their sphere of action 
can never be determined with precision, but it is likely that the committee may keep 
discretional room for decisions on whether to intervene or not beyond the space of the 
camp.
45
 
Although the exact extent of the popular committee‟s authority remains unknown, 
as Khalil denies any involvement outside the official boundaries of the camp, the popular 
committee does not administer the camp alone. As security is one of the main concerns – 
perhaps especially after the events of Nahr El-Bared – cooperation with the security 
committee is crucial. However, the judicial system of the camp is rather complicated and 
no clear rule applies. As if developing another kind of judicial procedures, the committees 
have their own methods to deal with criminals and offenders without involving the 
Lebanese authorities. For small offences such as theft for instance, members of the 
committees investigate the matter. When they find the thief, they force him/her to give 
back the stolen object or pay back the value of the object. In both cases, the punishment of 
the offender is completed only after he/she spends some time in prison. As Khalil explains, 
there are rooms in the camp of Burj El-Barajneh, south of Shatila, that function as a prison 
                                               
44 Insights from interview with Afef, Shatila area, 13 November 2008. Interview conducted in 
Arabic. 
45 Also according to UN-HABITAT and UNDP report (2010), which focuses on Palestinian 
informal gatherings („Adjacent Areas‟) around the camps of Nahr El-Bared, Beddawi, Ein El-Hilweh and 
Mieh Mieh, popular committees of refugee camps may intervene in the management of areas surrounding the 
refugee camps. 
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for such offenders. But there are no written rules as the punishment is decided by the 
members of the committees judging case by case (see also Peteet, 1987). The popular and 
security committees of the camp would alert the Lebanese authorities only in the case of 
serious crimes such as homicide. In this case, since Lebanese authorities cannot enter the 
camp unless accompanied by the security committee, the delivery of the offender is 
arranged between Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. As emerged during the interviews, 
if an inhabitant of the camp commits a crime outside the camp and the Lebanese catches 
them outside Shatila, there is no need for further cooperation. But if the crime is committed 
outside the camp and the offender enters the camp in the attempt to escape Lebanese 
jurisdiction, then the popular and security committees of the camp are contacted by the 
Lebanese police to arrange the handover of the criminal to the Lebanese authorities. This 
need to co-operate shows how Lebanese sovereignty is conditional and contingent to the 
Palestinian cooperation and good will.
46
 
According to El-Natour,
47
 there is full cooperation between the camp committees 
and Lebanese police on matters of security. After the departure of the PLO and the 
destruction of great part of the institutions and infrastructure the Palestinians no longer 
have courts and tribunals, so those who commit serious crimes are, or at least should be, 
handed over to the Lebanese. If the Lebanese want to arrest someone that lives or hides in 
the camp, before handing over the wanted the committees of the camp first investigate the 
accusation. And secondly, only if the majority of the committees members agree, the 
suspect is given to the Lebanese police or the security committee accompanies members of 
the police inside the camp to carry out the arrest. This procedure is essential to guarantee 
the people of the camp fair treatment. Echoing El-Natour, in fact, if the Lebanese claim 
that a terrorist is hiding in the camp, the committees require evidence of the accusation. It 
is then up to the camp‟s committees to verify and decide if the person is actually a terrorist 
and whether to hand him/her over or not. These measures are necessary to protect the 
camp‟s inhabitants and to guarantee that the reason why they may be taken into Lebanese 
custody is because of an actual crime committed and not because of some other political 
reasons or interests, but also to protect the rest of the camp‟s population from potential 
attacks as El-Natour makes clear: 
                                               
46 See also interview to one of the members of the Shatila security committee in Asser, (2008) 
(newspaper and online articles section). 
47 Insights from interview with Souheil El-Natour, Mar Elias, 24 December 2008. Interview 
conducted in English. 
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You are leaving the responsibility for the security of the camp in 
order to allow a lot of terrorists to come and to give [have] the 
pretext to destroy it?! No! You want X, or Y or Z? We discuss? 
Yes! We are searching to deliver him.
48
 
Yet, security and justice may not be as simple as they are depicted by Khalil or El-
Natour. As corruption and struggles for power and control spread, the safety and security 
of its inhabitants can no longer be assured. This is the moment in which bare life may be 
produced by the very Palestinian actors in charge of the wellbeing of the camp‟s 
population. Shatila refugees are increasingly complaining about the lack of security. While 
some argue that this is due to the growing presence of foreigners in the camp and outlaws 
hiding from the Lebanese police, a great part of this lack of order is caused by the way in 
which security is managed. The independent – from the Lebanese jurisdiction – judicial 
system developed in the camp by the popular and security committees does not assure 
justice for those who are victims of an offence. While Khalil maintains that all the crimes 
committed in the camps are taken care of and offenders punished, Zahra, the social worker 
accompanying me in my encounters in the camp, raises some concerns. She argues that in 
the NGO for which she works a computer was stolen about ten years before. The NGO 
contacted the popular committee to report the theft, but so far nothing happened on that 
front. The computer was never found. Nor the thief.
49
  
The theft of a computer is not the worse that can happen. Although Shatila camp 
seems to be relatively safer than other camps where different factions‟ litigations often turn 
into shootings and homicides, still the management of the camp‟s affairs and crimes is 
disputable. This is perhaps an outcome of a lack of central authority, but justice may be a 
quite relative word.  Hakim, a Palestinian student living in Shatila, told me how he ended 
up not trusting anyone in the camp: not the popular committee, nor any other organisation 
claiming to help people. According to him, everyone promises solutions and 
improvements, but ultimately no one does anything. Lamenting serious concerns for the 
lack of a clear judicial system in the camp that would punish criminals, he says: 
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49 Insights from interview with Khalil and Zahra‟s insights on the work of the popular committee in 
the camp, Shatila, 24 December 2008. 
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I will tell you something.. if I kill someone.. if I have one of my 
parents [perhaps meaning relatives] like in Fatah or some 
Palestinian organisation I never catch to the police or the Lebanese 
government [...] [if] I‟m alone and no one can help me, they give 
me to the Lebanese people and government, you know... This is the 
rule here.
50
 
Maintaining that having some links with some factions in the camp would guarantee his 
impunity, Hakim makes clear that in the Palestinian camps impunity is the rule rather then 
the exception. He complains that although people still refer to the popular and security 
committees to deal with a crime, the authorities of the camp do not properly intervene and 
nothing is done to catch the offender. As he reinforces his argument, Hakim argues that 
every organisation in the camp protects their friends and relatives. Paying bribes to the 
committees is enough to wash away any culpability. The situation has become unbearable 
in Shatila to the point that he states he would rather see the Lebanese authorities in the 
camp than live in a place where justice and honesty do not exist. But Hakim‟s opinion on 
the eventual Lebanese authorities‟ return seems a desperate call for a better future that 
might not be shared by those who much older than him actually experienced the authority 
of the Lebanese during the period of the Deuxième Bureau. 
The same concern for the insecurity and injustice for the people of the camp are 
also raised by Mahmoud who so passionately laments the lack of order and honesty. 
Arguing that only those affiliated or related to some particular faction can see their 
condition improved or can be saved from a jail sentence, he denounces the corruption of 
some Palestinian factions.
51
 Everyone that is connected to an influential political faction or 
member can commit whatever crime while impunity is guaranteed by acquaintances or 
relatives. A similar reflection is developed by Hanafi (2008b: 92; 2010: 61). In a camp of 
the south two men whose families are connected to Fatah, leaders of the camp, raped a 
young girl in 2007. After two weeks only of imprisonment, the boys were released and 
when the family of the girl threatened to sue them in front of a Lebanese court, the Fatah 
leaders of the camp menacingly warned them to not do so. 
                                               
50 Interview with Hakim, Shatila, 17 December 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
51 Inisights from interview with Mahmoud, Shatila, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in 
Arabic. 
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As refugees living in the camps are no longer at the mercy of the Lebanese police 
or intelligence services, they certainly become the victims of their own Palestinian 
„brothers‟ and other kinds of violence. No longer generating from the Lebanese authorities, 
the decision on the exception and bare life is taken in the very same space of exception by 
the Palestinians as the inhabitants of the camps feel increasingly insecure and unprotected. 
Moreover, with corruption spreading, justice is not the only concern for the camp‟s 
population. People have definitely lost confidence in those who are supposed to represent 
them and many denounce corruption of the justice system and the bad management of the 
camp. As the popular committees attempt to show their moral and political integrity, in the 
underground other dynamics produce growing feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration. 
Disillusioned with political factions that once they had so vividly supported, refugees are 
realising that only formal affiliations and open support of a party pay back. Thinking and 
acting differently might confine people to the oblivion. According to Mahmoud, the PLO 
is still distributing funding to the camps, but he laments the fact that this money never 
reaches the poorest. Implying corruption, he complains: „Why some people should live and 
other die?‟.52 If one knows influential people that control the chains of money distribution, 
one survives. If one lacks such connections, one is forsaken. 
Despite the development of self-governance in Palestinian refugee camps, this 
system does not guarantee the justice and the wellbeing that the camp‟s population deserve 
after years of marginalisation and hardship. Furthermore, singling out the „sovereign‟ in 
Shatila is still a hard task. Khalil is part of the popular committee that is „recognised‟ as 
handling all the administration issues and the inhabitants of the camp indirectly recognise 
its authority by addressing it for the solution of a dispute, a real estate transaction or the 
need of a service. Perhaps, this recognition is more due to the committee‟s long-standing 
control of the camp rather than a real belief that members of the committee are competent. 
Yet, Khalil‟s committee is not the only one. As of 2008/2009, Shatila, in fact, hosts a total 
of three popular committees, all competing with each other to gain control over the camp. 
As Kortam (2007) suggests, the rise of multiple sovereigns in the Palestinian camps is not 
only the outcome of the Lebanese disengagement, but the result of the void also created by 
the PLO‟s departure in 1982. While until 1982 popular committees used to cooperate with 
the PLO, its withdrawal prompted struggles over power and control between the different 
Palestinian factions. Since the PLO‟s departure, there is no unified political authority that 
                                               
52 Ibid. 
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may represent the Palestinians. The division of the Palestinian movement is today 
manifested in the rise of multiple popular committees in each camp. As the main split used 
to be represented by the pro-Syrian and pro-PLO factions (see also Cobban, 1984), today 
the reality is more complex than this because of the rise of Islamic fundamentalist 
movements alongside nationalist ideologies (Rougier, 2007). While the presence of Islamic 
groups is not recorded in Shatila, or at least with no significant relevance, the camp hosts 
three popular committees: Khalil‟s group, closer to pro-Syria tendencies; Fatah‟s and pro-
PLO‟s committee, which after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 managed to re-establish a 
presence in the camps of Beirut (see also Traboulsi, 2007: 228-231); and an elected 
committee that today is not very active. 
As for the latter, Shatila could claim to be the first Palestinian camp in which 
elections for its representatives ever took place. Perhaps tired of not being able to fully 
contribute to the appointment of the popular committee‟s members, elections were held on 
May 22, 2005 (Kortam, 2007). As a result of the elections, a committee was formed with 
the task of improving services not taken care of properly by the other authorities in the 
camp. The elected committee was able to solve some problems related to the supply of 
electricity by directly negotiating with the Lebanese electricity company and obtaining a 
second transmitter that improved the provision of electricity. It also took care of the 
camp‟s waste during the days in which UNRWA did not arrange the collection and 
managed to resolve social problems and domestic disputes. Although the elected 
committee remains in place only nominally because of countless obstacles it had to face – 
not least the unsuccessful cooperation with the other two committees of the camp – the 
election itself represents a positive democratic development and shows the ability of the 
Palestinians to organise themselves in harsh conditions (ibid). 
The lack of cooperation, the rise of corruption and the struggles for control show 
the complexity of power relations and multiplicity of sources of power emerging in the 
camp. As in Shatila the main popular committee stands out as exercising more authority 
than others, other „petty sovereigns‟ materialise in the refugees‟ space challenging the 
dominant authority and proposing new alternatives and ways of operating in and 
administering the camp. Though the path towards a real change and pluralisation of 
Shatila‟s administration is still long, small gestures give way to hope for a better future. 
And perhaps it is precisely this scope for hope that shows the most encouraging and 
constructive side of the exception. 
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Positive and productive exceptions: The way to hope and resistance 
Whilst Weizman (2007: 18) argues that extraterritorial spaces could constitute 
serious challenges for the security of the state, he goes on to suggest that the „archipelago 
of exception‟ might also offer positive outcomes. Allowing for the „formation of self-
governing society‟, the extraterritoriality might give opportunities for people that in this 
way can „reaffirm their existence as political beings‟. From a technology of separation, 
confinement and exclusion, the camp can turn into a space that allows everything that is 
excepted for the refugees outside. Paradoxically, the space of exception provides the 
refugees with the chance to perform all the practices that are forbidden to them beyond its 
boundaries.  
As discussed above, for instance, while the Palestinians are legally prevented from 
buying or inhering real estate, this opportunity is created within the camp. Although 
formally the state of the land on which the camps have been established is uncertain and 
certainly does not belong to the refugees, the Palestinians have created an informal 
economy of real estate. They build, rent, sell and buy houses or rooms (see also Chapter 6). 
Concluding transactions on real estate allows the refugees to improve their income or find 
cheap solutions for living when residing outside the camps becomes prohibitive. While this 
may seem problematic as not being able to live anywhere else is part of a discriminatory 
policy adopted by the Lebanese government, the camp becomes an opportunity for 
normalcy such as owning a house, economic transactions and profit. 
Moreover, as job opportunities are curtailed to the refugees by means of laws and 
decrees applying the reciprocity principle, Palestinians are able to practice their professions 
and work inside the camps. For example, as doctors are prevented from working in 
Lebanese hospitals and clinics despite their knowledge, specialisations and experience, 
they can do so in the camp where they can open their own clinic or work for UNRWA‟s 
and Palestinian Red Crescent Society‟s health centres. This is the case of Dr. Suleiman for 
instance (as discussed in Chapter 4). While from time to time and informally he performs 
surgery in Lebanese hospitals, this occasional income is not enough to sustain his family. 
Hence his decision to open a clinic inside the camp where he can work on a daily basis and 
where his income, even though low, is more regularly guaranteed. The same applies to 
pharmacists as those who managed to graduate or acquire the knowledge but cannot work 
outside the camp can do so inside the camp by opening their own drugstore.  
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Although it seems that opening any other shop is not forbidden to them outside, 
doing it in the camp is easier and more profitable. Extraterritoriality, in fact, implies a 
detachment from the normal juridical and political system of the state from which they are 
conceptually separated. But it means being detached from the state economic system too as 
the exceptionality of the camp is maintained also as regards taxation. As the merchandise 
in the camp is not subject to taxation, the goods are cheaper than in other places (Hanafi 
and Tiltnes, 2008). From informal chats and encounters with Lebanese acquaintances 
during my fieldwork, it emerged that the camps‟ better prices attract Lebanese customers 
too. It seems that particularly common among those Lebanese who are not scared to access 
the camp is the purchase of replacements of car parts, for example, or the fixing cars which 
is much cheaper in the camp than outside. And while for Lebanese buying products in the 
camps is convenient, for Palestinians it is an opportunity of income and survival. This also 
shows that the economy of the camp is not as closed as one may think. Although very 
gradual and slow, this openness offers a potential for economic regeneration. 
The camp is the space where it is also possible to maintain the tradition and more 
intimate relations – everyone knows everyone – thus it is also the place where long-lasting 
and trust-worthy relationships, acquaintances, and friendships develop giving rise to 
solidarity, mutual help and job opportunities. Aziza, a Lebanese hairdresser married to a 
Palestinian and living in Shatila, told me that she has more clients in the camp than 
outside.
53
 And perhaps word of mouth on her ability as hairdresser may spread more 
quickly within the concentrated space of the camp than in other more dispersed areas. As 
everyone knows everyone – or at least this is the impression one might get by simply 
walking in the alleys and observing people‟ non-stop greetings and chats – the chances to 
get more customers or coming to know of job opportunities is greater within the space of 
the camp. 
As the camp is not only synonymous with oppression and violence, even those who 
have managed to find another accommodation commute daily to work there. While I am 
not arguing that the decision to work or live in the camp is the outcome of a free choice (as 
this is certainly not the case due to countless restrictions and discriminatory measures), 
Palestinians constantly show their strength and remarkable ability to overcome their 
difficult condition. Despite high unemployment rates and extremely high levels of poverty, 
by exploiting the very same exception that was meant to marginalise and exclude them, the 
                                               
53 Insights from interview with Aziza, Shatila, 27 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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refugees have reinvented their roles and with them have transformed the function of the 
camp from constriction to possibility. As the camp opens up new ways of being and living, 
everything forbidden outside is allowed inside. 
Concluding remarks 
The refugee camp is born as a space that gathers the displaced to better offer 
humanitarian relief and assistance. Yet, as demonstrated in the first pages of this chapter, 
the Palestinian camps in Lebanon from humanitarian spaces were turned into spaces of 
surveillance. As the camp becomes the technology of a disciplinary power obsessed with 
spatial orders and distinctions, it allows for the separation of the Palestinians from the 
Lebanese citizens preventing their integration in host society and also facilitates the control 
and surveillance of the refugees‟ activities and movements. This was particularly true 
during the period of the Deuxième Bureau when the Palestinians were at the mercy of the 
Lebanese authorities. Yet, power does not only operate in the ways imagined by Agamben. 
While the sovereign may decide whom to cast out the normal juridical order and to strip of 
rights, refugees challenge the Lebanese authorities by resisting arbitrary violence and 
liberating their camps. 
Although during the civil war the Palestinians and the camps were treated as sacer, 
killed and destroyed with impunity, Palestinians camps today present an anomalous 
situation. De jure they are part of Lebanese sovereign territory. De facto they are 
controlled by Palestinians factions. After the Cairo Agreement (1969) and especially after 
the civil war, in fact, it seems that the exceptionality of the space of the camp is 
dramatised. As subject to a double abandonment, the refugee spaces are still placed outside 
the normal juridical order, but this exclusion from the normal politico-juridical system 
seems not to be followed by an inclusion in the domain of power as Lebanese authorities 
disengage from control and intervention. From a disciplinary mode typical of the 
Deuxième Bureau era (containment, isolation and surveillance), power turns to a security 
mode. It reduces interventions and lets things be and happen. Although interventions are 
limited, risks, advantages and disadvantages are meticulously calculated. 
Though the mode of power changes – from a disciplinary to a securitarian – 
Foucault (2007, 2008) reminds us that this does not mean that one technology replaces the 
other. As discipline does not disappear completely, nor does the old theory of sovereignty 
according to which the sovereign holds the right over the life and death of his subjects. In 
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the security mode, different technologies of power are re-deployed and assembled in 
different ways as it was shown in the case of Nahr El-Bared. Although it may seem that the 
Lebanese authorities may have ceded the control of the camps completely to the 
Palestinians, by attacking the camp they show how they may reclaim back that control at 
any moment. The control exercised over the camps or the state authorities‟ absence are the 
manifestation of the sovereign‟s potenza: a potentiality to-act or not-to-act, to-control or 
not-to-control. 
As the camp is included in the domain of sovereign power through potentiality, the 
sovereign‟s decision not-to-act opens up opportunities of resistance as well as positive and 
negative self-governing practices. Because of the corruption and the multiplicity of „petty 
sovereigns‟ arising in the space of the camp, the bareness of the refugees‟ lives could be 
revealed by decisions taken by the Palestinian governing the camps. But the positive side 
of the exception is that the Palestinians, prevented from working or buying real estate 
outside the camps, can reproduce a sort of normalcy within the space of the camp by 
exploiting its very exceptionality. 
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6- Campscapes: 
Blurred boundaries and exception in Beirut 
One of the essential characteristics of modern 
biopolitics [...] is its constant need to redefine the 
threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what 
is inside from what is outside. Once it crosses over the 
walls of the oikos and penetrates more and more 
deeply into the city, the foundation of sovereignty – 
nonpolitical life – is immediately transformed into a 
line that must be constantly redrawn. Once zoē is 
politicized by declarations of rights, the distinctions 
and thresholds that make it possible to isolate a 
sacred life must be newly defined. And when natural 
life is wholly included in the polis – and this much 
has, by now, already happened – these thresholds 
pass, as we will see, beyond the dark boundaries 
separating life from death in order to identify a new 
living dead man, a new sacred man. 
 
(Agamben, 1998:131) 
 
[...] even though the camp originally emerged (in the 
Nazi period) as an exceptional space in which the life 
of the inmate was violently transformed into bare life, 
the production of homo sacer is today extended 
beyond the walls of the concentration camp. 
 
(Diken, 2005: 317-318) 
The previous chapter has drawn on an analysis of Shatila itself by looking at its 
politico-juridical structure as well as its evolution as a space of exception from its 
establishment in 1949 until the present day. However, given the protracted refugeeness of 
the Palestinians in Lebanon and elsewhere as well as the prolonged existence of their 
spaces of reference, this chapter adopts a slightly different approach in order to shed some 
light on the meaning of the camp today and on how biopolitical concerns affect different 
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subjectivities in Lebanon. By drawing on some conclusions on his study of the camp and 
biopolitics in Western democracies, Agamben (1998: 181-182) once said: 
Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West [...] [This thesis] throws a sinister 
light on the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban 
studies, and architecture today are trying to conceive and organise 
the public space of the world‟s cities without any clear awareness 
that at the very center lies the same bare life (even if it has been 
transformed and rendered apparently more human) that defined the 
biopolitics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century. 
Certainly we are not in the context of twentieth century totalitarian Western states, but is it 
entirely true that the camp, and the camp only, could be the paradigmatic spatial device 
that divides the life worth living from the expendable life? What happens when the space 
of the camp begins overlapping with the space of the city? What if urban theorists and 
planners are no longer able to divide bare life from the „citizen‟, the one supposed to be 
protected and taken care of? Questioning temporariness and isolation – main features of 
refugee camps at least at the moment of their establishment – becomes therefore crucial. 
As statistics of United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) show, 
the refugee population around the world excluding the Palestinians and amounting to some 
10.5 million does not live exclusively in refugee camps. UNHCR (2010) estimates that 
more than half of them reside in urban areas and that only less than one third actually live 
in refugee camps (see also Agier, 2011: 36-37). It seems that the refugee population is 
more dispersed than sociologists or biopolitics theorists would expect them to be. Hence, 
the urgency is to look not only at the refugee in different terms, but to also look at the 
camp itself through different lenses and in a less generalised way. Though collecting 
statistics concerning the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon seems problematic as they inhabit 
zones of indistinction also in terms of their juridical status in the country (see Chapter 3), 
one of the most revealing datum regarding their presence is that only about fifty percent of 
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them live in the camps.
1
 Secondly, if this datum is compared with others in the rest of 
UNRWA‟s fields of operations, we can see how Lebanon, along with Gaza, constitutes a 
sort of exception as it holds a sad record in terms of the highest number of refugees living 
in the camps. This means that life in the refugee camp does not constitute the norm as 
regard the Palestinian refugee condition. 
But there are other signs that urge us to adopt a rather different approach from the 
one proposed by Agamben. The camp is certainly established to separate the refugees from 
the citizens, but how does the passing of time affect the camp physicality and the 
inhabitants‟ relation with its outside? The peculiar urban location of Shatila, at the 
crossroads of the city and the countryside, urges us to question the role of the camp. 
According to unofficial UNRWA statistics, today about thirty percent of the camp 
population is constituted by non-Palestinians and includes Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, 
and Gypsies among others.
2
 Given this relatively high presence of „foreigners‟ in the camp, 
how might we conceive of the refugee camp today? What can we say about its inhabitants 
and, as a consequence, the kind of biopolitics at stake in Lebanon? Is it still a Palestinian 
space? Is it still a refugee camp, a temporary settlement for those awaiting the return? 
Biopolitical lenses reproducing and celebrating the citizen/alien dichotomy must be 
reconsidered as we can no longer assume that the space of the camp is exclusively a 
refugee space. 
It is important to highlight the fact that such a high presence of non-Palestinians in 
the camp is not recorded in other camps in Lebanon, or at least not with such significance. 
However, Shatila‟s urban location leads us to inevitably consider the relationship between 
the camp and the city and the impact and influences that these two spaces might have on 
each other. In order to capture the function of the refugee camp today, Shatila is considered 
in its temporal and spatial relations. A relational approach proves crucial. On the one hand, 
refugee camps are increasingly becoming permanent solutions abandoning in this way their 
temporary character. On the other, it is precisely this protraction of temporariness that 
leads to their potential transformation and the change of relations with its outside. 
Certainly investigating refugees in urban contexts is not a new move. In her 
research on Hutu refugees in camps in Western Tanzania and refugees in townships, 
Malkki (1995b) showed how location might have a different impact in the construction of 
                                               
1 According to UNRWA only 226,533 refugees out of 425,640 registered in Lebanon live inside the 
official 12 refugee camps (www.unwa.org as on July 2010). 
2 UNRWA operational file „Shatila Camp‟ obtained at the UNRWA headquarters in Beirut during 
fieldwork. 
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the identity and everyday life experiences and perceptions. But what happens when the 
camp is actually located in the city and when such a distinction between urban refugees 
living outside the camp and refugees living in camps can no longer be drawn? Who are the 
inhabitants of the camps and their neighbours? 
As Doraï (2007, 2008, 2010) has recently pointed out, the evolution of the refugee 
camps and their potential transformation into city-like structures have been partially 
neglected (see also Al-Qutub, 1989; Hanafi, 2008b; 2010b). One of the pioneers of this 
approach has been French anthropologist Michel Agier (2002, 2004, 2008, 2011; see also 
Perouse De Montclos and Kagwajna, 2000) who examined refugee camps in Kenya 
through the prism of the city. To Agier (2011: 186), in fact, „[f]rom spaces of transit and 
waiting, some [camps] organise themselves into “towns” despite not being endowed with 
an urban project inasmuch as everything is designed not to last‟. In contrast with a 
literature that looks at the camp per se, I instead argue that the urban perspective should 
also encourage us to look at networks and connections that with the time are developed and 
bind the camp to the city. I do not suggest that the camp is fully integrated into the 
dynamics of the city. Rather, I argue that the camp is still located in the „space of 
exception‟ though, as I later discuss, it is an expanded version of the exception that might 
not include the refugee only. 
In this chapter I examine the development of Shatila to identify urban or semi-
urban fabrics inside the camp and to uncover the relation of the camp and its inhabitants 
with the surrounding environment. While reflecting on the meaning of the camp and 
biopolitics today, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section offers a 
historical account that considers the process of uncontrolled urbanisation in Beirut and the 
creation of areas of urban informalities since the 1950s. It examines the economic and 
political reasons that led many Lebanese to leave the countryside to find fortune in Beirut. 
The second part of the chapter explores the ways in which biopolitical concerns 
operate in Lebanon. While exploring what kind of exception is applied in Lebanon, I 
question whether national belonging and citizenship constitute the exclusive discriminatory 
factors that lead to the exclusion of some subjects. It is shown how Lebanese citizens, 
neglected by their own government, end up sharing the Palestinian refugees‟ conditions 
and living in the camps or their proximity. The exception is not limited to rights and 
citizenship, but expands from the camp and the body of the refugees to include different 
kinds of „banned‟: from the deprived Lebanese to the illegal immigrants and poor 
foreigners. As the exception is applied to different subjects, geographically it also exceeds 
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the camp boundaries to produce what I call „campscape‟. Borrowing Arjun Appadurai‟s 
(1996) understanding of modernity as well as rephrasing Zygmunt Bauman‟s (2000) 
metaphor of „liquidity‟, this section argues that the camp has increasingly become fluid as 
the exception exceeds the boundaries of the refugees‟ spaces and bodies to include the 
citizens as well as the areas surrounding the camp. 
The last part of the chapter looks again at the space of the camp itself. While the 
previous sections will have explored the new composition of the camp and the surrounding 
environment, this final part reconsiders the camp as a closed space. To further investigate 
how the relations binding the camp to the city affect the refugees‟ perception of their 
space, it is shown how despite good relations holding together Palestinians and non-
Palestinians, the exceptionality of the camp is maintained by the same Palestinians as 
strategy of resistance waiting for the implementation of their right of return. 
The camp meets the city: 
The production of Beirut’s ‘misery belt’ 
The reasons that led the country to the civil war were not only ideological and 
sectarian (see Chapter 4). While these factors greatly contributed to the outbreak of 
violence, other economic and social aspects such as the high rates of inequalities dividing 
the Lebanese body prepared the ground for the long lasting conflict. In his reconsideration 
of the history of modern Lebanon, Traboulsi (2007) analyses partially overlooked 
economic and social factors and, in so doing, highlights some thorns in the side that the 
country has yet to solve. Traboulsi agrees that the eruption of the war in Lebanon must be 
sought in the sectarian system. Yet, what previous analyses on the civil war had to some 
extent neglected was the role of the sects in establishing an „enlarged clientelist networks 
designed to resist the inequalities of the market and compete for its benefits and for the 
appropriation of social wealth and services of the state‟ (p. viii). While the 
institutionalisation of the confessional system came with the French Mandate (1920-1943), 
the seeds for such a sectarian, economic and political structure were deposited since the 
early Ottoman domination when different communities began confronting each other over 
political and socio-economic privileges in the old autonomous province of Mount Lebanon 
that hosted mainly Druze and Christian communities (see also Salibi, 1965,1988). 
Campscapes 
201 
 
With the Mandate and the artificial creation of Greater Lebanon (1921) that 
annexed the present day provinces of the South, the North, the Bekaa Valley on the east, 
and the coastal towns of Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli to the old province of Mount 
Lebanon, inequalities separating the rich from the poor were exacerbated as taxation 
coming from the newly annexed territories was mainly spent on the old province of Mount 
Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 81). Under the pressure of the French, banking and trading soon 
became the most flourishing activities at the expense of the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. As the tertiary sector was highly developed and run by merchants, the newborn 
bourgeoisie deeply connected with the Mandate authorities. With the formal independence 
of the country in 1943, the Lebanese presidency, held by the Maronite community, became 
„the main pole of attraction for the country‟s dominant economic interests‟ as all the main 
business of the country was controlled by some thirty families pivoting around the figure 
of Bechara Al-Khouri, the first Lebanese president (p. 115). Therefore, the main economic 
activities were directed and controlled by the Christian sects, in particular the Maronites, 
leaving the Muslims, in particular the Shi‟ites, in an inferior position. Members of this 
oligarchy controlled all economic activities: from the banks and agricultural and industrial 
production to the whole service system comprising transport, water and electricity 
companies. But this power was not limited to the economic sphere as with the profits 
coming from all these activities, the oligarchy entered the political arena by financing 
political lists and running for posts in the government and parliament to maintain and 
increase their power and monopolies. The corruption of the system was manifested also by 
the president himself as, instead of separating politics from economics, further entwined 
them protecting the economic interests of the few at the expense of the disadvantaged. 
While Lebanon in the period soon after its independence knew an unprecedented 
economic growth, the benefits were not distributed equally as profits tended to be 
concentrated in Beirut and in the area of Mount Lebanon exacerbating sectarian 
inequalities and divisions. Beside these internal causes, the division of present day South 
Lebanon from present day Israel and Occupied Territories at the hands of the mandated 
powers of France and Britain, along with the birth of Israel in 1948, represented a huge 
blow for the rural population of the newly annexed southern provinces (Sfeir, 2008: 59-
71). Because of the boycott of Israel by the Arab states, the production that previously was 
destined to Palestine was suddenly cut and agricultural and industrial activities could not 
rely on Western markets only since „the value of its export to Palestine was greater than its 
export to France, Great Britain and the US combined‟ (Traboulsi, 2007: 113). The only 
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exception to this economic crisis was represented by the city of Beirut that substituted 
Haifa, as main port for the Arab hinterland, and soon became the centre for 
communications and transports linking the West to the Arab hinterland. 
The development of Beirut as the financial district of the Middle East that started 
under the auspices of the French in the first half of the twentieth century was therefore 
continuing at the expense of the countryside. No investment was undertaken in favour of 
the agricultural sector and farmers slowly began succumbing to the rampant capitalist 
system. While Beirut was taken care of through plans aimed at improving its infrastructure, 
its road and transportation systems, investments in real estate and in the construction and 
service sectors, the Lebanese of the rural areas were left with no services. In the 1960s the 
south still had no running water, electricity, hospitals and schools as even basic services 
were a luxury for the few. The country‟s liberal economic system reserved just 0.7 percent 
of state budget for the South inhabited by twenty percent of the whole country‟s population 
(Sayigh, 1994: 162). Despite some timid attempts to reform the system supporting the 
agricultural and industrial sectors and the provision of services in the remote areas of the 
country under the presidency of Gen. Fouad Chehab (1958-1964), projects and plans were 
never completed as they were opposed and rejected by the oligarchy not ready to lose its 
privileges to improve the condition of the deprived (Sayigh, 1994; Traboulsi, 2007).  
It is in this climate that at the beginning of the 1950s waves of Lebanese left their 
homes in search of fortune and better conditions in Beirut as well as other coastal cities, 
though the latter to a lesser extent. The urbanisation of the country was of such explosive 
and uncontrollable proportions that migrants began pouring into the periphery of the 
capital punctuated by former Armenian refugee camps and neighbourhoods, as well as 
Palestinian refugee camps (Salibi, 1976: 7-10). What was later called the „Beirut misery 
belt‟ seemed to follow an axis drawn around the capital along a line starting in the eastern 
part of city from the former Armenian camp of Medawar in Quarantina, proceeding 
towards the Palestinian camps of Tell El-Zaatar, Jisr El-Basha and Dbayeh and stretching 
towards the western part of Beirut to include the camps of Shatila, Mar Elias and Burj El-
Barajneh. The explosion of informal settlements made villages around the capital become 
the natural extension of its centre while camps, not isolated any longer, began touching the 
city. Shatila camp, for example, was quite isolated from the centre of Beirut when it was 
established in 1949 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Shatila camp, early 1950s. ANERA Archives (in Peteet 2005: 8). 
 
At the time it seemed clear where the refugee camp started and ended. Yet, the explosive 
urbanisation of Beirut made the city touch the camp as informal settlements and the Beirut 
misery belt seem constituting the threshold where the camp meets the city. While the UN‟s 
maps still represent Shatila as an isolated space (see Figure 4), the UN‟s imaginations seem 
not to reflect the reality on the ground as satellite images show the entanglement of the 
camp with the city (see Figures 5 and 6 that show Shatila‟s locations today). 
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Figure 4: UNRWA map of Shatila camp, UNRWA Lebanon Field Office (Undated), obtained at the 
agency’s headquarters (Beirut). 
 
Figure 5: Google Earth Image (2011) representing the area of the southern suburb of Beirut that 
includes Shatila camp. 
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Figure 6: Adaptation of Google Earth image (2011) with Shatila (boundaries of the camp are in red). 
 
The concentration of informal settlements in areas with a high presence and density 
of refugee communities is not limited to the period following the 1950s. Beirut refugee 
camps and neighbourhoods had welcomed rural migrants in other occasions too as 
Armenian and Syriac camps established in the 1920s in the eastern part of the city became 
the first poles of attractions for those in need of cheap accommodation (see Fawaz and 
Peillen, 2002). Even when Armenian refugees began abandoning their camps, this did not 
lead to the eradication of Medawar camp in the quarter of Qarantina. On the contrary, 
spaces emptied by the Armenians were soon filled by Lebanese leaving the countryside 
and foreign migrants such as Kurds and Syrians. As the Armenian refugees camps 
provided shelters for other kinds of migrants, so did and still do the Palestinian refugee 
camps of the capital as migrants settle within their boundaries or in their proximity. As the 
camp of Tell El-Zaatar in the eastern part of Beirut „by 1974 had extended over five times 
beyond its original size‟ (Fawaz and Peillen, 2002: 13), especially after the Cairo 
Agreement (1969) the lands around Shatila in Western Beirut began being populated by 
new comers that included Palestinians and Lebanese citizens. Although officially refugee 
Campscapes 
206 
 
camps cannot expand, the quarters of Sabra and Hay Gharbeh, respectively north and west 
of the camp, became the natural extension of Shatila (Clerc-Huybrechts, 2008: 180). The 
presence of services such as health care and job offers, provided by the Palestinian 
organisations and open to anyone in need, also contributed to the growth of the area and 
informal settlements around the camp. As Shwayri (2008: 78-79) argues, there is no 
coincidence that the refugee camps and shantytowns develop in such proximities. While 
they have distinct physical forms and legally are to be distinguished, „they both came about 
through similar processes of struggle during the Independence era and up to 1982‟. 
As Fawaz and Peillen (2002) suggest, the north-eastern part of the „misery belt‟ 
attracted those in search of jobs in the industrial sector while the western side constituted 
an appealing destination as the construction sector was developing around major projects 
such as the Sport City Stadium, Beirut International Airport and the Gulf Club most of 
them initiated and completed during the presidency of Camille Chamoun (1952-1958). As 
urban planning focused on the realisation of luxurious residential areas, on the eve of the 
civil war some 40,000 to 50,000 high standard apartments in the whole Beirut were left 
empty while the demand of low-cost housing was never satisfied (Clerc-Huybrechts, 2008: 
42, Trabousli, 2007: 160). While luxury apartments were left unused, migrants from the 
countryside and those fleeing the south because of Israeli retaliatory attacks settled in the 
suburbs violating norms of construction, land allotment and private properties (Clerc-
Huybrechts, 2008). Despite some timid attempts to improve the condition of areas where 
informal settlements developed, no low-cost housing plan was ever implemented (Rowe 
and Sarkis 1998: 15). By the early 1970s the inhabitants of the shantytowns were mostly, 
although not exclusively, Shi‟ites economically and socially marginalised. While well 
before the civil war the southern part of Beirut was a mixed area, during the 1960s became 
particularly populated by the Shi‟a communities that, forced to leave the south because of 
lack of services and growing Israeli retaliatory operations, ended up constituting twenty-
two percent of population of metropolitan Beirut. Forced to share the same neglected and 
forgotten urban spaces, poor Lebanese and the Palestinians also shared the feeling of 
abandonment and vulnerability. It is in this context that the camps and the slum became 
„spaces of struggle‟ as social and economic solidarity turned into political and military 
alliances during the war (Shwayri, 2008: 78; Salibi, 1976: 10). Overcrowding situations, 
squatting, poor sanitation and health conditions, scarcity of supplies such as water and 
electricity rendered these areas „breeding grounds‟ for parties in Lebanon ready to confront 
militarily (Traboulsi, 2007: 162). It is also in these conditions of extreme deprivation and 
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neglect that violence erupted on different levels. While ideological differences on 
Lebanese identity and foreign policy loaded the gun, the deprivation of certain layers of 
society pulled the trigger for a conflict that lasted for over fifteen years. 
Campscapes and the ‘floating’ exception 
What kind of biopolitics in Lebanon? 
Though the civil war certainly did not spare any confession or nationality – whether 
Lebanese or Palestinians – important reflections need to be made as regards what kind of 
biopolitics is at stake in the country. If by biopolitics we mean the production of bare life 
as a result of a legal abandonment at first glance the Palestinian refugees and the refugee 
camps reflect the logic of exclusion as depicted by Agamben (1995a, 1998). Stateless and 
having to rely on humanitarian aid and informal economies, their presence is also rendered 
invisible in the official realm of politics and law. In the context of the nation-state system, 
Agamben has shown how today democracies‟ first task is that of constantly defining who 
can be included and who is to be excluded from the protection that the sovereign can grant. 
However, as the opening quote of the chapter suggests, the definition of this threshold must 
constantly be redefined. 
As regards the Palestinians, not all of them were treated the same way. Not all of 
them were forced to live in refugee camps and certainly not all of them were prevented 
integration into Lebanese society and economy. The particular sectarian system of the 
country, in this sense, led to a well planned fragmentation of the Palestinian body as 
exclusion seemed to not run on national belonging tracks only. Along with national and 
non-national distinctions, sectarian and class patterns have also guided spatial, social and 
political distinctions. Responding to the capitalist forces and political interests was one of 
the main considerations in the adoption of policies geared at including some Palestinians 
while excluding some others.  
A different case from the one depicted most of the times in studies regarding the 
Palestinians in Lebanon is in fact represented by the Palestinian middle and urban classes 
that moved to neighbouring Arab countries well before the proclamation of the state of 
Israel (May 1948) when civil violence began escalating in Palestine. Upper and middle 
class Palestinian families in most cases had properties and real estate in urban centres of 
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neighbouring Arab countries and huge amount of capital were, therefore, transferred to 
what later became their new countries of residence (Brand, 1988b). In the context of 
Lebanon, government‟s policies tended to divide the Palestinian body according to patterns 
that would have guaranteed some profits in economic terms and advantages in the political 
arena. The most well-to-do Palestinians, especially the Christians, were allowed to settle in 
the cities and integrate themselves into Lebanese society while their capital could be 
absorbed and invested in new business and companies (El-Natour, 1993; Hudson, 1997; 
Sayigh, 1988; Sfeir, 2008). Thanks to their money and wealth, upper class Palestinians 
even managed to bypass „legal obstacles‟ preventing other refugees from practicing their 
occupational vocations as they began working as doctors and engineers. Compared to those 
coming from the rural context, urban class Palestinians were more educated and having 
worked for British mandate authorities managed to find better opportunities and jobs with 
new established British and American oil companies in Lebanon. As El-Natour (1993: 65-
67) suggests, these Palestinians offered an invaluable contribution to the economy of their 
host country. One of the most successful figures was Youssef Beidis who funded the Intra 
Bank in 1965, had shares with the Middle East Airline – Lebanese airline company – the 
port companies and Phoenicia and Hilton hotels in downtown Beirut. The 
confessionalisation of the Palestinian body became even more obvious as some Christian 
Palestinians were encouraged to obtain the Lebanese citizenship in the government‟s 
attempt to counterbalance the rampant demographic growth of the Muslim population.  
From the 1950s until the 1970s, some 28,000 Christians obtained the Lebanese citizenship 
while the Muslims could obtain it as long as they paid lawyers and only in the case in 
which they were able to prove their Lebanese origins (El-Natour, 1993: 42; Sayigh, 1994: 
23). 
However, while the upper class Palestinians enjoyed citizenship and the acceptance 
in society mainly thanks to their capital or sectarian identity, the majority of the refugees 
came from a rural background (Sayigh, 2007). Having lost their homes and means of 
livelihood in 1948, these Palestinians could not find any other solution than living in the 
refugee camps established at the time by the Red Cross, UNRWA and the Lebanese 
government (see Chapter 5). Although most of the Palestinians in the country experienced 
a multilayered discrimination that translated into social, economic and spatial 
marginalisation, if we look at the microcosm of the refugee camp in Shatila, those well-
connected with some Lebanese or those coming from important families that for one 
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reason or another decided to settle in the camp or its proximities had less problems than the 
„ordinary‟ refugee. 
The story of Muhammad, a Palestinian refugee living right beyond the official 
boundary of Shatila, is quite indicative. Fleeing Palestine with the family when he was just 
a teenager, he spent one year or so in the south of Lebanon until 1950 when, thanks to the 
family‟s wealth, he had the opportunity to move with his family to Beirut and buy a flat. 
The father was a Mukhtar, the head of the village of origin in the North Galilee. His family 
was well known and respected in Palestine and had acquaintances in the Lebanese capital 
even before the Nakba. Though in the end his family decided to move in the proximity of 
the camp as most of the people they knew resided in Shatila, Muhammad tells how he 
managed to build his house outside the official boundaries: 
They asked my father to come and live next to the camp since they 
are old and cannot walk all the way through every time they want 
to visit him. But they were living in tents. We could not live in 
tents. So my father asked M. A. to get him building permission. A. 
brought some 5,000 bricks and told my father to start building. [...] 
I started the construction and the police came to stop me [...] I went 
to M. A. to complain. So he called the chief of the police and asked 
him to come.. He introduced me as the son of the Agha M.
3
 and 
after that the policemen themselves helped us building the house 
for free.
4
 
While the case of Muhammad is not isolated, other Palestinians have mentioned that 
having good relations with the Lebanese could lead to some advantages. As Hadi, another 
Palestinian I met in Shatila, tells the story of how his family slowly improved their houses 
transforming the tent into a solid construction when the Lebanese authorities left the camp 
in 1969, he admits that some people managed to use cement and concrete well before 
                                               
3 „Agha‟ is an important title that dates back to the Ottoman Empire and it was given to either civil 
or military leaders. Although Palestine was under the Bristish Mandate when Muhammad‟s father was the 
Mukhtar, he was given this title so as to stress his importance as the guide of the village. 
4 Muhammad, Shatila area, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. For anonymity 
purposes names have been removed. 
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others, as he says that „there were some exceptions of course, some people were close to 
the authorities or married to Lebanese..  those people were an exception‟.5 
Muhammad‟s and Hadi‟s accounts show how good relations with host authorities 
could have eased restrictions and problems faced by the majority of ordinary refugees. 
Although some might argue that, despite his strong acquaintances Muhammad did not 
manage to improve his life much, building a house in concrete in Shatila at the beginning 
of the 1950s must be considered a significant achievement that was prevented to the rest of 
the refugee population. 
It seems therefore that national belonging was a primary, but not exclusive, 
discriminatory factor in the Lebanese policies‟ attempt to separate the Palest inians from the 
Lebanese nationals. Confessional and financial patterns, as well as good connections, were 
constantly and arbitrarily applied in order to divide those worth protecting and integrating 
from those whose exclusion was essential. If we broaden the scope of enquiry to include an 
investigation of other categories of people residing in the country, we might see how and to 
what extent the Lebanese economic and political system played a significant role in the 
caesura dividing not only the Palestinian body, but also the same Lebanese community. If 
we extend the concept of biopolitics distancing its definition from Agamben‟s 
understanding and include other forms of abandonment and exclusion, the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon are not the only „banned‟. Today, since the end of the civil war more 
than twenty-five percent of the Lebanese population „lives below the poverty line‟, while 
„25.8 percent of individuals [...] in Beirut earn less than US$106/month‟ (Fawaz and 
Peillen, 2002: 4). Though we can argue that the abandonment works on economic and 
social lines and has certainly been aggravated by the years of war leading to massive 
displacement and destruction, looking at the root of the Lebanese citizenship would 
illustrate how economic and sectarian concerns have always taken the upper hand in the 
decision-making process that shaped Lebanon as state and its population. 
Maps, statistics and censuses are not objective, but help to produce the population 
and „to construct [… it] in a particular manner that is not naturally given‟ (Campbell, 
1998a: 79). As Maktabi (1999) explains, the 1932 census was crucial as it paved the way to 
a precise definition of who had to be included or excluded from the Lebanese citizenship. 
Moreover, as the Maronite community constituted the demographic majority according to 
the census, the presidency of the republic, the most important post in the executive, was 
                                               
5 Hadi, Shatila, 23 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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reserved to the Maronites. The analysis of the methods with which the data of the 1932 
census were obtained, however, helps in reconsidering and questioning the ways in which 
Lebanese citizenship was shaped as the census itself became highly politicised and 
contested. Discrepancies between the first census of 1921 and the one of 1932 had the 
purpose to change the ways in which citizenship could be granted, and along with it, the 
right to vote. While the 1921 statistics had only an administrative purpose, Resolution 
2825 issued in 1924 determined that all the former Ottoman subjects residing in Greater 
Lebanon as on 30 August 1924 – date of issue of the resolution – would have become 
Lebanese citizens. As Maktabi stresses, the presence on territory was the essential 
requirement. 
However, these provisions changed some years later in 1931 when a new census 
was about to recount the Lebanese residing in Lebanon as well as include the emigrant 
population that was not considered previously. While many residents in Lebanon were 
denied citizenship after the 1932 census because they lacked proper documentation 
proving their residence there since generations, and most of whom were Muslim, priority 
was granted to Christians either emigrants living elsewhere or newly arrived such as the 
Armenians fleeing persecutions in Turkey. Christian communities were definitively 
favoured at the expenses of their Muslim counterparts as Kurdish refugees, mostly Muslim, 
were never granted the same rights of the Armenians, Chaldeans or members of other 
Christian sects that settled in Lebanon only later on. Therefore, while on the one hand the 
inclusion of mainly Muslim areas to the old province of Mount Lebanon during the 
Mandate increased the demographic significance of the Muslim communities, on the other, 
the census rebalanced those threatening statistics with the aim of maintaining the Christian 
supremacy. Yet, as distinctions are never drawn once and for all, boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion are constantly produced. What once was included formally – those having 
acquired the Lebanese citizenship by virtue of birth – could be excluded informally later on 
through an act of political and economical abandonment. A complex redefinition of the 
threshold separating the one protected by the sovereign and the one abandoned must 
therefore be reworked on economic, political and social lines. 
The previous section has shown how entering the space of the city does not yet 
mean achieving a „qualified‟ and political life as the abandonment of some subjects and 
areas demonstrates. While officially Lebanese nationals are protected by their state, 
unofficially the sectarian and neoliberal system of the country prevents them from enjoying 
not only their rights as citizens, but also their rights as human beings entitled to a dignified 
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life. It is no wonder that refugee populations and the less taken care of among the Lebanese 
might end up living in and sharing the same spaces. In our encounter in Sabra, Fadi, a 
Lebanese man married to a Palestinian, told me his story of coexistence and solidarity with 
the Palestinians as he was born in Shatila.
6
 His account shows how difficult and 
problematic it is to draw the boundary between him and his neighbours. This is not only 
because he married a Palestinian and even joined the resistance in Fatah ranks, but also 
because being Palestinian or Lebanese seemed not to make much difference. Not in social 
and economic terms, as some Lebanese and Palestinians share the same condition. Not in 
the political value of his family‟s and his own life as he lost his father during the massacre 
of Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Sharing the same spaces and conditions blurred national 
boundaries that allegedly separate the refugee from the citizen. In that circumstance, the 
life of Lebanese who were living side by side with the Palestinians became expendable and 
killable too (see Chapter 5). 
Fadi‟s is a story of Lebanese-Palestinian solidarity and mutual support. Growing up 
among the Palestinians, fighting with the Palestinian resistance and benefitting from the 
Palestinian services, he also regrets the deterioration of the relations especially after the 
civil war. Praising the importance of the Palestinian institutional presence in Lebanon (see 
Chapter 4), he thinks that „the Lebanese realised what they lost after the resistance left in 
1982.. they felt neglected [again]‟.7 He also remembers how after the war began, the 
population around the camp began increasing exponentially as Palestinians as well as 
Lebanese Muslim escaped the siege of the camps of East Beirut in 1976 (Fawaz and 
Peillen, 2002: 16). About 200,000 people migrated from East Beirut as Palestinians and 
Lebanese Muslims squatted in West Beirut and the camp proximity (p. 2, see also Khalaf, 
1998). The context of the civil war led in fact to an „unprecedented increase in illegal 
construction and unregulated growth‟ as people kept on escaping dangerous areas where 
their sectarian identity might have led them to death (Salam, 1998: 130). 
The sectarianisation of attempted reconstruction projects made explicit the 
privileges reserved to certain citizens and not others as during the 1980s the distribution of 
funds for reconstruction reflected the interests of the presidency. Maronite enclaves were 
privileged over the overcrowded southern suburb of the city hosting mainly Muslims, and 
over the south of the country whose agricultural production and means of livelihood were 
destroyed by repeated Israeli attacks and invasions. As Sayigh (1994: 135) maintains, in 
                                               
6 Fadi, Sabra, 26 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
7 Ibid. 
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metropolitan Beirut inequalities in the reconstructions were expressed by the distribution 
of funds. After 1982 the government allocated LL100 million for a new sewage system in 
the region of North Metn housing some 150,000 people while only LL30million for the 
southern suburbs with some 700,000 inhabitants. 
The end of the hostilities did not lead to major improvements in the government 
policies as inequalities were not reduced and the centre of Beirut, once the heart of the 
country‟s economy, was given priority over other areas that remained neglected (among 
others Gavin, 1998). While major efforts were put in the heavily contested reconstruction 
of the financial district to attract foreign investment by providing an economically stable 
facade of the country, the rehabilitation of the suburbs and its inhabitants has yet to be 
completed as it seems that low-cost housing has never been provided and as displaced keep 
on solving their accommodation needs by increasing the world of the informalities in the 
city (Salam, 1998). 
In Lebanon, it seems that biopolitical concerns do not run along national or 
citizenship tracks only. Political and economic struggles over power and resources 
radicalised positions and exacerbated inequalities along both sectarian and economic lines 
as testified by the lack of investment in certain areas. Primary distinctions, that are based 
on law and rights – therefore citizenship – are made along national belonging that separates 
the Palestinians from the Lebanese. Secondary distinctions cut through the very Palestinian 
and Lebanese bodies. Sectarian, political and economic interests produce other outcasts as 
neoliberal policies complete distinctions through a process of socio-economic 
abandonment and by translating this ban geographically. While the camp is the spatial 
device that contains the threat and separates the refugee from the citizen, this technology of 
power may lose its effectiveness and function over time. As refugee camps and informal 
settlements develop in such proximity, the camp boundaries increasingly blur as the 
refugee meets the citizen. 
Liquid camps and blurred boundaries in south Beirut 
Bare life in Beirut is not represented by the Palestinian refugees only as boundaries 
separating the camp from its outside and the centre from the informal settlements can no 
longer be drawn easily. As clear-cut fences do not exist, new „disjunctive orders‟ and 
spatial models are imposed. Rather than looking at the camp, all this time we might have 
been looking at a „campscape‟. As Appardurai (1996: 33) suggests: 
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 [t]he suffix –scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes 
[...] These terms with the common suffix -scape also indicate that 
these are not objectively given relations that look the same from 
every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival 
constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, 
multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational 
groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or 
economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, 
neighbourhoods, and families. 
The suffix –scape gives the idea of fluidity, of something elastic. It indicates dispersal and 
non-static boundaries. The notion of campscape seems to better render the image of what is 
the refugee camp today in its relation with its surroundings as the exception has 
transcended the camp‟s shape. 
Although this understanding of the camp of Shatila applies today, in the aftermath 
of the civil war and for the early 1990s, the presence of checkpoints around the camp 
seemed to re-impose spatial differences and separations. Reconstruction of Palestinian 
spaces was highly regulated and restricted as in the early 1990s the presence of 
checkpoints was aimed at controlling this process and at preventing the camp from 
expanding horizontally or beyond its boundaries (Peteet, 2005: 172-173). Nonetheless, 
with the financial support and help provided by UNRWA households were slowly rebuilt 
and repaired to accommodate the ever increasing population of the camp. Since 
construction was prohibited outside the camp, the expansion of the site occurred vertically 
as if the camp suddenly turned again into a closed and well demarcated space because of 
the presence of Lebanese and Syrian checkpoints at the entrances.
8
 While during the 1980s 
houses were a maximum of two floors high, today the camp environment has significantly 
changed as inhabitants are forced to build upwards to five or six floors, each floor 
constituting one household. The construction aspect of the camp follows its own logic and 
                                               
8 For the involvement of Syrian troops in the control of the camps during and in the aftermath of the 
civil war, see Chapter 5. 
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pattern as flats are built one on the top of the other in order to accommodate all members 
of the family, spouses and children included, usually occupying the entire building.
9
 
However, as during the 1990s checkpoints began to slowly disappear, the removal 
of controls rendered movements inside and outside the camp much easier. Today the 
difference between the actual camp and its outside is barely perceptible as many 
Palestinians also live outside Shatila‟s official boundaries. No fence ever surrounded 
Shatila and, as it appears today, the camp has only one net on its northern side with 
multiple points of access. The rest of the camp is open and boundaries are represented by 
streets that are wider than the narrow alleys within it (see Figure 6). It is precisely this 
openness and lack of controls that facilitated the increase of the camp population. Beyond 
those Palestinians or Lebanese that have always been living in the camp, the newcomers 
are represented by three categories of people: those who came to live in the camp as 
internally displaced refugees of the civil war, mainly Palestinians as the camps of 
Nabatieh, Tell El-Zaatar and Jisr El-Basha have never been reconstructed; Palestinians and 
Lebanese who moved to Beirut in search of better jobs opportunities; and Lebanese and 
other non-Palestinians who are so poor that could not find any cheaper accommodation. 
Today, in fact, the camp is not inhabited by Palestinians only because out of a population 
of about 12,000 to 13,000 people, unofficial UNRWA statistics estimate that some thirty 
percent of the camp population is non-Palestinian including Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians 
and other Arab and non-Arab nationalities.
10
 
                                               
9 Insights from various interviews conducted during the fieldwork in Shatila. 
10 UNRWA operational file „Shatila Camp‟ obtained at UNRWA headquarters in Beirut during 
fieldwork. 
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Figure 7: Shatila’s boundary. Photo taken from the Palestinian Civil Rights Campaign website 
(Undated), available at www.palestinecivilrightscampaign.org/gallery.html (last accessed October 2011). 
With the increase and diversification of the camp population, today the housing 
patterns inside the camp are changing as not all the buildings host one family only. 
Constructions in the camp still reflect its vertical tension as the person interested in 
building must ask permission to the owner of the top flat. Usually this permission is given 
as for the owner of the upper floor, this constitutes a one time income equal to 2,000 – 
3,000 US dollars. The roof of the top flat is therefore turned into the floor of the new house 
and in this way the construction process can continue.
11
 But for Palestinians and non-
Palestinians moving to the camp there is also the option of renting a room or an entire 
house or to buy the property. Although officially these kinds of transactions are not 
allowed in the camp as refugees do not own the land on which the camp was established, 
these are to be seen as a further development of informal and more flexible economies that 
allow the population of the camp to make some profit and the newcomers to find a cheaper 
and affordable accommodation. As Doraï (2010) explains in his analyses of Mar Elias 
refugee camp (Beirut) and the urban dynamics in which the camp is embroiled, the 
practices of renting and selling houses inside the camp is an attractive option for many 
Palestinians that so far are still prevented from working in Lebanon. To compensate for the 
lack of income, they build more floors on the top of their roofs and rent to new Palestinian 
residents or immigrants for some $100-150 a month in this way competing with other more 
                                               
11 Insights from interview with Salah, Shatila, 17 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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expensive areas of Beirut and „playing‟ with the exception. Also Hanadi‟s (2008) study on 
the situation of the Burj El-Barajneh camp (metropolitan Beirut) reveals the new role 
played by refugee spaces in the context of the city and neoliberal economies. From a space 
in which the alien is kept far from the national body, the refugee camp turns into a space 
that welcomes all the categories of people banned from the qualified life of the city. 
Because of their prolonged existence, refugee camps of Beirut seem to lose their 
temporary character and to become more permanent solution that host refugees as well as 
other outcasts of the Lebanese system. On the one hand, this permanency is also 
materialised through the utilisation of solid materials such as cement for the constructions. 
On the other, the logic of emergency typical of refugee spaces or urban informalities keeps 
on surviving through the lack of planning. As in between temporariness and permanency, 
refugee camps today inhabit „a “frozen transience”, an ongoing, lasting state of 
temporariness, a duration patched together by moments none of which is lived through as 
an element of, and a contribution to, perpetuity‟ (Bauman, 2002: 345). Yet, the high 
percentage represented by the non-refugee population in Shatila leads us to consider the 
camp under a different light. 
As Nigel Thrift (2006) reminds us, space must be addressed as a process and not as 
a frozen materiality. It is never static, but is always in constant motion and fluid. Hence, 
even in the refugee camp understood as the permanent spatialisation of the exception we 
witness a development and evolution not only of its mere physical features, but also assist 
to the change of its function and use. In this sense the camp could be seen as a space in 
potentiality (Agamben, 1999). It can become a space of abjection in the Agambenian 
understanding and, therefore, a technology of power aimed at the elimination of the 
biological threat as it happened with the concentration camps in Nazi Germany. But this 
potential actualisation and transformation into a death factory is only one among other 
possibilities. The camp can also turn into other more positive and productive spaces. The 
ways in which the camp can transform and develop are „decided‟ by the sovereign, but 
along with him, by the context, circumstances and the people acting on, inhabiting or 
surrounding it. 
As regards the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and in particular the camps 
that are today part of metropolitan Beirut, I argue that the state of exception is still 
permanent (see Chapter 5). However, what is excepted changes over time and 
circumstances as Shatila, like other camps in the city, welcomes different kinds of banned 
and the „human waste‟ of the Lebanese system. The camp is, therefore, converted into a 
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space that not only provides cheap solutions for those who cannot afford to live anywhere 
else in the city, but can also provide a safe haven for those who need to hide and remain in 
the shadow. As discussed in the previous chapter, this latter point has serious implications 
in terms of criminality‟s safe islands because of the Lebanese authorities‟ lack of control of 
Palestinian refugee camps. From a technology of control in the hands of the state 
authorities as it was in the past, the camp is turned into a technology of invisibility by the 
same subjects that the sovereign intends to exclude. As the banned exploit the space‟s 
exceptional legal status, foreigners can hide from the police and the state in the eventuality 
they overstay their visa terms. By the same token, the camp is an exception not only in 
terms of rights as it hosts those stripped of any protection. The camp itself becomes a finer 
form of resistance as along with rights it excepts duties (Hanadi, 2008b). As the very 
exception that once produced bare life might be transformed into a form of resistance, the 
development of informal economies in the camp must be seen as a coping strategy that 
exploits the exceptionality of this space and the Lebanese authorities‟ disengagement. 
I am not suggesting that Shatila and other camps of metropolitan Beirut are 
representative of the situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. As discussed above 
(Chapter 5), the camp location and history along with security concerns guide the 
possibilities of closures or openness. The same degree of flow and freedom of movement is 
not allowed elsewhere. While after the civil war checkpoints were a main feature of the 
refugee spaces and the Lebanese landscape more generally, in the 1990s controls were 
dramatically reduced in Beirut but never eased in the camps of the south. So while the 
camps of the south must be seen as closed spaces (Hanafi, 2008b), the camps in the capital 
present a rather different situation. In the case of metropolitan Beirut camps, their 
proximity to the centre of power seems to be an indirect form of control that could not be 
guaranteed elsewhere.
12
 However, this absence of direct control leads to the impossibility 
of distinguishing physically and also symbolically the camp from what lies on its outside. 
If state authorities wanted to control the outcasts of the system, it would be difficult to 
locate security checkpoints nowadays since the refugee population is dispersed also in 
informal gatherings around the camps and other areas of the cities such as Said Ghawash, 
Daouq, Sabra, and Hay El-Gharby all located in the south-west part of the city (Abbas et 
al., 1997). Indeed, the expansion of the alleged threat, embodied by the Palestinians 
refugees, the deprived Lebanese and immigrants, would render surveillance of these areas 
                                               
12 Insights from interview with Jaber Suleiman, Mar Elias, 14 January 2008. Interview conducted in 
English. 
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extremely difficult as the exception seems having „leaked out‟ the camp to include also the 
„slum‟. Therefore, the need to transfer security checks and controls towards the heart of the 
city to protect economic and political activities and nodes by closing down the centre and 
the shopping malls rather than the camp. 
It is worth noting that while refugees have a clear sense of where camp boundaries 
lie and of what constitutes the camp in the legal sense of the term, this official discourse is 
not reflected in the stories of the Palestinians. As emerged during the interviews, to them 
„camp‟ is wherever Palestinians live and wherever there is a significant Palestinian 
presence. The impossibility of borrowing legal and official definitions of what a camp is 
and who is to be considered „banned‟ encourages to broadened the enquiry and include 
other spatialities and lives.  
Although living conditions in the camps are deteriorating because of overcrowding 
and the lack of adequate services, this situation is not peculiar of the camp only but it is 
shared by areas and buildings lying next to it as well as other Palestinian informal 
settlements (Abbas et al., 1997; UN-HABITAT and UNDP, 2010; Zabaneh et al., 2008). 
Shatila is, in fact, situated in an area, like other Beirut‟s camps, characterised by low-
income, deprivation, low levels of educations, state‟s neglect as regards services,  
assistance, infrastructures and systems of care to mention but a few (see also Fawaz and 
Peillen, 2002). Those inhabiting the camp are not worse-off if compared to those living 
outside legally or squatting. In this way, Shatila lives a tension between its exceptionality 
as refugee camp, also in legal terms, and its exclusion from the city centre as part of the 
„slum‟. While the legal boundaries of the camp matter in as much as Palestinians living 
inside the camp are considered „legal‟ while those squatting in adjacent areas risk the 
demolition and eviction every day, these distinctions seem to no longer make sense as law 
and practices blur into each other. Another example of these blurred boundaries is provided 
by the case of taxation. While it is not applied in the camp rendering goods cheaper and an 
incentive to shop inside the camp itself (Howe, 2005), it does not seem likely to be applied 
in the informal and poor settlements around it. 
If for one moment we abandon the notion of exception in its legal understanding 
and embrace an exception that might be working on economic and social lines, we might 
realise how the distinction between the camp and the slum cannot easily be drawn. As the 
camp welcomes the undesirable and all those excluded from the right to and the space of 
the city, so does the slum as the logic of exclusion expands indefinitely. Just like the 
Armenian camps at the beginning of the last century constituted points of attraction for 
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those in need and search of better opportunities, so did and does Shatila along with other 
Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. While the Lebanese authorities‟ control and 
engagement in place produced the closure of the camp, their abandonment allows motion 
and change. Motion, as Palestinians began settling outside the camp boundaries. Change, 
as today the camp has turned into a possibility for those who need to hide from the state‟s 
control and who cannot afford to live elsewhere. 
Borrowing Zygmunt Bauman‟s (2000, 2002, 2007) metaphor of liquidity, while in 
general terms refugee camps are considered „holes in time and space‟ as the police contain 
the refugees within the camp boundaries and prevent them from „leaking out‟ and „spilling 
over‟, Shatila cannot keep its shape any longer and turns into a „liquid camp‟ as it expands 
and allows in-and-out flows. Just like the camp inhabitants leak out, so does the exception 
as along with the refugees it includes the citizens and other outcasts. The heterogeneous 
population of the camp meets the diverse residents of the informal settlements as both 
these spaces hosts Palestinian refugees, Lebanese rural migrants, the internally displaced, 
as well as other Arab and non-Arab people in the shaping of the „campscape‟. 
Never has the French word standing for the term „slum‟ been so revealing. As 
Mustafa Dikeç (2007) explains the term „banlieu‟ derives from the word „ban‟ or, to recall 
Agamben‟s take, the inclusive exclusion. As Agier (2011: 45) points out the banlieu is not 
a place but a relation because to be banned stands for that which is included by virtue of its 
own exclusion (see Chapter 1). Attached to the centre but abandoned by it, the degraded 
peripheries of the cities constitute spaces of exclusion and exception as regards care, 
services and effective planning strategies (see also Gandy, 2006). As the case of Beirut‟s 
informal settlements shows, apart from some exceptions – namely the Elissar project that 
aims at the rehabilitation of certain areas of south Beirut – the government and local 
constituencies do not intervene in these areas and prove incapable of engaging with it 
(Fawaz and Peillen, 2002; Harb, 2001, 2003; Harb El-Kak, 1996). Just like the refugee 
camp that was established as a short-term solution, the temporary character of certain 
peripheries was also a main feature of the informal settlements. But just like the camp turns 
its temporariness into permanency, or better „frozen transience‟, so does the slum (see also 
Wacquant, 1999).  
If once the wall of the city was to produce bare life, today the pulling down of that 
barrier marks the pulling down of clear distinctions and the penetration of the banned into 
the polis. In Beirut, for instance, it is not hard to see poor Shi‟ites squatting next to 
luxurious hotels risking, awaiting but also resisting eviction (Khalaf, 1998: 56). As 
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Agamben (1995a, 1998) argues, whenever the unlocalisable, the bare life, became 
permanent and spatialised, the results has always been nothing but the camp. What we are 
facing today however, in the case of the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and the other 
outcasts of the Lebanese political and economic system, is that the unlocalisable has 
remained permanent but at the same time has exceeded the space of the camp. If the camp 
was born as the localisation of the exception, the link holding localisation and „disorder‟ 
together have broken down as the supposed-to-be unqualified life has climbed over the 
fence and somehow entered the space of the city. One of the main critiques raised by Jenny 
Edkins to Agamben‟s position on biopolitics is his lack of attention for the reasons that 
nowadays lead to a more mobile society challenging solid physical and symbolic barriers 
of the nation-state system. In particular, according to Edkins (2000: 38): 
Agamben notes that the movement of populations typical of 
modernity leads to locations similar to the camp, such as the 
holding zones at airports for asylum seekers, and he considers the 
figure of the refugee. He does not analyse the politics of emergency 
or exception that produces this movement or the global liberal 
governance that arguably represents the contemporary form of 
biopolitics. 
By analysing the space of destination and the ways in which power operates in Western 
democracies, Agamben seems to miss the causes leading to displacement. Investigating 
countries of origins, their governance and politics might better inform root causes of 
displacement and see how elsewhere life has become expendable in other ways. As Dikeç 
(2007: 24) stresses, neoliberalism must be understood as „a specific form of polit ical 
rationality producing new spaces‟. In particular, it manifests itself at the urban level as it 
increases socio-economic inequalities discriminating the undesirable and the one that has 
no means to fight far superior forces (see also Davis, 2006). While urban informalities are 
understood as spaces hosting the excluded and marginalised, echoing Bayat, AlSayyad 
(2004) suggests that those inhabiting the ghetto of Chicago or the favelas of Rio did not 
lack integration into the system. Quite the contrary, as they are fully integrated „but on 
terms that often cause them to be economically exploited, politically repressed, socially 
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stigmatised, and culturally excluded‟ as a materialisation of the truest and the most 
intimate meaning of „ban‟ (p. 9). 
 As bare life in Beirut is not only represented by the Palestinian refugees, economic 
and social abandonment is applied to other categories of people including the very 
Lebanese citizens. The camp is no longer the spatial device that separates the refugees 
from the citizens. It is no longer a closed and surveilled space typical of disciplinary 
obsessions. As the state authorities withdraw, so the boundaries, physical and symbolical, 
separating the alleged bare life from the life protected and worth living blur. The 
overarching event, in fact, is not the separation of the refugee from the citizen, or the 
immigrant from the citizen, but as it is increasingly the case in other urban centres of the 
old and new worlds, the newness lies on „greater propinquity in social and physical space‟ 
and on the threshold where the refugee/immigrant and natives encounter (Wacquant, 1999: 
1645). The camp, therefore, escapes the modern illusion of creating homogenised spaces as 
flows bring heterogeneity in the camp and its outside giving rise to a campscape. 
While motion, openness and change are the main features of Shatila refugee camp, 
the camp returns to its closed conceptualisation only in the official discourse as authorities 
treat it as an isolated area never connected to its surroundings, or better, connected only in 
negative terms as potential refuge of terrorist threats to national security (see Figure 4: 
UNRWA map of Shatila where buildings at its sides all of a sudden disappear as if non-
existent). Rather than following the closed space discourse, in the next section, the camp is 
reconsidered in its enclosure only in order to analyse other dynamics and the effects of its 
openness as different banned meet. 
Shatila as contested space: 
Between Palestine and the space of the marginalised 
This chapter started with the problematisation of the camp as a space dedicated to 
the refugees only. But, as discussed so far, the camp is never static. It is an ever changing 
space. In particular, since the end of the civil war especially, it does not host the 
Palestinians only, but also all those people that are excluded and marginalised. As the city 
is synonymous of encounter and diversity, the variety of people inhabiting Shatila leads us 
to consider the camp as a city-like structure. As Agier (2002: 322, 2008, 2011) suggests, 
the camp, just like the city, becomes the place in which different identities meet, affect 
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each other, establish networks and create possibilities. By questioning if the camp can 
actually be considered as „a space of urban sociability‟, Agier identifies three main features 
of urban life (see also Perouse De Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000: 207-208). According to 
him, three parameters are essential for a city to be defined as such. It must hold a „social 
stratification‟, a „social differentiation‟ and a „symbolic of place‟.  
Using Agier‟s lens of enquiry my intention here is not only to see if Shatila could 
be considered an urban space as explored so far focusing on networks, relations and 
interactions. I make use of Agier‟s prism in order to see the ways in which these relations 
and features affect the Palestinian community and the camp within its boundaries. It is 
extremely difficult, however, to draw clear identitarian and national boundaries between 
people considering the mixed composition of the area and the fact that identity is certainly 
not a given. 
„Social stratification‟ in the Palestinian camp of Shatila is exemplified by the 
presence of different kinds of professionals and workers that at times might even guarantee 
its self-sufficiency as different skills are present in the camp. The camp at the beginning 
was mainly inhabited by a rural population that having lost their land in Palestine had to 
adapt to survive this new reality. Refugees of the camp reinvented themselves in new 
professions and jobs. Already in the early years of their residency in Lebanon, they went 
through a process of „economic transformation‟ according to which they turned from 
sharecroppers and peasants into a proletariat class at the margin of the capital (Sayigh, 
2007: xxv). Today in Shatila, there are school teachers, engineers, builders, painters, 
plasterers, sewers, social workers, shopkeepers, hairdressers, barbers, doctors, nurses and 
all the variety of vocations and skills that would characterise a professionally diversified 
society typical of an urban environment. 
„Social differentiations‟, however, seems to be one of the most crucial and 
interesting parameters to explore as Palestinians and non-Palestinians share the same space 
and conditions. This might lead to both positive and negative effects. The camp resembles 
the city in as much as over the years it has become a „heterogeneous ensemble of identity‟, 
a result of the presence of different social and national identities (Agier, 2002). The 
openness of the camp and the proximity to the center of Beirut guarantee this „social 
differentiation‟ that might encourage a change in the ways in which refugees conceive 
themselves, their spaces, their lifestyles and expectations. The removal of controls allows 
Lebanese as well as foreigners to access the camp. Along with identity change and social 
transformation, this same openness of the camp might bring also new opportunities as 
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precisely the establishment of new networks allows some sort of economic and social 
regeneration. As they develop new coping strategies to face their condition and socio-
economic marginalisation, they contribute to the evolution and expansion of the informal 
sector by reinventing their roles and professions. Many improvised their construction 
abilities as they turned from farmers in Palestine to builders in Beirut as construction 
planning was flourishing before the civil war and as they managed to work through their 
Lebanese acquaintances. But also new transformations take place as from builders they 
might decide to become shopkeepers. For example, Yusuf, a Palestinian I met in Shatila, 
decided to free one room on the ground floor where he lives and turned part of his house 
into a shop. The opening of his shop was guaranteed by contacts with acquaintances and 
commercial stores outside the camp that provided the goods to sell. As he says: 
 [...] then I started selling textile and fabrics [...] I got them from 
everywhere.. China, Taiwan, UK, Italy... I got them from other 
wholesale dealers.
13
 
Clearly a closure of the camp would not have allowed such exchange of goods and would 
have impeded the development of networks. Now, however, as the distinction of the camp 
is blurred, flows of people as well as material are facilitated if compared to the past when 
checkpoints slowed down these in-and-out movements. 
 While the process of transformation according to which social and economic 
changes occur in the camp is partly due to this social differentiation, the geographical 
location of the camp also plays a major role as with the years it has become part of the 
urban structure of Beirut. Being connected to the city, though not entirely part of it because 
of a politics of exclusion preventing assimilation, has an impact that is not experienced by 
other Palestinians residing in other more rural camps. Though a Palestinian identity is still 
very much prominent, social change in the Palestinian community of the camp might 
occur, as today, traditions live along with new patterns and more urban ways of life. The 
urban context might allow changes in identity as well as expectations or potential and 
gradual dissolution of the hope of a return to Palestine. Expectations in Shatila might 
                                               
13 Yusuf, Shatila, 18 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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certainly be different from expectations in other camps of the country. As Sayigh (1994: 
85) maintains: 
The influence of urban Arab and Lebanese culture was naturally 
stronger in camps like Shateela and Bourj Barajneh than in the 
rural camps which remained, in comparison, „conservative‟ and 
„backward‟ (terms used of them by the camp people). Perceptions 
of city people as „civilised‟ and village people as the opposite have 
strong roots in Arabic culture and society. In Shateela, this cultural 
hierarchy was given weight by the presence of city Palestinians as 
well as the closeness of the city. 
Cinemas and bars, as she reveals, were one of the first urban influences that the camp went 
through. The first cinema of the area, Cinema Sharq, was opened adjacent to Shatila in the 
early 1960s when refugees began appreciating both their proximity to the capital and going 
to the cinema (ibid). As regards the present day, although Omar, a Palestinian student I 
met, has a clear sense of identity at the point of not being willing to accept the Lebanese 
citizenship were it offered, he spends some of his free time playing football or wondering 
with his friends around the centre of Beirut or the fanciest shopping malls of the capital. 
Never buying anything, as he cannot afford to, he somehow seems attracted by another 
kind of life that at the moment he enjoys seeing from far while dreaming of a job in Dubai 
that would guarantee him a proper income and the chance to help his family.
14
 
However, this change occurring at the social level does not imply that new 
lifestyles are acritically accepted as traditions and the memory of village life are still 
present in the camp. The building and dwelling patterns are for instance a strong reminder 
of Palestine village life in the first half of the past century. The importance of family bonds 
is spatially translated as all members of the same family tend to live in the same buildings 
and as new marriages welcome new members, the building expands vertically as to 
accommodate them (see also Harker, 2011). 
 As regards the coexistence of Palestinians with non-Palestinians, it would be quite 
naïve to assume that sharing the same space and condition would inevitably lead to 
                                               
14 Omar, Shatila, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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positive relations of solidarity. Shatila and the community it is supposed to represent – the 
refugees – are both a highly contested arena. Tensions between solidarity and antagonism 
have always been part of the Palestinians refugees‟ relation with the Lebanese (for a deeper 
discussion on Palestinians‟ relationship with Shi‟a neighbours and movements see Khalili, 
2006, 2007). Moments of peaceful coexistence and mutual help have been alternated to 
periods of military fights and, sadly, even massacres. Another example reported by Sayigh 
(1994: 47-49), was the growing presence of Lebanese settling close to the camp in the 
1950s when clashes occurred over some Lebanese youth smuggling drugs. Also the 
opening of a cafe in the camp or even outside the camp was not accepted and firmly 
opposed as the urbanisation of the area by non-Palestinians was perceived as an outrage to 
Palestinian morality constantly undermined by „modernity‟. 
Despite years of conflicts and repeated military clashes between the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese, intermarriages occur. As emerged during the interviews, clear identity 
boundaries can never been drawn as many Palestinians have Lebanese relatives and some 
are married to Lebanese and Syrians living in the camp (for a glance into the intermarriage 
of Lebanese and Palestinians see Meier, 2008). However, as common as it was to hear 
about intermarriages and good relations with non-Palestinians as if the latter were 
completely absorbed and accepted in the camp community, it was also common to hear 
about fears of foreigners living or entering the camp. As the camp produces its own 
outcasts, fear and mistrust are somehow part of the attitude reserved to newcomers, not 
only perceived as a threat to moral values and traditions, but also as potential physical 
dangers for the community of the camp. Fully integrated in the camp life, Aziza, a 
Lebanese woman married to a Palestinian, says: „There are all kinds of people here [...] the 
camp is multinational.. this is why I don‟t feel safe.. it is a cocktail‟.15 And Zahra, the 
Palestinian woman guiding me through the camp and encounters, comments saying „this 
area from time to time is a bit dangerous.. there are Gypsies!‟.16 Yet, the Gypsies‟ presence 
could be disputable. They are labelled „Gypsies‟ but nobody seems to know their stories or 
origins as, maybe, a simple wave to greet has always been enough. As emerged during 
other encounters in Shatila, the presence of Gypsies, in particular, is felt as deeply 
problematic as danger is seldom associated with them. This may be because of their non-
Arab background, or perhaps because Gypsies never tried to integrate, or probably because 
the same inhabitants of the camp never tried to assimilate them. However, while with the 
                                               
15 Aziza, Shatila, 27 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
16 Zahra‟s comments in English during our encounter with Aziza, see note above. 
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Lebanese there is some sort of commonality as Lebanese and Palestinians share the same 
language, culture and sometimes traditions having experienced for centuries common Arab 
and later on Ottoman domination (Salam, 1988), this affinity is not perceived with other 
people that might have come from other countries or completely different realities.  
Mahmoud, a Palestinian living in Shatila, for instance, raises some issues on the 
presence of foreigners in the camp: 
You don‟t feel safe because here, in the same area, other people are 
living in Shatila but you don‟t know them! Maybe they are thieves, 
maybe they are good.. you don‟t know!‟.17 
According to Ibrahim, foreigners should not be living in the camp. This could not only be a 
danger for the safety and security of the camp population, but the presence of non-
Palestinians might contribute to the loss of the Palestinian tradition and identity.
18
 Security 
concerns are becoming more common especially after the events of Nahr El-Bared in 2007 
(see Chapter 5). Afraid that events like that might happen again in Shatila, that along with 
other camps offered hospitality to the refugees of Nahr El-Bared for a long time, 
Palestinians in the camp would rather live with those whom they have always been 
knowing than facing the unknown. 
But the fear of the foreigners entails other domains also. According to Halabi 
(2004) the question of morality is really imperative in the camp too as the influx of single 
workers, in particular Syrians, is not welcomed as families are afraid for the women and 
girls of the camp. While in the camp there are some problems of domestic violence, as 
Halabi goes on to suggest, the blame for any immoral activity is on the foreigners who are 
also perceived as competitors in the access to the very limited resources of the camp as the 
overcrowding situation deteriorates. 
 Despite the fact that the camp could be seen as a space of hospitality as it 
welcomes those in need like internally displaced Lebanese from the July 2006 war or the 
displaced of Nahr El-Bared, the camp is still much perceived as a piece of Palestine and 
the last piece of land remained for them unless a return will be allowed (on hospitality see 
                                               
17 Mahmoud, Shatila, 14 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
18 Insights from interview with Ibrahim, Shatila, 20 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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Khalili, 2006; Ramadan 2008). The camp seems to hold together a strong sense of 
Palestinian-ness as „[w]hat creates a political refugee identity is [...] not just poverty, which 
refugees share with many of the surrounding populations, but a mix of low status, limited 
opportunity, vulnerability, and thwarted national identity‟ (Sayigh, 1998: 20). The camp 
becomes the place where it is possible to keep alive memories of the homeland and the 
hope in the return.  It is the place where it is possible to create continuities with Palestine 
manifested in different ways. Even though some of them has never seen their village of 
origin – as Palestinians like to remember their origin through the place in which their 
parents or grandparents have once lived – the connection with the far away is strengthened 
by technology. Hadi, for instance, explains the ways in which he learnt how to use a 
computer: 
I work by memorising things… I don‟t know the language 
[English]… when I first got a PC… you know XXX centre? I am 
one of the founders [...] At that time we had a Pentium 2 in the 
centre. [...] I was afraid of the idea of working with a computer. I 
didn‟t know anything about it. My friends were working on a 
project called “The memory” and they were preparing a CD with 
traditional songs, so they proposed to buy a PC. We founded an 
institution, bought a Pentium 3 and started working on it but they 
didn‟t allow me to use it… they said that if I wanted to learn I 
should have used the older one. So I learnt. First I started with the 
basics, then power point and now I do some graphic design. [...] it 
is hard for me to follow up all the new technology since I don‟t 
know the language… it is difficult to be up-dated… I learn through 
different attempts and mistakes.
19
 
Beyond the fact that learning to use a computer with no explanation given might be 
remarkable, Hadi‟s story tells how Palestinians, despite the difficult condition, manage to 
overcome lack of knowledge and means with great effort and dedication. Technology is 
                                               
19 Hadi, Shatila, 23 December 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. For anonymity purposes, names 
have been removed. 
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used to connect, to remember, to create documents and files for the preservation of the 
Palestinian traditions. But as Hadi told me, now and then he likes to check, through Google 
Earth, the houses of his parents in Palestine. Technology can, in fact, connect them to their 
homeland enhancing that bond and creating continuities transcending physical distances 
and obstacles.  
But there are also other ways to maintain the continuity with Palestine as people 
still keep the keys of their houses abandoned decades ago or the documents that prove 
ownership of the land and the house when once they, or their parents or grandparents lived 
in present day Israel. Documents that still hold the British stamps as issued during the 
mandate. These are the materialities that strengthen the connection by not allowing them to 
give up the hope and desire of return (Bennett, 2004). Along with keys and materialities 
that once touched the Palestinian land, memories and traditions typical of the village of 
origin are reproduced and reconstituted. The continuous reference to the village of origin 
shows how Palestinian village life and specificities are still indelible markers along with 
more recent memories of atrocities the camp population endured in their more recent past 
in Lebanon. 
Memories of the remote and more recent pasts interweave in the „symbolic of 
place‟. Back in the 1950s, quarters and streets in the camp were named after villages in 
Palestine. And later some of them have been replaced with names of predominant 
Palestinian factions especially after the Cairo Agreement and the rise of the Resistance. 
Hospitals and Palestinian Red Crescent Clinics, though outside the camp, are named after 
some Palestinian cities, like the Gaza hospital in Sabra
20
 or the Haifa hospital not far from 
Burj El-Barajneh camp. The „there‟ and „then‟ live along with the „here‟ and „now‟. 
Overlapping layers of memories connect the Palestinians to their old village life, to the 
national leaders of the past and the present as well as to more Lebanese or Shatila 
specificities. Pictures of Arafat or Shaykh Ahmad Yassin – founder and spiritual leader of 
Hamas until 2004 when he was killed by an Israeli aerial raid – might be hung right next to 
a Hezbollah poster. Having for long supported the Palestinian cause, and though the 
solidarity relationship between the party and the Palestinians is very complex, Hezbollah 
has come to represent another strength for many refugees who still believe in the liberation 
                                               
20 The Gaza hospital is not operative today. During the 1982 Israeli invasion and heavy shellings of 
the area, the hospital was partially destroyed. Nowadays, it is occupied by Palestinian families who turned it 
into flats where to live. 
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of their land or as they get services from the party that the Lebanese government do not 
offer or that UNRWA offers only partially (Khalili, 2006, 2007). 
But it is not only the Lebanese environment to somehow affect the deployment of 
visual memories or political posters. Beyond the connection to Palestine, the camp 
throughout these decades, in fact, has also developed a quite peculiar identity typical of 
Shatila only. Pictures of the martyrs of the camp who fought till death to defend the camp 
population during the multiple sieges are to be found all over the streets and buildings. A 
memorial dedicated to the victims and martyrs of the „War of the Camps‟ and located right 
in the middle of the camp next to the mosque, is one of the first places that Palestinians 
would show to those interested in visiting the camp as ultimate witness of Shatila‟s 
predicament so soaked in violence. 
While there seems to be a common Palestinian identity, this same identity is 
fragmented. The geographical dispersal in different countries and in different camps of the 
same state contribute to ruptures with the past or official discourses imposed by the 
Palestinian leadership over the years, and produce new meanings specific to each camp 
(Hanafi, 2008b; Khalili, 2004a; Peteet, 2005). Each camp has built its own community 
made of good memories, like Palestinian traditional weddings, but also tragic and terrible 
reminiscences. It is in this context, in the recollections of the most recent past and 
„Lebanese events‟, that the camp to a certain extent distances itself from the homeland to 
embrace a more peculiar „Shatila‟ identity made of joyful moments, taking the children of 
the camp to the park to play, but also memories of violence. However specific to Shatila, 
collective identities and experiences of Palestinian-ness seem not to disappear as they are 
all displayed in the camp through so powerful visual tools in between past and present 
lives (see below Figure 8, picture of a famous Palestinian character named Handala
21
 on 
the wall of a house, part of the collective cultural and political Palestinian background). 
                                               
21 Handala, which in Arabic means „bitterness‟, is a character born out of the pen of the famous 
Palestinian cartoonist, Naji El-Ali (1937-1987). Handala, always portrayed from the back and his hands 
clasped behind as in sign of resignation, appears in most of Naji El-Ali‟s cartoons as a witness to violence 
and to the Palestinian condition. As the cartoonist suggested, Handala is a child aged ten and will never grow 
up. As if symbolising the „frozen transience‟ of refugees, he can acquire a natural life and grow only when he 
will be allowed back to his homeland.   
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Figure 8: Handala in Shatila. Picture taken by the author, December 2008. 
As foreigners‟ presence trigger the fear of losing their identity, space and cause, the 
camp somehow becomes Palestine, their piece of national land that refugees would never 
want to give up. Expressing his anger towards those Palestinians who abandon the camp, in 
this way empting dwellings for potential foreigners, Hakim, a Palestinian student and 
worker, says: 
Why these people emigrate and other people come here?! And this 
is not good with respect to us because we... from camp to Palestine 
only! Not to another country!
22
 
The presence of foreigners in the camp cannot help but enhancing their collective identity 
while the presence of the camp itself prevents them from forgetting their origins, roots and 
craved return. The spatiality of the camp, the poor conditions, the insecure and seldom 
unsafe shelters are constant reminders of their status, their displacement and predicament. 
As long as the camp is there, as long as its exceptional and temporary character is 
maintained there is hope for the return. It is precisely the dissolution of this space that 
would implant in the Palestinians a sense of failure. This tension between temporariness 
                                               
22 Hakim, Shatila, 17 December 2008. Interview conducted in English. 
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and permanency is, in fact, expressed in the built environment of the camp that keeps on 
responding to the logic of emergency rather than normalcy. Constructing one flat on the 
top of other with no planning as well as the use of solid material alternated to less solid 
fabrics are materialisations of this „permanent temporariness‟. This is the reason why 
major improvements in the camp would not be welcomed unless they represent the 
minimum necessary to just be able to conduct a decent life. Any improvement is negotiated 
in ways in which it could never lead to permanency as „the temporary becomes a way of 
life‟ (Sivan, 2007: 155; see also Farah, 2003; and Abourahme and Hilal, Forthcoming). 
„Masters in waiting‟, as Omar likes to define themselves, Palestinians seem not to 
give up and as Abdullah reminds: 
The Palestinian people have the ability to survive, to bear the 
hunger and the exhaustion. We have the will to abide all this. You 
are aware of what is happening in Gaza in these days.. No 
electricity, no food, nothing! And they are bombing day and night.. 
but they will not surrender even if there is only one grip of land left 
in their hands.. And here is the same.
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Remaining in the camp could be therefore seen as their last grip to their homeland. After 
more than sixty years from the Nakba, Shatila is still much a reality and the place where 
collective Palestinian memories converge with more Lebanese and camp specific ones. The 
willingness to preserve the camp as such, with all its exceptionalities and even negative 
sides, makes of Shatila embody the road to Palestine and the road to their right of return. 
The resistance is towards integration in Lebanese society and, at the same time, constitutes 
a continuous and thorny challenge for both Israel and the international community that 
have yet to find a solution for the millions of displaced. As the camp keeps alive the hope 
that return is still possible, the camp itself materialises and spatialises the being political of 
the refugees. The exception does not necessarily lead to the annihilation of the subject. It is 
precisely in this moment that playing and mocking the exception that would want them 
killable, the people of Shatila turns this same exception into the ultimate form of 
resistance. 
                                               
23 Abdullah, Shatila, 17 November 2008. Interview conducted in Arabic. 
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Concluding remarks 
While Agamben argues that the camp is the biopolitical paradigm of politics today, 
the chapter challenges his reflections and shows how the camp may only partially capture 
the life that the sovereign casts out the normal juridical order. Starting from a reflection on 
the presence of non-Palestinians in Shatila, who constitute thirty percent of the camp 
population, the chapter has questioned the kind of biopolitics at stake in Lebanon. 
Secondly, it has questioned the role of Shatila refugee camp today and the spatialities of 
the exception. 
Abandoning a legal and juridical model that looks at bare life in terms of law and 
rights, the chapter has focused on flows, openness and has taken motion, changes and 
processes as references for an investigation on the exception. This approach explained the 
presence of other kinds of outcasts within Shatila. As the Palestinians are stripped of their 
rights, citizenship and protection, the exception „floats‟ and is not limited to national 
belonging distinctions. While the first caesura of the population in Lebanon divides the 
Lebanese from the Palestinians – the citizen from the refugee – other distinctions run along 
economic and sectarian lines. The latter allows certain Palestinians (the Christians and the 
upper class) to be included in the normal juridical order and even acquire citizenship that 
sanctions the inclusion. Yet, secondary distinctions exclude some Lebanese citizens from 
the protection and care they are supposed to receive. 
In this context, structures like refugee camps increasingly become sites that are no 
longer inhabited by refugees exclusively as the camp welcomes the multiple outcasts of the 
Lebanese neoliberal and sectarian system. We are not assisting to a distinction that 
separates the life of the refugee from the qualified political life of the citizen, but witness 
the increasing propinquity of different kinds of banned who share the same condition and 
spaces. As both Palestinians and Lebanese (and other outcasts) live in the camp as well as 
outside, the exception exceeds the boundaries of the camp to include informal settlements 
flourishing around Shatila. The difficulty to localise the space of exception leads to 
consider the formation of a new spatial model that I call „campscape‟ in which refugee 
camps and informal settlements represent a new enlarged exception. Although legally the 
space of exception is represented by the camp only (as placed in a different juridico-
political order), life, processes and circumstances blur those boundaries. As it was shown 
in the previous chapter, perhaps an abandonment of spatial disciplinary obsessions have 
led to the leakage of the exception from the space of the camp to its outside. 
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This also shows how the camp itself is not a static space. Shatila‟s urban location has 
provided an interesting example to understand the ways in which the camp is still bound to 
the city through its exclusion along with the informal settlements and to reveal the ways in 
which Shatila‟s proximity to the centre of Beirut may affect the camp‟s inhabitants. The 
camp provides shelters and cheap accommodation for those who cannot afford to live in 
the city, but the presence of a high number of non-Palestinian has yet to completely change 
Shatila‟s character and exceptionality. Although the function of the camp has changed over 
time as it hosts other outcasts, the presence of foreigners including Lebanese does not lead 
to the dissolution of the exception (or at least not yet). Despite the presence of non-
Palestinians, Shatila is still very much perceived as a Palestinian space. The camp, in fact, 
combines a Palestinian symbolism shared by all the Palestinians no matter where they live, 
symbolisms that are peculiar to the Lebanese context, as well as memories that are peculiar 
to Shatila only. Although the proximity of the camp to the centre of Beirut and though 
presenting characteristics typical of a city-like structure (social stratification and 
differentiation, and a symbolic of place), Shatila is still very much perceived a piece of 
Palestine that refugees do not want to give up. The presence of non-Palestinians triggers 
fears for the security of the camp population, but also fear of losing and forgetting their 
identity and the role of the refugee camp. Preserving the camp, its history, memory and 
purpose is the last form of resistance for the refugees as they refuse to be naturalised in 
Lebanon and they refuse the dissolution of their cause. Remaining in the camp may be 
forced through their exclusion and marginalisation. Yet, it may also be a conscious 
decision to re-affirm their status of refugees and their right of return. As waiting becomes 
the foundation of the Palestinian identity, maintaining the exceptionality of the camp still 
represents their road to Palestine. 
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Conclusions 
In this research, I have explored the complexities of sovereignty, sovereign power 
and the exception as they are manifested in the Palestinian lives and refugee camps in 
Lebanon. In particular, at both the global and local scales, I set to investigate the multiple 
sovereigns that impact upon the Palestinian lives. Beyond the Lebanese government‟s 
policies, whose decisions reduce the Palestinians to bare life? What and where are these 
decisions taken? Not only interested in the official realm of politics and political 
institutions, I have also interrogated the relevance of a law-and-right approach. Is the life 
stripped of rights incapable of political agency or resistance? What, if any, are the ways in 
which refugees react to and challenge the sovereign decision? 
Questioning the law-and-right approach was also essential to uncover the complex 
networks of power relations within and beyond the space of refugee camps. More 
specifically, I have interrogated and problematised the uncritical assimilation of refugee 
camps to spaces of exception. Established as temporary structures, refugee camps are 
increasingly proving as lasting and permanent. So, in protracted situations of refugeehood 
(like that represented by the Palestinian refugees) what happens to the space of exception? 
What is the relation of the space of exception to state‟s sovereignty and control? Can new 
power relations and forms of governance take place within these spaces? Moreover, 
interested in revealing the relation of the refugee camp with what lies outside, I also looked 
at the refugee camp through the urban prism and in its relation to the city. In light of this 
investigation, can the refugee camp maintain the same role and indentity over time? 
Agamben‟s reflections have provided invaluable insights for the examination of the 
ways in which sovereign power operates and produces Palestinian bare life. Yet, a 
combination of his theories with Foucault‟s understanding of power have proved crucial to 
recognise the ongoing discrimination of the Palestinians through their exclusion by means 
of law alongside the recognition of the political value of the refugees‟ voices and agency. 
In these pages, I have discussed how a life stripped of its juridical significance at the point 
of being killable with impunity reacts to the sovereign decision. Although placed at the 
margins of politics, the Palestinians have proved to be also active participants on the power 
relation chessboard. 
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This study has shown that sovereign power cannot be identified with sovereign 
statehood only. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are affected by a multiplicity of 
sovereigns inhabiting different geopolitical scales. Sovereignty is not a prerogative of the 
state that can perform unlimited violence (or protection) towards those residing on its 
exclusive sovereign territory, but is a relation in which different actors (supra-state as well 
as sub-state) act on each other and influence each other. As it cannot be identified with the 
state only, it is shown how sites of political decisions are multiple and spread on global and 
political levels. In particular, the „global dimension of sovereignty‟ demonstrates that, 
although state power and authority are not dead (Connolly, 2005), they compete with and 
confront decisions taken in other sites (other states‟ and suprastate organisations‟ 
decisions). This was demonstrated in Chapter 3. While investigating the more official 
realm of politics, I have discussed the relation between decisions taken by different actors 
(the international community, UNHCR, UNRWA, some Arab states and the Lebanese 
government) and affecting the Palestinian refugees‟ lives. The non-solution of the refugee 
problem and the question of Palestine in 1948 had serious repercussions for the displaced. 
The depoliticisation of their life occurred in different moments and sites. While the 
statelessness was produced through the dissolution of the British Mandate for Palestine and 
the creation of the state of Israel, the persistence of their bare life condition was maintained 
and reproduced by the international community‟s inability to solve their lack of protection 
as well as humanitarian agencies that while focusing on the Palestinians‟ survival 
neglected the political significance of their lives. Moreover, I have shown how numerous 
attempts to naturalise the Palestinians in the Arab host countries and the pending solution 
of their refugee status are met with hostility and resistance by the Lebanese government 
and, more recently and intensely, by Lebanese society. By preventing the refugees‟ 
naturalisation the Lebanese authorities, in fact, continue to present the international 
community (and indeed the Palestinian Authority, the PLO and Israel) with ongoing 
challenges. The further marginalisation of the Palestinians in Lebanon and exclusion from 
basic human rights must be understood as a well-targeted message levelled at the 
international community and at the Palestinians. It is paramount to recognise these signs 
and to uncover how these affect the Palestinian community in Lebanon now and in the 
future. 
If the global dimension of sovereignty was discussed through an investigation of 
different political and humanitarian institutions, this research has also demonstrated how 
power should be disenfranchised from the notion of statehood and from political 
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institutions only (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 1999). Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in particular, have 
examined the agency of the refugees. Despite the refugees‟ legal abandonment represented 
by their being stateless and unprotected, Palestinians fight back and do not surrender as 
explored in Chapter 4. As through their actions refugees reject a life of passive reception of 
humanitarian aid, this study has revealed that if power takes life as its reference and object 
of intervention, so does resistance. Through different strategies of „incidental resistance‟ 
(Scott, 1985) and „quiet encroachments‟ (Bayat, 2010), the individual agency of the 
refugees – the transgression and bypassing of law – makes them resist annihilation. 
Strategies of self-help re-instate power relations after the sovereign‟s decisions. As power 
and resistance coexist, they are in a dialogical relation of prohibition-and-transgression, 
act-and-response. Although it does not bring revolutionary changes and does not seriously 
undermine the structure of domination as power continues to circulate unevenly, this 
„politics of practice‟ (as opposed to the „politics of protest‟) enacts and endorses the rights 
of which the sovereign has stripped them. These unorganised, unplanned, individual and 
self-indulgent practices provide them with the necessary to survive. 
Power relations including technologies of power and forms of resistance have then 
been explored in their spatialisations. The refugee camp has been critically examined as 
space of exception. In revealing its complexities in Chapter 5 and 6, I have argued that the 
refugee camp lives a tension between law and life. Although it is placed outside the normal 
juridical order, it was shown how the camp is never static but in constant evolution as 
different actors (the Lebanese authorities, humanitarian agencies, the Palestinian 
representatives and factions, refugees themselves as well as other inhabitants) shape its 
meanings and functions. 
In investigating the ways in which the exception operates, in Chapter 5 I have 
argued that although the legal exception is maintained over time, the ways in which 
relations of power occur in these spaces may change. As Agamben (1995a, 1998) affirms 
that the camp is included in the domain of power by virtue of its exclusion, different 
technologies of power (and technologies of inclusion) may be utilised over time and 
different circumstances. Although it is generally accepted that the inclusion of the refugee 
camp in the domain of state power is achieved through the state authorities‟ disciplinary 
control and surveillance, the ways in which Palestinian camps in Lebanon are today 
included in the domain of state authorities certainly differ. If the disciplinary model was a 
prerogative of the Lebanese authorities until 1969, the signing of the Cairo Agreement 
marks the absence of their engagement and control. It may seem that the exceptionality of 
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the camp is dramatised through a double exclusion (excluded from normal juridical order 
and abandonment of management) and, therefore, that the inclusive moment is lost. Yet, I 
argue that even if the state disengages from the control of the refugee camps at the point 
that Palestinian camps resemble islands of Palestinian territory within Lebanese 
sovereignty, state authorities maintain a control in potentiality. Manifestation of a 
securitarian mode that let things be and limits intervention, the disengagement is never 
complete. While the disengagement from the camp is the result of the potentiality not-to-be 
and not-to-act, this potentiality may be actualised and control re-instated through 
modulated intervention. As the case of Nahr El-Bared shows, although the abandonment of 
state-centric perspectives is useful to better explore power relations and recognise the 
agencies of other actors, the Lebanese state‟s control over the camps is maintained in 
potentiality by keeping the possibility of intervention open and acting when necessity so 
requires. 
However, as long as the sovereign abandons the space of exception, the vacuum 
left by the Lebanese authorities may be filled by what Butler (2004) has defined „petty 
sovereigns‟. This has negative and positive consequences as sovereign power and control 
within the camp are reproduced by popular committees and other Palestinian factions who 
manage the camp and its population. The lack of coordination and the increasing 
competition of these actors for the control of this space, leads to the spread of corruption 
that is manifested the most in the questionable administration of justice. If Palestinian bare 
life was once produced by the international community, humanitarian agencies, Arab states 
and the Lebanese government, now life is rendered bare within the camp boundaries and 
by the very Palestinians who are supposed to protect their communities. 
Despite these negative implications, I have also demonstrated how the space of 
exception can still be turned into a positive and productive space as refugees experiment 
forms of governance (see the first democratic elections occurred in Shatila) and self-
administration. The camp is not only the absolute biopolitical space inhabited by bare life, 
but could also be the space where the refugees can reconstitute their normalcy, produce 
and negotiate their own subjectivities, as well as resist the marginalisation from the outside 
through the resistance from within. As informal economies develop such as the real-estate 
economy, the camp can turn into a space of hope where for refugees it is possible to 
perform everything that is excepted to them outside its boundaries. 
Through an investigation of the camp in its relation to the city and informal 
settlements, I have discussed the role of Shatila and the ways in which the function of the 
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camp may change. From a space of exception hosting the refugees, Shatila has turned into 
a space that welcomes all the outcasts of the Lebanese political and economic system. 
Moreover, the disengagement of the Lebanese authorities from the camp in 1969 has 
facilitated the greater propinquity of the Palestinians and non-Palestinians as the 
boundaries of the camp increasingly blur. As no barrier separates them from the outside, 
flow and movement is guaranteed while the camp is no longer distinguishable from the 
informal settlements around it. 
Through the presence of Lebanese citizens within the camp, I have shown how the 
sovereign exception should be disenfranchised from an exclusive law-and-rights 
framework. While Lebanese formally are included in the protection of the sovereign, they 
are de facto marginalised at the point of sharing the Palestinians‟ social and economic 
exclusion. Perhaps because too poor, or perhaps because married to a Palestinian, the 
presence of Lebanese in the camp shows how life itself does not know distinctions. As the 
camp boundaries increasingly blur, so do identitarian boundaries separating the 
Palestinians from the Lebanese. 
While I do not argue that this kind of evolution in the camp‟s meaning and function 
is a model to be uncritically applied to other spaces of exception or the investigation of 
other refugee camps, I assert that the refugee camp is a space in potentiality. Once the 
exception is declared there is no single outcome. As understood by Agamben, it can turn 
into a space of abjection and, therefore, a technology of power aimed at the elimination of 
the biological threat. But it can also transform into a productive space that welcomes other 
outcasts or in which the inhabitants exploit and mock the exceptionality of the camp. The 
ways in which the camp develops are determined by multiple factors. Change can be 
dictated by the sovereign (Lebanon or other states or suprastate organisations intervening 
in these sites); the circumstances (location, for example, could be one factor as Shatila‟s 
proximity to the centre of Beirut has certainly influenced the ways in which the camp has 
transformed and along with it its population); the agency of people living in the camp and 
its proximity (for instance, the development of informal economies). Actors, events and 
circumstances that not always can be controlled and guided by the sovereign. 
In this context, I have also shown that the decision over the exception is not an 
exclusive prerogative of the sovereign. In preserving the Palestinian-ness of the camp and 
along with it the „temporary‟ character of this space, the refugees turn the camp‟s 
exceptionality on their favour. The preservation of the Palestinian identity and traditions 
are to be seen as another form of resistance. This time not an incidental resistance, but a 
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political and conscious one aimed at not forgetting their origins and their predicament. As 
long as Shatila maintains the role for which it was established (temporary settlement of 
refugees waiting the return), the Palestinians can still hope in the return. As Palestinians 
also voluntarily choose to live in the camp, resistance to formal politics (those who would 
rather see the refugees naturalised and assimilated in host countries) is enacted in the very 
space of exclusion. 
In giving a contribution to the discipline of Refugees Studies, this research has 
revealed the complex nexus that links the humanitarian to the political. Denying the 
political significance of humanitarian interventions and assistance would dismiss the 
humanitarian organisations‟ complicit role in reducing certain subjects to bare life, a life 
stripped of any political and juridical value. Further interrogating the relation between the 
humanitarian and the political becomes paramount for the discipline of Refugee Studies if 
we are to fight sovereigns that draw lines dividing the life worth living from the one not 
worth living. If Agamben‟s theories would limit an investigation on the lives and 
experiences of those who have been cast out, still his insights and reflections could inspire 
an examination of the refugee status and refugees‟ „forms of life‟. More specifically, 
uncritically accepting definitions of who is to be considered „refugee‟ (be them operational 
as in the case of UNRWA or legal as in the case of UNHCR) might lead to think that only 
those who have officially been recognised as such are worthy of protection and/or 
assistance and, therefore, worthy of investigation. Yet, those who are excluded from both 
the political and humanitarian spheres, are rendered even more invisible. If refugees are 
excluded from a nation-state system and protection, those who are also excluded from the 
humanitarian assistance because of operational and legal definitions are further 
marginalised and forgotten. This means not only investigating the lives of „political 
refugees‟, but also interrogating the meaning of refugeeness today to include in our 
analyses also those that are rendered refugees in other contexts and circumstances. Indeed, 
lines separating the so-called „political refugees‟ from „economic refugees‟ are so fragile 
and breakable as it was shown in the case of Palestinians who may share their marginal 
conditions with other outcasts (among others see Black, 2001; Malkki, 1995b). Contesting 
and challenging these definitions is important to challenge sovereign powers (states as well 
as humanitarian organisations) that by drawing lines decide the political significance and 
insignificance of lives. 
This research also demonstrated that we should be ready to embrace new 
frameworks of analysis. Crucial for both the disciplines of Geography and Refugee 
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Studies, examining the camp and the „campscape‟ has shown how previous spatial models 
of reflection might be disrupted. The refugee camp cannot be uncritically assimilated to the 
space of exception as described by Agamben for three main reasons. Firstly, refugee camps 
are increasingly becoming permanent solutions to displacement (Agier, 2011; Sivan, 
2007). Rather than seeing refugee camps as responding to the logic of emergency or 
temporariness, there is an urgency to examine these sites through the lens of „normality‟ 
and as spaces in evolution. An approach that considers the refugee camp for its legal aspect 
only would inevitably miss new forms of living and being political that may rise in these 
spaces. Whilst I am not arguing that life in the camp is easy, refugee camps should be also 
considered as productive spaces in evolution where new forms of governance are 
experimented (Hanafi, 2010b). Rather than addressing the camps as potential threats, we 
might examine them as laboratories of the politics at the margins where the excluded (be 
them the refugees or other outcasts) may reproduce their new normalcy and negotiate their 
lives. 
Secondly, if we consider the camp through law, we risk neglecting spaces that 
deserve equal attention because they are placed outside the „normal order‟ in other ways. 
This study has problematised the legal prism in approaching the exception. I have argued 
that the exception does not work on legal tracks only. As Palestinians are legally excluded 
from the state‟s protections, other outcasts are produced along other kinds of political, 
social and economic exclusion. Although this research has focused on one refugee camp, 
Shatila, that has been officially recognised and, as such, receives relief and assistance, if 
we are to investigate lives and spaces that are placed at the margins, perhaps researching 
„informal gatherings‟ (Palestinian and non-Palestinian) would be equally important. Like 
the example shown before, the recognition of a formal status (for both refugees and 
refugee camps) misses those who are left out and who are not even entitled to humanitarian 
assistance. Future investigations of the Palestinian lives and camps in Lebanon, for 
example, might want to consider the condition and the politics of informal gatherings. How 
are lives and spaces forgotten by formal politics lived?  
 Thirdly, it seems that the refugee camp is not the only spatial referent for refugees. 
As the figures of UNHCR (2010) show, the spatial order represented by the refugee camp 
is broken. UNHCR, in fact, estimates that only one third of refugees worldwide (those 
officially considered so) live in refugee camps. This certainly has methodological 
implications for future researches. We can no longer assume that the „where‟ of the refugee 
is necessarily the camp. In light of this, future studies may enquire into the implications, 
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for refugees, of not living in these spaces. May living outside a refugee camp compromise 
their right or desire of return? How are the lives of refugees outside the camp negotiated? 
In order to avoid the depoliticisation of lives, refugees should no longer be treated 
as mere objects of knowledge with no agency. This thesis has demonstrated how a legal 
understanding of life and spaces overlooks the political significance of life and spaces 
themselves, and further neglect processes and continuities reproduced by refugee 
communities. Only empirical analyses could grasp social, political and, not less important, 
economic dynamics occurring within and beyond the space of exception. This is also 
essential in light of potential negotiations and solution to refugees‟ displacements. 
These theoretical and empirical considerations allow me to briefly return to the 
purpose with which this research has been initiated. This research started with the aim of 
not forgetting about the existence of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living 
outside Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Living as refugees in host countries and often 
treated as inconvenient guests, diasporic Palestinians are too often neglected as if non-
existent as if the solution to the question of Palestine would be exhausted once the 
Palestinian state will be born. This research wanted to tell the predicament of those living 
in Lebanon in order to urge a solution for their displacement and recognise the political 
significance of their lives. Since 1948, as a solution to their displacement could not be 
found, the international community and Israel have pressed for the refugees‟ naturalisation 
in the Arab host countries (as explored in Chapter 3). Yet, if Lebanon along with Syria and 
Jordan continue to refuse such naturalisation, the refugee question (and indeed their lives 
also outside UNRWA‟s areas of operation) would remain suspended and Palestinians fated 
to endure further exclusions and hardship in host states. Leaving them suspended for more 
than sixty years has not led them to forget about their lost lands, identity and origins. Nor 
does it seem likely that they will forget about their displacement if no feasible resolution is 
found for their prolonged „legal inexistence‟. Not only is it paramount that refugees are 
considered the priority of any negotiations between the Israeli and the Palestinian 
delegations, but grassroots involvement in such negotiations is also highly recommended. 
Throughout their displaced existence as individuals as well as communities, the 
Palestinians have shown capacity of agency and political intuitions. During my encounters 
in Shatila, the Palestinian endurance, resistance and stamina was so evident in their 
everyday gestures between normalcy and temporariness, between permanency and waiting. 
Although refugees may have been neglected by formal politics and institutions, although 
their rights may have been dismissed, until a just solution is found they will never forget. 
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Facing this reality and acting towards a democratic involvement of their voices and desires 
would be the first step towards the recognition of their predicament and exclusion. 
Refugees have to participate in the decisions taken over their lives if a true peace is to be 
found. Excluding them from the talks would only further marginalise them and their 
voices. 
To conclude, I hope that in this thesis I have also shown how binary distinctions 
such as exception vs. rule, space of exception vs. space of law, sovereign power vs. bare 
life, refugee vs. citizens, Palestinian vs. Lebanese (the latter also critically addressed in 
Chapter 2 and the social science use of the „sample‟) are frameworks of analysis that 
would not grasp the complexity of power relations and life itself. In other words as these 
binary distinctions are produced within biopolitics – which itself places life at the centre of 
power concerns – if we take life as both object of our future investigations and subject of 
agency, distinctions and lines cutting through bodies disappear. Although the sovereign 
will never stop to draw lines to separate the life worth living from the one deserving 
abandonment, life itself is the best form of resistance. The sovereign may have cast out 
certain lives from the normal juridical order. Yet, he may have forgotten or dismissed that 
life after the decision does go on.  
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